



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Per. 3977 e

Per. 3977 e: 62
2nd ser. 1-2



THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
SELF-EDUCATOR:

ESTABLISHED FOR THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION
OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN
RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,
AND AS A MAGAZINE OF SELF-CULTURE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

"Here is a thing wherein I would willingly have you agree, that is, to *dispute* and not to *quarrel*; for friends *dispute* between themselves for their better instruction, and enemies *quarrel* to destroy one another."—*Plato*.

"Truth can never be confirmed too much,
Though doubts did ever sleep."—*Shakespeare*.

VOLUME I.—NEW SERIES.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY HOULSTON AND STONEMAN,
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1856.

LONDON:
J. AND W. RIDER, PRINTERS,
14, Bartholomew Close.

P R E F A C E.

THE first six months of our New Series have been eventful ones in the existence of the *British Controversialist*, entered upon with anxiety, yet without fear, as to the result. We are glad to be able to congratulate our readers on the perfect success which has been achieved by them. And we beg to tender our most cordial and heartfelt thanks to all who have so zealously co-operated with us and aided our efforts, which otherwise must have fallen to the ground. To our contributors we owe a debt of gratitude, which we can only increase, but never repay. To our correspondents, for their kind letters of sympathy and advice, we would tender our acknowledgments, and confessing that limited time and limited opportunities have prevented us doing all we would; nevertheless, we can say we have done all we could, and, as far as in us lies, we will ever fulfil the part assigned to us by our fellow-labourers in the field of self-culture and mental and moral attainments.

That the *British Controversialist* is exerting an influence, the more powerful because an influence for good, we have abundant proofs in the cordial correspondence identifying us with those arteries which pulsate with the life-blood from the heart of our social greatness—the Mechanics' Institutes, Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies, scattered throughout the kingdom—we might say, scattered throughout the world—for from lands far distant have come the hearty recognition, and the report of kindred objects and kindred hopes. And it is our pride and rejoicing that the *British Controversialist* forms these scattered elements into one vast confederation, and, by enduring bonds, unites men of every rank, but brothers and equals in this, at least—the mutual desire for self-improvement.

But leaving the "dead past," save so far as it may supply motives or lessons for the future, we ask all our friends, both old and new, to ever remember that it is their own Magazine; and that if they would maintain its old character for progress, they must labour earnestly and heartily in extending its sale, its influence, and thereby its usefulness. With our increased extent, we shall be able to admit a larger number of contributions; and it has been often a source of regret having to reject papers of undoubted merit, and to curtail others, simply because we were cramped up by our limited space. The Classes, too, will be extended; and we trust that all our inquiring friends will remember the Inquirers' Columns; and those, who can do nothing else, may surely be able to speak a word for us, to invite the attention of some one to whom, perhaps, the *British Controversialist* has hitherto been a stranger. This timely recommendation, though indeed most precious and most priceless, is within the power of every one.

We cannot conclude this brief preface without a passing tribute to the memory of one who has fallen with his loins girded, and his staff in hand, whose worth is best known by those who knew him best; in business always the gentleman, always the sincere friend, and always—and here is the secret of the foregoing—always the Christian;—we mean Mr. John Stoneman, of the firm of Houlston and Stoneman, whose name has been associated with our Magazine from the very commencement. He died April 5, 1856.

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

THE ITALIC SCHOOL—THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS—PYTHAGORAS.

"WISDOM is the principal thing, therefore get wisdom: and with all thy getting, get understanding." *To-day*—dedicated, as it should be, to memory and hope—may we not fittingly once more venture to press upon the attention of each of our much-loved readers, the importance of that discipline of life which is now called Wisdom,* and repeat, with reiterative earnestness, "Get wisdom, get understanding; *forget* it not." The *Past* is no longer ours, except in its lessons and results. So far as it controls, modifies, transforms, or diversifies the Present, it is living and powerful; but to what issues, depends upon ourselves. Each thought, word, and act is a seed sown in the soil of eternity, which bears immortal fruit, blessed and blessing, or *otherwise*, according to its nature. Wherefore, let us each *now* endeavour to attain a safe light† in which to trace the pathway of life, and in obedience to the divine evangel of duty—

"Act—act in the living present,
Heart within, and God o'erhead."

The love of wisdom—philosophy—is surely that, above all things, which should distinguish man, whose best and chiefest

* "Vitæ rationem eam, quæ nunc appellatur Sapientia."—LUCRETIVS, v. 9.

† This is the primary signification of the Greek Σοφία, *wisdom*—a compound of σόον, *safe*, and φάος, *light*.

heritage is a reasonable soul. In that soul there will and must arise thoughts which involve all that is valuable in time, and that forth-stretch themselves even to eternity. In these thoughts intellectual science has its birth-germ, and the desire *to know* its origin. Every life requires pilotage. Who shall guide the bark of being aright, not only through the rapids of time, but also across the distance-space between the tabernacles of earthly sojourn and the abiding-places of the life beyond life—two halves of one apparently dissevered existence? Such inquiries have a never-fading interest for man; ceaselessly they appear and re-appear in every age of human life, and ever and anon “some pre-eminent mortal—some great soul of souls”—engages in the task of their solution, and strives to raise a beacon-house, whose radiance may—

“Lie like a shaft of light across the land,
And like a lane of beams across the sea.”

Such an one was Pythagoras, to whose life and its environments, as well as to the doctrine in which it resulted, we at present invite attention, in the hope that some thought, “strong in being true,” may become a life-possession to our readers in the course of the study they bestow.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH.—Pythagoras—son of Mnesarchus, a seal-engraver and opulent jewel-merchant—was born at Samos—an island in the Grecian Archipelago, on the coast of Asia Minor, famous for its wealth, enterprise, and maritime greatness—at an uncertain date in the sixth century B.C.* As became the son of a rich and distinguished citizen, Pythagoras received every advantage in the shape of education which the time and place could yield. Music, poetry, and the gymnastic arts he undoubtedly learned, for they were the common subjects of scholarly discipline in his day. But much more than these must have formed the topics of his zealous study. The world was at this time full of wonder at the learning of Thales,† and had not yet ceased to venerate the philosophic Heptad,‡ one of whose reputed members—Pherecydes—dwelt in Samos, and latterly received the charge of the youthful Pythagoras. That he profited by the labours of some of his instructors is clearly proven by his success in gaining the prize at a wrestling match, in his eighteenth year, at the Olympic games. There can be little doubt but that the ardent and vigorous mind of his philosophic teacher, the strange yet boldly excogitated doctrines he taught, and the glowing earnestness of the style of Greece’s first prose writer—

* Bentley says, 588; Larcher, 608; Dodwell, 568; Clinton, 570; Meiners, 584; and Lloyd, with predominating probability, 586.

† See *British Controversialist*, vol. v., p. 321.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

for such Pherecydes is reputed to have been—operated like fascination on his soul, cultured, if it did not originate, his taste for philosophic pursuits, and excited in him an earnest and enthusiastic love of wisdom, which he determined, so far as in his power, to satisfy. At that time the universe was man's only text-book, and travel, or converse with those who had travelled, the only means of reading it. In this wisdom-search Pythagoras set out, and went, first, to the wonder-land of Egypt. That country was familiar to the Samian mariners, and it is probable, from his father's position, that he may have enjoyed the friendship of many of the wealthy and noble. It is said that he had received from Polycrates, afterwards tyrant of Samos, letters of introduction to Amasis, king of Egypt, and that in consequence thereof he was initiated, by that sovereign's commands, into all the mysteries of the priest-caste there. From them he may have had his notions on the immortality of the soul modified; many traditions regarding the gods interpreted; the secret symbol writing of the time expounded; the institutions of the country—sacerdotal, civil, and social—explained; and some elements of arithmetical and geometrical science added to his knowledge. It is very certain, at least, that a man of acute and observant mind, whose chief purpose in travel was the acquisition of knowledge, could not have witnessed the workings of the strange polity which prevailed in that country, without learning therefrom much that might afterwards be valued and useful. On leaving Egypt, after a long sojourn, he passed into Chaldæa, and from the *Magi* of his day learned all the witching lore they had acquired, and the "pleasing sorcery" by which, making the fancy minister to thought, they knit together the fortunes of men with the influences and aspects of the orbs of heaven, at the same time that he witnessed the mode in which their dynasts wielded power. Nay, even to far Hindostan he penetrated, and, from the gymnosophist ascetics there, wormed out the secrets of their close-kept faith. Carrying with him, as he must have done, the teachings of Pherecydes, as well as the popular versions of the maxims of the sages and the Thaletian prolocutions, as the groundwork of his observations and inquiries, he must have been led to reflect on the ignorance of moral and political truth which his compeers exhibited, and been induced to scan, with minute care, the diverse systems of government and laws under which the human race lay bound "as with an iron rod." Having done so, and witnessed their dire effects in the entire prostration of intellect—the stereotyping of a dead brute-level of soul amongst the classes who stood beyond the circle of king, noble, and priest—and being connected, by birth and sympathy, with the merchant-class, most subject to tyrannous spoliation, there is little to be wondered at in his forming some legislative scheme by which, while men should be subjected to wholesome discipline, they might

be gradually elevated and made self-ruling. Hastening home with the ardent hopefulness of a reformer, what was his disappointment at finding his native island suffering severely from the ambitious designs of his quondam friend, Polycrates, the most enterprising, luxurious, and arbitrary tyrant of Samos—and himself exposed to jealousy as “a dangerous man”—as all thinkers truly are to overweening despots. Upon seeing this the state of matters, he set sail for continental Greece, where he again appeared as a competitor in the Olympic games, and took a tour through the greater part of the peninsula. It was in this journey—while yet the recollections of the exciting days of the festival were fresh in his mind—that, having entered Phlius—whither the fame of his learning had forerun himself—on being saluted by Leontius, the king, by the title of *sophist*, then usually applied as a term of respect and honour to those men who belonged to the peerage of thought, he, with becoming modesty, rejected the implied compliment, and adopted the more humble title of *philosopher*; at the same time, with singular beauty and felicity, explaining the signification which he wished to be attached to that word by an unrivalled simile, to this effect; viz. :—

The life of man may be compared to the Olympic games. In those grand assemblages, some strive for glory and the ennobling palm of the victor; many, by the sale or purchase of merchandise, seek profit; and a multitude have no higher aim than the mere pleasure and excitement which the concourse affords; while there are but few who come there to survey calmly the whole of the groups, and acquire a knowledge of their several interests, and hopes, and desires. Even so in this world-life of ours. We leave our heaven-home to enter into being here, where the festival of life is to be wrought out or witnessed. Many exert themselves to acquire fame and power, or the good repute of men; more endeavour to earn wealth; and a multitude seek pleasure only; while there but a few who, free alike from vanity, avarice, or appetite, seek to employ themselves in the contemplation of the works of nature and in the search for truth; these last are *philosophers*—lovers, although it may not perhaps be that they are gainers, of the truth. In this class he ranked himself, and thus at once gave a reason for his extended travels, as well as forth-shadowed his views of the highest aims of life; viz., that which, when the time of action is over, gives place to the calm pleasures of thought—contemplative reasoning on men and things.

It will be afterwards seen, that although he regarded *thought* as the grandest element in life, he did not seek to confine men to resultless thought, but that he desired to make men contemplative, that they might be more truly and earnestly active and capable when the hours of action came. He passed through

Elis, Sparta, Olympia, and visited Crete and Delphi. In these journeyings he studied, with the greatest care, the various political constitutions under which men lived, and was doubtlessly maturing that sublime legislative scheme, in which were to be combined the finesse and craft of the Egyptian and other priest-politics, with the noble training and legal system which many of the republics of Greece exhibited. Nor could he fail to be stimulated by the fame of Solon of Athens, Lycurgus of Sparta, Zaleucus of Locri, Charondas of Catana, Pittacus of Lesbos, and Bias of Priéné. It is not improbable, either, that having elaborated his plan, and settled on the aim and purpose of his life, he kept ever before his mind's eye how needful it was to find a fitting place for his experiment. Hence he not only traversed over continental Greece, but extended his voyaging into those colonies which the energetic Locrians had established in Southern Italy.

There, not far from the Tarentine gulf, and near the present Capo delle Colonne, stood Crotona, at that time an oligarchy, on the verge of revolution. The fame of Pythagoras had, of course, been bruited abroad, even to Crotona; and, no less probably, had the difficulties of the Crotoniats reached his ears, and, perhaps, induced his journey thitherwards. For it is in unsettled states that speculators are ever most ardently welcomed, and in these, too, they have the widest scope for experiment, as well as the men and means to carry out their views. The senate of Crotona went forth to meet him, and complimented him as the person whose fame most unequivocally pointed him out as a fitting arbiter and adviser. There was, probably, some duplicity in their intentions—some design of wielding him as a tool of their own; but on his side it appears that a similar design as to themselves had been speedily formed; and although he abjured the outward offices and trappings of government, there can be little doubt but that he in a short space of time became the virtual lawgiver and ruler of that state. He had now attained the ripe age of forty, had seen much and thought more, and was especially skilled in those arts by which man governs men.

The detail of his doctrines will fall to be considered in our expository sketch, and therefore we can only mention incidentally here that his highest purpose in this institute was to rear and culture those men who were likely to have consigned to their charge the reins of government, upon whom, consequently, the welfare of men would depend; and he justly believed, that those who could most readily receive the willing homage and obedience of the people, would eventually be able to elaborate the most perfect social code, and the most efficacious means of attaining a happy life and prosperous nationalities.

In this he most admirably succeeded for a time; so much so, that three hundred of his disciples sat in the legislative halls of

Crotona, while numerous other members of his school held power in the cities of Italy and Sicily, as well as in islands which lie in the *Ægean Sea*; thus realizing, in its larger and truer significance, his ambition to become the legislative benefactor of his race.

But it is seldom given to man to survey the successful issue of his plans. Nor was it so with Pythagoras. In the neighbourhood of Crotona lay the city Sybaris, whose wealth and luxurious magnificence have been written in the proverbs of many nations. The governors of that city had resolutely rejected any modifications of their law-codes in accordance with the Pythagorean scheme, and hence had arisen discord and dissension within it, and a quarrel between the Sybarites and the Crotoniats. The latter, under the leadership of Milo, a favourite pupil of the Samian philosopher, completely overcame the former, and the proud city of Sybaris fell. But success is not always prosperity. A faction arose in Crotona, headed by Cylon, an artful and ambitious demagogue, who had been refused admission into the Pythagorean league. Excited by the desire of sharing in the wealth of the conquered city, they became clamorous, because denied the right of spoliation. In their fury, they set the senate house in flames during a sederant of its members. Pythagoras fled to Metapontum, where he shortly afterwards died,—about B.C. 504,—and Crotona suffered the penalty of its folly by a speedy and irretrievable decay. The reaction, however, had commenced; similar outbreaks sprang up everywhere; and the system, strong-built though it was, was shattered by popular commotions. The outward form perished for a while, but with a true metempsychosis its spirit still survives, and permeates many systems of thought. Like a mighty shade, the author stands away in the time-distance, and among the grey mists of the past. Fable has limned those mists with many fancies, and her gorgeous tracery has been accepted as the real and true; but the glory of earth's earliest and best Utopian, though perceptible only through the twilight haze of antiquity, is still vivid to the eye, and posterity has not ceased to remember him, not only as a lover of wisdom, but also as a creator of the good and the true. Echo has repeated his name from age to age for twenty-four centuries, and the muses have unanimously translated him to the upper sanctuary of Fame.

In our next we shall present an expository *resumé* of his teaching, when it will become more evident than now how full of the spirit of wisdom he was.

MAKING OTHERS HAPPY.—Have you made one happy heart to-day? How calmly you can seek your pillow! how sweetly sleep! In all this world there is nothing so sweet as giving comfort to the distressed, as getting a sun-ray into a gloomy heart.

Religion.

HAVE WE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, APART FROM SCRIPTURE, TO BELIEVE IN THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THIS question, as we understand it, includes another—"Can man, without the aid of revelation, attain to the belief that he is immortal?" In endeavouring to solve this problem, our first duty is to realize, as far as possible, what would have been the amount of our knowledge on this and kindred subjects, had we not received the teachings of revelation. In order that our verdict may be impartial and unbiassed, it is absolutely necessary that we place ourselves, in imagination, in the position of those who have not a particle of revealed truth (if there be such), while we prosecute our inquiry by the light of nature and reason. We must avoid the error of some opponents of scripture, who, after enjoying the light of divine truth from their infancy, and having had their thoughts and feelings influenced by it, have asserted that there is no necessity for a written revelation, and that reason itself is sufficient for the discovery of all truth.

Now it is in the matter of discovering moral and spiritual truths that we think man's powers are deficient. Reason, assisted by the light of nature and the dictates of conscience, might perhaps lead man to infer the existence of some superior being, who was the ruler of the universe and the arbiter of the race, to whom he owed allegiance, and whose favour it was his duty to seek by some kind of worship; but when conscience accused him of having incurred the anger of the Deity, we think he would have no idea of the way in which he could conciliate offended majesty; and for the discovery of the fundamental principles of true morality, history evidently shows that his powers are vitally deficient. Neither would reason and the light of nature alone be sufficient to assure him with certainty of his destiny, of his existence, or the duration of that existence beyond the present life. The certainty of a future state and its character, are subjects upon which the mind of man, unassisted by revelation, can afford no satisfactory information. It is impossible to say to what extent the ideas of the heathen, who have no *written* revelation relative to the great truths of the existence of a God, the necessity under which man lies to propitiate his favour by means of sacrifices, the existence of a future state, and the im-

mortality of the soul, are the remains of an unwritten oral revelation, which has been handed down traditionally from generation to generation, becoming more obscure and more indistinct by the additions and alterations of every succeeding age. It is with this doctrine just as it is with the striking similarity of traditions to be found in almost every nation relative to the creation, the happiness of the first human pair, their subsequent fall, the deluge, &c.

In endeavouring to answer the question under debate in the negative, we propose, first, examining two or three arguments that are generally supposed to be sufficient of themselves to establish the truth of the soul's immortality, and then appeal unto the evidence on this subject afforded by the history of the most refined and intellectual nation of antiquity.

First. It is sometimes argued that, "as the soul is not matter, is immaterial, it must therefore be imperishable." This argument seems to make short work with the question, but we certainly cannot see any force in such reasoning. We are not assured by the nature of the premises, neither do we apprehend how the conclusion follows. We know that every immaterial being is not necessarily indestructible: immortality is surely not an essential attribute of an immaterial nature. Immortality must ever depend upon the will of the Creator, and not upon any inherent quality in the immaterial nature; a creature can only be immortal as he is upheld in immortality by God. There is no evidence apart from revelation which would lead us to suppose that any creature may not also have a termination of its being. This difficulty was felt by the philosophers of ancient Greece, India, and Rome, and hence all their arguments for the soul's immortality proceeded on the assumption of its *pre-existence* as a portion of the Divine Being, and to whom it was to be rejoined. Thus we see that their idea of immortality was really the immortality of the Deity himself, and not that of the soul of man as an individual being. To use the words of Dr. Chalmers, "We can perceive no force or practical evidence in those abstract or metaphysical generalities which are sometimes employed to demonstrate the indestructibleness of the thinking principle, so as to be persuaded that it shall indeed survive the body, and separately maintain its powers and its consciousness on the other side of the grave." But in revelation, almost on its threshold, we are informed that God "breathed" into man the "breath of life, and man became a living soul;" and this gleam of the grand attribute of immortality is constantly kept in view throughout the Old Testament, until fully revealed in the New, where, in the "recorded fact of our Saviour's resurrection, we see a popular and far more substantial and satisfactory argument for the soul's immortality than any furnished by any metaphysical speculation." It is to this fact also that the apostle Paul appeals as the sure foundation of the Christian's hope of a

future resurrection and glorious immortality. The ancients never dreamed of the resurrection of the body; they considered that one source of bliss in the future state was to have "no bodies:" so on their principles the resurrection would be of no benefit to them; and, indeed, when the doctrine was proposed to them, they scouted it as the height of absurdity.*

Second. Another argument for the soul's immortality is drawn from what may be termed the moral state of the mind, more particularly that property of expansion and progress which is affirmed of it, both in respect to its virtues and its powers. This of itself does not establish the fact of the soul's immortality. We fear that the flowery and poetic description of the moralist in respect to this has no *proof* and no *experience* to support it. There is beauty in their representations when they talk of the good man and his prospects; of his progress through life as a splendid career of still increasing virtue, and his death as a gentle transition to another and a better world, where, without the encumbrances which here clog the soul, the same progress in virtue towards perfection will continue in an accelerated degree. We would willingly believe it, and much more, if it were *proved*. What is the foundation on which so superb a superstructure is reared? Merely the illusions of fancy! If it be a real progress to eternity, where is the proof? We can see none: rather the contrary. Death intervenes, and puts a stop to all such development. "Why so cruel an interruption to the progress? What means this awful and mysterious death? Bears it not in every circumstance all the marks of a termination? Why is the good man not suffered to carry on in his triumphant progress? Why comes this dark and inexplicable event to be interposed between him and the full accomplishment of his destiny?" Nature affords no answer to these queries. Reason starts back aghast at their overwhelming profundity. Death, to the mind of every man unenlightened by revelation, is a dark, unknown uncertainty, and terrifies the boldest heart. Is it called a "step"? There is nothing in a name to allay our suspicion. What evidence have we that it is not the end of life, the termination of man's existence? "We see the gradual decay of the faculties which should be ripening and expanding; those virtues which are represented as in a state of constant perseverance, we see giving way to the power of disease, withering into feebleness; and instead of that which confers grace and dignity on man, we see the peevishness, discontent, and fretfulness of age. We see the body bending to the dust, extended in all the agony of helplessness and pain. To call this a triumphant procession to eternity, or to disguise those actual horrors which the ear hears, and the eye witnesses, by the gildings of a flimsy imagination! We ob-

* Gen. ii. 7; 1 Cor. xv.; Acts xvii. 16—34.

serve the emission of the last breath, and whether the spirit is extinguished or fled to another mansion, nature tells us not; but when the academic declaimer talks of his fancied career of perfection, we may lift the honest front of experience against him, and call upon him to reveal to us the mystery of death. Why comes this unseemly event to meet the hero of immortality on the path he was treading with such security and triumph? Why has the being, whom they would proudly assimilate to angels, such an ordeal to undergo? Why, like them, does he not flourish in perpetual vigour? And how shall we explain that mighty change, with all its affecting accompaniments of reluctance, agony, and despair?*" Is death a "debt of nature"? While nature cannot answer, and even seems to repel the charge, revelation shows us that death is the penalty of sin; and that while all who sin shall die, it further reveals to us, as the conclusion of the sentence, that eternal living death of all who die in sin, that they shall live in torment, for ever deprived of that favour of God which is "better than life." The descriptions of death given by the New Testament writers is what we should expect it to be. It is not the "gentle transition" of the moralist to any "out of Christ." They speak of its "sting," tell of its "horror," its "pains," and of the "fear of death" inherent in the breast of every man; and experience confirms the truth of their descriptions. But while they thus truly represent death, they also open up the vista of a bright futurity beyond, when they direct the hope of man to Him who, by the greatness of his might, "hath abolished (or 'made of none effect') death, and brought life and immortality to light by the gospel."

Thirdly. It may be argued that the soul must be immortal, because of the desire for immortality which, it is asserted, is felt in every human mind. To us this argument appears anything but conclusive. Because immortality is desirable, are we thence to infer its certainty? This would indeed be a slender basis for so important a conclusion. There doubtless is a *capacity* for immortality, and perhaps a *desire* for it, existing in the breast of every man; but we are not certain that in the majority of cases this desire extends to more than a lengthening of the present life, or that man looks beyond the present unto a future state, in which he shall truly live *for ever*, before he has been informed of this fact by revelation, written or unwritten. But our present object is not so much to question the existence or origin of this desire, as to show that of *itself* it is not sufficient evidence for the soul's immortality. Although we allow that a passion for immortality is inherent in man, we consider it, in the abstract, to be a truth to which, with all his philosophy and reasoning, he could not of himself attain. It is one thing to *believe* a truth

* See "Congregational Sermons," by the late Rev. Dr. Chalmers, Sermon 39.

because of its harmony with our consciousness, and another thing to *discover* that truth; it is one thing to *desire* a doctrine to be true, and another thing to be *assured*, on undoubted evidence, that it is certainly true. The dread of annihilation is awful to the thoughtful man; but this is no proof that he shall not some day cease to be. That every man entertains the same dread of annihilation is mere assumption; a great mass of mankind never seriously entertain the thought that they are destined to a future and an eternal existence. Their whole life is a practical denial of this truth; all their thoughts are concerned about, and bound up with, the present life, and death they look upon as their end. Man, unenlightened by revelation, we think, could never arrive at the idea of continuous existence. Hence we see that those nations which enjoy no written revelation, have an idea that in the state of departed spirits beyond the grave they shall live through a long and indefinite number of ages; but what will eventually become of them they know not; their belief does not extend to immortality: but those who ventured to shoot their thoughts beyond this infinite number of ages supposed, that they would eventually either be rejoined to the Supreme Being, or gradually sink into a state of unconsciousness, virtually annihilation. This anticipation of a future state, we too suspect, is also the remnant of a traditional revelation. "That men wish to be immortal may be true, notwithstanding all men die. That all men wish to exist after death is also true; but it is surely as illogical to infer from thence that all men shall exist hereafter for ever, because all wish it, as to infer that none shall die, because we have a natural aversion to death. This would be founding faith on desire, belief on wish, demonstration on feeling," and this when experience seems to point the contrary. The fact appears to be, that it is impossible for any human being, without the aid of revelation, to prove by his unassisted reason the immortality of the soul. We do not know it from experience; it must either be wholly a matter of belief, or an instinctive principle implanted in the mind. The latter it cannot be, or mankind would not doubt their immortality more than their present existence. The fact that even with the light of scripture men are found doubting this truth, proves the inability of their powers to discover it. Revelation alone can assure us of the fact; and where its light does not shine, man is found living "without hope," as well as "without God in the world."

Let us now turn to the testimony of history, by way of illustrating the foregoing arguments. It is certain that the belief of the soul's immortality is of very ancient date; it precedes all history, and, as we before observed, seems to have been part of the first oral revelation, preserved and handed down by tradition from the earliest ages, as its reception has been almost universal. Without adducing any testimony from the history of the more

ignorant and barbarous portion of the human family, we shall restrict ourselves to inquire what were the sentiments of the speculative philosophers of ancient Greece,—that most refined and intellectual nation of antiquity, and who had the idea given them to start from, relative to the immortality of the soul. We find that many of them denied the cognate truth of a future state of retribution, and that all had their doubts of the soul's immortality. Such as held the immortality of the soul, supported it by metaphysical arguments drawn from its supposed nature as a portion of the Divine Being—"not made by him, but issuing from him and out of him—a part of himself, and discerped from him—proceeding from him as a sort of emanation—a portion of the divine essence put into or immersed in a human body—that the divine essence was a subtle ether expanded through all nature, and that the soul was a small part taken from this celestial ether, and was immortal because that out of which it was discerped is immortal." This is a summary of the arguments used by the philosophers of ancient Greece to establish the soul's immortality. The sentiments of the wise men of India, Rome, and Egypt were very similar; and these notions naturally gave rise to the doctrine of transmigration of souls, as believed by the Greeks, Hindoos, and other eastern nations. Thus, according to them, two things were always included in the soul's immortality, viz., its pre-existence and its post-existence as a portion of the Divine Being. There were none of the ancients, unenlightened by revelation, "who held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not also hold its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted that the soul was generated, or made, it never could be proved that it might not also become corrupted," and so end its existence.* In the *Phædon* of Plato, Socrates endeavours to prove that the soul existed before its entrance into the body, and that the knowledge we have now is only a reminiscence of that which we had in a pre-existing state, and that the soul, because of its nature, shall exist when separated from the body. Thus we see that they did not understand the immortality of the soul in its individuality. They also differed as to the time of the re-union of the soul with God; some supposing it to be immediately after death, others, the Pythagoreans, not till after many transmigrations, while the Platonists held a middle opinion, and rejoined pure and unpolluted souls to the Divine Being immediately after death, but those who had contracted much defilement were sent into other bodies to purge and purify themselves before they returned to their parent substance. Those who doubted the pre-existence of souls also doubted their immortality, and inferred, that, as the soul did not exist previous to the body, but

* Cudworth's "Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated," vol. i., p. 406.

co-existed with it, it therefore could not survive the dissolution of the body. The one assumed pre-existence, and thence inferred immortal existence, on the principle that what always did exist always must; the other, from a universally acknowledged principle that whatever is born and hath a beginning must also have an end, inferred that souls must die. Thus we see that both reasoned from premises they could not prove; while the one, from an erroneous assumption, made a legitimate inference, the other, from ignorance of the true foundation on which the soul's immortality must ever rest, came to as wrong a conclusion, and both ever found themselves involved in doubt and uncertainty.

We may here ask, If these ancient philosophers could attain no surer knowledge of the soul's immortality than this, can we suppose that any philosophers of any age or country, and denied the light of revelation, would have been more successful than they? It is not sufficient to argue that since their time men have reasoned to a different conclusion: has not the darkness which obscured their mind been dissipated by the light of revelation? It is not sufficient to assert that without revelation men could have reasoned out satisfactorily the truth of the soul's immortality. We ask, Did they ever do so? When, where, and by whom was this feat accomplished? Let us know, that the information may descend to posterity. We call for facts, not theories or proofless assertions. The experiment has been tried, and we have seen something of its complete failure. It is sufficient for us to know that the wisest men of the most civilized, refined, educated, and literary nation of the ancient world, doubted and differed upon this question, ever founding their reasoning on premises they could not prove, came to conclusions which, at the best, were but guesses, the truth of which they themselves doubted. Without referring to their vague, indefinite, selfish, and often contradictory notions respecting the destiny of different classes of men in the future state,—always reserving supreme felicity to philosophers, those who had loved knowledge,—we adduce one or two of the opinions on this subject of that wisest man of the heathen world, Socrates. While, as we have seen, he maintained the doctrine of the soul's immortality, he appears to have done so with doubt, and supported it chiefly by moral arguments; as, that it is best for us so to live as if it were true; that then, if it should prove false, we shall lose nothing; while, if it is true, we shall be great gainers. "If what I advance upon the immortality of the soul prove true, it is good to believe it; and if, after my death, it prove false, I shall still have drawn from it in life this advantage—of having been less sensible here of the evils which generally attend human life." Again, he afterwards reasons, that "if the soul be immortal," the belief of it "requires to be cultivated with

attention," because of its influence on both the present and future life; for "if death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers by it, as being delivered at once from their bodies, their souls, and their vices; but as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any safety for itself, but in becoming very good and very prudent."* These are, doubtless, practical lessons, and quite as much as we can expect from any who possessed the limited light and felt the same doubts as Socrates. In reading these, and similar expressions of his, while we admire the wisdom of the man in thus teaching and insisting on the *practical* lessons that result from a belief of the soul's immortality, we cannot but feel grieved when we witness the doubt and uncertainty which evidently obtained in his mind relative to the *truth* of the doctrine he taught. In his "Apology before his Judges," he still hesitates: he hopes that death is a good thing, for two reasons; "either the dead man is nothing, and hath no sense of anything, or it is only a change or migration of the soul hence to another place." And again, afterwards, when announcing his belief that "those who live there are both happier in other respects than we, and also in this, that for the rest of their time are immortal," adds by way of caution, lest he should commit himself, "if the things that are told us be true." What "things" these were to which he thus refers, we do not know, unless they were some traditions still remaining touching the future state and the soul's destiny, which were received as divine, and which he hoped were true, but could not be sure. His "Apology" concludes with these remarkable words, expressive of doubt and uncertainty:—"It is now time to depart hence: I am going to die; you shall continue in life; but which of us shall be in a better state is unknown to all but God." This was all the light that the wisdom of Socrates could throw upon the future—all the consolation he could apply to his anxious spirit. How great was that darkness which shrouded his mind on to the last hour of his life!

We have now thus briefly noticed the chief sources of man's knowledge on this subject apart from revelation; we have seen something of the sentiments of the ancients on this question, who had ample opportunity of reasoning out its truth, conclusively if they could; from the survey we have made, we have also seen something of the almost Egyptian darkness and uncertainty which prevailed in the human mind until enlightened by revelation; and, together with the above brief and imperfect reference to the teachings and opinions of the wisest man that ever graced the heathen world, our inquiry leads us to the conclusion that we "have *not* sufficient evidence, apart from scrip-

* See Rollin's "Ancient History," vol. i., book ix., chap. 4, sect. 7; and Note by the Editor: ed. 1833.

ture, to believe in the immortality of the soul," and that revelation alone *can* or *does* assure us of the fact.

It now remains for us to see what arguments can be advanced on the opposite side; meanwhile, the practical lesson obviously taught by our view of the question is, gratitude to the Author of our being for not having left us to nature's darkness to doubt and conjecture about our nature and destiny, but that in the written revelation of his will, He has informed us, not only of the truth respecting our existence in the future, as destined to an unending state of being, but how we may obtain that "immortal life" which, in its highest and noblest sense, has been forfeited by sin.

CLEMENT.

INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION.—Instruction has reference solely to the intellect; education extends to all the faculties and capacities of the spirit. The intellect only can be informed; the intellect and all the other powers can be trained. If we confine our view to the intellectual aspects of the mind, it is indeed true that instruction and education, though they may be distinguished in thought, are yet never found separate in fact: the well-instructed man is necessarily well-educated, and *vice versa*; for it is evidently impossible that an ill-trained intellect should be capable of acquiring and retaining much knowledge. But education has a more extensive range—the entire domain of mind—the whole nature, spiritual and moral, no less than intellectual, is subject to its power. In its highest sense, it implies the development, in the right direction and in the highest possible degree, of all the powers of the soul, with due reference to their harmonious action. Instruction is valueless, save in so far as it ministers to this elevation of the nature of man. This highest education is, it must be admitted, unattainable without previous instruction; for man cannot be influenced in his moral or spiritual nature by that which is unknown to him. On the other hand, man may know that by which he is yet in his moral and spiritual nature influenced; nay, a man may not only be unaffected by, but he may positively hate, that which he very accurately knows, and this notwithstanding its excellence.

MR. JAMES WILSON, the naturalist of Edinburgh, Mr. Ramsbottom, Mr. Shaw, and other scientific gentlemen, have just succeeded in establishing that the parr, or young salmon, must remain two years in the fresh water before their migration to the sea. It is needless (says the *Ayr Advertiser*) to remark the great change which this discovery must occasion in the laws of the salmon rivers.

LIFE is a web, composed of many-coloured yarn, and we must take the shades with the lights, the bad with the good. In short, we must just make the best of things.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"Who best
Can suffer, best can do; best reign, who first
Well hath obeyed."—*Milton*.

IN the consideration of the character of Queen Elizabeth, who lived at a period since the expiration of which there has been as great a revolution in individual feelings and manners as there has been in politics and government, we must endeavour therefore to realize the then general state of thought and opinion. Thus we shall be led to erect a somewhat different standard of perfection to that by which we should judge of one living amongst ourselves, and having the same advantages. And the course of events having so much influence in the formation of character, we should do wrong were we to omit to notice the general aspect of affairs—our foreign relations; the many dangers which menaced the realm from all sides; the internal troubles of the kingdom; the restless disposition of the nobles, those on whom the sovereign should most depend, and who, in many cases, were at this time but leagued against the throne; the disputed title of the monarch to occupy that throne. These would render government perplexing to the sagest ruler, having the interests of his people at heart.

Again, when we consider that a change was to be brought about in the religion of the people; the commons just emerging from the state of being, as it were, a mere blank in the constitution, and beginning to feel their power, requiring the most bold and decisive, while careful and delicate management; our commerce, in place of whitening the oceans with its argosies, confined at the commencement of the reign to the merest operations of barter between neighbours, at the close had entered that

fully pursued, has made us unrivalled among
of it,—these point to a time of transition, a
difficult in which the ruler of a nation can be
: wisdom or folly of his decisions depend the
cess of a people.

so that it is not our intention to assert or to
that Elizabeth was irreproachable, or with-
these heavy and manifold: but we do assert

that the talents which she exhibited as a ruler of men, and that not theoretically but practically, commend her to our esteem, employed, too, as they were, and with the happiest results, in raising England to a pitch of power and prosperity scarcely surpassed by any nation. On her accession she found it inferior almost to all; and as we are at a loss to discover any particular elements of success in the bare relations of persons, parties, or nations at that time, we cannot but attribute to her excellent government the brilliant position to which the name of England was raised. Mark, too, the contrast between this and the succeeding and preceding reigns.

To judge of character we must look for its manifestations in the acts of the individual, and to the early impressions and education we may generally trace the foundation of the various traits exhibited in it. In Elizabeth we have no exception to this rule. Anything but the ease and felicity of royalty was attached to her condition in her younger days. The severe treatment which she met at the hands of her sister Mary warned her to be careful. Various were the pretences employed for rendering more harsh the restraint under which she was placed, and even to be in danger of a violent death. She was falsely accused and imprisoned, being indebted for the preservation of her life to the influence and policy of Philip of Spain. Robertson, in his "History of Charles V.," thus speaks of her conduct during this period:—"During Mary's jealous administration, and in a situation extremely delicate, that princess conducted herself with prudence and address far exceeding her years." May we not expect that such treatment would be likely to induce in any, especially in one who was so studious to avoid giving any cause for offence, those failings which later in life Elizabeth exhibited? Thus the jealousy with which she was treated might well beget the same feeling in her. This time was well employed in gaining from Grindal and the celebrated Roger Ascham, not only that knowledge of classic authors and languages for which, as a sovereign, she is remarkable, but those good and wise maxims of government which she so well practised on coming to the throne. She also gained a considerable knowledge of theology. Her speech in Latin to the University of Oxford, when at the age of sixty, is proof sufficient of her familiarity with that language, were it not for her extempore reply to the insolent demands made on her in Latin verse by Philip's ambassador, in which the wit is as conspicuous as its spirit. We subjoin it, as some of our readers may possibly not have met it:—"Ad Græcas, bone rex, fient mandata, calendas." And even after her accession she did not neglect her studies, as we are told by Ascham that five years after coming to the throne "she read more Greek in one day than some prebendaries did read Latin in a week." This is a strong proof of her general industry.

Sir Richard Baker, in his "Chronicle," has recorded a reply made by her extempore to those who questioned her concerning the doctrine of the real presence. This subject, he says, was "the common net at that time for catching Protestants"—a snare most difficult to escape. The question was asked, "What did she think of the words of Christ, '*This is my body*'? Did it mean that the true body of Christ was in the sacrament?" She replied:—

" Christ was the Word that spake it,
He took the bread and brake it;
And what the Word did make it,
That I believe, and take it."

This prudent and cautious reply, at so early an age, speaks the existence of those brilliant talents which, when matured, she exerted with so much success for the welfare of her kingdom. Her first great step as Queen was to restore the reformed religion, for the accomplishment of which she had recourse to means the most judicious and gentle. And we are compelled to admire her boldness and determination in resolving on so important a measure, when she viewed so many considerations tempting her to adopt the opposite policy. Her consistency on this point is sufficiently proved by her refusal of the offer of marriage made her by the Duke of Anjou, who although, as is evident, was even more than acceptable as far as personal considerations are concerned, yet, being a Catholic, she wisely determined to reject him, rather than risk the chance of disturbance to the tranquillity of her subjects. The violent projects set on foot against her, the hatred extended towards her by the faction of the Guises on account of her support of the Huguenots, and the repeated attempts of Pius to upset her rule, dismayed her not; and while with a steady fixedness of purpose she carried out her plans, we must admire the vigilance and foresight with which, when all Europe was in commotion, she quelled all symptoms of disaffection among her own people, and for a long series of years prevented the embroilment of England in the continental quarrels.

It has been said, that, in her general conduct towards the people, she exceeded the bounds of moderation, and infringed the liberties of the subject which are ever to be guarded. We think it was not then the idea of trespassing liberty of the subject, which led Elizabeth, with perhaps a too imperious hand to rule by the parliament, but rather the conscientious duty to transmit unimpaired and unimpaired the full prerogative as received from the ancestors, which she considered to be one of the duties of the constitution. The same views were

held by the parliament, as we may discover from the course pursued on several occasions, especially from the debates on the question of monopolies, when the question of the extent of the royal prerogative seems to have been freely discussed. Neither do we find in contemporary writers any opinion expressed that she had infringed the rights of her people. In Shakspeare we can find no mention of civil liberty. Camden, the first volume of whose history of her reign appeared in 1615, twelve years after her death, and whose character for integrity and truth-speaking has made him esteemed by the learned of all nations, takes no notice of the rebukes administered to the parliament by Elizabeth as being at all at variance with their privileges. He records a saying of hers, to prove her affection for the people, viz., that "she would lend credit to nothing against them which parents would not believe of their own children." We think, then, that we may safely acquit her of all designs on the liberty of the people.

Her desire to maintain the former existing relations with foreign powers is of an analogous nature with her home policy. In the offers of sovereignty made her by the Netherlands there was a temptation held out which few would have resisted. Yet was she so firmly determined in following out the policy of maintaining the tranquillity and happiness of her own realm, rather than of acquiring increased dominion, as at once to refuse them. And her rejection arose not from motives of parsimony, as some would assert, as on their second application in 1585 we find her affording them such substantial aid (refusing, at the same time, the proffered throne) as to bring down on her the whole power of the enraged Philip, and thus, to quote Camden's report of the King of Sweden's opinion of her decision, "she had taken the diadem from her head, and ventured it upon the doubtful chance of war." She was rather forced to this contest by the just views which she had of foreign policy, and by the earnest solicitations of her ministers, than by a desire of ennobling her own name or that of her people by an empty glory. Hume says, "This princess was rather cautious than enterprising in her natural temper. She needed more to be impelled by the vigour than restrained by the prudence of her ministers; but when she saw an evident necessity, she braved danger with magnanimous courage, and, trusting to her own consummate wisdom, and to the affections, however divided, of her people, she prepared herself to resist, and even to assault, the whole force of the catholic monarch." In her self-reliance, the most prominent element of her character, she had a mountain of strength, and that she fully needed it we may understand by comparing the part in public affairs taken by her, and that by our own gracious Queen. In her time it was for the sovereign to take not only the initiative in all important matters of state, but also with him rested the

decision as to their execution or otherwise; all depended on the crown; but now the history of a reign is a history of the measures undertaken by its various administrations more than an account of the acts of the sovereign.

The selection of her ministers is a point in which we admire her prudence, while in the choice of her favourites we cannot overlook her weakness. On this subject we quote the words of the elegant Robertson, who says:—"Elizabeth's wisdom and penetration were remarkable in the choice of her ministers: in distinguishing her favourites those great qualities were less conspicuous. She was influenced in two cases so opposite by merit of very different kinds. Their capacity for business, their knowledge, their prudence, were the talents to which alone she attended in the choice of her ministers; whereas, beauty and gracefulness of person, polished manners, and courtly address, were the accomplishments on which she bestowed her favour. She acted in one case with the wisdom of a queen, in the other she discovered the weakness of a woman."

The courage almost inseparable from the self-reliance we have before noticed was strongly developed in Elizabeth's mind. In the various steps in the undertaking of the contest with Spain; on the approach of the Armada; when Pius fulminated his bull against her and her throne; in her treatment of all foreign powers, we find the same firm conduct and cool determination, joined to an unflinching perseverance for the attainment of her objects. Her admiration of this quality in others was marked by her liberal rewards of gallantry on all occasions.

As an economist, we must place her the highest among sovereigns, and though her frugality would be construed into parsimony by her detractors, we deny that it can justly be so called. Her object was not to accumulate riches, but to relieve the burdens of her kingdom; and history tells us that, in addition to the discharge of all debts incurred by herself, she left the exchequer freed from those of her father. When the credit of the government, which had been completely lost through want of regularity in the re-imbursements of the loans, and which had been forced to resort to Antwerp to obtain the needful supply of money, she fostered commerce in all its branches; and though the course she adopted of granting monopolies was opposed to justice and the advancement of her subjects' well-being, yet must we excuse her of any intention of damaging their interests. Monopolies were given as rewards to those who in various capacities, civil or military, had rendered service to the state. Elizabeth's revenue did not allow her to compensate these services adequately in money or other presents, and the practice (instances of which in the last Henry's time are not uncommon) rose to a pitch most oppressive for the people. Her sagacity showed her the error which had been committed, and led her at

once to abolish nearly all of them. She was most persevering in extending the trading operations of her subjects, and missed no opportunity of forming commercial treaties with foreign parts.

Over one prominent transaction of Elizabeth's reign we would willingly draw a shade; but, as being truth-seekers and not panegyrists, we must not shrink from recording our opinion on this subject. The facts of the unfortunate Mary Stuart's case are too well known to require to be stated here. As we consider that on this point Elizabeth might have taken a different course without disadvantage to herself or the interests of her kingdom, we attempt not to justify her conduct, but would suggest that the circumstances in themselves offer grounds for palliation. That Mary was wrong in attempting to sustain a claim for the crown is admitted. Her subsequent conduct did nothing to raise our estimation of her character, but rather the contrary; and we can find no word of milder import than criminal by which we may characterize her deeds while under confinement. She rendered herself, by her own acts, amenable to the law of the realm: the question remains, Ought the fullest penalty of that law to have been exercised against her? Let us remember, however, the period, the great frequency of capital punishment, her sister's and father's conduct, and Elizabeth's becomes, by contrast, merciful and even praiseworthy.

Had space allowed, we might have considered her in her relations as a woman only, or have analyzed the principles of her mind; but we have aimed more at bringing the most characteristic points of her life into prominence, looking to abler hands for the more difficult task of treating of her character in the abstract. We trust that we have said enough to support our opinion that England's great Queen Elizabeth merited, in her capacity as sovereign, our esteem and admiration.

V. V.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE reign of Elizabeth is one of the most glorious recorded in the annals of England. England was, for the most part, free from wars abroad, and all domestic troubles. "Peace was in all her walls, and prosperity in all her palaces." In this golden age, arts and literature flourished with unwonted glory. Abroad there were bright lights shining,—Tasso and Cervantes, Camoens and Titian, Galileo, Kepler, and Tycho Brahe; but England could boast of names scarce less illustrious than these,—Sidney and Camden, Beaumont and Fletcher, Massinger and Ford, Marlowe and Green, Drayton and Hooker, Spenser and Shakspeare. To this period the Englishman ever looks back with pride, and in his mind, it shines surrounded with a halo of glory. And this halo invests cotemporary events and personages, unworthy of it, with a roseate grandeur. This is especially so with

regard to Elizabeth,—she is represented as the genial sun to whom these stars did splendid homage; she was made famous in the fame of her subjects, as Mæcenas in the fame of Horace.

The Queen was held in exaggerated estimation in her own day. One poet, after her death, wrote:—

“ The Queene was brought by water to Whitehall;
At every stroke, the oares teares let fall;
More clung about the barge; fish under water
| Wept out their eyes of pearle, and swame blinde after.
I think the bargemen might with easier thighes,
Have rowed her thither in her people's eyes.
Yet, howsoere, thus much my thoughts have scann'd,
She 'd come by water, had she come by land.”

Though few rise to such a pitch of whimsical extravagance as this, many hailed her with most exaggerated applause. And no wonder. Young, of commanding presence, and somewhat handsome, she followed her gloomy, morose sister, as smiling May succeeds to April storms. The nation, groaning under a harsh rule, and the burden of an imposed religion, to which many thousands were utter enemies, and which few held with a true heart-love, rejoiced to see one come forward who they hoped would redress their grievances in both. To this was added, a knowledge of Elizabeth's sufferings and unhappy state under her cruel sister. No wonder, then, that enthusiastic welcome to the youthful queen sounded through the rejoicing nation. And this enthusiasm she would not suffer to decrease. By ostentatious benefits, which cost nothing, and displays of masculine courage and determination, she won a large hold on the affections of the people. Then, again, the character of the times must be taken into account. It was an age of chivalry—galantry made the man. No wonder, then, that the maiden queen was the theme of courtly poets, and noble cavaliers, and even of the good old yeomen of England. And so, Elizabeth's popularity, though oftentimes nearly extinguished, never died out. And now it lives in the productions of that age, and in the minds of those who regard that era with that feeling of mixed love and reverence, which is like the violet haze of evening enveloping a landscape.

This is a world of mutation, and those who were despised in their own generation are the demi-gods of to-day. Fame is a goddess, and, like all females, is fickle. The diadem is torn from the brow of the Corsican, while the slandered Cromwell is crowned with triple honour. Elizabeth shone radiant, but it was in borrowed plumage—as perchance a crow would seem, decked with the dove's fair feathers. Elizabeth chose her own judge. At the commencement of her reign, she professed her attachment to the Bible—declared it her chief treasure,—the

rule of her conduct—the guide of her life. This profession was always maintained. Therefore, by the standard of gospel morality she should be tried,—a standard higher and truer than any ethicist has given or any priesthood taught. The rule of expediency is no God-taught rule, nor is it consistent with either man's nature or well-being. The morality of policy is no morality at all. Of Elizabeth, spiritually, it is not ours to judge. We know not the inner life,—what god was worshipped in the temple of the heart, or what the dictates of the oracle within. The tree is judged by its fruits.

Look we, then, at Elizabeth's history.

She has been accounted a zealous Protestant, ever remaining true to the faith, and determining, while in prison, that, should she reach the throne, she would reinstate the reformed religion in England. History, however, based upon authentic documents, declares,—“With the outward badge of the straitest sect of Protestantism, Elizabeth gave up altogether the outward profession of the reformed religion. She asked for Romish books to enlighten her mind, and their effect was speedily visible on her external conduct; she became a regular attendant at mass; she wrote to the Emperor himself for a due supply of crosses and chalices; she even invoked divine vengeance on herself, if she was not a true Roman Catholic.”

Upon her accession, she, though gradually, re-established Protestantism. Whatever were the motives, the result was most happy, and Elizabeth deserves praise for the discretion and wisdom with which this delicate operation was carried on. These were qualities she always evidenced—save when passion led her astray.

She proclaimed herself the head of the Reformed Church, and the champion of Protestantism throughout the world. This she made a pretext for intermeddling with Scottish affairs; but when the struggles between the French papists and protestants commenced, she hung back from affording them succour, until won over by the bribes of Condé. Then, when she did give help, she chiefly aimed, not at the destruction of Popery, but the political weakening of France. When the struggle was renewed, her penuriousness kept her from doing what was expected of her. Then, when it again broke out, her measures were all underhand. While she professed to keep the treaty inviolate, she supplied the Huguenots with money, and English troops, who, however, did not fight under English colours. Again, the chief aid Elizabeth lent the heroic prince of Orange, was a literal theft, under pretence of a loan and in defiance of the treaty, of the treasure of the Duke of Alva.

But the chief blot upon the history of the Queen, was her treatment of Mary of Scotland. Poor Mary! her's is a bitter tale. Life's tragedies are sadder than the poets'. Noble spirited,

generous hearted, with a face fair as the smiles of morning, and soul as light as the forest fawn; like all noble natures, hasty, impetuous, rash; no calculation, like her cousin—no schemer—no plotter,—such was Mary. Calumny has been busy with her name—for few could praise Elizabeth and yet exonerate her cousin. Yet truth shall prevail.

It were tedious and useless to particularize the whole transaction. Foolishly advised, Mary and the Dauphin declared themselves the rightful rulers of England—a pretention which they would not relinquish. This insult nettled Elizabeth; moreover, she somewhat feared Mary, knowing that the many Roman Catholics of the kingdom would be sure to join her standard, were she to raise it against her. So she endeavoured to undermine her power, and therefore fomented the Scottish disturbances, caused by the preaching of Knox and his school. This she and her advisers managed to do secretly.

Here let it be remarked, that the situation of Elizabeth was far different from that of a modern monarch in England. Few will say—The ruler can do no wrong; but many, among Englishmen, are more inclined to blame the ministers and parliament than the monarch. But, be it remarked, the parliament had little or nothing to do with the acts of Elizabeth; and her advisers frequently had their schemes overruled, or else merely seconded the policy of the Queen; although, with most successful *finesse*, she managed, whenever any act was unpopular, to cast the odium of it upon them. Preserving the show of a limited monarchy, Elizabeth was almost absolute. The age of Augustus presents a parallel. The state of the English people was acquiescence; the employment of the obsequious commons was the voting of supplies.

Elizabeth continued her machinations in Scotland, hoping thereby to diminish the popularity of Mary, and weaken the French interest there. At first, she merely forwarded sums of money, but afterwards, despatched an army and a fleet.

Mary, high spirited as she was, refused obedience to her cousin, and would not sanction the treaty of Leith, nor remain away from her country after her husband's death. Elizabeth, though deeply offended, masked her anger, and an apparently cordial intercourse sprang up between the cousins. She simulated much interest in the matter of Mary's re-marriage; but yet, with regard to it, acted with the most mean inconsistency and duplicity. Mary, though after a severe struggle, forgave even this.

Elizabeth next entered into secret amity with her cousin's enemies, Murray and his associates, who, trusting on her support, endeavoured to seize Mary, as she journeyed from Perth to Callendar. This failing, Elizabeth gave the conspirators the means of equipping troops. Happily, Mary's gallantry foiled

English craft and bribes, and Scottish treachery. And then, as Hume, who generally favours Elizabeth rather than Mary, says,—"Elizabeth, when she found the event so much to disappoint her expectations, thought proper to disavow all connections with the Scottish malcontents, and to declare everywhere, that she had never given them any encouragement, nor any promise of countenance or assistance. She even carried further her dissimulation and hypocrisy."

Spite of the Queen's power of self-command, the news of the birth of Mary's son completely overcame her, and she expressed the misery the event had caused. Next day, however, having schooled herself to the deception, she smilingly declared her satisfaction in her cousin's happiness, and her love for her.

After Mary's imprudent marriage with Bothwell, she fell into the hands of Knox and his associates, who cast her into Lochleven prison. Now that her power was crushed, Elizabeth feigned much compassion for her fallen cousin, and exclaimed against the crowning of her son and the regency of Murray; yet she instructed Cecil to be in close correspondence with the insurrectionists, and thus still pursued her double course. Professing holy forgiveness, and the condolence of an affectionate sister, she was all the while plotting against her best interests.

She promised Mary, while yet in prison, her countenance and support. When she escaped, Elizabeth set at nought her assurances, excused herself from her promises, and even imprisoned Mary in Bolton Castle. Then came the celebrated conference, wherein one great end of Elizabeth's schemes was exposed—the reduction of Scotland to a state of vassalage. At its conclusion, Elizabeth adjudged that affairs should be as they were at first, and yet she rewarded the rebel and perjured Murray, but kept Mary in durance.

After some time, Babington's conspiracy was discovered, and soon followed Mary's trial. By a statute cunningly prepared by the Queen's councillors, it was pronounced punishable treason to be the person in favour of whom any movement entailing the Queen's deposition should be organized. By forty subjects Queen Mary was tried. Her defence, her innocence, her misfortunes, could make no impression upon men whose minds were made up. She was condemned to death. Again, ere the last scene of the tragedy, must Elizabeth's hypocrisy be evidenced. Hume's account may be given entire, as his statements are indisputable:—"The Queen had now brought affairs with Mary to that situation which she had long ardently desired, and had found a plausible reason for executing vengeance on a competitor whom, from the beginning of her reign, she had ever equally dreaded and hated. But she was restrained from instantly gratifying her resentment by several important considerations. She foresaw the invidious colours in which this example of uncommon

jurisdiction would be represented by the numerous partisans of Mary, and the reproach to which she herself might be exposed with all foreign princes, perhaps with all posterity. The rights of hospitality, of kindred, and of royal majesty, seemed in one single instant to be all violated; and this sacrifice of generosity to interest, of clemency to revenge, might appear equally unbecoming a sovereign and a woman. Elizabeth, therefore, who was an excellent hypocrite, pretended the utmost reluctance to proceed to the execution of the sentence; affected the most tender sympathy with her prisoner; displayed all her scruples and difficulties; rejected the solicitation of her courtiers and ministers, and affirmed, that were she not moved by the deepest concern for her people's safety, she would not hesitate a moment in pardoning all the injuries which she herself had received from the Queen of Scots."

That Elizabeth's reluctance and hesitation in this matter were insincere, is proved by the facts that she had the sentence published by proclamation, that she would not listen to the remonstrances of foreign monarchs or the prayers of the young king of Scotland, and that she endeavoured to get Paulet and Drury to make away with Mary in a private manner, which they, to their honour, refused to do. At length she signed the warrant, laughing and joking as she did it. But as soon as the execution was over, she feigned the utmost surprise, sorrow, and indignation, threw all the blame upon her ministers, and ruined the too faithful Davidson, her poor dupe, for the part he had taken in the affair, at her command.

Mary died, with the fortitude and resignation of a Christian, a prisoner in a foreign land, by the hands of the executioner. Yet she whom millions lauded, and peace followed and centuries of fame, had the less happy lot.

That Elizabeth deserves not the admiration and approbation of posterity is amply proved by the account of her dealings with Mary. A few more particulars, however, may be briefly given.

Elizabeth is scarcely to be blamed on account of her bigotry and intolerance, since all of that age seem to have had their failings. Her duplicity with respect to her own marriage is well known. When the commons, in their anxiety that the succession to the throne should be fixed, recommended the Queen to marry, and represented it as her bounden duty so to do, she, both by means of her ministers and otherwise, declared her intention to choose a husband. Afterwards, she denied her promise. Once she engaged to accept the Prince of Anjou. The commons were satisfied, and then, as if for the first time, she discovered that the difference in their religion rendered the union impossible.

Related to this is a part of her conduct which must not be overlooked, but which all will scruple to touch upon. The (so called)

Virgin Queen has given us numerous proofs that she was not possessed of "untainted soul virginity;" and few careful students of history will fail to think, with Hume, that "her extreme fondness for Leicester, Hatton, and Essex, not to mention Mountjoy and others, with the curious passages between her and Admiral Seymour, contained in Haynes, render her chastity very much to be suspected." The Queen showed great policy in allowing her lovers, even after rejection, yet to hope, as it ever kept them devoted to her interest. It also flattered her egregious vanity, and gave her opportunity for the most heartless coquetry.

Cruelty was no stranger to the breast of Elizabeth. It is scarcely to be wondered at that the educated woman who could take delight in witnessing the baiting, and dying struggles of animals, should care little for the sufferings of a fellow creature, when those sufferings accomplished her wishes. Witness her conduct to the Earl of Hertford, and also to the secretary, Davidson.

Elizabeth, though a most cruel executor of the laws, frequently, and in various manners, violated them herself. "Laws," said Swift, "are like cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but let wasps and hornets break through." She showed this by legislating independently of parliament, by trying and condemning Mary, by seizing Alva's treasure ships, by aiding the French Protestants in spite of the treaty.

Hers could scarcely have been a happy life. As age came on, and she looked back through the vistas of memory, she must oft have started with affright, for there were depicted scenes of terror and of crime. Her later history reveals her eaten up with remorse, unsatisfied, unsettled, all wild unrest. Peace forsook her soul by day, nor would sweet sleep come soothingly by night. "A good conscience is the best opiate," said Knox. Alas! Elizabeth had not this.

With great qualities of mind, a masculine spirit, considerable learning for that age, independent in thought, witty, quick in fancy, and somewhat romantic, Elizabeth was not exempt from mental foibles, as her ridiculous vanity, and the like. But of these there is no need to speak. All have their littlenesses.

A soul-cankering egotism, which naturally includes selfishness, was her characteristic. This was the idol to which the other passions built the temple. Others are subservient to this. As says Pope:—

"One master passion in the breast,
Like Aaron's serpent, swallows all the rest."

"When fortune gives the means," says Rochefoucault, "self-love makes men idolize themselves, and tyrannize over others. Nothing is so impetuous as its desires; nothing so secret as its designs; nothing so artful as its conduct."

This potent magician it was that stifled the divine voice of conscience, and invoked to the aid of her schemes the spirits of cruelty, cunning, and falsehood.

Elizabeth was emphatically a schemer, and wonderful was the astuteness of her intellect. Her schemes for retaining popularity and power were admirably adapted to their end. She knew that by well ordered coquetry she could keep the powerful of the day about her, and devoted to her. At Tilbury, her display put her in no danger, but it mattered vastly to her soldiers and people. She had well imbibed the lesson of the chief Greeks and Romans, that magnificence goes further with the populace than probity or ability. Therefore, that she might appear in pompous grandeur, she even relaxed her customary avarice.

Her policy was crafty, her morals loose, her lip certainly not pure, her death miserable. Her vanity and coquetry, her injustice and cruelty, her false professions, her unrighteous dealings, her hypocrisy and constant duplicity, evidence how unworthy Elizabeth was of our admiration.

Camberwell.

THEBELKELD.

THE THREE DUTIES.—“Reading,” says Lord Bacon, “maketh a full man, conference a ready man, and writing an exact man.” A young man who neglects reading is generally very meagre; one who does not see much of his fellows is seldom a man of affairs; and few who do not write much ever attain that precision of thought which is essential to real power. Therefore, young man, read—confer—write! Not one of the three duties can you safely neglect.

SWITZERLAND has produced a rival to Lord Dundonald. According to the *Salut Public*, a mechanic named Fœderer, a Swiss by birth, but long resident at Lyons, recently left that city for Paris, in order to submit to the examination of competent men a warlike machine of his invention. It has cost him many years' meditation and labour, and will, he says, throw 700 projectiles a minute, and destroy in a very short time either a town or a whole squadron.

THE PATENT OFFICE.—A free library and reading-room, in connection with the office of the Commissioners of Patents, Quality-court, Chancery-lane, was opened to the public on Monday, March 5. The hours of attendance are from 10 till 4 o'clock. The library includes a printed collection of all specifications filed since October 1, 1852, as well as a considerable number of those recorded under the old law.

IN 1623, a mail containing despatches for the Secretary of State was sent by express from Plymouth to London in fifty-seven hours; express trains perform the distance now in five hours.

Philosophy.

IS MAN THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

PHILOSOPHERS, in their attempts to discriminate the extrinsic from the intrinsic influences which have given to the human mind the composite form that it exhibits, have rather differed in their estimate of what those classes severally represent; the extreme sensationalists averring that all man's perceptions are objective, and that he owes nothing to any cognate faculties, whilst those who hold such opinions as the hypothetical opponent whom Locke so satisfactorily annihilates in his first Book—if any one, indeed, hold such at all—assert, that he possesses in an embryo form, at his birth, all those powers which it is the object of his after life to develop. We are content to assume that, whilst he is possessed of certain capabilities for judging and acting—partly the result of hereditary predisposition and physical conformation, and partly the specific attributes of its humanity—it is, at the same time, sufficiently plastic to allow of its being moulded into any shape by those influences which are brought sufficiently early to bear upon it. We will take it for granted that there is a “something” innate in our mental constitution, without hazarding a definition of what that may be, or troubling our readers to discuss it after we have done so; and we will leave them to settle in their own minds the quantity, quality, and all the other *accidentia* and *discriminantia* of that “something,” as totally irrelevant to our present purpose. It will be sufficient if we are allowed to consider man as a fair subject for a kindred process to that which changes the wild crab to the garden apple, or which, by the varieties of climate, soil, and locality, gives a flower in one country one hue, and in another a very different one. We apprehend that there is no class of beings of whom it can be said that they are produced by nature in a state of perfection unalterable by any ulterior influences; for, go where we will, the conviction meets us at every point, that man in the aggregate is, if we may so say, the resultant of grand political and social laws; and, in the individual, of no less distinct moral and physical forces. As the irregularity of coastline, the luxuriance of vegetable productions, or the beneficence of climate, render one nation prosperous and civilized, and, by their absence, retard the development of another and keep it in a state of semi-barbarism, so, in a proportionate degree, is every individual affected by the circumstances of locality, association,

THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

he has himself voluntarily incurred, or to which he is naturally exposed. However we may ignore the view to ourselves in the maturity of age or we may pride ourselves upon being the presiding spirit in careers, there can be no question that the appliances of education have been advanced, and the obvious tendency of our penal legislation, and the opinion is arriving at the conclusion that the children and pauper population, at least, are creatures of circumstances in which they are placed and circumstances which are brought to bear upon them; and we cannot but regret that we do not provide them with useful, or, at any rate, profitable, amusements, they will yield themselves to those who are at hand, whether objectionable or not, for the purpose of amusement.

On this question, let us notice one or two points which may be said to be the creatures of circumstance. First, no less from its chronological priority than its importance, is the influence of the parental example, whilst it is difficult to exaggerate the effect, it is hardly possible to give a definite estimate, as the influences vary in different cases. In the nature of things it is inevitable and necessary that this should be the case, and it is ordained that man, in his adolescence the creature of his parents, should, in his infancy, be cast upon the world helpless and unskilled of animals; and it is inevitable that his weak and ignorant protector becomes his counsellor and guardian, so that the advice, precepts, and dogmas of his parent, are enforced by all the authority and authority, to say nothing of divine authority, of lending. What wonder, then, if the child be in many cases the impress and duplicate of his parents, hereditary vices and hereditary virtues are of the same nature as their physical analogues? that family characteristics, the attributes of race are something as definite as the world gives them credit for being? Because the parental roof that the child gains its first education, and commences the acquisition of knowledge which are to determine its character through its association to the associations he forms and the position which he is placed, that his moral and intellectual development is developed. How many a man who will leave his name in the world's annals may trace back the origin of his career to some almost forgotten incident, some influence heard, or to the train of thoughts which some influence set in motion! The child's mind is like a pool of some wayside pool, on which every stray thought is a transient ripple, whose undulations, as they die

away, become reflected on the atmosphere and all around, leaving traces of their having once existed which can never be effaced. This truth is at the bottom of all our schemes of early training. Do we wish to cultivate the martial feeling? We straightway surround the youthful aspirant with toys and books which shall teach his ardour to kindle as he handles the implements or reads the story of war. Is he to be a sailor? a savaⁿ? a preacher? or a poet? The same process is repeated in so many different ways by ourselves or by nature: the pool, with its mimic ships, philosophy in petticoats, or the life amongst the flowers and forest glades, by which the tuneful muse is wooed, fashion the plastic mind into that form which it is afterwards destined to exhibit. And if we can thus train the mind to any pattern that we please, there is a no less melancholy certainty in the fact that if we shut our eyes to the necessity of educating our fellow-men, whom fortune has surrounded by all that tends to depress and degrade the intellectual and moral standard; if we do not lead them to the sources of all that is holy and happy, as far as in us lies, then they will take their character from the external circumstances in which they are placed, to our future sorrow and their humiliation. If squalor and poverty breed disease and pestilence, so will the mind uncared for and uncultivated generate a far more foul and hurtful canker in the heart of the commonwealth when the agents of evil shall commence their operations upon it.

There is a certain stage of temptation which, when once passed, renders hope of retreat almost as hopeless as it was to the inmates of the "Inferno." It is true that this stage may be almost indefinitely protracted, in proportion as the mind has been fitted by previous discipline for contact with vice; but there can be very little doubt that, in the case of four-fifths of the criminals who fill our docks, that portion of their nature which is adapted to such conflicts is reduced to a minimum by agencies of which they are the unconscious and unavoidable victims. Their homes reek with an atmosphere which engenders moral death; and instead of being in the position of the "strong man *armed*, who keepeth his goods in peace," they are abandoned to powers of evil whose name is legion, and their dominion as supreme as it is relentless. Let it not be thought for a moment that we are attempting to throw a cloke around crime by making man the facile victim of principles which he is unable to resist: far from it; we only wish to insist upon the fact that we can hardly better illustrate the force of circumstances in determining the character of our mental nature, than by investigating the sources from which most of our thoughts proceed. It is hardly to be conceived how much we are not merely the "creatures," but the "slaves" of circumstances in this respect. In the uncultivated mind, which rarely or never descends below the surface of thought, this is emphatically the case. Every external object

suggests ideas which may die away or be responded to by others indefinitely, until the chain of reasoning is broken by some other incident, and some new series of ideas originated. Even the abstruse thinker is by no means wholly absolved from his obligation to this law; for whenever his will is not brought powerfully into action to isolate individual ideas for further examination, and to extrude all foreign ones until the process is completed, nature carries on her photographic process as she otherwise would, and prints off scores of impressions, which are as ineffaceable as the recipient mind itself. And it is only by the very highest method of intellectual culture that any stage can be reached in which the mind can at all be said to be independent of this necessity. It is the very highest order of genius alone which can originate germs of thought by its own creative power, and which can say to the ceaseless roll of sensations that pour in upon it, "Hitherto shall ye come, and no further; and here shall your proud waves be stayed." As the heart beats responsive to the emotions which appeal to it in proportion to its sensibility, or represses them by the force of habit, so is the mind affected by the phases of external nature, and registers silently but indelibly the impressions they produce.

There is a way, however, to pass from the spiritual to the material, in which we may be said rather to be the "victims" than the "creatures" of circumstances. It has been caustically remarked, that "*Homo est quod est propter stomachum*;" and however the hyperbole may transcend the truth of the case, it is very certain that we are more implicitly under the dominion of our stomachs than we generally care to own. And we may honestly confess, "*Duram servimus servitute*!" There is no yoke so intolerable, no state of things so difficult to reform when it has once established a firm footing, as the lassitude, ennui, and night-and-day-mare which are the retribution of an abused stomach—an abuse, be it remembered, as often the result of necessity as of choice. Sydney Smith remarked that he became daily more and more convinced that the want of the apothecary was at the bottom of more than half the ills of life; and a less profound penetration than that of the witty philosopher is necessary to inform any one how much of comfort and satisfaction on the one hand, or of misery and discontent on the other, he owes to the preponderance for good or evil of his sensual propensities. And even when we have deducted a fair allowance for those indulgences over which we have a reasonable and sufficient control, there will yet remain a residuum to the balance of those accidents of climate, weather, and diet, over which we can exercise no anticipatory control. The reports of the Registrar-General inform us of how much in the increase of suicide we may attribute to the fogs of November: and it is by no means an unworthy subject for consideration, whether that

ungenial element which more or less pervades the national character may not fairly be attributed to the variability of our climate.

Here we are arrested in our speculations by the remembrance that *we* are the victims—though, perhaps, our readers may hardly coincide in the idea—of a circumstance as arbitrary as any whereupon we have dilated,—the necessities of space; and ere we have exhibited the “lord of the creation” in his various phases as the “creature” of his imagination, his wit, his superstition, or his ambition, we are compelled to close our article, already protracted to an unwonted length, with the assurance to our readers, that if they are the “creatures,” they are no less, in many respects, the “creators” of their circumstances. “There is a tide in the affairs of men,” &c.: so says the great artist of human nature. Happy the man who knows not only himself but his opportunity! If he but blend the woof of his own energy and foresight with the warp of circumstances, he may rest assured that he shall make to himself a garment which will cover him from the winds of adversity, and temper the beams of a too prosperous sun. For the evils of that undeveloped mind and wasted body, which are but too often the misfortunes of his birth or lot in life, no man is accountable; but for that mental inertia, which is more fatal in its consequences than the sloth of the sluggard, and that “*crassa ignorantia*,” which visits its effects upon himself and his fellows with unerring retribution, he is responsible both to God and man. VINCULUM.

THE public do not generally know that at the South Eastern London Bridge Station, over the little refreshment room facing the railway, stands a clock, whose pendulum is some five miles off—that is, at the Royal Observatory, Greenwich. It was made a present to the company by the government, for permission to lay down its telegraph wires over their line, and is kept going by the wires of the telegraph attached to the clock of the Observatory. It is curious to observe the assumption of positive dignity with which the second-hand of the clock beats its time, as if conscious of its royal and learned source of motion.—*Herapath.*

HYDROSTATIC RAILWAY BREAK.—This invention was lately tested on the Hereford and Shrewsbury Railway with perfect success. The express train calling at six stations was easily stopped by the apparatus. The train was stopped, when going at the rate of forty miles an hour, in 300 yards; the distance required when the common break apparatus is used being 1,600 yards. As the engineer is nearest generally to the point of danger, he has, under this arrangement, no occasion to lose time by whistling to arouse the guard; the top is merely opened, and at once every carriage is placed under the pressure of the break.

The Essayist.

SELF-CULTURE: ITS IMPORTANCE TO YOUNG MEN, AND THE BEST MEANS BY WHICH IT MAY BE SECURED.

A PRIZE ESSAY, BY MR. DUNCAN M. WEST, GLASGOW.

THERE is a time in the life of all individuals when their character and destiny are determined either by themselves or by the circumstances which surround them. There is a period when they either choose Wisdom or Folly to be their conductor through life. There is, therefore, freedom in man to choose good or evil. This liberty of thought, conjoined with the knowledge of his destiny and the means by which it may be effected, constitute man a responsible being.

Youth is the determining time of life. The weal or woe of existence depends on the use or abuse of that period. Every young man ought, therefore, to realize, by earnest reflection, whether life has been valued by him, or its purpose determined.

The object of self-culture, in its truest and most comprehensive sense, is to unfold and develop the spiritual, moral, emotional, intellectual, and physical being of man, as these correspond to the soul, conscience, heart, intellect, and body. This education is the work and duty of life.

Man is a religious being. Consciousness, biography, and history attest this truth. As the religious principle of his nature, when cultured, influences the whole character, it ought to form the first object of the work of life. We begin, therefore, with soul-culture, as the first element involved in the term Self-Culture, and lay the basis of the success and enjoyment of life in the cultivation and development of the soul. The purpose of man's existence is religious. The inner life guides the outer. Actions, duties, and studies are guided by its principles. Christianity enables man to realize the personality of life, the connection of the soul with God, the necessity of and the means by which reconciliation may be obtained, and his relations to eternity. By its transforming power, moral, social, and intellectual culture are directed; and from it are acquired those principles which give consistency to character and unity to action in fulfilling personal and social duties. Each individual is bound to consider his relations to human and divine existences, and to realize and perform the duties which those relations involve.

From the adaptation of the truths of the Bible to the constitu-

tion of man, it is evident that there can be no hope without its revelations, no character without its principles, no successful self-culture without its motives, no triumphing over circumstances without its religion, and no victory without its purifying and strengthening power. To unfold and develop the religious element of life ought, therefore, to form the first work of self-culture, as it enables man to fulfil the object of his creation.

The second element of self-culture is moral. This part of man's being is represented by conscience, which has been termed, the "God in man." It exists in every human bosom, and is the rule of life to those persons who do not possess the revelation. To those who have accepted the teachings of divine truth, moral culture is a necessary result of soul-culture. A religious man is a moral man. The performance of his duties to the Supreme Governor of the universe necessitates the fulfilment of the duties he owes to home, society, and the world. Conscience, as the judge of others and ourselves, regulated by the standard of the Bible, enables man to decide between right and wrong, gives fixedness to character and accuracy to judgment.

The object of this culture is to train and regulate the desire for power, which includes the desires for society, fame, continued existence, knowledge, and the approbation of others, that it may be made conducive to success in life. The passions, too, of love and hatred, joy and grief, hope and fear, require either to be cherished or subdued. Selfishness, so insidious in its operations in the human heart, is watched, vanity abhorred, and hypocrisy shunned. The principles of honour, integrity, and candour are also cultivated, that the actions of life may be in harmony with the teachings of the "inward light." There may be, however, morality without religion; but the standard of this morality will be a fallible guide in enabling man to decide between right and wrong. Conscience, to attain its natural supremacy in the human bosom, must be regulated by divine truth, that motives may be accurately traced and duties rightly performed. There is as close a connection between spiritual and moral culture as there is between the root and branches of the vine. This element of self-education is, therefore, a duty resulting from man's relations to God and to the world.

The third element of self-culture is the affections. The affections of the heart are either parental, filial, fraternal, or conjugal; and in these relations much of the enjoyment of life is bound up. Home is the school of the affections. The hallowed presence of a mother's love, the counsels of a father, the joy-inspiring influence of a sister or a brother's kindness, soften the obdurate will, mould the rugged temper, and subdue the passions of youth. Home is, therefore, ever dear to the memory from its sacred associations. But if there the affections have been untrained, they are sources of sorrow in future years. Suspicion

takes the place of confidence, parsimony of generosity, thanklessness of gratitude, baseness of honour. The effects of this neglect are too apparent in the world of life. Brothers are separated from sisters, children from parents, and husbands from wives, through the peace-destroying influences of anger, envy, and jealousy. There is no sight on earth so beautiful as a happy home, where kindness gleams in every eye, and love reigns in every heart, and sheds its benign influences over all the events of the household. The home of Thomas Arnold, of Rugby, presented such a sight. Our connection with the world leads to the formation of friendships. These, too, have great influence on the development of the affections; but they are only perpetual and benefiting when based on moral worth. David and Jonathan in ancient times, and Hallam and Tennyson in modern, are memorable examples of pure and perfect friendship. Then there are the conjugal relations of life, which exert so powerful an influence on the enjoyment of life. Man is formed for society; not only for the society of his own sex, but for that of woman. This desire for attachment is one of the indestructible principles of his nature, and leads to those conjugal relations of life on which the structure of society rests. The glimpses of the households of Foster, Chalmers, and Scott, as seen in their biographies, reveal the happiness which results from cultured affections in the married state. Dark and sorrowful, however, are the episodes in those of Milton, Shelley, and Byron. As the pleasures of home, the purity of friendship, and the enjoyment of this world, depend on the culture of the affections, it forms an important element in the education of life.

The fourth element of self-culture is the mind. There are none but may adorn and cultivate their minds. There are none engaged in the business of the world who may not employ some time in training their intellectual powers. There is no man but requires knowledge. Reason, judgment, memory, and imagination are, therefore, necessary to be disciplined, for by their exercise man learns to think, and thinks to learn. He examines the old and new worlds of knowledge, and extracts wisdom from their records as the bee extracts honey from the flowers. He strives to trace and analyze the phenomena of nature, to perceive its beauties and sublimities, and understand their spiritual significance. He holds converse with the illustrious dead, enjoys the grandeurs of song, and is delighted with the marvels of science. By reason and judgment truth is separated from error, and the principles of ethical and political science are investigated, from which beliefs are formed to aid in the performance of duty. Then, too, the pleasure of society is enhanced by a cultivated mind. Much of the conversation of social gatherings is "stale, flat, and unprofitable." What a difference from the intellectual company who interchange thought and sentiment on subjects of

passing and enduring importance. Their talk is seasoned with salt, and collision with opposite minds is mentally exhilarating. There is also the influence which the cultivated mind exerts on those with whom it comes in contact, or associates with.

There is no danger of the student of knowledge sitting down, Alexander-like, to weep because there are no more worlds to conquer; for science and literature are inexhaustible sources of knowledge, and the more the mind is enriched with these treasures, the better is man fitted to enjoy life, perform its manifold duties, and realize its great responsibilities. The mind, however, when uncared for, becomes, like the garden of the sluggard, full of weeds and briars.

The fifth element of self-culture is physical. The ardour of spiritual worship, the performance of duty, the training of the affections, and the strength of the mind, are aided by health. The house man inhabits is "fearfully and wonderfully made." The object of this culture is to know the laws of health, and obey them. Without strength of body comprehensive culture is impossible. With its aid it may be accomplished. Man, therefore, in this work controls his appetites and lives temperately, that his usefulness may be increased, and the acquisition of knowledge facilitated. The weak in body cannot be said to enjoy life. The "Confessions of an English Opium Eater," and the misery of Coleridge, related by Cottle, are well-known examples of the retributive character of the violated laws of nature, not only on the body, but also on the mind. Benjamin Franklin is a good illustration of the observance of physical laws. The preservation of health is one of the imperative duties of life, and ought, therefore, to form a part of self-education. The necessity of this culture is every year being more felt and recognized as essential to the promotion of happiness.

Another idea involved in the term self-culture is its personality. Each person must individually realize the worth and work of life. No one can think, feel, or judge for another. Every man is, therefore, the architect of his own fortune. Until the personality of life is felt and acknowledged, there can be no progress, no assimilation of the external agencies by which life is unfolded and developed, no knowledge of the powers and capacities of the mind. "The one thing needful," says Niebuhr, "is to cultivate one's understanding for one's self, so as to render it capable of production." The education of existence will proceed vigorously when the habit of meditation is formed, which consolidates character, purifies the affections, and strengthens the intellect.

The theory of self-culture, laid down in the preceding remarks, comprehends man as a spiritual, moral, social, intellectual, and physical being; and it is our opinion, that only as these elements of his being are cultivated and developed, will it approach to

perfection : for religious culture makes a man a Christian ; moral culture, a just man ; heart culture, a social man ; mind culture an intelligent man ; physical culture, a healthy man ; and the union of these forms a complete man. The late Dr. Arnold, of Rugby, is a type of this comprehensive education. As man is not a bundle of faculties, but a unity, the internal elements of his nature are to be regarded as the manifestations of the spiritual essence of his being.

The importance of this self-culture to young men is evident from the fact that each person has a soul to be made pure, duties to perform, affections to cherish, a mind to cultivate, and a body to govern, and that only as this education is performed is the immortal possession of life rightly valued. Man is placed here, not only to make the best of this world, but to prepare for the world to come. Self-culture enables him to make the best of this world, by securing the next. Youth is the seed-time of life. During that period, habits are formed and principles acquired, which influence the destiny of each person. Its opportunities for improvement, like yesterday, never come back. "It is a time, therefore," remarks Horace Mann, "when every young man is adjured by every motive that can operate upon a mortal or an immortal nature, to take an observation, and to see whether the star of his destiny is about to reach its zenith on the meridian of Nazareth or of Sodom." Self-culture is important to young men, because "success in life" is aided by it. The pursuits of business are facilitated by knowledge. The principles of honour and integrity regulate the transactions of commerce, when conscience is directed by divine truth. The mind is sharpened for the daily contest, when cultivated. The intelligent are more likely to succeed in business than the ignorant, the merchant of equity than the dishonest dealer.

Usefulness in the world likewise depends on the improvement of youth. The man who has no self-respect, never respects others. The young man who feels not the responsibilities and duties of life, seldom benefits humanity. The social relations of the world reveal the charities of existence. The lives of John Pounds and Sarah Martin show the good which may be done to humanity by humble endeavour.

Self-culture also enables young men to resist the temptations of the world. The "lust of the eye," the attractions of wealth, the desire for pleasure, the love of show, and the power of public opinion, are guarded against ; for the world, like the mirage of the desert, is deceptive. Duty, like a stern task-master, guides the mind, and enables it to perceive the line of conduct to be pursued in the toils of business and the relaxations of labour. No influence can move the mind to barter conscience for gold, or sacrifice the eternal at the shrine of the mutable.

What are the best means by which self-culture may be

secured? Many elements enter into the discipline of life. The *unconscious* education of youth, in the associations of home, the religion of parents, the nation of birth, the place of residence, and the companions of the school, influence the after life. The most important element, however, in self-discipline is reflection. "Man is evidently made for thinking; this is the whole of his dignity, and the whole of his merit. To think as he ought is the whole of his duty; and the true order of thinking is to begin with himself, his author and his end. . . . Thus the whole of our dignity consists in thought. It is by this we are to elevate ourselves, and not by mere space and duration. Let us, then, labour to *think well*; this is the principle of morality."* The first object, therefore, to which reflection ought to be directed is soul-culture, or religious decision, as the way to know the duties, shortcomings, and responsibilities of existence. The religion of youth is more characterized by feeling than by judgment, for its doctrines and precepts are received and adopted on the testimony of others. When reflection develops, the evidences of the truths of our religion ought to be examined, for the blind assent of the understanding to religious doctrines is a fruitful source of error, and the stronghold of human-invented religions.

Man has received a revelation; it is the duty, therefore, of each individual to ascertain, Is the Bible from God? Convinced of this truth by the examination of its evidences, man is prepared to receive its teachings, and to know by thought its bearing on him as an individual; for from historic Christianity, each person, like Chalmers, must pass to vital Christianity. "The way towards the blessed life" is not through Fichtean formulas, or transcendental vagaries, but by continued reflection on divine truth for a religious purpose. This we believe to be the best means by which soul-culture may be secured. The life-change which Christianity necessitates may be calm and peaceful, as in the life of Edward Bickersteth, or dark and troubled, as in that of David Brainerd; but then only is the work of existence felt and acknowledged. Reflection leads to self-examination, which is the basis of self-knowledge and the origin of self-government.

Religious decision, moreover, is the best aid to moral and social culture; for conscience is guided by the truths of the Bible, and the affections of the heart are trained by social intercourse, and by the study of the lives of those who manifested in their conduct the christian graces. True progress in life is therefore spiritual. "This idea, the idea of God, is beyond all questions the one great seminal principle, inasmuch as it combines and comprehends all the faculties of our nature, converging in it as their common centre—brings the reason to sanction the aspira-

* Blaise Pascal, "Thoughts on Religion," pp. 50, 118.

tions of the imagination, impregnates law with the vitality and attractiveness of the affections, and establishes the natural legitimate subordination of the body to the will, and of both to the *vis logica*, or reason, by involving the necessary and entire dependence of the created on the Creator."*

What are the best means by which intellectual culture may be secured? We reply—1st. The study of principles. Philosophy examines the principles of the various branches of knowledge; and this, "when founded on just observation and sound reflection, and conducted by rational investigation, is a study which paves the way to a more scientific and successful cultivation of all the other parts of knowledge."† The principles of knowledge, as mentioned by Beattie, are the evidences of external sense, the evidence of internal sense or consciousness, the evidence of memory, and some others. The instrument by which knowledge is acquired is reason, and "consists of perception and judgment, and operates by comparison; and its office is to judge of evidences, to form and apply axioms, and to trace similitudes."‡ The processes of reasoning are induction, deduction, and analogy. The first ascends from particular facts to general laws; the second descends from general principles to particular truths; and the third is to refer a thing that is doubtful to something similar and different, that uncertainties may derive their proof from certainties. Each of these processes of reasoning pre-suppose some principles from which they commence. A principle has therefore been defined as that from which reasoning begins. To know the principles of the various divisions of knowledge is the surest way of attaining truth.

The study of philosophy or metaphysics is also advantageous, as the best discipline of the intellect. Metaphysics are generally conceived of, it is said, after the manner of the Scotchman: "That's metaphysics," says he, "when twa men talk thegither, and the tane does na ken what the tither means, and the tither does na ken what he means himsel." This prejudice exists in many minds; but it is through this study that man acquires a knowledge of the laws of thought, the powers of the mind, the origin of ideas, and the methods of reasoning. "It is as the best gymnastic of the mind," remarks Sir W. Hamilton, "as a means principally and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculations the necessity which has too frequently been denied them. By no other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentrated in such independent, vigorous, unwonted,

* "Guesses at Truth," by Two Brothers, first series, p. 202.

† Tatham's "Chart and Scale of Truth," sect. ii., vol. i., p. 21.

‡ *Ibid.*

and continued energy : by none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely evolved."

2. The study of books. As a means of self-culture, this is invaluable. Books are one of the principal sources of knowledge. They preserve the experience of nations, and embalm the lives of the great and good. They excite thought, dissipate prejudices, strengthen opinions, influence character, and stir to duty. All who are bent on self-culture resort to books for instruction and delight. The variety of subjects on which books have been written, and the variety of books which have been written on subjects,—the long periods of time they embrace, and the limited opportunities which those have who are engaged in business, renders it necessary to have a definite purpose in reading. If method preside over one subject it will gradually connect itself with others, for there is no isolated territory in the kingdom of knowledge. There is a family relationship between the different branches of knowledge, and man cannot become acquainted with one without being introduced to the other. Poetry will lead to history, and history will introduce you to philosophy ; biography will extend the circle of your friends, and science enlarge the boundaries of your knowledge ; art will lead you to nature, and nature will increase your love for art. The business of life and natural taste will determine the choice of subjects.

The duties of society will necessitate a knowledge of the principles of political economy ; of history, which unfolds the origin and progress of society, and the influence of institutions and laws on the destiny of nations ; of ethics, which makes known man's personal, social, and national duties, and which examines the foundations of morality ; and this knowledge is acquired from the study of the standard books of our literature.

Besides, too, books influence the character. The mind assimilates to that it is most in contact with. We are all, says Locke, a kind of chameleons, who take a tincture from the objects which surround us. The more the mind and heart are under the influence of the intellectually great and morally pure, the more they are ennobled and purified. Milton's devotion, Howard's philanthropy, and Johnson's struggles, will leave healthful impressions upon us.

Through the Bible, the "eldest surviving offspring of the human intellect," and the best of books, the soul is instructed in the character of God, enriched by the study of the life of Christ, informed of its destiny, impressed with its duty, purified by its truths, and brought into communion with the patriarchs and saints of old.

The advice of Lord Bacon is wholesome—"Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested ; that is, some books are to be read only in parts,

others to be read, but not curiously, and some few to be read wholly and with attention."*

Moreover, books are our companions at all times. We may take a "winter walk at noon" with Cowper, or enter the cottar's humble home with Burns, read a tale of pastoral life with Wilson, or moralize with Southey by the holly-tree; accompany Gibbon, as he traces the rise and fall of ancient Rome, or Macaulay, as he delineates the events of England's history; be instructed by Burton's "Anatomy of Melancholy," or delighted by the quaint reflections of Montaigne. There is wisdom and warning, revelations of sadness and gleams of joy, pictures of heroism and tales of cowardice, in the records of books. As aids in self-culture, we may say with Southey,—

"With them I take delight in weal,
And seek relief in woe;
And while I understand and feel
How much to them I owe,
My cheeks have often been bedewed
With tears of thoughtful gratitude."

3. The study of nature. Life is unfolded through nature. The richness and variety of its phenomena are adapted to excite the sentiments of beauty and sublimity in the mind. The buds and leaves of spring; the sunshine and the showers of April; the blooming flowers of summer, and the pomp of the autumn woods; the clambering ivy, and the wreathing vine; the dawn of morn, the many coloured rainbow, and the setting sun; the gleaming stars of night, and the solemn light of the moon, excite emotions of beauty, burdened with intense delight. Then, too, there is the music of the outward world. The songs of the nightingale and the lark; the bleating of the lamb, and the hum of the bee; the organ tone of the thunder, and the light tinkle of the brook; the rustling forest leaves, and the hymns of ocean, charm the ear, and call forth sentiments of gratitude; for—

"To him who, in the love of nature, holds
Communion with her visible forms, she speaks
A various language; for his gayer hours
She has a voice of gladness, and a smile
And eloquence of beauty, and she glides
Into his darker musings with a mild
And healing sympathy, that steals away
Their sharpness ere he is aware." †

The immensity, the grandeur, and the beauty of the forms of nature render the study of its phenomena not only a source of the most exquisite delight, but of the most solid instruction. ‡

* "Essay on Studies."

† Bryant's "Phanatopsis."

‡ The reader may consult with advantage Mudie's "Guide to the Observation of Nature," published in "Constable's Miscellany."

The prodigality of the gifts of nature would require "an eternity to sit out the banquet." Creation may be regarded as the library of God. Each person may become a reader, for its volumes of stones, of insects, of birds, of animals, and of stars, are ever open for study. Is not earth the university in which man studies for heaven?

The study of nature may also be made subservient to the culture of our moral being, for each object is suggestive of thought. There is a homily in the opening bud of spring, instruction in the growth of summer, wisdom in the fading leaf of autumn, and solemn truth in the dreariness of winter. "Day unto day uttereth speech, and night sheweth knowledge."

The study of nature may also be made an aid to physical culture. One of the best means by which bodily vigour may be increased is to study the natural sciences, either geology, botany, or entomology. These may be pursued in summer, and a stock of health laid in for winter. The reader of the "Glaucus" of Mr. Kingsley will at once perceive the physical advantages derivable from the study of natural science. Examining the "wonders of the sea-shore," mind and body act in unison. The breezes of the ocean, and the beauty of the scenery, add strength to the body, and impart a charm to the study in which the mind is engaged. There is the science of botany, which impels the student to visit nature, to climb the rugged mountain, to enter the umbrageous forest, to visit the lonely marsh, and to wander by nameless brooks, in search of the wild flowers of the year; and this search for instruction gives bloom to the cheek, freshness to the eye, and an elasticity to the limbs.

Such studies conduce to physical strength and vigour of mind.

Recreation, companions, society, and travel are also means by which life is unfolded. "It is through sorrow and mirth," says Mr. Helps, "plenty and need, a variety of passions, circumstances, and temptations, even through sin and misery, that men's natures are developed."*

This self-culture is the work and duty of existence, and is realized by personal labour. Each man may be a moral hero, though he may never be an intellectual giant.

" Act! act in the living present!
Heart within and God o'erhead."

For in this work—

" The smallest effort is not lost;
Each wavelet on the ocean tost
Aids in the ebb tide or the flow;
Each rain-drop makes some flowret blow;
Each struggle lessens human woe."

* "Friends in Council," vol. i., p. 57.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

When was Homer born? and when and where did he die?—THRELKELD.

Can you inform me of the price of a good Greek and Hindui grammar for beginners, and where to be obtained?—D. LANCASTER, *Leeds*.

Lord Lovel's Portrait, by Hogarth.—Can any of your readers inform me where a copy of this portrait may be found, and its probable price, as also any other particulars respecting it?—O. S. T.

Would you please inform me of a standard Ancient Geography with maps, or one without maps with an atlas? Also of the best Greek and English lexicon. Please mention price of both, and by whom published.—LOR.

Will you tell me of the difference between *words* and *language*? This query is based upon the definition which S. N. gives of words, vol. vi., p. 201; viz.:—"Words are the results, *representatives*, and embodiment of *thought*;" and the following paragraph, taken from Appendix of "Art of Reasoning," p. 231:—

"We believe that the Whatelyan system of logic is not only erroneous, but inadequate; and erroneous because it is inadequate, inasmuch as he accepts *language* as the REPRESENTATIVE of *thought*, whereas it is only the EXPONENT of it," &c.—G. GEOY.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

(*Vide* Vol. VI.)

Spirit Rappers and Table Talkers.—"Beta" is referred to the debate upon the above subject* for an answer

* Page 137, First Half-Yearly Volume, 1854, price 1s. 6d.

to his query. This horrible delusion is there, as we think, admirably refuted in the negative articles by B. S., who thus conclusively sums up the whole matter:—"The whole secret of superstition and credulity is a *state of subjection to a dominant idea*—it is a condition of monomania—a partial madness. This enslaving of the will to some one belief destroys the free action of the mind, and hurries man, bound hand and foot, down the swelling floods of enthusiasm. We rather pity than blame the state of those who are thus situated; they have lost the power of action, and with it their moral accountability. Let every reader who would shun this moral disease *try* every opinion at the *bar of reason* before he elevates it to the throne of belief. Those who are willing to believe before evidence, are in danger of eventually believing not only *without* but even against evidence."

While on this topic, we must just say, that for a clever and successful exposé of table-talking and table-turning, the reader cannot do better than pay a visit to Professor Anderson, who, though disclaiming all connection with the spirit world, yet seems to have unlimited command over every description of furniture, for bells, tables, and automata move and talk in every part of the house; and he publicly challenges the whole community of rappers to produce any sound for which he cannot account; and failing, undertakes to pay a forfeit of £100. We believe that the Professor has done and is doing more to put down this monster superstition of the nineteenth century than any other man.

Words and Language.—Logic is passionless; Rhetoric, passionate. The former concerns itself with the *pure*

form—the statesque in thought; the latter, with the ornate expression—the picturesque of thought. Their aims and objects differ, and hence the definitions of terms applicable in the one science are not applicable in the same sense in the other. In logic, language *expones*, i. e., places out (*ex* and *pono*) of the mind the thought which moved it, and it should do so in proper form, i. e., in accordance with the *laws* which govern mere thought. In rhetoric, of which, in its extended signification, grammar and composition are component elements, language is employed to represent, i. e., to exhibit, thought with all its accessories, however accidental or unessential, of feeling, passion, &c. It will be seen, therefore, that the apparent contradiction disappears when we remember that logic requires language to expone *thought alone*, while rhetoric requires it to represent *more than mere thought*; and that the author, as a logician, may disapprove of one definition of language, of which, as a rhetorician, he may approve. All this the author has said before. See “Art of Reasoning,” chaps. iii. and x.; and “Elements of Rhetoric,” chaps. ii. to iv. Were these read?—S. N.

Roman Coins.—The following extract from the “Archæologia,” vol. xiv., will supply an answer to the question of “Cæsar,” and perhaps afford interest to others:—

“Having noticed in Camden’s ‘Britannia’ an account of some clay moulds for fabricating Roman coins found about the beginning of the last century at Edington, in the county of Somerset, and understanding from persons in the neighbourhood that they still continue to be discovered there, I was induced, some time since, to go thither with a party of friends, and we were fortunate enough to be directed to a spot where, in less than an hour’s search, we picked up several hundreds of them.

“The field in which they were found is a meadow that bears no mark of ever having been ploughed, which accounts for the moulds remaining so long undiscovered. It is situated at the north edge of Polden Hill, at about a quarter of a mile to the north of the village of Chiltern. We were led to this particular spot by a person who had some time before cut through a bed of them in digging a drain. They were lying promiscuously scattered over a space about four feet square, and from six inches to a foot below the surface of the ground.

“On carefully clearing away the earth which adhered to the moulds, we perceived that we had a much greater variety, as well as a larger number, than had been elsewhere discovered. Such moulds had been heretofore met with in small quantities at Ryton, in Shropshire, and at Lingival, in Yorkshire, and great numbers of them at Lyons, in France; but all these appear to have been of the Emperor Severus, Julia his wife, or Caracalla, their son; whereas, in our collection, there are not only numerous impressions of these, but also of Geta, Macrinus, Elagabalus, Alexander Severus, Maximinus, Maximus, Plautilla, Julia Paula, and Julia Mamaea, besides a considerable number of reverses. . . .

“Though we have frequent instances, as in the moulds at Lyons, of a head on one side, and on the other a reverse, yet it often happens that there are reverses on both sides, and these entirely different from each other, which, as both impressions must have been made at the same instant, whilst the clay was moist, can only be accounted for on the supposition that the coins of several emperors were fabricated at one and the same time; and this, it is evident, could only take place in the hands of illegal coiners.

“The discovery of the wedge of base metal found, together with the moulds, at Lyons, affords a strong presumption

that they were designed for the fabrication of base coins; but it is no more than a presumption. That such, however, was the use made of those which are in our possession, cannot well be doubted, since we not only found, as at Lyons, a lump of metal, but likewise in one instance, the very coin itself lodged in its mould, and formed like the lump of a white metal resembling silver, but which, upon examination, proves to be principally tin."

The "wedge of base metal," alluded to above, was of silver, largely intermixed with copper. A French writer argues that the moulds used at Lyons were "used by those forgers who superadded debasement of the standard to counterfeit casting, by largely increasing the proportion of alloy;" a system of forgery alluded to in the Theodosian code. The reason for the blundering coinage alluded to by "Cæsar," is given by Akerman in his interesting

little book, "Coins of the Romans, relating to Britain." He says, "The moulds, being impressed on both sides, were often packed up to receive the fused metal without any order of arrangement, and a reverse of Caracalla or Severus might frequently be placed next to the head of (Julia) Donna."

THRELBELD.

Works on Singing.—We would recommend to S. R. the system of Hullah for teaching singing. His "Grammar of Vocal Music," price 7s., may be had of Parker, West Strand. A useful handbook is the "Musical Guide for Singing and the Pianoforte," published by Cradock, 48, Paternoster Row. For the theory of music, West's "Questions," &c., price 4s., is an excellent work; and for a lesson book, "Williams's edition of Sourci's "Pianoforte Instructions" may be mentioned.

THRELBELD.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Gordon Street U. P. Church Young Men's Literary Society.—The first annual soirée of this society was held in the schoolroom adjoining the church on the evening of Wednesday, the 21st of November. The Rev. G. M. Middleton, president of the society, occupied the chair, and after coffee and refreshments, he opened the proceedings of the evening with an instructive address, bearing on the importance of young men preparing themselves for the situations which they may be called to occupy. The secretary's report showed the membership to number upwards of thirty, and the attendance to average about twenty-five. The treasurer's report showed the society's funds to be in a favourable

position, and held out the prospect of shortly being able to introduce periodical literature into the society. Able addresses were delivered by Mr. Hay, Mr. Bruce, and Mr. Blair. In the course of the evening Messrs. Bowie and Seaton sang several duets and songs. After a few remarks from friends present, a vote of thanks was proposed to the chairman, which was warmly responded to, and after joining in singing a dismissal hymn, the meeting separated, highly satisfied with the proceedings of the evening.—B.

Whitby Institute Geological Class.—A class for the study of this delightful branch of science has been formed in connection with the Whitby Insti-

tute. The preparatory meeting was held on Tuesday, October 2nd, when it was decided to form a class for the study of geology. The Rev. Joseph Hughes, M.A., minister of the episcopal chapel, was invited to be the president, and he was empowered to select the most suitable book for study.—J. R. P.

Edinburgh Young Men's Association.—The annual soirée of this society was held at No. 20, Waterloo-place, on the evening of the 2nd of October last, the president, Mr. Brodie, in the chair. The secretary, Mr. Thomas Usher, read an interesting report of the proceedings during the past year, referring also to the arrangements made for the session commenced. Eloquent addresses were delivered by J. W. Jackson, Esq., Mr. Davey, and Mr. Henry May. A variety of vocal and instrumental music was performed during the evening. The attendance was numerous, and the proceedings gave general satisfaction. The weekly meetings are held every Friday evening, at 12, South-street, David-street.

Christchurch Mutual Improvement and Debating Society.—The first anniversary of this society was held on the 4th of October. Since the half-yearly meeting in April, the number of the members has been nearly doubled, and the institution generally is in a prosperous condition. Able recitations have been given by Messrs. Homer, Ellington, Norris, and others. The principal lectures have been by Mr. James Millard, on "Earl Cardigan;" by Mr. H. Edwards, on "Modern Englishmen;" by Mr. Asbury, on "E. A. Poe," and "Intemperance;" by Mr. Chas. A. Millard, on "Dogs;" and by Mr. W. T. Edwards, on "Taste," "History," "Self-Culture," and "Primitive Christianity." The following subjects have been discussed:—"Were the Crusades Beneficial to Europe?"

"Is Language of Divine or Human Origin?" "Which was the Greater Man, Cæsar or Napoleon?" "Wellington or Napoleon?" "Do Great Men make the Age, or does the Age make Great Men?" "Have the Working Classes been Benefited by the Introduction of Machinery?" One plan has been adopted in this society, which I would beg leave to recommend to the members of like institutions. Encouragement has been given to the exercise of the imagination, in the composition of fictitious tales, as "The Adventures of a Naturalist;" "Marcellas, or Primitive Christianity." A poem on "Recreation" has also been read, and a drama, entitled "Lucius," the composition of the secretary, performed by the members.

The Bath City Lectures seem to be gaining strength and popularity. Amongst others are announced, Dr. Latham on the "Coloured Population of London;" Mr. W. Tite, M.P., on "Egyptian Hieroglyphical and other Writings;" and Mr. Danby Seymour, on the "Crimea."

The Bedford Literary and Scientific Institution has now been in existence for some years, and, though its numerical strength has varied considerably at times, owing, perhaps, to the fluctuating state of society at Bedford, has met with steady and increasing support. Its primary object is the providing sound and wholesome reading for the young men of Bedford; and the library comprises the works of the most celebrated modern authors in every department of literature. The reading room, open from ten to ten, is supplied with the *Times*, *Daily News*, *Spectator*, *Athenæum*, *Illustrated London News*, *Punch*, *Blackwood*, *Quarterly and National Reviews*, &c., &c. Discussions take place, and papers are read fortnightly, on literary and scientific subjects.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Lord Eglintoun has just celebrated the anniversary of the Glasgow Athenæum; and in a speech complimenting and therefore pleasing everybody, touching upon the Duke of Argyle, the "Historian" of Europe, Sherriff Bell, the inimitable Dickens, and the talents of the Lord Advocate, he yet found time to tell the Glasgow students that reading was better than smoking and drinking, which was about the sum total of the whole speech.

A new edition of the works of Buffon, by M. Flouveny, of the Académie Française, and one of the permanent secretaries of l'Académie des Sciences. It is preceded by a memoir of Buffon and his writings.

Cardinal Wiseman has delivered a lecture at the Hanover Square Rooms, on the "Perception of Natural Beauties by the Ancients and Moderns," trying, as usual, in his modest and insinuating style, to identify the papacy with art; and, perfect at least in the art of dissimulation, he has been telling the world that the uninitiated have no right to form any opinion upon the Austrian Concordat; that it is written in a sort of language not known to the vulgar, and that it must not be interpreted according to the ordinary signification.

"The inimitable" Dickens has favoured the world with the first number of the history of "Little Dorrit," and though not sufficiently advanced to let us see what it is to be, it is yet far enough for us to trace the hand and genius of a "Boz." His Christmas round of stories, "The Holly Tree Inn," is fully up to the mark, and will repay the yearly investment.

Though not a literary event, we must briefly notice the visit of Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia, the representative and the hope of Italian freedom and independence; as our firm and faithful ally he was received with uproarious demonstrations. The Chris-

tian Young Men's Association (amongst others) presented an address, and of course got snubbed by the "Thunderer," who wanted to know who they were, and felt rather surprised at the presumption of clerks and shopmen.

In our summary of the events of the month, we must not forget to chronicle the demise of the Rev. Robert Montgomery, a preacher and a poet of some pretensions; but as a poet, at least, he has never risen above the position assigned him by Macaulay in the "Edinburgh Review." The literary world has been startled by the melancholy death of Mr. Leopold James Lardener, assistant librarian at the British Museum—well known and respected as a linguist of no ordinary acquirements. In a fit of temporary insanity he threw himself from a window, and shortly afterwards expired; it is attributed to physical disease.

Dr. Liddell's promised "History of Rome" is out. It has all the merits of the lexicographer, but few of the historian. Dates, references, &c., are accurate, but dry; and events the most important in the annals of the greatest empire of the world, are dismissed with the courtesy and the quietness of everyday life.

The next on our library table is "A Lady's Second Journey Round the World," by Ida Pfeiffer; and is worthy of notice chiefly from the fact that it is her second journey, and safely accomplished; for though it has considerable humour, and evinces the writer's mental culture, it is slovenly and inaccurate, and is not entitled to any very high place in travelled literature.

Vols. III. and IV. of Macaulay's "England," heralded by a subscription list of something approaching five and twenty thousand, has at last appeared; but we must leave them till after Christmas.

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

THE ITALIC SCHOOL—THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS—PYTHAGORAS.

If in the wondrous alchemy of the physical universe there is no waste, but, contrariwise, an eternal ebb and flow of death and life, decay and reproduction—a ceaseless cycle of change, in which, with magical ubiquity, the old is ever *becoming* the new, and the secret essences of creation, in ever continuous transmutation, throw off one set of forms only to assume other modes of manifest existence,—how much more probable is it, that by an equally real, though equally inscrutable process, each human thought, endowed with eternal re-organizability, is and becomes but the causal generative of another. Is not this the fact which underlies and potentiates progress, unites the past and present, and encompasses with glory the memory of the world's thinkers? Civilization is thought transformed into fact; and the facts of to-day are only the germs of the speculations of to-morrow. Each new fact widens the circumference of thought, and each new and true thought extends the dominion of fact into other regions of utility and beauty. Thought is the inner life of science and history, and they are the developments, results, and manifestations of thought. To know the thoughts out of which these grow, and whence their fertility arises, is to comprehend the secret springs by which the life of humanity is put and kept in motion; or, rather, is to become acquainted with the ultimate elements of discoveries. But if it is difficult from the time-distance of twenty-five centuries to bring forth into distinct perceptibility the details of the mere exterior life of men,—those items of their doings which strike all eyes, and form the integers in the sum of the estimates of contemporaries,—how much more critical the task of reducing to a truthful and intelligible statement the traditionary teachings of those who, in earth's early youth, strove—

“To elevate the *more* than reasoning mind!”

To attain even the possibility of success in such an effort, one must throw his life back into the ages in which Thought was

young—the times in which ideas, affinitive but not definitive, struggled into being, and remained in shivering, single isolation, until some larger minds arising, collected them into the *foci* of their respective systems, and gave them a oneness and a strength which before they had not. The era of the Heptad was such a time. Then the mysteries of being were first made the topics of serious, earnest, intellectually-directed thought. Then philosophy became a pursuit, and the anxieties of men were devoted to other and nobler ends than the enjoyment of life's brief, uncertain day. In the immediate aftertime the contemplative Pythagoras was born. Already had the enigmas of human life been stated for unriddlement. Already had the talents of the wise and good been exercised for their solution. Already had the corner of that vast sheet of mist which over-canopies "the ocean of truth" been raised, though but as it were only a span-breadth, and the idea of "the Infinite" had been attained. Already had one *factor* of philosophy—*Physics*—been postulated as thinkable; and now the other—*Ethics*—was required to show how man may and should be raised above those narrow bounds within which all that is merely earthly is held. This Pythagoras essayed.

We note this down here just as a tide-mark of the progress of philosophic thinking up till his era. We recall to mind what had been accomplished, that from this we may judge of the greatness of the thoughtsman who extended the circumference of reflection into new regions, wherein the rivers of thought had not previously cut out their channels. Taking this distinction for our start-point, we shall endeavour to give a brief comprehensive and comprehensible *resumé* of the chief teachings of the philosophy of Pythagoras, supplemented by such remarks as seem requisite to connect his speculations with the utilities of our own age.

EXPOSITION.—The phenomenal world, the actual manifestations of being, form the *data* from which the philosophies of Ionia and Italia have been deduced. How could doctrines so decidedly opposed receive their origin from similar data? The query is pertinent, and reaches down into the under-currents of speculative thought. Phenomena constitute experience. Experience is the necessary start-point of science. But experience informs us only of *facts*, and leaves us ignorant alike of relations and reasons. So soon, then, as man sets out from the existent and real,—*i. e.*, fact,—to attempt the construction of science, he enters into an infinite field of hypotheses, through which he must needs wander and search for ever, were there not developed in the initial acts of thought certain formative and regulative laws of thinking, which shape the problems of the reason, and control the efforts by which the mind aims at excogitating them. There arises thence an *ego-consciousness*, which inter-

polates itself into every speculation, and silently or pronouncedly affects all its results. Each philosophy, therefore, bears a primordial tendency, derived from, as it is dependent upon, the special capacities, original or cultured, of the mind of its author—a tincture of the individual *ego* of which he may, and indeed must, be unaware.

The personal culture of Pythagoras was distinctly mathematical. To him tradition assigns the invention of our common multiplication table, the discovery of numerical proportions, and the construction of the earliest harmonical canon or monochord—an instrument for ascertaining and demonstrating the ratios of musical sounds with scientific exactness. Among other geometrical theorems ascribed to him are those contained in Euclid's "Elements," book i., prop. 32 and 47.

He was the originator of the "theory of incommensurables," and the inventor of the musical scale. Nor did he limit himself to speculative mathematics alone. He projected the same principles of thought to those bodies which occupy the vast spaces of the infinite, and came pretty near—by guess, at least—to the true theory of astronomy; thus lighting, if he did no more, the lamp which, trimmed by subsequent investigators, has enabled man to map out "the heavens like a scroll." He asserted the central position of the sun, the diurnal and annual revolutions of the earth, and the motions of the planets. He possessed a correct idea of the nature of comets, believed that the fixed stars were the central suns of other systems, and first taught that the evening and morning star was the selfsame body.

Such being the bias of his mind, both by inherent tendency and subsequent culture, how could we anticipate otherwise than that the philosophy of Pythagoras should be one in which the ideas of *quantity* and *form*,—i. e., numerical and geometrical relations,—should hold a prominent, if not indeed a pre-eminent position? And does not one "breathe the spirit of a purer air," when a great thought like this dawns for the first time upon the world? Is not the phenomenal also the variable and the non-essential; for essences are changeless? Are not the outward and ordinary things around us only the envisagement of the perfect essences out of which the universe is originally and primarily formed? Just as all our attempts at forming geometrical lines and figures involve some imperfection, although they are the embodiments of eternal and self-perfect truths; just as no items in the universe correspond to our notions of quantity, and no musical instruments, however perfect, impart to the organs of sense those everlasting consonances which the soul has knowledge of; may it not be also with the objects of sense as compared to thoughts of thought? How can it be otherwise concluded, then,—since all phenomena changes, except in one relation, and that the numerical,—but in these words, employed

by Aristotle to explain the doctrine of Pythagoras—"Nature possesses substantial existence through numbers"?

As a first principle, then, Pythagoras postulates this—"Numbers are the causes of material being"—"the beginning—*αρχή*—of things the cause of their forth-forming, and of their different modes and conditions." It is thus that the mathematical tendency pronounces itself in his philosophy; so much so, that it is said he "fancied the principles of mathematics were the principles of things."

Let us attempt to reach the truth lying in those utterances, however strange they outwardly seem. Anaximander had asserted, that beneath the countless appearances, external forms, and variabilities of Nature, there existed some infinite essence and unity. This idea of an Infinite Unity Pythagoras accepts and interprets. In his mind and system it becomes the most abstract notion which his time afforded—a number, *i. e.*, the primary, formal, and material Unit, which is at once the basis, the essence, and original of phenomena—the One, the Many, and the All. In and as the very centre-core and life of all appearances Number stood. And this notion of number is not merely the synonym of being, but being itself; insomuch that being is less frequently brought before the mind in its true essence and reality than in its formal and external relationships and connections. Number is invisible, intangible, incorporeal, and yet real; what other idea have we which is so,—which combines reality, unity, multiplicity, harmony, self-development, and legislative pre-science?

It may indeed be, that in the degenerate after-time of his school the *literal* enwrapment of the truth may have been remembered alone, while the deep and living spiritual thought which it contained may have evaporated or been otherwise lost to humanity by a deficiency of philosophic insight in his followers, and that there was in this *numeric theory* a true and real conception of the modern doctrine of definite proportions, which his followers misconceived, by passing from the notion of a material atom to that of a geometric point, and thence to the more readily comprehended idea of a numerical unit. We say this may have been, and yet we hardly suppose so. We ground this opinion, not merely upon the inefficiency of the mode of conducting experiments in physics among the Greeks, nor even on the improbability of the rise of such a notion in the thoughts of anyone at the elementary stage of philosophic insight to which the Greeks had then attained, but more so on the fact that, did we so interpret his doctrine, we must perforce accept a material instead of an ideal *monad* or unity, and transform the whole Pythagorean thought-system into a materialistic rather than an idealistic philosophy. This exchange we reject, not merely from feeling, but from reason; for we know not how any fair exposition of

his other doctrines can be given, which does not involve the abstract idealism which lies at the root of the numeric theory of Being.

Let us not strive to overstrain the significance of the few oracular remnants of thought from which a notion of his system must be gathered, but rather, while confessing their subtle *tendency* towards the truth, accept his tenets in their plainest terms. And even thus they are sufficiently grand to fill us with surprise; for do they not intimate that the whole scheme of creation is a glorious and mighty order (*κοσμος*), proceeding from, as well as resulting in, an infinite harmony, in which the All is the co-adaptation of the One?

This *One*, then, what is *it*? It is "God the governor and originator of all, everlastingly One"—"the bond of the continuance of mundane things"—"that which is above all contraries, and yet implicitly involves in itself all contrariety." It is the universal *monad*, which manifests itself in all special subordinate monads, and which, permeating them all, forms at once the bond of the system and the origin of the universe. It is the thoughtful, active, arranging reason, which unifies and harmonizes the world. As all things proceed from, and bear the impress of, this primal Unit, it follows that "all reality consists of copies of numbers" issuing from the infinite with special forms, and receiving being from the—*ἀπειρον πνεῦμα*—infinite atmosphere of the world,* by breathing which they become capable of infinite development; and as all numerical developments are only peculiar relations of unity, so all states of being are but special finite manifestations of the infinite. Matter, in separating from the *monad*, becomes the multiple, the variable, the imperfect, the discordant, the unequal, the indefinite, the evil—*i. e.*, constitutes the dyad; and spiritual beings, when they emanate from the monad, and enter the dyadic state, become imperfect and evil.

Material existence has for its centre a fire—the sun—*ἡστία τοῦ παντός*—the hearth of the whole. Round this fire in choral dance move the earth, the moon, the planets, and the firmament. From the central fire, as their mediate source, the soul-particles emanate, enter the atmosphere, in the moment of birth are inhaled, and in that of death exhaled again into the vital air, where they again float, and again receive life, again die, and are again granted existence, till the imperfections of the dyadic nature are eradicated, and the soul becomes qualified for reabsorption into the Supreme Monad for ever. Do we not all sometimes feel inclined to say—

"I well nigh dream
I too have spent a life the self-same way—"

* Does not this notion bridge the distance between the "infinite" of Anaximander, and the "air" of Anaximenes? See *B. C.*, vol. vi., pp. 1, 41.

Tread once again an old life's course. Perchance
 I perished * * * *
 An age ago; and in that act a prayer
 For one more chance went up so earnest—so
 Embued with better light, let in by Death—
 So free from all past sin—that it was heard;
 That life was blotted out, not so completely
 But scattered wrecks enough remain to wake
 Dim memories."

Let us grant that, stated as *a fact*, this is far and woefully wide of the truth. Yet let us behold it steadily as a *theory*, and what does it imply? Surely the greatest thought that ever throbbed within the brain or animated the soul of any worthy of the ancient world, and that is this:—The human soul, in its personal entity,—its veritable *ego* state,—is not the subject and slave of the laws which govern the surrounding and accidental phenomena amid which it dwells, but bears within itself a life that is indestructible, as the essence from which it flows; that the measure of the soul's capacity for enjoyment is in exact proportion to "the manner of life from youth upwards," and that its after fate corresponds to its preceding moral state. It is true that, unblest by *the* pure light of heavenly truth, his views of life were limited to "the circumscription and confine" of this present scene of being, and did not go out stretching upward and onward to the throne and the very presence of the Most High. But was it not a sublime, uninspired vision into the eternal truth of being that taught him to behold in Death, not the dire messenger of sheer annihilation, but the enlargement of the nature, experience, and destiny of man—the medium through which a new opportunity of moral evolution was bestowed, wherein the self-same, the identical soul, either in a higher nature should reap the conscious joy of his former moral deeds, or in a baser form of existence taste the woe of moral depravity; while in either Hope lit its lamp within the chambers of the soul, and cheered the present with glimpses of futurity? Never is the great soul more truly revealed than when it vestures a new great thought with the garments of eloquence and truth. And truly there is no grander thought in the whole range of merely human speculation than this much ridiculed doctrine of Metempsychosis. If from such a thought a mighty heathen drew forth a moral code of great purity, and practised its severest precepts honestly, shall we not each say to himself, "Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whoever thou art, who, knowing *the* truth," walkest not therein!

Such is only a general view of the system of Pythagoras; we reserve for a future article a more detailed account of such portions of his philosophic tenets as are in the present paper either imperfectly treated of or completely omitted.

Religion.

HAVE WE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, APART FROM SCRIPTURE, TO BELIEVE IN THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE arguments in favour of an affirmative side of the above question seem to be rather of a speculative and analogical, than of a positive character. And in our present state of existence they must necessarily be so; for, organized as we now are, the presence of anything purely immaterial is impalpable to the grossness of our bodily senses, and we have no other media of communication with external objects; so that, from actual and personal experience, we cannot be assured that the spirits which leave our world still remain in a state of existence.

Yet we believe that, even setting aside (for the time being) the light of revelation, there still remains ample testimony to prove to the inquiring mind that the faculty of thought which leads it to examine the probabilities of its external duration, will continue to live for ever.

And, firstly, the soul of man is immaterial. When under the influence of "Death's twin-brother, Sleep," unconscious of all that is passing round us, what incursions into the realms of fancy does not the spirit make, perfectly independent of the body! Who will not bear witness to her ceaseless activity? She is fully as busy as when concerned in the turmoil and confusion of the world in which she dwells. And—

" Her ceaseless flight through devious worlds speaks her nature
Of subtler essence than the trodden clod,
Active, ærial, towering, unconfined,
Unfettered with her gross companion's fall."

Can any impediment offered to the body stay the sublime aspirations of man's wondrous soul? Who has not seen, when the functions of life are completing their last work,—yes, even when the fainting form is struggling in the cold embrace of its mysterious visitant, Death,—at such a time the spirit yielding a brighter lustre than it ever did when its mundane companion was in the possession of full health and vigour? And can any one, knowing that even a few such cases occur, believe that in the moment when the heart, creature of flesh and blood, ceases to exist, that same instant the soul, the gem which the body has

but for a time, is at once and for ever obscured in everlasting night? The immateriality of the soul does not prove its immortality, but it may convince of the fact that the body and spirit are not synonymous existences, seeing that they sometimes continue their operations independently of one another.

Another argument in favour of this view of the case is, the innate consciousness of the eternal duration of the soul, which men have universally entertained. From the worshipper of Boodh to the inhabitant of civilized Rome; from the Scandinavian warrior to the philosopher of classic Greece; from the rude aborigines of Northern America to the wise and learned of the present day;—men of all nations and of every age have firmly believed in the non-annihilation of a part of their being. Whence comes—

“ This fond desire,
This longing after immortality?”

It is a portion of the spirit of man, and constantly develops itself with its other manifestations. Addison says, “there is argument for the immortality of the soul drawn from the perpetual progress of the soul to its perfection, without a possibility of ever arriving at it; which is a hint that seems to me to carry a great weight with it. A brute arrives at a point of perfection that he can never pass. In a few years he has all the endowments that he is capable of; and were he to live ten thousand more, would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties to be full blown, and incapable of further enlargement, I would imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of annihilation. But can we believe a thinking being, that is in a perpetual progress of improvement, and travelling on from perfection to perfection, after having just looked abroad into the works of its Creator, and made a few discoveries of his infinite goodness, wisdom, and power, must perish at her first setting out, and in the very beginning of her inquiries?”

The soul of man being immaterial, it appears evident that it can never be destroyed; or, at least, that the power alone that created it can check its duration. The question, then, is, “Does a probability exist that such will ever be the case?” From what we see around us, everything would lead us to conclude that this power will never be exercised. Nothing in this world is annihilated, though all things in connection with it are constantly changing. The fuel which we burn is not consumed, but, its parts separating, enter into new combinations, and so become amalgamated with other substances. Examples might be multiplied *ad infinitum*. And is it reasonable to suppose that the spirit of man, the noblest work of which our unassisted powers are capable of conceiving, will *alone* be annihilated, alone be quenched in endless, hopeless darkness?

No! we must believe that the mighty soul, with its sublime aspirations, with its grand faculties, with its infinite capacity for weal or woe, with its attributes of reason, recollection, and reflection, will endure for ever, and that in a more extensive sphere of action than it can occupy in this mere prison of clay, "the embryo of our free existence;" for this is but—

"The bud of being, the dim dawn,
The twilight of our day, the vestibule."

Reason, analogy, innate perception, the desire of nations, and the continually unfolding powers of man, all these proclaim that the spirit within him is immortal.

"The sun is but a spark of fire,
A transient meteor in the sky;
The soul, immortal as its sire,
Shall never die!"

LA PENSEE.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

" * * * The dread of something after death,—
The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns,—puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of.
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all."—*Shakspeare*.

It is of great importance we should definitely fix the line of demarcation between faith and reason, philosophy and revelation; perhaps at no time and on no question so necessary as the present. The limits of reason, objectively considered, are the boundaries of the world of sense; subjectively considered, the world of sense is etherialized by reflection, and frequently leads to the delusion that reason has ingress to the world of spirits. This material world and its manifold laws, relations, actions, and sayings, are the boundaries of reason. Revelation lifts the veil of the spirit world and the future; its chief peculiarity, its essential characteristic, is the communication of knowledge, thoughts, and feelings to man, unattainable by less miraculous means. The terms of the present question preclude revelation, and demand from us proofs of the immortality of the human soul by reason alone. Bearing this in mind, we must rely upon facts, realities, and clearly defined, firmly established inferences derived therefrom, to support or condemn our view of the case.

Not only is the kind of evidence limited to realities, but the extent of evidence available is restricted; demonstration, as the term is ordinarily used, is altogether inapplicable; a certain degree of probability is alone attainable by reason, unless it can be shown that the finite can comprehend the infinite, that time

can encircle eternity. The certainties numbered by reason are exceedingly few, and mostly limited to the exact sciences; the chief part of man's knowledge consists of probabilities, of ever-varying degrees of force. It is, therefore, on the present occasion,—as on nearly every occasion that the judgment of man is exercised in the transactions of life, or in the pursuit of knowledge,—a balancing of probabilities, a weighing of the evidences; and whichever way the evidence may preponderate, there the judgment must rely; reason's task is performed, and for further light revelation must be sought. The anchor of faith alone rests upon the Rock of Ages.

What is man? In answering this question, it is not our purpose to speak of genus, species, class, bone, sinews, flesh, or blood, but of man as a sentient being. Man shall be posited before us as an objective reality. We will look upon him as exhibiting those actions designated, in the language of every day life, as feeling, seeing, hearing, desiring, loving, hating, willing, understanding, and thinking. These actions are exhibited to the observer through the intervention of physical, material media. That these media are strictly, simply so, and not in any respect the origin or cause of these actions, is evident from the fact that these media may individually become vitiated or extinct; and yet there is remaining the personal consciousness of existence, the personality, I, myself. Further, these actions cannot be separate independent existences; for in the very nature of things it appears absolutely necessary, that for every action there should exist the actor as the origin or cause of the action. It is thus evident, that the origin or cause of these actions cannot be in their self-existence, nor inherent in the media through which they are manifested; that is, they are neither self-existent nor material; and as all existences must be either matter or spirit, the efficient, natural cause of these actions must necessarily be, in relation to these actions, a self-existent, immaterial, spiritual personality. Thus man is resolved into a personality, a compound of body and soul, matter and spirit—the former possessing all the properties of inanimate matter in mystical union with a vital principle, the latter endowed with all the properties of spirit, mysteriously united with the grosser elements of the material world. Here it must necessarily be observed, that this mysterious union can by no means imply any modification of either in their essential properties, by which their specific nature is changed. They essentially remain body and spirit, the personality and the media whereby that personality is manifested in its actions.

What is death? It must be either a separation of parts previously existing as a whole, or it must be an annihilation of some or the whole of those parts. That it is not the latter must be evident from the fact that the most ardent and laborious searcher

into the arcana of nature has never met with a single indication of the possibility of annihilation. Of course we are not now speaking of what is possible to an infinitely powerful Divinity, as such a being can only be known through the medium of a revelation, a source of evidence not available in the present debate, either by implication or otherwise. The idea of annihilation necessarily implies the existence and exercise of a power equal to that of creation; for we submit that equal power is necessary to reduce to nothingness that which now exists, as to produce from nothing that which has the properties of existence, and it must be evident, creative and annihilative power are equally beyond the power of reason to prove. But that death is the former, a separation of parts previously existing as a whole, is much more plausible, is more compatible with the known constitution and course of nature around us, is matter of daily and hourly experience in this world of vicissitude and change. The body of man is affected by death in this manner: by the chemical change in its composition, the separation of its parts, it is resolved into its constituent elements, the first principles or primary elements of matter; but no single particle is subject to annihilation, it is still existent in a gaseous or earthy state. The body itself is thus affected, and, in its relation with the soul, is so far affected in the same manner, as to undergo the separation of that union heretofore existing. But in this change, this separation, we find no reason to believe that the soul or the body have lost any one of their essential properties, as matter and spirit; neither have we any proof that the soul is farther affected than by this separation to be deprived of its media of communication with compound beings—united bodies and souls;—it may be able to communicate with other separate souls, by means of its spiritual nature. The body, we find, previous to the continued changes caused by decomposition, is deprived of the power of locomotion; but it still possesses all the properties of matter, magnitude, extension, inertia, &c. Why should the soul be thought to have suffered more by the change called death than the body? The body, after its separation from the soul by death, is still body, and through every subsequent change it continues still in existence, and is still called body; it still possesses all the properties of matter. Nor can the organic changes of the body after death be made a valid objection to the force of this argument. The disorganization of the body results from the action of known laws upon the various tissues of the corporeal fabric, and is a continuation only of that series of changes commencing with death, or the separation of the body from the soul. It is a chemical process, at all times in operation, under ordinary circumstances, in the material world. But this disorganization or corruption of matter can be no proof that the soul or spirit can become, by the circumstance of death, subject

to a like disorganization or corruption, nor to any kind of organic change by which it shall ultimately become discernible. We will, however, examine a little more in detail this portion of the argument.

We have seen that the efficient natural cause of the actions, thinking, willing, &c., is not in the actions themselves, nor in the media whereby those actions are manifested. We have also seen that there is within the knowledge of man only two distinct classes of existence, matter and spirit. We see that one of these classes, matter, cannot be the efficient natural cause of these actions. It must necessarily, therefore, be concluded that spirit is alone the efficient natural cause of the actions, thinking, willing, &c. Death we have defined as either a separation of parts previously existing as a whole, or as a perfect annihilation of some or the whole of those parts. Now, from all ideas possible to be received through the medium of reason, the soul or spirit is a simple independent existence, without parts and without any contingent dependence upon other created existences. For if we examine our ideas respecting existences, they are necessarily drawn from material objects. We can conceive of existence only as possessing magnitude, density, &c., as possessing the capacity for divisibility; but respecting spirit we have no idea but by the actions previously particularized. These actions are not analogical to the properties of matter, and therefore cannot be analogically considered as corruptible, discernible, separable, or subjected to decay in the same manner as material objects, either in themselves, or in their efficient natural cause. Hence, we conclude, spirit is not corruptible by the separation of its parts, and therefore must exist throughout a future immortality. Annihilation being to reason impossible of conception, cannot be postulated by reason as a valid possible objection to the immortality of the human soul.

Another view of this case is presented to us in the moral nature of the soul; and this also favours the affirmative to immortality. We find, not only in our daily experiences, but on the strictest examination of the human faculties, that the power of judging is an essential property of the soul. The judgment passed may in any particular case be right or wrong; the variation only confirms the existence of the faculty in all cases. This faculty implies a knowledge of good and evil; whether partial or perfect is of no importance to our present question, we are only desirous to substantiate the existence of the faculty, and to show its action. The existence of this faculty and the knowledge which it implies, necessitates a period of rewards and punishments, where a perfect rule shall be observed, and a just justice be dispensed to all spirits possessing these attributes and this knowledge. Material wrongs and material rights may be possibly rewarded or punished in this state of our existence in

an adequate degree, but we submit that moral reward and moral punishment are not adequately possible here. The constitution of this our present state of existence, and the moral constitution of the universe, make the full and impartial and perfect administration of rewards and punishments a moral and material impossibility, because the evils of the moral world are not cognizant to the bulk of the moral subjects of the universe, and there is no accessible authority within the domain of reason competent to pass a correct judgment upon the moral subject, who is impartially or fully able to reward or punish according to demerit.

The conclusion to which these remarks conduct us is the necessity of infinitely extended duration, wherein there shall be full opportunity given, and where a competent authority exists, to administer rewards and punishments in perfect adaptation to truth and justice. Hence the necessity of immortality to the moral subject, and the support this argument must give to the affirmative of our debate.

The impossibility of conceiving what annihilation is, must be an invincible obstacle to all proof of the mortality of the soul; and that the impossibility of this conception is real, must be apparent from the language employed in defining the terms annihilation, non-existence, nonentity, nothingness, deprivation of parts and properties. These, and all other attempted synonyms, with the ingenious circumlocutions introduced into the language of metaphysics, are simply negations, and show equally the paucity of language to convey the idea and the inability of creating the idea by the aid of reason alone. If we look out upon the world of our experiences, we find in all things a confirmation of the maxim that nature abhors a vacuum, that nothingness can have no positive existence; and if annihilation can be possible, it must be not only possible of conception, but it must be capable of proof, especially so of material objects, upon which our experiences in daily life are employed; and if it is not capable of this conception and proof, much less is that capable of conception and proof with respect to the soul, of whose existence and nature we can only be conscious by the manifestations coming within the sphere of our experience. This is evident if we, by an act of intuition, examine our own consciousness. We have proof of the existence of the soul from this consciousness. Can we conceive of the non-existence of this consciousness, any more surely than we can conceive of matter without its essential properties, extension, impenetrability, &c.? The intuition of existence from self-consciousness of existence is inseparable from our being, and is not derivable from any objective or extraneous source. Hence the impossibility of conceiving what annihilation is must be proof of the immortality of the soul, as we have seen death cannot affect the soul but by annihilation, or

the separation of its parts ; and as the soul is a simple indivisible personality, it cannot be separated.

Thus our probabilities are cumulative ; and as it is in the nature of probability to admit of ever-varying degrees of force, from the lowest degree of presumption to the very margin of absolute certainty, and as the present question admits not of demonstration, as in the exact sciences, we are warranted in demanding from opponents, upon whom rests the *onus probandi* of proving their position, the most unequivocal facts and proofs to set aside the increasing force of these probabilities.

In concluding our present remarks, we observe that the present existence of the soul is presumptive evidence of its continuing in existence for infinity, because it is impossible to conceive of any adequate cause for its disceptibility or annihilation, either in its nature, its actions, or in the powers cognitive by the powers of reason, as previously shown.

We have been necessarily limited in the space assigned. But we wish you to remember, that the soul or mind is that part of our being which thinks and wills, remembers and reasons ; that we know nothing of it except from these functions. By means of the corporeal senses, it holds intercourse with the things of the external world, and receives impressions from them. But of this connection also we know nothing but the facts ; when we attempt to speculate on its nature and cause, we wander at once from the path of philosophical inquiry into conjectures, which are as far beyond the proper sphere as they are beyond the reach of the human faculties. The object of true science on such a subject, therefore, is simply to investigate the facts, or the relations of phenomena respecting the operations of mind itself, and the intercourse which it carries on with the things of the external world.

Birmingham.

L'OUVRIER.

MEMORY.—There is something very curious about memory. I don't think there is such a thing as total forgetfulness. Memory has many cells. Some of them ain't used much, and dust and cobwebs get about them, and you can't tell where the hinge is, or can't easily discern the secret spring ; but open it once, and whatever is stowed away there is safe and sound as ever. I have a good many capital stories poked away in them cubby-holes, that I can't just lay my hand on when I want to ; but now and then, when looking for something else, I stumble upon them by accident. Tell you what, as for forgettin' a thing teetotally, I don't believe there is sich a thing in natur.—*Sam Slick's Nature and Human Nature.*

Philosophy.

IS MAN THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

"THE question," says John Stuart Mill, "whether the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena, is the celebrated controversy concerning the freedom of the will, which, from at least as far back as the time of Pelagius, has divided both the philosophical and the religious world." The most objectionable form which this controversy has assumed in the present time is that stated in the "new moral world" of Robert Owen, which, based on the doctrine of necessity, was to supersede the present ignorant and chaotic confusion of society, and, by the introduction of its social arrangements, to be the means by which the causes of poverty, disunion, and vice were to be removed, wars to cease, and intelligence and happiness to pervade the world. This theory, however, when reduced to practice, proved a failure, and is now regarded by the common-sense portion of the community as one of the wonders of human folly. Owen and his followers still maintain, in spite of the most convincing evidence, but apparently to be consistent with their theory, that man is the creature of circumstances, and, therefore, not responsible for his belief. A greater than any of them, however, has declared that the great truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth, that man shall no more render account to man for his belief, over which he himself has no control. Henceforward nothing shall prevail upon us to praise or to blame any one for that which he can no more change than he can the hue of his skin, or the height of his stature.*

It may be as well, in the outset, to state the opinions of the Owen school, who maintain the affirmative of this question:—

1. That man is a compound being, whose character is formed of his constitution or organization at birth, and of the effects of external circumstances acting upon that organization, which effects continue to operate on and to influence him, from birth to death.

2. Man is compelled, by his original constitution, to receive his *feelings* and his *convictions* independently of his *will*.

3. His feelings, or his convictions, or both of them united, create the motive to action called the will, which stimulates him to act, and decides his actions.

* Lord Brougham's Inaugural Discourse as Lord Rector, before the University of Glasgow, 1825.

Each individual is so organized that his will is formed for him by his feelings, or convictions, or both; and thus his whole character, physical, mental, and moral, is formed independently of himself.*

We admit that man has no power over those circumstances which exist before, and form his general and individual organization up to the moment of his birth; but to infer from this that man has no power over the succeeding circumstances which operate on him, is in opposition to the known facts of life, and is that fallacy known in logic under the name of "fallacia compositionis."

In this system it is assumed,—1st. That man is morally pure. 2nd. That man is merely a *bodily* organization, operated on by external circumstances. And, 3rd. That every action is necessitated by a motive, or that motives are efficient causes. The assumption of these points, without proof, renders the conclusions drawn from them untenable. "To speak of feelings or convictions creating the will is," says Morell, "simply an absurdity." Motives, too, in this system, are referred to external circumstances; whereas, in their nature they are, strictly speaking, subjective; they influence the will, but do not determine the volition. The will is the true determining power, and leads to voluntary action. "Doubtless the other powers of the mind must furnish the objects. The physical or mental sensibility must announce what is painful and what is pleasurable; the conscience declare what is morally right and what is morally wrong; the reason may proclaim what is true and what is false; but it is not the province of one or all of these to make the choice. By the sensibility the mind feels pleasure and pain, but it is another power which chooses the former and avoids the latter."†

According to this system man's character is formed *for* him and not by him. This is simply to regard man as a mere machine, under the influence of motives, as a steam engine is under the impulse of its moving power. That man has the power to form his character, and to raise himself above the circumstances which surround him, is evident from the records of biography, and is, moreover, a fact of consciousness. On this principle of necessity there could be no such thing as decision of character. Man commits moral suicide when he acts in accordance with the belief that he is the creature of circumstances.

It is stated, further, that all our beliefs are formed for us; and yet those who assert so maintain that their convictions are sincere and conscientious. Sincerity is a moral quality, supposing

* Public Discussion between Robert Owen and Rev. J. H. Roebuck, of Manchester, pp. 11, 12. 1837.

† "The Method of the Divine Government," by the Rev. James McCosh, book iii., chap. i., sect. i., 262.

liberty in the agent; it cannot, therefore, harmonize with the principle of necessity. Man cannot be said to be sincere in any belief formed for him, or any action which he is compelled to perform by external circumstances. Owenites and Secularists, to be consistent with their theory, ought to boast less of their sincerity and conscientiousness. They may affirm that man is the creature of circumstances when they prove that all his thoughts and actions are determined by external causes; but sincerity cannot be predicated of beliefs or convictions formed for and not by us.

According to this system, which maintains that every action is the effect of a volition, and that every volition is the effect of a cause or motive over which man has no control, because external to him, there can be neither merit nor blame in human actions. This is stated by the poet Bayley in "Festus"—

" Yet merit or demerit none I see
In nature, human or material,
In passions or affections good or bad;
We only know that God's best purposes
Are oftenest brought about by dreadest sins.
Is thunder evil? or is dew divine?
Does virtue lie in sunshine, sin in storm?
Is not each natural, each needful, best?"

If it, then, be true that all thoughts and actions are necessitated, because man is the creature of circumstances, the monuments of Howard and Johnson, the Poets' Corner of Westminster Abbey, are striking examples of the folly of nations in perpetuating the memory of men whose actions and writings were the results, not of their desire to benefit humanity, but of external circumstances, over which they had no control. The life of Gustavus Adolphus no more merits admiration than the deeds of Louis XIV. deserve condemnation. The self-denial of the brave and tender-hearted Florence Nightingale is entitled to no praise, and the iniquities of the impostor, Alice Grey, ought not to be blamed. The transportation of Strahan, Paul, and Bates was unjust, because they were necessitated to appropriate the securities of Dr. Griffiths. These are conclusions logically deducible from the affirmations of those who maintain that the actions of man are necessitated by motives over which he has no control.

The scripture command is, "Honour to whom honour is due;" and the voices of nature re-echo the sentiment. We will honour the soldier who fought and died in the red gorge of Inkermann as much as we revere the memory of Cathcart. The great names of our country will still be honoured and admired, and the writings of Shakespeare, Bacon, Milton, and Burns ever be studied, even though the assertion that man is the creature of circumstances be proclaimed for a century to come with the eloquence of a Demosthenes or a Burke.

The religious beliefs which men form are the result of examination. It cannot be supposed that the evidence for the truth of Christianity would be of such a nature as to exclude conviction from the mind, or be unadapted to the constitution of man. That it is suited to man is evident, not only from those who have embraced its truths, but from the kind of evidence on which it is based. On this subject it has been observed, that "*sufficient evidence* must not be understood to mean such evidence as shall *infallibly constrain* the believing assent of every individual. * * * The want of efficacy may arise, not from any deficiency in the evidence, but from causes in the mind to which the evidence is presented. If these causes consist in or arise from *natural incapacity*, they exonerate the party from blameworthiness. But if they be of a moral kind—if they are to be found in evil principles and passions in the heart, blinding the understanding, perverting truth, and resisting evidence—the guilt contracted, whether the believer be himself sensible of it or not, may be very deep." It is affirmed, however, that the effect of the evidence before the mind is involuntary, and, consequently, man is not responsible for his belief; but then the responsibility consists in the voluntary act of the mind in collecting and examining evidence.

That it may not be said that the opinions of those who maintain the affirmative of this question have been misrepresented, the following quotation is from Mill's "System of Logic," in which the philosophical doctrine of necessity is maintained:—"In the words of the sect [the Owenites] which, in our day, has so perseveringly inculcated and so perversely misunderstood this great doctrine [of necessity], a man's character is formed *for* him and not *by* him; therefore his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no use; he has no power to alter it. But this is a grand error. He has, to a certain extent, a power to alter his character. * * * The free will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that portion of the truth which the word necessity puts out of sight, namely, the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own character, has given to its adherents a practical feeling much nearer to the truth than has generally (I believe) existed in the mind of necessarians. The latter may have had a stronger sense of the importance of what human beings can do to shape the characters of one another, but the free will doctrine has, I believe, fostered, especially in the younger of its supporters, a much stronger spirit of self-culture."*

1. The statement that man is the creature of circumstances, and therefore not responsible for his belief, is contrary to the truths of scripture and the facts of man's constitution. We

* "A System of Logic," by John Stuart Mill, vol. ii., book vi., chap. ii., § 3, 491, 493.

cannot suppose that the Bible, in which is embodied the will of God, would be given to man without any degree of responsibility attached to its truths, or that the condition of responsibility would be antagonistic to the nature of man. To suppose this, would be to set down the Bible as unworthy the attention of intelligent beings. Civil government attaches responsibility to the actions of those under its care, by punishing the law-breakers and protecting its subjects. Under the moral government of God, there are degrees of responsibility according to the circumstances in which man is placed; and "the method of government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must go upon the supposition that we are free and not necessary agents."* What are the grounds of responsibility? As stated by Wardlaw, they are, "capacity of understanding, opportunity of knowledge, and sufficiency of evidence. The absence of any one of these would nullify just responsibility."† McCosh remarks, on this subject, "The fact that man's mind is self-acting, and, in particular, that the will is self-acting—has its power or law in itself—is one of the conditions of responsibility. The other two conditions of responsibility seem to be conscience and intelligence. There must be conscience to distinguish between right and wrong, and authoritatively declare which is the one and which is the other. There must also be such an amount of intelligence as to enable the mind, in the complex acts of life, to separate that which is moral from that which is indifferent. These three, then, seem to be the essential elements or conditions of responsibility. Every human being, in a sane state of mind, is in possession of all these."‡ Morell, too, observes, "First, we must have the conception of right and wrong, or moral intelligence would be wanting; next, we must have the feeling or impulse arising from it, or moral disposition would be wanting; and, lastly, we must have freedom to act upon right or wrong motives, or else responsibility would be wanting."§ These grounds or conditions of responsibility, as facts of man's nature, are in harmony with the truths of Revelation. "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloke for their sin. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father."|| In this and other passages of scripture it is implied that men have the power of examining evidence, and that their moral guilt and re-

* Butler's "Analogy," part i., chap. vi.

† "Man Responsible for His Belief," by Ralph Wardlaw, p. 34.

‡ "The Method of the Divine Government," book iii., sect. i., 264.

§ "Speculative Philosophy," by D. Morell, vol. i., part ii., chap. iv., 487.

|| John xv. 22, 24.

sponsibility consist in not honestly and fully examining the evidence presented to them. Man's beliefs are not formed for him by outward circumstances, but they are formed by him from the examination of evidence, and, therefore, he cannot be said to be the creature of circumstances.

2. The statement that man is the creature of circumstances is directly opposed to the doctrine of man's free agency. That man is a free agent is a fact of consciousness. All the proceedings of a civil government rest on the assumption that man is a free agent. "All political discussion, whether speculative or practical, constantly assumes that man is a self-moving agent, that he determines his own will, that he has the power of choosing or rejecting any given course of conduct, and that he is responsible for his own acts."* It is evident, too, from observation, that men act in accordance with this principle of their nature; for no course of conduct would be pursued, no pursuit engaged in, did they think they had no power over external circumstances. Men believe that they have the power to form opinions, cherish dispositions, engage in business, and continue determinations; and this belief is a powerful stimulus to action. Miller, Faraday, and Oersted are eminent examples of men who have obtained lasting reputations, and that in spite of adverse circumstances. Great actions spring from this belief. Luther, when cited to appear at the Diet of Worms, and advised by his friends not to go, said, "I am called in the name of God to go, and I would go, though I were certain to meet as many devils in Worms as there are tiles on the houses."

All the efforts made to reclaim the vicious and instruct the ignorant proceed on the fact of man being a moral and accountable being. It were useless to attempt to elevate the masses of the community, were they wholly the creatures of circumstances. The *British Controversialist*, too, is based on the fact that men possess the power of forming opinions, by comparing and judging conflicting evidence. Self-culture would be an impossibility, on the assumption that man is the creature of circumstances. "The whole language of men," says Price, "all their practical sentiments and schemes, and the whole frame of human affairs, are founded upon the notion of liberty, and are utterly inconsistent with the supposition that nothing is made to depend upon ourselves, or that our purposes and determinations are not subjected to our own command, but the result of an invincible natural necessity."†

In proportion as the doctrine of responsibility is unacknowledged, is vice prevalent, honour disregarded, and the dignity of man lowered. As it pervades the minds of individuals, and is

* G. Cornewall Lewis's "Politics," chap. xxiii., § 10.

† Price's "Review of Principal Question," chap. viii.

felt by nations, is man ennobled, society progressive, and truth triumphant.

Those who maintain that man is the creature of circumstances, and hence not responsible for his beliefs, dispositions, or actions, have to prove—

1. That all our ideas are derived from sensation.
2. That all our volitions have an objective cause, not a part of, or dependent upon, ourselves.
3. That spontaneity is no part of the constitution of man.
4. That conscience is not the principle of moral approbation and disapprobation—the great regulative power which governs, restrains, and directs all the affections and passions.

“So long as Mr. Owen,” says Morell, “in common with the rest of the sensationalists, performs the real mission of this school of philosophy, by pointing out the importance of attending to the influence which outward things exert upon the mind and character, he is to be admired and applauded; but when he drives his principles to an extreme, shaking the pillars of morals and religion, and involving all human things in one unalterable chain of fixed necessity, he presents another instance to be added to the many which have gone before, of the absurdities into which those men invariably fall, who devote their whole life to the expansion of one idea, to the neglect of everything else.”*

W.

* “Speculative Philosophy,” by J. D. Morell, vol. i., part ii., chap. iv., p. 481.

TIME, the most precious of all possessions, is commonly the least prized. It is, like health, regretted when gone, but rarely improved when present. We know it is irrecoverable, yet throw it wantonly away. We know it is fleet, yet fail to catch the current moment. It is the space of life, and while we never properly occupy its limits, we nevertheless murmur at their narrowness. It is the field of exertion, and while we continually leave it fallow, we yet sorrow over our stunted harvest.

MIRTH.—Harmless mirth is the best cordial against the consumption of the spirits: wherefore jesting is not unlawful, if it trespasseth not in quantity, quality, or season.—*Fuller*.

GOOD QUALITIES.—I have known some men possessed of good qualities which were very serviceable to others, but useless to themselves; like a sun-dial on the front of a house, to inform the neighbours and passengers, but not the owner within.—*Swift*.

ADVICE TO YOUNG MEN.—The best rules to form a young man are, to talk little, to hear much, to reflect alone upon what has passed in company, to distrust one's own opinions, and value others that deserve it.—*Sir W. Temple*.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It is said, with much truth, that actions are the indexes to character. "To judge of character," says our friend V. V., "we must look for its manifestations in the acts of the individual, and to the early impressions and education we may generally trace the foundation of the various traits exhibited in it." The experiences of daily life, in one form or other, and more or less strikingly, furnish ample evidences of the truth of this remark. Individuals, public and private, high and low, rich and poor, in every capacity, are esteemed and honoured, or despised and rejected, according to the virtuous or evil nature of their motives and actions. Nations and communities are distinguished for their morality, greatness, power, industry, and wealth, or reproached for their vices, ignorance, idleness, and poverty, only in proportion to the exalted or degraded position in which their rulers and people stand in the great scale of human character, and the facilities which they afford for the increase of trade and commerce, and improvement in the arts and sciences; the civil and religious privileges which they confer; their preservation of rights, and their redress of wrongs; their encouragement of the virtues, or, on the other hand, the incentives they create to the practices of indolence and immorality, by open example, or, what is equally as bad, by passive submission. And this wise and universal mode of estimating the characters of nations and people, and testing their merits or demerits, collectively or individually, bears with it, we think, rather than otherwise, a very beneficial influence; because, if the character of an individual is determined by his actions, and his happiness and position in society depend on the judgment formed of him, there exists an impulse for him to pursue such a course of conduct as is consistent with the highest state of moral rectitude, and as is desirable in all men having regard for the well-being of the state.

We shall not depart from this process of estimating the qualities of individuals in our examination into the character of the subject of this discussion, the result of which will, we confidently believe, prove that the judgment we have formed in the affirmative of the question is based on a substantial foundation.

When Queen Elizabeth was called to the throne, and proclaimed Queen of England, the news was received by the people with the liveliest satisfaction and joy. "The bells of all the churches were set ringing; tables were spread in the streets, where was plentiful eating and drinking and making merry; and at night bonfires were lit in all directions, and the skies were reddened by flames which had not consumed human victims."* A prisoner, guarded by soldiers in a miserable cell, she became at once a queen, surrounded by her nobles in a stately palace; and once in that exalted position,—a position to which she was entitled, not less by the will of her people than by hereditary right,—she swayed the regal sceptre with a firm hand, and exercised her prerogative with wisdom, mildness, justice, and impartiality—in a word, as a *Queen*; and yet, perhaps no prince or princess ever took possession of the throne with so many difficulties to encounter and overcome. France, Scotland, Spain, the Pope, and many of the neighbouring nations, were her open or secret enemies. Parties and factions, the majority of which were headed by popish bigots, threatened to disturb tranquillity at home; while many politicians, popular in the last reign, were unwilling to conform to her principles of government, and to pay her that obeisance which a queen can claim, and is entitled to, from her subjects. But with a mind, a heart, and a spirit becoming a monarch, she resisted hostilities, suppressed insurrections, secured the affections of her people, and showed her bitterest enemies, the Papists, such an example of moderation and forbearance, as they might admire but could not imitate.

The first objects to which Elizabeth applied herself with any degree of assiduity, were the extinction of Popery and the establishment of Protestantism. This was politic on her part, particularly as the nation loudly called for reformation, and as the atrocious excesses committed by the Papists during Mary's reign had, rather than strengthened, essentially weakened the catholic interests, by infusing into the minds of the people a desire for change in a system of religion so cruel in its practices, and consequently so repugnant to their feelings. She passed act after act in favour of the Reformation; repealed those statutes of Mary which acknowledged the Pope's supremacy over the church, and which enforced submission to his dogmatism and the old acts against heresy; she re-established the use of the Common Prayer-book, the reading of the services in the vulgar tongue, and ordered the articles of religion, now reduced to thirty-nine, as revised by the bishops and adopted by the convocation, to be published, and made it imperative upon the clergy to subscribe thereto.

Regardless of papal bulls and the threats and admonitions of

* Stow; Holinshed; Burnet.

catholic lords and bishops—confident in the support of her people, encouraged by their affections, and animated by a desire for her country's weal, she trampled over all opposition, baffled all her adversaries by her superior wisdom, and established that religion which we now have the inestimable privilege to enjoy.

Well may "Threlkeld" observe, in his able article, that "*Elizabeth deserves PRAISE for the discretion and wisdom with which this delicate operation was carried on,*" which "discretion and wisdom," he continues, "*were qualities she always evinced.*" That is one admission by "Threlkeld" very favorable to Elizabeth, an admission to the effect that she strenuously exerted *her best talents*—in this respect at all events—for *the best interests of her people* (why not more carefully conceal your admiration of the lady, friend "Threlkeld"?); but history goes a little further, and says, with a *result that exceeded, perhaps, the most sanguine anticipations of her most ardent admirers.* And for that great and mighty work, which a revolution could not have effected, is she not worthy of *our* admiration? "Whatever might be the faults of Elizabeth," says one of our highest authorities,* "it was plain that, to speak humanly, the fate of the realm *and of all reformed Churches, was staked on the security of her person and on the success of her administration.* To strengthen her hands was, therefore, the *first DUTY of a patriot and a Protestant*; and that duty was well performed." It would not have been the *duty* of her subjects to give her support—that support would not have been so willingly and so amply afforded, did there not exist an absolute necessity for reform in the established religion of the country; and that reformation would never have been produced, were it not for that "discretion and wisdom" which Elizabeth evinced, to her great and lasting honour.

In or about the year 1587, Philip, king of Spain, annoyed at Elizabeth's rejection of his hand in marriage, and incited by the Pope, who was desirous of impeding the progress of the Reformation, threatened to invade England. Emboldened by the courage and discipline of his troops, and the number and power of his fleet, he cherished no hope but that of complete success in the undertaking; while the naked state of our coasts, the paucity of our ships of war, and the inexperience of our sailors in naval warfare (who, however, lacked none of that daring and bravery which is inherent in Britons), furnished some cause for anxiety on the part of the English. But Elizabeth prepared to resist the foe with a spirit and an energy that claims our warmest admiration. She levied troops, strengthened her fleets, fortified her garrisons, built new forts, detached portions of her forces on all points of the coast, and personally superintended the progress of the various works in her arsenals. Everywhere the din of war

* Macaulay's "History of England," vol. i., p. 61.

was loud and long and heavy. Both sides of the Thames were strongly fortified, as it was expected that the Spaniards would attempt to attack London. At Tilbury Fort a great camp was formed, consisting of 22,000 foot and 2,000 horse, between which place and the metropolis were stationed a force of 28,000 men, commanded by Lord Hunsden. It was here that she reviewed her troops, "riding a war horse, wearing armour on her back, and carrying a marshal's truncheon in her hand," encouraging them with her presence, and exciting them to the utmost enthusiasm with her eloquent addresses. "My loving people," said she, on one occasion, "we have been persuaded by some that are careful for our safety to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes, for fear of treachery; but, I assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear! I have always so behaved myself that, under God, I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects, and therefore I am come among you at this time, not as for my recreation and sport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of the battle, to live or die amongst you all—to lay down for my God, for my kingdom, and for my people, my honour and my blood even, in the dust. *I know that I have but the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart of a king, and of a king of England, too; and think foul scorn that Parma, or Spain, or any prince of Europe should dare to invade the borders of my realms. To which, rather than any dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up arms. I myself will be your general—the judge and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field.*" Influenced by her example and courage, volunteers flocked to her standard by thousands, and resolved to die in its defence. The nobles and people rendered pecuniary assistance, and fitted out and armed, at their own expense, a large number of merchant ships; and thus, in course of a short time, very effective forces were raised, both on land and sea, capable to cope with any enemy. At length the Armada—which the proud Spaniards styled *Invincible*!—arrived in the Channel. "It comprised one hundred and thirty vessels, of all sizes, mounting two thousand four hundred and thirty-six guns," and carrying, in addition to the seamen, "twenty thousand land troops, among whom were two thousand volunteers of the noblest families in Spain." Our fleet, commanded by Admiral Drake, met and engaged them. We know the result. Aided by the elements, our ships so far destroyed this "*Invincible Armada*," that out of the one hundred and thirty vessels of which it was composed only fifty-three returned to Spain! On this enterprise depended, we may say, the success of the Reformation, and, we may add, Elizabeth's fate; and to her who so effectually maintained the honour of Britain and the dignity of her crown, are

we indebted for this freedom from worse than the bondage of slavery—the thralldom of the Pope!

These warlike measures were necessarily attended with considerable expense to the country; but Elizabeth did not oppress her people with heavy taxes to support them. She was remarkably frugal with her treasury, and even deemed it prudent to make provision for any contingencies that might have arisen; and, consequently, the evils of war were, to a great extent, counteracted, and were felt but little by the people. This gave them satisfaction, increased their admiration for the Queen, and disposed them to render her every aid that she needed. Some writers have, indeed, proceeded so far as to assert that the sound judgment and deep penetration which she displayed in the management of her finances was the principal cause of her popularity. Her conduct in this respect could but materially add to her many other excellent qualities, while it commanded the esteem of her subjects; but that it was the *chief* reason of her being regarded with so much favour we are inclined to doubt. However, be it so or not, we are informed that she paid “those great debts which long lay upon the crown,” and that she even had ample pecuniary resources at her command, which enabled her to carry out any of her projects, to aid any wise and benevolent movements, to resist or suppress anything that, in her opinion, was inconsistent with the happiness of her people.

The poor were the special objects of her compassion and care, and her reign is distinguished by her incessant efforts to ameliorate their condition. “*Pauper ubique jacet*,” she would often exclaim, on witnessing her destitute subjects,* numbers of whom would congregate in places where she was expected to pass to beg alms from their Queen, which she bestowed with a liberality unstinted, and a grace and condescension truly pleasing. In her anxiety for their welfare and comfort *she devised a plan more humane and beneficial than even feeding and clothing of millions, by affording them the means, with proper industry, to feed and clothe themselves*;† in furtherance of which a statute‡ was passed, the first section of which directs that the churchwardens of every parish, “and fower, three, or two substanciall householders there,” to be nominated yearly, “shall be called overseers of the poore of the same parishe, and they, or the greater parte of them, shall take order from tyme to tyme, by and withe the consent of two or more Justices of Peace, for *settinge to worke* of the children of all such whose parentes shall not, by the saide churchwardens and overseers, or the greater parte of them, bee thoughte able to keepe and maintaine their children. And also for *settinge to worke* all such

* Pashley's “Pauperism and Poor Laws,” p. 188.

† Warren's “Blackstone's Commentaries,” ab. ed. 686.

‡ 43 Elizabeth, c. 2.

p'sons, married or unmarried, havinge no meanes to maintaine them, as use no ordinairie and dailie trade of lief to get their livinge by; and alsoe to *raise weeklie* or otherwise, by *taxacón* of every inhabitant person, near and other, and of ev'y occupier of landes, houses, tythes, impropriate or propriac'ons of tythes, cole mines, or saleable underwoods in the saide parishe, in such competent sume and sumes of money as they shall think fytt, *a convenient stocke of flaxe, hempe, wooll thread, iron, and other necessarie ware and stuffe, to set the poore on worke*; and alsoe competent sumes of money for and towards *the necessarie reliefe of the lame, impotente, olde, blinde, and suche other amonge them being poore and not able to worke, and also for the putting out of suche children to be apprentices, to be gathered out of the same parishe, accordinge to the abilitie of the same parishe*; and to doe and execute all other thinge, as well for the disposinge of the said stocke as otherwise conc'ninge the p'misses, as to them shall seeme convenient." And as a proof of the excellency of this statute, we need only add that under its provisions all relief of the poor of England and Wales has now been administered for two centuries and a half!

We do not deny that the character of Elizabeth was spotless, and our readers will not, from our preceding remarks, be led to suppose that we are of that opinion. We view her as a queen—a queen of the sixteenth century—an age of learning and politeness, when it was impossible to be eminent without great parts and a singular habit of virtue,* and form our judgment of her accordingly. She was not, did not pretend to be, infallible, and what few errors she committed are most trifling comparatively with her many virtues, and must be ascribed to the peculiarity of her times. In her palace she was an example to her people in their more humble spheres, while she carefully watched their interests at home and abroad. "She encouraged agriculture, by allowing a free exportation of corn; promoted trade and navigation; and so much increased the shipping of her kingdom, both by building vessels of force herself, and suggesting like undertakings to the merchants, that she was justly styled the restorer of naval glory, and the Queen of the northern seas."†

She was gifted with rare talents, was well versed in classics, and could speak many of the languages of her day. Of her learning the following lines were written in the year 1570:—

"None like Elizabeth was found in
Learning so divine,
She had the perfect skilful art of
All the muses nine.
In Latini, Greek, and Hebrew, she
Most excellent was known;
To foreign kings, ambassadors,
The same was daily shown.

* Lord Bacon.

† Hume.

The Italian, French, and Spanish tongue
 She well could speak and read,
 The Turkish and Arabian speech
 Grew perfect at her need."

Indeed, of all the qualities suitable for a sovereign, and a sovereign of such a realm as it was her privilege to govern, she was possessed to an eminent degree. "The solid judgment, immense capacity, and deep penetration which she discovered in the choice of her ministers, the management of her finances, and the administration of justice, *have deservedly acquired the praise and admiration of posterity*; while her prudence and vigilance, her vigour, constancy, and magnanimity, *have never, perhaps, been surpassed by any monarch in ancient or modern history.*"* It would seem as if—

"Fate itself her sovereign power obeyed."

On these grounds, supported as we are by such high testimony, and taking all matters into consideration, we submit, that not denying that on some few points, one or two of which "Threlkeld" has noticed in his excellent paper, her character is open to censure, we have maintained an affirmative view of this interesting question.

T. W. R.

* Pinnock's "Goldsmith's History of England."

CONSTANTINOPLE.

CONSTANTINOPLE, which has been called the "Queen of the Universe," is, like Rome and Moscow, seated upon seven hills; yet, unlike those cities, it enjoys the advantage of the refreshing ocean breezes. The Sea of Marmora washes it on one side, and an arm of the Bosphorus, called the Harbour of the Golden Horn, on the other. It is built on a promontory of triangular shape, of which the base is landward. The natural beauties of its situation are so great, that writers of history have exhausted their eloquence to describe it. It makes its best impression as approached from the sea, when terrace rises above terrace from the margin of the water, interspersed with the marked foliage of the cypress groves.

The new seraglio of the Sultan, with its gardens, occupies the apex of the triangle, surrounded by a wall flanked with battlements and towers, which is three miles in circumference, and has twelve gates. This wall encircles palaces and mosques, "a city within a city;" from six to seven thousand persons reside within its bounds. Art has here lavished all her power to grace an abode for the "king of kings." It contains, besides apartments for the 800 ladies of the harem, chambers filled with robes, brocades, velvet, gold cloth, bridles and saddles covered with jewels, scimitars and pistols glittering with diamonds, with sub-

terranean vaults of treasure. The walls enclose an extensive square, where the annual caravan to Mecca still assembles, that the Ottoman Court may witness its departure.

The seraglio commands an unrivalled prospect across the Bosphorus. It is opposite to Scutari, the Asiatic suburb, the Chrysophrasus, or Golden City of the ancients ; so called, from the magical effect produced upon it by the setting sun. Behind it rise the mountains of Asia Minor, with Mount Olympus, snow-clad and supreme, over them all. The matchless harbour of the Golden Horn, five miles in length, yet capable of having its mouth closed by a single chain, has all the flags of Europe floating on its bosom ; hundreds of "caiques," or sharp-prowed boats, plying hither and thither among them. On its further side lie the suburbs of Galata and Pera, connected with the city by a floating bridge ; these are the Frank quarters, and here the ambassadors have their palaces, the rich Jewish bankers reside, and an air of European civilization is apparent. Looking from Pera across the harbour to the imperial city, with its 362 mosques, its 30 bazaars, its 300 fountains, and its 100,000 wooden houses, it often lies cut out on the clear sky, like a picture, without a curl of smoke to break the illusion.

But these charms are all external. The illusion vanishes on entering the streets, which we should often call lanes, and finding an indescribable pavement, interlaced with muddy holes, and impeded by heaps of filth, which the herds of unowned dogs, always foraging, do not suffice to clear. The houses present dead walls to the passenger ; they have neither name nor number, and derive their light and air from interior court-yards ; many parts of the city are in ruins, from the fires that are constantly occurring, and which have been known to consume 12,000 dwellings at one time. Indeed, Constantinople is said "to be burnt to the ground, and to rise again from its ashes, about every fifteen years ;" yet the sufferers rebuild without any attempt at improvement, and make no efforts to prevent a recurrence of the calamity.

As you pass along, seeking some person, whom it may take you a winter's day to find,—for the streets are unnamed also,—you hear behind you the sound "Au, Johnny !" and must move out of the way for a Turkish porter, with some towering burden on his back ; or for two or three porters, with a pole on their shoulders, swinging casks or great cases ; or, perhaps, for a string of mules, or even camels, filling up the narrow way ; and, oh ! the thick thronging multitude in various costumes, and speaking many languages. You must give a few piastres to a poor Jew, on the floating bridge, to be your guide and interpreter ; for he knows most of the European and many Asiatic languages. He wears Turkish trousers, and a large fur caftan, with a red fez or skull-cap on his head, wound round with linen. You may know his physiognomy among all the strange

and motley crowd; and he will tell you that 170,000 of his brethren are to be found in Turkey. You will, perhaps to your surprise, see many Turks unturbaned, in coats, waistcoats, and trousers, like the Giaour they once despised; the red fez only marks them, as not European; the lower orders retain the Asiatic dress; and the ulemas, or Mahommedan priests, preserve the elegant robe and turban. You may, perhaps, meet the Sheik al Islam, their high priest, with his white beard, and robes of green and gold. The Turkish ladies, veiled, wander at will through the gay bazaars—for each merchandize has its bazaar. You may know the Armenian by his flowing dress and black kalpack, and purple slippers; and the Pasha's troops are in scarlet, with their caps like flower-pots, stuck with large feathers. But, having glanced at the inhabitants, we must return to the city.

Alison says of Constantinople, "that in every age since its foundation, it has formed a chief object of the ambition of the world's rulers; because it is, from its position, the natural emporium where the commerce of the West meets that of the East; the midway station, where the internal *water* communication of Europe, Asia, and Africa, unites in a common centre." The waters of the Mediterranean can fill the harbour of its Golden Horn with vessels, freighted with the fruits and grains of Egypt, with the gold and ivory of Africa, with the silks and wines of Italy, the wool and oils of Spain. That sea can also waft to her the manufactures of England and France, and the raw produce of all the vast new world beyond the Atlantic. The waters of the Danube, the Dneister, and the Volga, can bring to her the corn, the furs, and the minerals of Russia,—the crops and all exports of Germany and Hungary; whilst the caravans of the desert, converging at Scutari, may contribute the shawls of Persia, the jewels, the gums, and the spices of India and Central Asia.

It only requires the construction of a line of railroad, which might be traversed in fourteen hours, from Scanderoon to Aleppo, to renew the commerce by the Euphrates, and to make Turkey the highway to India; but Turkey, unless in the form of barbaric chivalry, is not an enterprising power. The Turk moves proudly and quietly among the people who outnumber him in his own dominions. The Greek residents undertake his commerce; the Jews and Armenians concern themselves with his finance; and, amid his glorious land, with its mines of copper and silver, lead, iron, coal, and salt unworked—its soil luxuriant as that of the tropics, yet not supplying, for want of culture, the present thinly scattered population,—he sits silently down in the composure of his fatalist faith, to contemplate the decaying away of his empire, saying, "Allah Kerim, God is merciful. We shall see."—*The Book and its Missions.*

The Essayist.

"THINGS NEW AND OLD."

"There is no new thing under the sun."

WHAT the Royal Preacher has said of the events which occur in the external world may be asserted with almost equal truth of the universe of mind. The amount of really original thought produced in this age of book-making is very much less than we are apt to suppose. Once or twice in an age a genius appears, fearlessly exploring the domain of truth; discovering verdure and beauty on what were heretofore supposed to have been arid wastes; finding veins of precious metal in mines long since abandoned as exhausted; bringing up "gems of purest ray serene" from the "dark unfathomed caves of ocean;"—but the visits of such to our earth are, like those of angels, "few and far between." Whatever they who shall live in the "good time coming" may be privileged to witness, the appearance in our mental firmament of such luminaries as Shakspeare, Bacon, Milton, and, perhaps we may add, Coleridge, must yet be regarded as phenomena. And were our literature pruned of all but the works of genius, applying the term to those only who contribute new ideas to the common stock, it would be reduced to very small compass indeed. But what man of taste would wish to see such a pruning? Much as we admire and reverence those men of mighty intellect, there is enjoyment, we had almost said equal enjoyment, to be derived from a perusal of the works of those immeasurably their inferiors. We linger with delight in communion with minds whose productions display nothing of the—

"Lofty sense,
Creative fancy, and perception keen,
Through the deep windings of the human heart,"

which so fascinate us in the writings of Shakspeare; nor any of the mingled sublimity and beauty with which we are alternately overawed and enchanted when reading "Paradise Lost."

It becomes a question of some interest, then, what it is which constitutes the charm of these second and third-rate authors. If their works may lay no claim to originality of thought, what is the redeeming quality by which they are raised in our estimation so nearly to the level of those who occupy the summit of the mountain? It seems to us that the question is best answered by a reference to external nature, which, we conceive, furnishes

us with something, if not perfectly analogous to the subject, at least illustrative of it.

Whence arises that buoyancy of spirit we feel when rapidly traversing for the first time a tract of country, whose surface presents to us an increasingly diversified succession of field and forest, hill and dale, and all that is lovely in rural scenery? What is that peculiarity in the landscape to which we apply the epithet "beautiful"? It is not that the fields are greener, or the foliage richer, than any we ever before witnessed; nor that the surface of the country rises and falls in more graceful undulations; neither is it that the rippling of the brook sounds more musical, nor that there is a clearer sky overhead. Probably each of these individual features might be witnessed within half a dozen miles from our native homestead; nay, more than this, the landscape there may possess more intrinsic beauty, and yet, leaving out of the account those associations which memory clusters around the scenes of our boyhood, we gaze upon its varied scenery with little if any more emotion than would be excited by the sight of a country as flat and monotonous as an American prairie or an Arabian desert. We might further conceive of such a disposition of the parts of the landscape now so lovely as should raise in our breasts no feelings of pleasure, but rather of *ennui*.

"But still 'tis rural—trees are to be seen
From every window, and the fields are green;
Ducks paddle in the pond before the door,
And what could a remoter scene show more?"

A whitewashed cottage, a meadow, a cornfield, a river, a few trees, or a country church, each separately considered, do not usually strike our minds as possessing any peculiar beauty; and yet some of the most charming prospects we have witnessed might be reduced to a few such simple elements. The fact is, that our enjoyment of such scenes arises, not from the objects of which they may be composed, as regarded singly, but from their combination.

And as it is in the material, so is it in the mental world. There are authors, the beauty of whose works we admire, but to whom we should not award the meed of originality, any more than we should say of a landscape that it was original. Supposing our previous acquaintance with literature to be moderately extensive, we shall probably find scarcely a thought or a sentiment that we have not before met with in a greater or less degree of expansion or prominence; the only difference is, that they now hold their places in a new combination.

Though the result might not compensate for the labour, we have thought it would be interesting to enter upon a course of reading, having the memory previously well stored with the

most striking and original ideas of our giants in literature, and to notice, as we proceed, how in the works of our most popular living writers they are continually recurring, and though familiar, yet in their endless diversity of light, and shade, and perspective, combining to form a scene "ever charming, ever new."

The subject under consideration suggests some practical remarks; for the sake of which, indeed, it has been introduced.

In the republic of letters, supposing what we have advanced to be correct, there are two distinct orders or classes. The higher order consists of those possessed of powers rare, inherent, and unattainable by effort, the creations of whose genius we are free to admire, but may not venture to emulate. In the other, and by far the more numerous class, are included all those who, drawing out the threads of thought from the productions of the former, and weaving them into the texture of their own minds, present us with a result which, if not so unique or so striking as the original, is not on that account less beautiful or less pleasing to the eye. The former class may be compared to the sun shining in his strength, the latter to the pale and silent moon, which—

"Through the ether sails,
And gilds the misty shadows of the vale,"

but whose soft and pensive light is not the less welcome because it is borrowed. The former are the mighty torrents rushing down the mountain's side, the latter the numerous artificial watercourses, by which the plains below are intersected, and into which the current is temporarily diverted, producing vegetation and fertility in what must otherwise have been dry and barren wastes.

To those of our readers who pant after literary distinction, and whose breasts heave with aspirations after its honours, permit us to say that, though you may not be geniuses, still you are not on that account to give up the pursuit, or to fold your hands in despair. Though there are towering peaks, whose summits you can never reach, there is an elevation to which, with ordinary ability and an *extraordinary* amount of application and perseverance, you may certainly attain; but its attainment will only be the result of unwearied energy and unrelaxed effort. Endeavour, by a course of mental discipline, to form habits of strong masculine thought; cultivate your taste; learn to acquire just perceptions of, and to appreciate, the true and beautiful, whether in nature or art; and, though the process may be tedious, and may make large drafts upon your patience and self-denial, the result will more than compensate you for the toil.

"Lives of all great men remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And, departing, leave behind us
Footprints on the sands of time.

"Let us, then, be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate;
Still achieving, still pursuing,
Learn to labour and to wait."

MARTIN MYRTLE.

A good conscience is more to be desired than all the riches of the East. How sweet are the slumbers of him who can lie down on his pillow and review the transactions of every day without condemning himself! A good conscience is the finest opiate. *Nemo malus felix.*—*Knox's Winter Evenings.*

ZEALOUS men are ever displaying to you the strength of their belief, while judicious men are showing you the grounds of it.—*Shenstone's Essays.*

ASSISTANCE.—Those who are constrained to solicit for assistance are really to be pitied; those who receive it without, are to be envied; but those who bestow it unasked, are to be admired.—*Zimmerman.*

TIME-STEALING.—It is well known that time once passed never returns, and that the moment which is lost is lost for ever. Time, therefore, ought, above all other kinds of property, to be free from invasion; and yet there is no man who does not claim the power of wasting that time which is the right of others. This usurpation is so general, that a very small part of the year is spent by choice; scarcely anything is done when it is intended, or obtained when it is desired. Life is continually ravaged by invaders; one steals away an hour, and another a day; one conceals the robbery by hurrying us into business, another by bullying us with amusement; the depredation is continued through a thousand vicissitudes of tumult and tranquillity, till, having lost all, we can lose no more.

POPULAR INSTRUCTION.—To instruct mankind in things the most excellent, and honour and applaud those learned men who perform this service with industry and care, is a duty, the performance of which must procure the love of all good men.—*Xenophon.*

ELOQUENCE.—Great is the power of eloquence; but never is it so great as when it pleads along with nature, and the culprit is a child strayed from his duty, and returned to it again with tears.—*Sterne's Sermons.*

PLEASURES.—Put this restriction on your pleasures: be cautious that they injure no being which has life.—*Zimmerman.*

The Review.

MACAULAY'S HISTORY OF ENGLAND. VOLS. III., IV.

THE continuation of this magnificent history is at last in the hands of the public, heralded by a larger number of subscribers than, perhaps, ever before known.

The style is essentially "Macaulayish"—the same word-painting, the same vigorous outline and splendid colouring, the same fondness for effect and admirable grouping, and (must we say it?) the same exaggeration—lights brighter, points stronger, and tints darker than truth requires.

The volumes now before us comprise a period of not quite nine years, extending from the Proclamation of William and Mary to the peace of Ryswick, contained in nearly sixteen hundred pages, and has occupied the historian seven years; and we fear that this history will be but a fragment after all; a colossal one, but still a fragment, for at the same rate, it would require the patriarchal age, both for author and readers, to bring down the story to our own times. The history is so diffusive and discursive, such repeated excursions into the more pleasant, perhaps, but less profitable regions of fancy, that though the reader is carried on by the mystic power which charms him to the page, there is a vague unsatisfaction when the work is done.

In a hasty review, as the present must of necessity be, we cannot attempt anything beyond a sketch of the whole, extracting some of the salient points as we proceed; and the reader will at once perceive that the main figure on the canvas, to which all others are subordinate, is William of Orange, standing out prominent in the foreground. He is presented to us, by this magic delineator, as something more than mere man; his faults are thrown in only as shading, to bring out the brighter side of his character with greater vividness. As a literary performance it will bear comparison with Hume's Charles II. In both we trace the hand of a master, but could fain wish that the portraits came nearer the originals.

Of the state of the Court after the Revolution, and the amount of corruption which pervaded all ranks, the historian gives a painful account:—

"From the time of the Restoration to the time of the Revolution, neglect and fraud had been almost constantly impairing the efficiency of every department of the government. Honours and public trusts, peerages, baronetcies, regiments, frigates, embassies, governments, commissionerships, leases of crown lands, contracts for clothing, for provisions, for ammunition, pardons for murder, for robbery, for arson, were sold at Whitehall scarcely less openly than

asparagus at Covent Garden or herrings at Billingsgate. Brokers had been incessantly plying for custom in the purlieus of the court; and of these brokers the most successful had been, in the days of Charles, the harlots, and in the days of James, the priests. From the palace, which was the chief seat of this pestilence, the taint had diffused itself through every office and through every rank in every office, and had everywhere produced feebleness and disorganization. So rapid was the progress of the decay, that, within eight years after the time when Oliver had been the umpire of Europe, the roar of the guns of De Ruyter was heard in the Tower of London. The vices which had brought that great humiliation on the country had ever since been rooting themselves deeper and spreading themselves wider. James had, to do him justice, corrected a few of the gross abuses which disgraced the naval administration. Yet the naval administration, in spite of his attempts to reform it, moved the contempt of men who were acquainted with the dockyards of France and Holland. The military administration was still worse. The courtiers took bribes from the colonels; the colonels cheated the soldiers; the commissaries sent in long bills for what had never been furnished; the keepers of the arsenals sold the public stores and pocketed the price."

Macauley traces this state of things, as we think, rightly, to the mal-administration of the Stuarts.

"But these evils, though they had sprung into existence and grown to maturity under the government of Charles and James, first made themselves severely felt under the government of William. For Charles and James were content to be the vassals and pensioners of a powerful and ambitious neighbour: they submitted to his ascendancy: they shunned with pusillanimous caution whatever could give him offence; and thus, at the cost of the independence and dignity of that ancient and glorious crown which they unworthily wore, they avoided a conflict which would instantly have shown how helpless, under their misrule, their once formidable kingdom had become. Their ignominious policy it was neither in William's power nor in his nature to follow. It was only by arms that the liberty and religion of England could be protected against the most formidable enemy that had threatened our island since the Hebrides were strown with the wrecks of the Armada. The body politic, which, while it remained in repose, had presented a superficial appearance of health and vigour, was now under the necessity of straining every nerve in a wrestle for life or death, and was immediately found to be unequal to the exertion. The first efforts showed an utter relaxation of fibre, an utter want of training. Those efforts were, with scarcely an exception, failures; and every failure was popularly imputed, not to the rulers whose mismanagement had produced the infirmities of the state, but to the ruler in whose time the infirmities of the state became visible."

The reason of the king's unpopularity with his Court is easily understood, when we bear in mind the social and affable qualities of the Stuarts, with whom William of Orange is thus placed in apposition:—

"Here he was less favourably judged. In truth, our ancestors saw him in the worst of all lights. By the French, the Germans, and the Italians he was contemplated at such a distance that only what was great could be discerned, and that all small blemishes were invisible. To the Dutch he was brought close; but he was himself a Dutchman. In his intercourse with them he was seen to the best advantage; he was perfectly at ease with them; and from

among them he had chosen his earliest and dearest friends. But to the English he appeared in a most unfortunate point of view. He was at once too near to them and too far from them. He lived among them, so that the smallest peculiarity of temper or manner could not escape their notice. Yet he lived apart from them, and was to the last a foreigner in speech, tastes, and habits. One of the chief functions of our sovereign had long been to preside over the society of the capital. That function Charles II. had performed with immense success. His easy bow, his good stories, his style of dancing and playing tennis, the sound of his cordial laugh, were familiar to all London. One day he was seen among the elms of St. James's Park, chatting with Dryden about poetry. Another day his arm was on Tom Durfey's shoulder; and his Majesty was taking a second, while his companion sang 'Phihida, Phillida,' or 'To horse, brave boys; to Newmarket, to horse.' James, with much less vivacity and good nature, was accessible, and, to people who did not cross him, civil."

And the Queen tried to make up for the deficiencies of her husband, but was not equal to the task; her tastes were not the most elevated, and literature owes but little to her influence. Macaulay says—

"There was no want of feminine wit and shrewdness in her conversation; and her letters were so well expressed that they deserved to be well spelt. She took much pleasure in the lighter kinds of literature, and did something towards bringing books into fashion among ladies of quality."

The time of William was marked by the most unblushing corruption; and "the standard of honour and virtue amongst our public men was, during his reign, at the very lowest point."

Amongst the darkest portraits these volumes contain is that of Marlborough, at once the greatest, and, according to this "veritable history," the worst Englishman of the day. Avarice seems to have been the prominent feature of his character:—

"Avarice is rarely the vice of a young man: it is rarely the vice of a great man; but Marlborough was one of the few who have, in the bloom of youth, loved lucre more than wine or women, and who have, at the height of greatness, loved lucre more than power or fame."

"At twenty he made money of his beauty and his vigour. At sixty he made money of his genius and his glory. The applauses which were justly due to his conduct at Walcourt could not altogether drown the voices of those who muttered that, whenever a broad piece was to be saved or got, this hero was a mere Euclio, a mere Harpagon; that, though he drew a large allowance under pretence of keeping a public table, he never asked an officer to dinner; that his muster rolls were fraudulently made up; that he pocketed pay in the names of men who had long been dead, of men who had been killed in his own sight four years before at Sedgemoor; that there were twenty such names in one troop; that there were thirty-six in another."

And even the Duchess is not spared:—

"The fondness of the Princess for Lady Marlborough was such as, in a superstitious age, would have been ascribed to some talisman or potion. Not only had the friends, in their confidential intercourse with each other, dropped all ceremony and all titles, and become plain Mrs. Morley and plain Mrs. Free-

man; but even Prince George, who cared as much for the dignity of his birth as he was capable of caring for any thing but claret and calvered salmon, submitted to be Mr. Morley. The Countess boasted that she had selected the name of Freeman because it was peculiarly suited to the frankness and boldness of her character; and, to do her justice, it was not by the ordinary arts of courtiers that she established and long maintained her despotic empire over the feeblest of minds. She had little of that tact which is the characteristic talent of her sex: she was far too violent to flatter or to disassemble: but, by a rare chance, she had fallen in with a nature on which dictation and contradiction acted as philtres. In this grotesque friendship all the loyalty, the patience, the self-devotion, was on the side of the mistress. The whims, the haughty airs, the fits of ill temper, were on the side of the waiting woman."

Another striking portrait of the sister service—the navy—is that of Lord Torrington:—

"No man had taken a more active, a more hazardous, or a more useful part in effecting the Revolution. It seemed, therefore, that no man had fairer pretensions to be put at the head of the naval administration. Yet no man could be more unfit for such a post. His morals had always been loose, so loose, indeed, that the firmness with which in the late reign he had adhered to his religion had excited much surprise. His glorious disgrace, indeed, seemed to have produced a salutary effect on his character. In poverty and exile he rose from a voluptuary into a hero. But, as soon as prosperity returned, the hero sank again into a voluptuary; and the lapse was deep and hopeless. The nerves of his mind, which had been during a short time braced to a firm tone, were now so much relaxed by vice that he was utterly incapable of self-denial or of strenuous exertion. The vulgar courage of a foremast man he still retained. But both as Admiral and as First Lord of the Admiralty, he was utterly inefficient. Month after month the fleet which should have been the terror of the seas lay in harbour, while he was diverting himself in London. The sailors, punning upon his new title, gave him the name of Lord Tarry-in-town. When he came on shipboard he was accompanied by a bevy of courtesans. There was scarcely an hour of the day or of the night when he was not under the influence of claret. Being insatiable of pleasure he necessarily became insatiable of wealth."

Though our space is limited, we cannot refrain making an extract relative to the rise of a free press in England, a subject which has contributed as much as anything to the present state of Great Britain:—

"While the Licensing Act was in force there was no newspaper in England except the *London Gazette*, which was edited by a clerk in the office of the Secretary of State, and which contained nothing but what the Secretary of State wished the nation to know. There were, indeed, many periodical papers; but none of those papers could be called a newspaper."

And of it—

"Only eight thousand copies were printed, much less than one to each parish in the kingdom. In truth, a person who had studied the history of his own time only in the *Gazette* would have been ignorant of many events of the highest importance. He would, for example, have known nothing about the Court Martial on Torrington, the Lancashire Trials, the Burning of the Bishop

of Salisbury's Pastoral Letter, or the Impeachment of the Duke of Leeds. But the deficiencies of the *Gazette* were to a certain extent supplied in London by the coffeehouses, and in the country by the newsletters."

Here is a graphic sketch of the siege of Londonderry, and of the state to which its defenders were reduced :—

"Every attack was still repelled. But the fighting men of the garrison were so much exhausted that they could scarcely keep their legs. Several of them in the act of striking at the enemy fell down from mere weakness. A very small quantity of grain remained, and was doled out by mouthfuls. The stock of salted hides was considerable, and by gnawing them the garrison appeased the rage of hunger. Dogs, fattened on the blood of the slain who lay unburied round the town, were luxuries which few could afford to purchase. The price of a whelp's paw was 5s. 6d. Nine horses were still alive, and but barely alive. They were so lean that little meat was likely to be found upon them. It was, however, determined to slaughter them for food. The people perished so fast that it was impossible for the survivors to perform the rites of sepulture. There was scarcely a cellar in which some corpse was not decaying. Such was the extremity of distress that the rats who came to feast in those hideous dens were eagerly hunted and greedily devoured. A small fish which happened to be caught in the river was not to be purchased with money. The only price for which such a treasure could be obtained was some handfuls of oatmeal. Leprosies, such as strange and unwholesome diet engenders, made existence a constant torment. The whole city was poisoned by the stench exhaled from the bodies of the dead and of the half dead. That there should be fits of discontent and insubordination among men during such misery was inevitable."

The account of two notable places, the "Alsatia" and the "Savoy," we give as a specimen of Mr. Macaulay's power of description :—

"Bounded on the west by the great school of English jurisprudence, and on the east by the great mart of English trade, stood this labyrinth of squalid, tottering houses, close packed, every one, from cellar to cockloft, with outcasts whose life was one long war with society. The best part of the population consisted of debtors who were in fear of bailiffs. The rest were attorneys struck off the roll, witnesses who carried straw in their shoes as a sign to inform the public where a false oath might be procured for half-a-crown, sharpers, receivers of stolen goods, clippers of coin, forgers of bank-notes, and tawdry women, blooming with paint and brandy, who, in their anger, made free use of their nails and their scissors, yet whose anger was less to be dreaded than their kindness. With these wretches the narrow alleys of the sanctuary swarmed. The rattling of dice, the call for more punch and more wine, and the noise of blasphemy and ribald song, never ceased during the whole night. The benchers of the Inner Temple could bear the scandal and the annoyance no longer. They ordered the gate leading into Whitefriars to be bricked up. The Alsatians mustered in great force, attacked the workmen, killed one of them, pulled down the wall, knocked down the Sheriff, who came to keep the peace, and carried off his gold chain, which, no doubt, was soon in the melting-pot. The riot was not suppressed till a company of the Foot Guards arrived.

* * * The Savoy was another place of the same kind; smaller, indeed, and less renowned, but inhabited by a not less lawless population. An un-

fortunate tailor, who ventured to go thither for the purpose of demanding payment of a debt, was set upon by the whole mob of cheats, ruffians, and courtesans. He offered to give a full discharge to his debtor and a treat to the rabble; but in vain. He had violated their franchises; and this crime was not to be pardoned. He was knocked down, stripped, tarred, feathered. A rope was tied round his waist. He was dragged naked up and down the streets, amidst yells of 'A bailiff! a bailiff!' Finally, he was compelled to kneel down and to curse his father and mother. Having performed this ceremony, he was permitted—and the permission was blamed by many of the Savoyards—to limp home without a rag upon him. The Bog of Allen, the passes of the Grampians, were not more unsafe than this small knot of lanes, surrounded by the mansions of the greatest nobles of a flourishing and enlightened kingdom. At length, in 1697, a bill for abolishing the franchises of these places passed both Houses, and received the royal assent. The Alsations and Savoyards were furious. Anonymous letters, containing menaces of assassination, were received by members of Parliament who had made themselves conspicuous by the zeal with which they had supported the Bill; but such threats only strengthened the general conviction that it was high time to destroy these nests of knaves and ruffians. A fortnight's grace was allowed; and it was made known that, when that time had expired, the vermin who had been the curse of London would be unearthed and hunted without mercy. There was a tumultuous flight to Ireland, to France, to the Colonies, to vaults and garrets in less notorious parts of the capital; and when, on the prescribed day, the sheriff's officers ventured to cross the boundary, they found those streets where, a few weeks before, the cry of 'A writ!' would have drawn together a thousand raging bullies and vixens, as quiet as the cloister of a cathedral."

With two more extracts we must conclude our hasty summary of the rich contents of these pictorial volumes, inviting our readers to the intellectual banquet:—

The Death of Mary.—"During two or three days there were many alternations of hope and fear. The physicians contradicted each other and themselves in a way which sufficiently indicates the state of medical science in that age. The disease was measles: it was scarlet fever: it was spotted fever: it was erysipelas. At one moment some symptoms, which in truth showed that the case was almost hopeless, were hailed as indications of returning health. At length all doubt was over. Radcliffe's opinion proved to be right. It was plain that the Queen was sinking under small-pox of the most malignant type. All this time William remained night and day near her bedside. The little couch on which he slept when he was in camp was spread for him in the ante-chamber; but he scarcely lay down on it. The sight of his misery, the Dutch Envoy wrote, was enough to melt the hardest heart. Nothing seemed to be left of the man whose serene fortitude had been the wonder of old soldiers on the disastrous day of Landen, and of old sailors on that fearful night among the sheets of ice and banks of sand on the coast of Goree. The very domestics saw the tears running unchecked down that face, of which the stern composure had seldom been disturbed by any triumph or by any defeat. Several of the prelates were in attendance. The King drew Burnet aside, and gave way to an agony of grief. 'There is no hope,' he cried. 'I was the happiest man on earth, and I am the most miserable. She had no fault; none: you knew her well, but you could not know, nobody but myself could

know, her goodness.' Tenison undertook to tell her that she was dying. He was afraid that such a communication, abruptly made, might agitate her violently, and began with much management. But she soon caught his meaning, and, with that gentle, womanly courage which so often puts our bravery to shame, submitted herself to the will of God. She called for a small cabinet in which her most important papers were locked up, gave orders that, as soon as she was no more, it should be delivered to the King, and then dismissed worldly cares from her mind. She received the Eucharist, and repeated her part of the office with unimpaired memory and intelligence, though in a feeble voice. She observed that Tenison had been long standing at her bedside, and, with that sweet courtesy which was habitual to her, faltered out her commands that he would sit down, and repeated them till he obeyed. After she had received the sacrament she sank rapidly, and uttered only a few broken words. Twice she tried to take a last farewell of him whom she had loved so truly and entirely: but she was unable to speak. He had a succession of fits, so alarming, that his Privy Councillors, who were assembled in a neighbouring room, were apprehensive for his reason and his life. The Duke of Leeds, at the request of his colleagues, ventured to assume the friendly guardianship of which minds deranged by sorrow stand in need. A few minutes before the Queen expired, William was removed, almost insensible, from the sick room."

Death of Tillotson.—"After the King had spoken, the Commons, for some reason which no writer has explained, adjourned for a week. Before they met again an event occurred which caused great sorrow at the palace, and through all the ranks of the Low Church party. Tillotson was taken suddenly ill while attending public worship in the chapel of Whitehall. Prompt remedies might, perhaps, have saved him; but he would not interrupt the prayers; and, before the service was over, his malady was beyond the reach of medicine. He was almost speechless: but his friends long remembered with pleasure a few broken ejaculations, which showed that he enjoyed peace of mind to the last. He was buried in the church of Saint Lawrence Jewry, near Guildhall. It was there that he had won his immense oratorical reputation. He had preached there during the thirty years which preceded his elevation to the throne of Canterbury. His eloquence had attracted to the heart of the City crowds of the learned and polite, from the Inns of Court and from the lordly mansions of Saint James's and Soho. A considerable part of his congregation had generally consisted of young clergymen, who came to learn the art of preaching at the feet of him who was universally considered as the first of preachers. To this church his remains were now carried through a mourning population. The hearse was followed by an endless train of splendid equipages from Lambeth, through Southwark, and over London Bridge. Burnet preached the funeral sermon. His kind and honest heart was overcome by so many tender recollections, that, in the midst of his discourse, he paused, and burst into tears, while a loud moan of sorrow rose from the whole auditory. The Queen could not speak of her favourite instructor without weeping. Even William was visibly moved. 'I have lost,' he said, 'the best friend that I ever had, and the best man that I ever knew.' "

RIDICULE, which chiefly arises from pride, a selfish passion, is but at best a gross pleasure, too rough an entertainment for those who are highly polished and refined.—*Lord Kaimes.*

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

Can any of your subscribers or correspondents furnish me with a suitable course of study for an articled pupil to a Land Surveyor and Civil Engineer, with more especial reference to the latter branch of the profession; naming suitable works, and, if possible, the publishers and prices?—SPERO.

Can any of your readers give me a description of a work entitled "Drouet on Harmony," adapted by Joseph Warren for the Concertina, and the object of it?—F.

The origin and full meaning of the two letters V. R., which we so often see in our church parties, and why these parties use it with such apparent importance?—HARDING.

How can the theory of the materials of the earth being originally in an incandescent and fused state be reconciled with the second verse of the first chapter of Genesis?—W. W. L.

In vol. iii., p. 33, of the *B. C.*, C. W., jun., mentions the circumstance of a merry monarch who puzzled the Royal Society by asking, "Why does a live salmon weigh more than a dead one?" Will C. W., jun., inform me to what sovereign he alludes?—DROFFHS.

Astronomical Society.—Is there, in connection with the above society, a periodical showing of the doings, discoveries, &c., of astronomers? If any such is known to you please to mention the name and price of it, and you will oblige.—J. L. J.

Foreign Languages.—Which of the languages are the most remunerative to a man who holds a situation as foreign correspondent or interpreter, either in connection with book-keeping or without it, and the best

method of obtaining a knowledge of them, also the time necessary to learn them?—ASPIRANT EDMUND.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

French for Self-Educators.—"Jean" is recommended to procure Delille's "French for Beginners," price 2s., and having mastered the groundwork, attempt to translate some short easy pieces, with the aid of a good dictionary. The pronunciation can only be learnt from a master. We should be happy to commence a junior French class in the *B. C.*, if it met with the approval of our subscribers.

The English Language.—The physical history of mankind reveals to us that, at remote periods of time, different tribes migrated from the East; that they gradually overspread and peopled nearly the whole of Europe. This is confirmed by the philologist, who points to the East, and bids us note, in the ancient language of India, the parent of our own and of most of the languages of Europe. History records, that at different intervals England was invaded and conquered by different peoples; that some of these were learned and polished, while others were barbarous, the denizens of the forest or the pirates of the ocean. These records are confirmed by the constitution of our language, presenting as it does a compound of diverse elements; a "babel," from which has emanated a tongue, at once possessing simplicity and terseness, grandeur and sonorousness.

History and philology agree that the original inhabitants of England were the *Celts*, a race which had migrated from the East, and occupied a considerable portion of the continent of Eu-

rope. But these were soon so completely driven to the northern and western borders of our island that they have left but very slight and scattered remnants of their language. The first invasion of this Celtic territory was the landing of the *Romans*, under the command of Julius Cæsar, 55 years before Christ. They occupied the country for about 400 years, and must, therefore, during that period have had an influence on the Celtic language; but with it passed away all but a few terms of the Latin of the first period, which natural objects have rendered permanent, so that we have yet to notice the great event which gave to England its name, and mark the epoch which laid the foundation of its language. The second important migration from the East was that of the *Goths*, from the more immediate vicinity of the Caucasus and the Black Sea, about 700 years before Christ; but it was not till the fifth century that their descendants first landed upon the shores of Britain. The Roman army has been withdrawn, to preserve its empire from the attacks which threaten it with destruction—the country is in an imbecile condition—when, in common with other tribes from the farther north, the *Saxons*, from the banks of the Elbe, under the leadership of Hengist and Horsa, plant the standard of the “White Horse” upon the shores of Kent. These were our forefathers, and from them have we not only inherited their massive frames and fair skin—not only their spirit of boldness and intrepidity, industry and independence, but from generation to generation have they taught us, in unmistakable monosyllables, their own noble and pathetic language. That by far the greater part of the English language is derived from the Anglo-Saxon, is proved by a comparison with other languages of the continent, of the same or different sources, and noticing their difference or similarity. To such an extent does this element

pervade our language, that it is calculated that “out of the 38,000 words of which it is composed, 25,000, or nearly five-eighths, are of Saxon origin;” and of the language itself, “as written in the time of Alfred, only one-fifth part has become obsolete to us.” The Saxons continued almost unmolested, though at feuds amongst themselves, till the invasion of the Danes, about 867. But during this time, there must have been a slight infusion of the Latin, by the introduction of Christianity by Roman missionaries, who, at least, propagated the services of their church in their own language.

With the invasion of the Danes, there was, of course, a consequent introduction of their language; but the Saxon and Danish were both Gothic dialects, so that the Danish could not have had a very great effect upon the vernacular. The Danes proper were not finally driven back to their own country till the earlier part of the eleventh century. This is called the Danish-Saxon period of the language, extending from 867 to 1066. But up to this latter date, from the first landing of the Saxon tribes, the language may be safely denominated simply as Saxon. Alfred was the great writer of the period. The Danes had not been long expelled, before the sturdy Saxon was again destined to be molested. His country was again invaded; and though he then, as we now, thought it his duty to preserve it from all marauders, he nevertheless became the conquered. His victors were the Normans, a race of Danish origin, who had colonized a province of France, and had acquired the Frank language (the source of the present French); this they introduced as a new element into ours, and especially was this the case with the higher or governing classes.

We are told that, without the castle walls, “sheep” (from the Saxon), were the objects of care of the Saxon serf; but no sooner were these useful creatures admitted within (for instance, to

the care of my lord's cook), than they underwent a strange metamorphosis—no longer sheep, but *matons* (from the Norman). Since the Norman conquest, no great immigrations of people into this country have taken place; but different circumstances and different languages have had their effect in moulding our own into the character it now assumes. The Latin, which comes next to Anglo-Saxon in the number of words it supplies, was introduced by the clergy of the Romish church, and by learned men, after the revival of the study of the ancient languages in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Greek, which may be marked next in importance, was cultivated in this country in the reign of Henry VIII.; but Greek words have been little used in our language till the present century, when the advancement of knowledge called for them. Latin and Greek words are chiefly found in that portion of literature in which consisted the particular excellencies of the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, and are, therefore, particularly the languages of science and philosophy. And as with the classical, so with many other of the European languages, we have borrowed from them the words in which are embodied the ideas of the particular art or science in which each people excelled. Thus, from the artistic Italian we have many of the terms in music, painting, and sculpture; from the Dutch navigators we have nautical phrases; and military terms from the chivalrous French.

The English, from the time of William of Normandy, may be very properly divided into old, middle, and modern. Since then, the progress of the language has been so gradual, that it is with difficulty these periods can be marked. We should consider that Chaucer wrote and Wickliffe preached, in the period of the Old English, which may be marked after the Saxon, at the Norman conquest, till the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries, when different effects must have had an influence upon it:—for instance, the introduction of the vernacular tongue into courts of law in the fourteenth, and the invention of printing in the fifteenth century. In this and the following century, the Middle English may be said to commence,—with the revival of the classics,—and to have continued till the commencement of the seventeenth. The principal writer of the middle period was the great poet, and greatest of dramatists, Shakespeare, and numerous writers in the reign of Elizabeth; and in a few years after, the printing of the present version of the scriptures, with minor events, gradually gave to the language a more permanent character. And now we have arrived at the language of our childhood; that which is dear to us, not only on account of its associations, but that it is the language with which none can vie in its thought-expressive power. This garb of thought may it be ours to use aright, and may the thoughts to which it gives life and vigour be ever worthy of their shrine.

ANSWER TO M. O. N. respecting Euclid, lib. iii., 31. He says "that he cannot comprehend how the segment A B C should be greater than a semicircle," because it is contained within a semicircle. The segment B A C is contained by the lines B A, A C, and is manifestly contained in the semicircle. The segment A D C is contained by the lines A D, D C, and is evidently less than a semicircle. The lines by which any segment is contained are called arcs, and the arc must be taken from the circumference of a circle. If, therefore, M. O. N. describes a circle, and marks from the circumference an arc, = A B, and another, = B C, he will find they enclose a segment which is greater than a semicircle; and this is what Euclid here means.—T. T.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Shaftesbury Institute.—On Wednesday, December 26th, 1855, a musical soirée of the members and friends of the above institute was held at Twyford Hall, Twyford-street, Caledonian-road. After tea a selection of music from the best masters was performed, and short addresses delivered at agreeable intervals. Mrs. Wilson presided at the pianoforte, Mr. H. W. Wilkins acted as conductor, and Mr. Berger occupied the chair. There was a good attendance, and the utmost good humour prevailed throughout the evening.

The Caxton Mutual Improvement Society, Manchester.—About six weeks ago a number of persons, chiefly letter-press printers of this city, met for the purpose of considering the propriety of forming a mutual improvement society. Several meetings were held upon the subject, and eventually an association was formed, entitled, "The Caxton Mutual Improvement Society." The first general meeting of the society, upon the books of which are already enrolled a large number of members, was held on Saturday last, at Grimshaw's Temperance Hotel, Victoria Market, when there was a numerous and respectable attendance. The chair was occupied by Mr. Wilkinson, of the *Examiner and Times*; and Mr. Thomas Partridge, the president of the society, delivered an able and eloquent inaugural address. A short discussion followed, in which most of the gentlemen present took part. After passing votes of thanks to the chairman and president the meeting separated. This society is not confined to printers, but any person, if approved of, may be admitted. The meetings to be held

fortnightly in the City Temperance Hotel, Victoria Market.

The Aberystwith Welsh Literary Society.—This society, originated by a few young men desirous of improving themselves in their native language, in October, 1855, has, we are happy to say, met with decided success. Its meetings are held every Friday evening, when specimens of Welsh poetry or prose writing are read by the members. Addresses are read; conversations on interesting subjects, debates, music, &c., generally make the hours spent both interesting and profitable. The debates, we are happy to say, are decided favourites with our Welsh members. The society already numbers above 60 members.—JOHN W.

Young Men's Mutual Improvement Association, Centenary Chapel, Stephen's Green, Dublin.—The annual soirée of this association was held on December 17th, 1855. The Revs. Thos. Neptune Hull, Wallace, McMullen, and William Guard Price (president) were present on the occasion, together with the members and friends, at which a highly interesting address was delivered by Mr. Hall. The meeting separated greatly pleased.—P. D., jun.

Madras Young Men's Literary Society.—A report from this far-off association has just reached us, and from it we learn that the society is flourishing. There was an actual increase of 30 members, and an addition of 117 volumes to the library. There are prosperous classes for discussion, English composition, logic, rhetoric, and study of the Tamil; and though the secretary concludes with an urgent

appeal for help and assistance, both pecuniary and otherwise, we think it ought to cause a blush of shame to many in highly favoured England.

St. Bartholomew's Working Men's Literary Institute, Gray's Inn Road.—The discussion class of the above institute held its usual half-yearly meeting on Saturday evening, Dec. 29th, 1855. The secretary (C. J. J. Beard) read a report of the progress of the class during the past six months. It appears that this class was first opened on Feb. 24th, 1854, and was free to any of the members, who also had the privilege of introducing one non-member each. In May, 1855, an important alteration took place; the class was thrown open freely to the public, that any stranger might speak upon the subject under discussion. The meetings have been weekly in the lecture hall, and several hundreds have availed themselves of the opportunity of listening to, and partaking in, the debates of the class. The committee were empowered to make some necessary alterations in the rules; and a vote of thanks having been given to the chairman, the meeting separated.

St. James's Literary and Scientific Society, 15, Clifford-street, Bond-street.—(President, the Right Hon. T. B. Macaulay, M.P.) The first public meeting of the elocution class was held at Burlington Hall, 21, Saville-row, on Tuesday, December 11th, 1855, Edwin Lankester, Esq., M.D., F.R.S., &c., &c., in the chair. Recitations were delivered by the members, and, notwithstanding its being the *first* appearance of the class in public, it passed off with great applause from a fashionable and crowded audience. The next entertainment will take place on Tuesday, March 25th, 1855, and a soirée of the institute will be held at the rooms on Wednesday, April 2nd.—E. N.

Cooper's Hall (Bristol) Mutual Improvement Society.—The fifth annual soirée was held on Wednesday evening,

December 26th, and, despite the dreary weather, was well attended. The hall (kindly lent for the occasion) was tastefully decorated with the flags of France, England, Turkey, and Sardinia, together with wreaths of flowers, ornamental statues, &c. Recitations by the members were given during the evening, interspersed with glees and duets by amateurs and professionals. Mr. Sneary presided at the piano-forte. Mr. Powell was in the chair; and the whole entertainment gave general satisfaction. The society is in a flourishing condition.—M.

The East Parade Young Men's Elocution and Discussion Society.—The annual soirée of this society was held in the lecture room of East Parade Chapel, on the 1st January last, at which upwards of fifty persons were present. The president, Mr. W. S. Jackson, was in the chair. After tea, Mr. J. Jowett read the report, enlarging upon the advantages of such societies. The chairman read the trial scene in the "Merchant of Venice;" and Mr. J. Webster, Conder's "Reverie," after which Mr. W. Toothill read some scenes from the "Hunchback of Notre Dame." The meeting was enlivened by music and singing, the piano being ably presided over by Miss Pilling. The walls were very beautifully decorated with a tasteful display of specimens of art, kindly lent for the occasion by Mr. John Turner. The meeting was concluded about eleven o'clock, after an evening spent in a pleasant and rational manner.—J. JOWETT, *Secretary*.

Monkwearmouth (Sunderland) Mutual Improvement Society.—The first anniversary of this society was held on New Year's Day, at the society's rooms, Whitburn Street, Monkwearmouth, when the members and friends took tea, after which Mr. Peter Yule was called to the chair, and Mr. Potts, the secretary, read the report. The chairman addressed the meeting in an excellent speech. Several temperance and other songs were sung by various

members and friends, and the evening was spent in the greatest harmony. This society constitutes, with president and vice-president, about sixteen members, and, though small, bids fair soon to extend its borders.

York Street (Walworth) Mutual Improvement Society.—The second annual soirée in connection with this society was held on Tuesday, January 8th, 1856, in the Clayton Jubilee Memorial Schools, York Street, when about 130 friends sat down to tea. The walls of the room were tastefully decorated with evergreens, and the motto of the class, "Excelsior!" appeared in proud characters at each end of the room. The chair was ably filled by the Rev. J. P. Turquand. The society was formed in the summer of the year 1854, and has steadily progressed to the present time. The number now on the books is twenty-one, and the average attendance at the meetings, which are held weekly, twelve. Nearly every member present at each meeting

takes part in the proceedings, and the object of the society is thus fully carried out. Various entertainments by the members were given, interspersed with selections from the "Creation" and Handel's "Messiah," sung by two of the visitors, accompanied by the piano, at which a young friend (only thirteen years of age) presided, to the great admiration of all present. The meeting separated about ten o'clock, after singing the National Anthem.—J. G., *Hon. Secretary.*

Seacombe Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The inauguration of the above society took place on the 15th instant, when rules were drawn up and officers elected. Although the meeting was small, yet it was deeply interesting. Addresses were delivered by Mr. Bemish, Mr. Nelson, and the secretary, Mr. Peers, upon the advantages derived from mutual improvement societies.—THOMAS PEERS, *Hon. Secretary.*

LITERARY NOTICES.

The "Library Edition of the British Poets." [James Nichol, Edinburgh; and J. Nisbet and Co., London.] This edition is intended to supply what hitherto has been considered a deficiency in our literature, viz., a uniform but economical series of our own poets; and we feel bound to say that, although Mr. Nichol and his talented editor, Mr. Gilfillan, announced a high standard by which the public were to judge their edition, the expectations induced have been more than realized. Three years' publication has just ended, and includes some of the finest poetry extant. Milton, Young, Thomson, Blair, Goldsmith, W. L. Bowles, Collins, Beattie, Herbert, and others, numbering in all 18 vols., for the comparatively small subscription of £1 1s. yearly.

"What next?—and next?"—A

pamphlet written by Mr. Cobden, devoted to the consideration of the various phases which the war may assume,—premising that the allies have lost in killed and wounded nearly as many men as it cost Napoleon, in actual combat, to gain possession of Moscow, and still Sebastopol is not wholly in our power, proceeds to mention a variety of hypothetical positions into which the contest may resolve itself. These form the basis of arguments as to the mode in which peace may be brought about, or the war continued. Mr. Cobden enters into the policy, trade, and general condition of Russia, and describes the feelings of the Russian people, religious and political. He recommends an instant withdrawal of all our forces, and a reduction of our navy.

Mr. Haydn, the author of the "Dictionary of Dates," and other useful books of reference, has just expired. Not long before, Lord Palmerston had granted him a rather meagre annuity of £25, but he accompanied it with a gift of £100 out of his own pocket. He was an industrious compiler, and has saved newspaper writers many a search.

While our last Number was in the press, Samuel Rogers, the poet and banker, expired. His death has given birth to more than the usual number of biographical notices. He had lived beyond the ordinary life of men,—we think his age was ninety-three or ninety-four,—during the whole of which, from the cradle to the grave, he had lived beneath the smile of prosperity. His society was courted by men of the greatest intellects, and the most cultivated wits of the day; and though he studiously adhered to business, he was a traveller, a *connoisseur* of art, and the friend and patron of artists. "Italy" was the last and best known of his works, and upon which, it is said, the banker assisted the poet, by expending £10,000. In accordance with his will, the whole of his collections in his house at St. James's Place are to be brought to the hammer.

Mr. Rogers has left several volumes of memoirs. These are in the hands of Mr. Moxon, and will be given to the reading world without loss of time. Rogers's personal property is said to be under £25,000. The pictures and books are possibly worth £40,000.

The Emperor Napoleon has sent to the Queen a pretty and precious Christmas gift, in the form of a lady's album. The substance of it is an artistic memorial of Her Majesty's visit to France, consisting of drawings in water colour, by the most renowned French masters. The Queen at Boulogne is by M. Morel Fatio, and the Departure from that port by M. Mozin. M. Chavet contributes two illustrations to the

royal album—the Ball at Versailles, and the Imperial Supper. The Queen's Arrival in Paris is by M. Guerard. M. Engène Lami illustrates the Arrival at St. Cloud. A few other drawings are by artists less known in England. The case is got up in the most exquisite style, and with all the richness of ornamentation for which French design is renowned. The book, we believe, was produced for the Emperor at a cost of a thousand guineas.

Mr. John Forster, author of a "Life of Goldsmith" and other popular books, and editor of the *Examiner*, has been gazetted Secretary to the Commission of Lunacy—a place worth £800 a year, and involving a residence in London. Mr. Proctor (Barry Cornwall) is a member of the Commission, at a salary of £1,500.

Mr. Dickens has read his "Christmas Carol" to a crowded audience in the lecture hall of the Sheffield Mechanics' Institution, in behalf of the funds of the institute. At the conclusion of the reading, and after a demonstration of applause had subsided, the Mayor (W. Fawcett, Esq.) presented to Mr. Dickens a very handsome table service of cutlery, a pair of razors and a pair of fish-carvers, in the name of the people of Sheffield. Mr. Dickens briefly returned thanks, and said that in an earnest desire to leave imaginative and popular literature something more closely associated than he found it, at once with the private homes and public rights of the English people, he should be faithful to death.

The Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University has given notice that Prince Albert's gold medal for the encouragement of English poetry will be given this year to such resident undergraduate as shall compose the best poem on "Luther at the Diet of Worms."

Mr. Macaulay's health is by no means such as his friends and admirers would wish it to be. He experiences great difficulty in conversing, even for a short time.

Aids to Self-Culture.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

GEOGRAPHY.

IN the word *Kosmos*—originally significant of beauty, order, and harmony—the ancient Greeks embalmed their idea of the *creation*. This was with them, however, an utterance of faith rather than of knowledge. It is true that the far-seeing glance of the master-minds of distant epochs have *guessed* that the universe was one mighty miracle of wisdom, power, regularity, and excellence; but it was reserved for later ages to prove by rigorous demonstration the exactitude and pertinency of the designation by which the earliest philosophic minds strove to express the thought which lay within them. So far as man has been enabled to comprehend what may be called the *geometry* of the works of the Most High, he has seen in each and all the most pervasive and persistent Order, in which term, indeed, all that is beauteous and harmonious is implied.

Of all the systems in the magnificent spectacle of order, which we denominate the Universe, that within which the journeyings of our own *home-planet* is confined, most nearly and most immediately concerns us—most obtains as well as deserves our regard. It contains within its circle the greater portion of our interest and fears—of our sympathies, personal, domestic, social, and national—of our struggles and hopes, whether these refer to the present or the future. Not only so, but the inborn curiosity which exists in every human soul, finding, as it does, its initiative processes taking their origin from the scenes in which its present being is cast, cannot but meditate with some solemnity on, and inquire with some earnestness into, the phenomena in the midst of which it is called to act. The scenery of earth, ocean, and sky, therefore, are not only the petty adjuncts of our present state, but also mysterious realities to be studied and understood—realities along with which our own life is, with ineffable consummateness, woven together, in solemn though seemingly anomalous communion. This unique multiformity, in which creative skill has manifested itself—this mighty mesh of phenomena—this perplexed yet unital system of appearance and law—this, to us, as yet, majestic indefinitude and infinitude

of visible grandeur and invisible force, all wisdom-guided and unerringly regulated towards the production of definite purposes—*what* is it? how can we know it? and what can we know of it? To these questionings of the spirit we are prompted by a sense of our own *being*, and the destiny with which it is fraught.

If to Reason's ear there is a silent music in the sky, and if to the imagination the untired voyagers of the infinite spaces of nature be embodied poesy; if on the purple-hued hill and the verdure-clad plain, in the unresting ocean and the bright blue ether which enwraps the terrestrial sphere "to which we are darkly bound," there are traces of a hand whose workings are wonderful, yea, ineffably and inconceivably glorious, what can our part be in the universal method—in the Kosmic harmony of creation? Granted that we have an allotted work—let us say rather a life—to be rightly and honourably accomplished; if it is to be accomplished *here*, in the very midst of the forces, agencies, influences, and operations of physical nature, how needful that we should discern those multiplex relationships amongst whose subtle, ever-active results, we must achieve the purposes of *being*. Early did this thought dawn in the horizon of the human soul; and though to the eye of sense the world was but a chaos of discordant order and diverse universality, the *faith* of the soul, overleaping the boundaries of *knowledge*, uttered its instinctive conviction of an overruling Providence in that word which best sums up and concentrates all that we can think of the universe—*Kosmos*.

But we feel the Kosmic infinitude too vast for calm and steady investigation—its forces, controlments, energies, and changes too much for our weak souls to grapple with; and hence, with the desire of definiteness to which the soul is subject, we must shut out from our mental inquiries the vast gigantic powers which, at a distance, labour to fulfil the task-work God has trusted to them, and confine our thoughts to the encirclement of orbs, whose courses, deducting some slight perturbations from afar, adjust themselves around that central luminiferous mass "which mortals call" the Sun. In this system we have three all-important notions imparted; viz., gravity, distance, and motion. In their harmonic action we have the key to the unlocking of the "chamber of secrets" of which we stand in need—the elementary second causes, with which the Creator operates to produce his grand results, to bless the universe with the possibility of permanence, and man with the joy of hope. But the unity of the solar system is even yet too vast for workable study; it outstretches the limits of human conception, except in some highly favoured moments of semi-inspiration; and hence man has thought it prudent to disintegrate *in thought* the earth from its co-travellers in space, and fix attention on the atom-unit in which his own life is to be spent, though in it his being is not to

have its ultimate and "end all." The results of his study of the earth, in its relation to the life of man, is called Geography.

Geography, then, in what we consider its true and proper meaning, is a description of the surface of the earth on which we live—its form, magnitude, and relation to other bodies in the universe—the various parts into which it may be divided—their connection with each other—their products, and the objects which occupy them, so far as regards its fitness for enabling the human race to work out the "end" of its being.

In suggesting the foregoing definition, we believe we are placing within the reach of the students of geographical science one tangible line of demarcation, by which boundaries may be laid down between this and other branches of human knowledge. Hitherto treatises on geography have had no fixed and definite limits. It has been thought right, rather than otherwise, to keep the signification of the word as vague as might be, so long as the matter comprehended within its scope and sphere was useful. Now we cannot conceive of a greater mistake than this. True as it is that science is one and indivisible in the theoretic idea we form regarding it, it is no less true that we cannot well appreciate, investigate, arrange, and generalize any set of facts unless we possess a clear, well defined, and precise centre-light in which to view them. Each group of facts formally concatenated round some one given precise idea, from which and in which they have a methodic existence in the intellect, constitutes a science; and no group, or possible collection, of facts can be explained scientifically until they are concentrated round, and incorporated into, some specific thought in which, however latent, the principle of their being is contained, and through which they acquire correlative unity and common light and evidence. So far, then, as vagueness enters into any scientific conception, it has the effect of making all that on which it shines uncertain and dim, resembling in this a telescope, in which the glass is out of focus. Precision is the prime quality in science; and no possible after-thought accuracy can rectify a primary indistinctness. We hold, then, that whatever is to be regarded as scientific should be exact, unambiguous, and intelligible—continent of neither more nor less of thought than the topic of study needs. To give this rigour of definitiveness to the word geography, we have endeavoured to connect the idea of utility with its other elements, and to impress into the very signification of the word the thought that the earth was made, and even yet exists as it is, "for man."

When treated of in this point of view geography will have two primary divisions; viz.:—

I. The earth's surface, peculiarities, and products, as fitted for the residence of man; i. e., Physical Geography.

II. The earth's surface, and the changes made thereon by its being the residence of man ; i. e., Political Geography.

Geography is in a great measure a derivative science ; many of its prime facts are accepted, incorporated, and postulated from other sciences. From astronomy it derives its knowledge of the position of the globe in reference to other celestial bodies—its form, magnitude, and motions—the theory of eclipses, the explanation of the phenomena of the seasons, &c. ; from geometry it acquires the art of representing by artificial means the forms of its various parts—the mode of ascertaining the longitude and latitude of places, and such means of admeasurement as is felt to be requisite ; from geology it learns the form and distribution of the solid portions of its surface ; from hydrography it receives like information regarding its fluid constituents ; and from meteorology it gains so much information as is attainable about its æriform enwrapment and the changes therein, as can be relied on. Chemistry details the nature, properties, and changes, past or possible, of the elements which compose it ; mechanics and dynamics describe the forces and influences which operate in or rule over its motions, &c. ; zoology and botany unite to tell the races of animals and vegetables which have peopled and do yet occupy its surface ; history records the successive changes of race, dynasty, government, condition, &c., of man during the past ; political economy explains the laws which govern these changes ; and statistics note the results which have flowed from the operation of any or all of the causes which are brought into light by history or economic science.

From what has been said above, it may be seen that unless some definite and decided limitation of the matter is insisted upon, that the strict and needful individuality of object, which is dissipated in every science, will be wanting in this, and hence it is that we again affirm that it should be borne clearly in mind that all its teachings must centre round the notion of human life—the duty and the destiny of man.

The earth is one of those spherical bodies, named planets, which constantly revolve round the sun, and derive their light and heat from it. From the sun it is 95,000,000 of miles distant : it performs its annual orbital journey round the central luminary in 365 days, 5 hours, 48 minutes, 48 seconds, and its diurnal revolution round its own axis in 24 hours. In circumference it is 24,898 miles ; in diameter, 7,912 miles : it travels at an average speed of 68,000 miles per hour, and includes in its superficial area nearly 200,000,000 of square miles.

Land and *Water* are the two primary distinctions observable in the matter which forms the earth's surface. By the word *Land* every kind of solid matter not covered with water is meant. It is distributed very irregularly throughout the super-

ficial area of the globe, and for convenience of description has received different names, in the use of which there has hitherto been much laxity, and regarding the meanings of which, therefore, we are anxious to secure greater exactitude and precision. The following definitions, though differing but slightly in their form of expression, arrangement, &c., from those found in ordinary books on this subject, will be found, we hope, to possess a greater unity of view and consistency of thought than is in general to be met with in our briefer manuals and compendiums of geography.

Land, in reference to extent and boundary, is thus subdivided; viz.:—

Continents—Those portions of land which are connected together and continuous.

Islands—Lands disjoined by water from the greater continental areas. Islands are of two kinds—*continental*, i. e., near to a continent; and *pelagic*, i. e., in the open ocean. *Islands* in irregular juxtaposition are *groups*; in regular juxtaposition, *chains*.

Peninsula—Land, of whatever shape, attached to any tract of earth, larger than itself, by any one of its sides.

Isthmus—Any elongated neck of land by which masses of land are connected.

Promontory—High land, of any dimensions, projected into the sea. Under this word may be noted the following varieties; viz., *point* is the extremity of a promontory when low; *tongue* is lower than point, *spit* higher; *cape* is mediumly elevated; *headland*, more elevated and rocky; *bluff*, a sudden jut of land; *naze*, *ness*, *bill*, &c., small points.

Along the coast an extensive series of rocks is called a reef; if they enclose water, *lagoons* or *atolls*; if they rise into sharp peaks, *needles*; if lying flat, *shelves*; if precipitous, *cliffs*; if steep and rugged, *craggs*; if lying completely but not far under the water, *banks* or *shoals*; if sometimes above and sometimes below the sea, according to its natural ebb and flow, *beach*. *Coast* or *shore* is the boundary of sea and land.

Country is an artificial political division of a continent, &c., indicating, in general, any tract of land under one specially instituted form of government.

Land, in relation to elevation, is subdivided in the following manner; viz.:—

Mountains—The loftiest elevations in a tract of land.

Mount is a single elevation; *hill*, a mount under 1,000 feet high; *peak*, a conical summit; *range*, *ridge*, or *chain*, many connected peaks; *crest*, the top of a mountain; *gorge*, a high, narrow passage between two crests; *defile*, any narrow passage between mounts; *pass*, *col*, *port*, any passage between mountains; *branch*, *spur*, &c., a chain of peaks diverging from any large mass of mountain land.

Valleys—The hollows lying between mountains or hills.

Plains—Large tracts of land, raised but little above the sea-level, extending a considerable way in the same direction; *steppes* and *pampas*, low, flat, level, treeless wastes; *deserts*, low, barren, sandy plains; *silvas*, extensive flat, wooded districts; *llanos*, plains sloping gradually upward from a river's banks; *savannahs* or *prairies*, vast extended, grassy, slightly elevated land; *table-lands* or *plateaus*, plains of a considerable height above the level of the sea; *downs*, high, open, undulating pasture lands.

Water is likewise subjected to divisions and sub-divisions, to which definite denominations may be given. Of these, the most important are those which follow; viz. :—

Ocean—That great mass of water which occupies the depressions on the surface of the earth.

Seas are, properly speaking, small land-locked divisions of the ocean, affording more than one outlet to the chief main. The name, however, has been very variously and vaguely applied, and in its present use is almost hopelessly indefinite.

Gulf, an extent of water well enclosed on three sides, scarcely so large, though it may be as deep, as a sea; *bay*, *creek*, or *bight*, an indentation of the main sea into the land, wider at the entrance than, and not so deep as, a gulf; *strait*, a narrow, elongated, straight passage between two considerable bodies of water; *channel*, a less deep though broader passage; *arm*, a shallower and less straight passage still; *sound*, *firth*, *fiord*, and sometimes *lochs*, smaller indentations of sea water into the land than any of those previously mentioned; *road*, *haven*, *harbour*, *port*, and *cove*, wholly or partially sheltered inlets of the sea. These are the chief external or seaward terms.

We must now turn our attention to inland hydrology.

Lakes are natural sheets of water, of less or greater extent, wholly surrounded by land, and receiving their supplies either from underground springs or the higher lands around them. They are of four kinds—i., without apparent inlet or outlet; ii., with affluents but no outlet; iii., with no visible affluents, but an outlet; iv., with both. *River* is a collection of small streams gathered together from the land around, and flowing in a channel or bed, and advancing with increased volume, in general, into other rivers or the main sea. The *basin* of a river is the whole area of country which it drains. A *watershed* is that portion of land at which the drainage waters which form rivers descend in opposite directions.

Embouchure or *mouth*—The place where a river joins any other mass of water: when, however, the flow of the river is disturbed at its junction by a tidal wave meeting its current, it is called an *estuary*. *Rivulets*, *streams*, and *rills* are small bodies of water in forward motion: when they flow into other

waters they are called *affluents*; if out of other waters, *effluents*. The points at which rivers unite are called *confluents* and *bifurcations*. Rivers are of three kinds; viz.—i., *fluviate*, falling into another river; ii., *lacustrine*, debouching into a lake; iii., *maritime*, discharging their waters into the sea. The length of a river is its *course*. A *delta* is the place at which a river, before falling into the sea, divides and ramifies its waters through the land.

In writing on geography in a magazine in which distinctness and precision are so highly and so justly prized, as well as, let us remark, so carefully and critically attended to, we surely shall not have done wrong if we have regarded correct definitions as essential, and have spent some time and labour in aiming at presenting to the reader some clear notions of words too commonly used with little care. Correct information is more valuable than much information; and if words must be the garment of our thoughts, it is right that they be well fitted to their purpose, and capable of exhibiting clearly the very form and fashion it is of. We have laboured with this intent. How we have succeeded, judge ye.

SECRETS OF COMFORT.—Though sometimes small evils, like invisible insects, inflict pain, and a single hair may stop a vast machine, yet the chief secret of comfort lies in not suffering trifles to vex one, and in prudently cultivating an undergrowth of small pleasures, since very few great ones, alas! are let on long leases.—*Sharp's Essays*.

MATHEMATICS.—If a man's wits be wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again.—*Bacon*.

BODY AND MIND.—As that body is most strong and healthful which can best support extreme cold and excessive heat in the change of seasons, and that mind the strongest and firmest which can best bear prosperity and adversity, and the change from one to the other, so the virtue of Emilius was eminently seen in that his countenance and carriage were the same, upon the loss of two beloved sons, as when he had achieved his greatest victories and triumphs.—*Plutarch*.

MENTAL INDOLENCE.—Men reflect little, read negligently, judge with precipitation, and receive opinions exactly as they do money, because they are current.—*Rev. R. Fennell*.

GENIUS.—The only difference between a genius and one of common capacity is, that the former anticipates and explores what the latter accidentally hits upon. But even the man of genius himself more frequently employs the advantages that chance presents to him. It is the lapidary that gives value to the diamond, which the peasant has dug up, without knowing its worth.—*Abbé Raynal*.

Religion.

HAVE WE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, APART FROM SCRIPTURE, TO BELIEVE IN THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN support of the position that reason does *not* afford sufficient evidence of the immortality of the soul, I offer the following considerations.

By common consent "*soul*" is now almost universally used to signify mind, spirit, while in scripture it is *not*; such distinction does not *there* appear; on the contrary, "*soul*" there stands for life generally, if not exclusively. Thus we read, "God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and [so] *man became* a living soul;" i. e., God breathed into *Adam*, and *Adam breathed and lived*—the breathing completed God's work. See also Isa. xxix. 8, where we read of the *empty* and the *faint* "*soul*." We know so little of mind or spirit apart from ourselves, that it is most difficult to affirm much concerning it, unless in connection with our material part, the life entire, as it now is. If we ask, Did the soul of Adam exist before he breathed, but, lacking thought, merely awaiting in unconsciousness a signal *from*, or the will of God to catch the first idea, and begin a ceaseless career? reason cannot tell. *That soul* or mind which we call our own can give less account of *itself* than it can of its tangible partner. We do not think the "*breath of God*" was *mind, spirit*, or that other or more is meant than that the *man lived*—that the entire being became active and conscious—the lungs heaved, the blood ran its ample serpentine course, the eyes opened, the ears vibrated, every sense and faculty was awake, memory opened her treasure house, and recorded her first impressions, and the soul or mind, gazing on the material universe, caught the thought *I live—that I*, however, embracing every *physical* particle of the *man*. On breathing, the marvellous creation—fearfully and wonderfully made—commenced *with the body* a joint, and, for a season, an indissoluble career. How, we ask, can that spirit, which is far more minutely acquainted with physical things than with itself, give to itself certain or sufficient evidence of its own immortality? It is said the soul is *immaterial*, and, *therefore*, immortal. It is said that man's *vast desires* tell of the same destiny. But has Addison been able to certify that man's vast desires are all in harmony with God's nature? Did not that moralist find some-

thing in man's soul which neither he nor any man could extirpate? Can reason tell how the hateful portion of the vast desires are to be disentangled from the rest, so as to guarantee the extinction of the one and the continuance of the other? Or, as one is in diametric opposition to God, how the better part can escape annihilation with the other? Are *all* immaterial things immortal? Is thought material? But who desires an endless retention of *ALL* thought? May not myriads of thoughts die out when their work is done? Is *instinct* material?—but do we concede immortality to the elephant, the horse, the dog, or the inferior creatures having animal life, but scarcely enough to distinguish them from the kingdom of nature next adjoining? Yet *God* breathed into these! The far famed moralists must go deeper into the mysteries of nature, and bring forth stronger reasons than those drawn from the immateriality of the soul, to give *sufficient* evidence of any future life. Or say, *how*, if the *first* act of mind in man depended on *breathing*, the *last* might not *also*? or that, if the building wherein the soul dwells must be shaken or broken down, the tenant may not be lost in the ruins?

If immateriality proves *future* continuous being, why does it not prove also a past duration before it joined the body? Is it not *rather* true that *God alone* hath (such) immortality? Is it not evidently true that *any* creature, *however* formed, material or immaterial, is only a tenant at will? Can reason predict, because of *materiality*, the necessary decay of suns and stars? She cannot. Her *presumption* is rather evidence of something we start back from contemplating. She is not *so far* in the confidence of Deity, and should rather hasten to admit that the duration of all things hangs not on properties or modes of being, but on the will of Him who hangeth the earth upon nothing, and who can make the adamant and the clay, the mole and the dog, as immortal as the man whom he formed of the dust to which the body must soon return.

But say, my opponents, Is a physical organization necessary to our possession of any spiritual existence? I reply, I do not attempt to limit the Creator's power. I believe that God is a spirit, angels are spirits, and that I shall be, in my spiritual power, ere long, detached from my body; but I do not go to *reason* for my hopes. When we speak of *ourselves* we include the fingers, the brain, the evanescent thoughts which give a character and bias to spirit; we include the emotional nature which trembles, if I may so speak, from the reception of a telegraphic notice through its physical agents, the ear or the eye:—body and soul are *now one* being; “we know not *what* we *shall* be.” The soul, although valueless without thought, is not more a creation with many thoughts than few. Is an *idea* a *thought*? *soul—mind*? To-day I have a new thought. Are thoughts and souls identical, interchangeable terms? When I

am to be detached from the body, I do in perfect ignorance commit myself unto a faithful *Creator*. I cannot, in the body, tell aught of the soul *apart* from it, and I do not attempt to speak of the *difference* between a created and the uncreated spirit, for *that* is inexpressible. I only maintain the impotency of reason to fathom the abyss of the future.

In all our inquiries about soul we find our subjection to physical things; but if reason has learned her immortality, let her disclose the source of her knowledge; for if *she* knows it from herself, the truth cannot be confined to any age or nation. Let her *repeat* her ground of faith. To my own mind it is clearly based on an instinctive *love of life*, and a desire to *be*, if *happy*.

If we investigate the grounds of reason's hopes, we learn *this* truth incidentally, that reason and fancy are in many minds rather *matted* in inextricable confusion than *mated*; that the imagination, instead of merely ministering to reason, has borne it away to dwell in castles of the air, subjecting facts and knowledge to theories and dreams. Hence our ghost stories, our transmigration of souls, and our gods and lords outnumbering men. We note this coalition as furnishing the clue to discover the source of reason's aspirations, as suggested before, maintaining that our lovely dreams have not any *certain* basis of hope.

We are pleased to know that a broad line *can* and must be drawn between the sterner facts of our existence and the chambers of imagery—the realms of fancy; between knowledge—the plain truths which are like lead in the rock—and the ever fitful visions which so much allure, and which have often commingled all things.

Before we consider those evidences of reason which sustain our faith in immortality, let us see what imagination has also been doing in this faith; for—

"Who, to dull forgetfulness a prey,
Left the warm precincts of the cheerful day—
This pleasing, anxious being e'er resigned,
Nor cast one longing, lingering look behind?"

or failed to colour the future; for fancy, although not favoured with a visit from some returning traveller from Hades, has bid the living follow, or listen to her voice, and take *her* picture for realities; and long before a line of inspired truth was written, she had made men more familiar with *her* paintings than with the world around them; and hence hades, the river, the ferryman, and those horrors which Moses never endorsed or taught. Are *these* to be received? are they taught in the *Bible*? are they patent and true? and yet is it not undeniable that in our most hallowed faith they are *the* pattern of our future, and most difficult to unlearn?

Let us "*prove* all things, and hold fast that which is good." If

reason taught the heathens truth in myth, let her re-open her school and teach in plainer form, and we shall be glad to hear; but if fancies are to be our guide, let us travel at night, fall over some unknown marsh, with Will-o'-the-wisp for company and added light. We think that, as the desire to *be* is pretty plainly the source of all imaginings as to the future, were every vestige of old mythology swept away, a new and potent creed would, phoenix-like, spring from its ashes. But let us hear what reason has to say. She has directed her eye to the heavens which encircle the earth, and found out wonders, to the ancients almost or quite unknown. She has found for herself a glass and a tube to peer into limitless space—to learn that her winged ally, imagination, cannot hope to fly to the verge of created things. Laying aside the telescope, she has taken the microscope, and learned that God is as great and wondrous in the minute as in the boundless. She has become a practical chemist, has melted the rocks, converted them into their most simple elements; she has mimicked nature, and harnessed her to her car; she has forced her into handmaidenship to the arts, and still sounds her echoing watchword, "Farther on!" she has learned that, when nature trembles in convulsion, riots in change, or seems in the article of death, 'tis but to re-appear in a new attire of augmented grandeur or beauty; she is, indeed, great, and bespeaks an Almighty Maker.

With all this power and glowing hope, she infers that as all meaner things survive the greatest known changes, soul—spirit is no exception to the rule, and deems it not unfair to conclude that if things controlled by mind are changed but not destroyed, the master-piece of creation, the demi-god of the universe, shall in death also merely change a mode of being, and re-appear in other guise. Reason marks how the acorn becomes an oak, an egg change to an eagle, the drifting spawn become a sportive fish, the animal kingdom, guided by a principle only second to mind, roam, full of vigour, where past generations gambolled in youth, or battled in strength; and the re-appearance of these helps to buoy her hopes; she dreams she hears the voice of the Almighty, and tries to smile at death, and hush all fear. Gathering confidence in her search for evidence, she sees how the sleeper awakes from repose, animated with renewed vigour; she notes how the fainting form, the sister of death, is recalled to life; sees or hears of the trance broken to give place to the dance of life; she sees torpid animals resume their activities at the call of nature, or nature's God; she sees all nature new-robed in spring; that the scattered grain, which fell into the prepared furrow, though once dying, re-appears in fertile, living ranks; and with these fast multiplying witnesses she argues her *own* future; deems those voices the voice of God, or echoing the voice of the departed dead among men.

But as we want something besides *hints* from nature, we must examine the evidence thus brought before us. Let us begin with reason—the mind—the soul itself. 'Tis a mighty, a marvellous creation, and knows no superior save God. It is the image of the Deity. It holds converse with the Creator *through itself*. "God made man in his own image." "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." It is ever growing by what it feeds on, and all nature, all created things, with their rapidly accruing stores, either passing silently in review before reason, or thrust upon her attention, scarcely feed enough her boundless, her insatiable hungering after the infinite.

But, may we not ask, Is *greatness* demonstrative of perpetuity? or if anything constitutes greatness save *Godhead*? Even reason is ready to admit her own exploits are puny compared with her desires, and *that* reflection almost palsies her; she admits that the greatness she revels in is not exclusively hers, but is shared in measure by her "sister," the worm of the earth; that there is no indubitably distinct mark, denoting an impassable barrier between herself and meaner things. Her own pantings after immortality are, indeed, heard distinctly in every chamber and corridor of memory, but they drown not the whisper of other living things for the same rich boon. Thus we support our position, that God has not to *reason*, and *in* and *of herself*, or by surrounding wonders, given any bond for endless life.

In the former part of this paper we referred to reason's ailments, and we will not much further tax her on that point, nor cite any of the array of proofs of her feebleness to conquer the inordinate appetites of the body, or her own wild emotions. Let her first conquer *them*, and before she is cloyed or sinks in decrepitness, and until then be free to confess that she is as little as she is great, and *could* find arguments, many and great, for ceasing to be.

But, further, although it is admitted, as it must be, that nothing known in the physical world is destroyed, and living things are multiplied with wonderful rapidity, and that animal life *now* is even a perfect copy of the original form in which it was made, this cannot *satisfy us*. Immortality is not derivable from *such* perpetuity. The rocks were not always rocks; the sea has not always been *the* sea; before the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters there had been chaos. Perpetuity is not enough for spirit—for *reason*; man covets *more*; he wants *isolation* as well as company, *identity* as well as being; not that fusion nature tells of, but the eternity of mine and thine. Man may live anew in his offspring, but not then alone. If individuality is not preserved, hope dies, reason wanders, and weeps in despair.

If reason has been taught to hope from the temporary dura-

tion of sleep or the trance, from the escape of the winged insect from the chrysalis state, the production of the blade, the ear, and the full corn in the ear, she must own that in every case the eye, the ear, the smell, the taste, the touch, has been her guide or aid; they help her up to the confines of creation, but they reach not across the tomb. True, they do not constitute spirit, but they are integral parts of *man*; each helps to form that *I* we so much love, and *here* union is *strength*; on these *she* seems to hang dependently, although God *can* make mind independent of them all.

It is because we have a more sure word of prophecy that we seek to keep reason to her legitimate ground. But she *may* have been aided in her faith by traditional truths. God may have raised the dead, and taught reason by such means; she has witnessed a deluge, and may have seen a miracle wrought; but *these* are not *her* evidences of immortality; these class best with *scripture* evidence, and to scripture we turn. There the sound of life hereafter comes with a distinctness which has made millions of hearts to leap for joy. *There* the voice increases in loudness, the insufficient becomes sufficient, and the bright hope of reason becomes dim by reason of the glory that excelleth. Life and immortality are brought to light by Christ. The New Testament speaks *out* as to the future, if it does not prosily recount all the labours and hopes of *man* to discover it; and if there is no gathering up of rays of light from various sources, not one iota of evidence is by it rejected. But leaving to those who possess not the gospel the light we allude to, scripture tells at once of one who has the keys of death and the grave, and who triumphed openly over both. Christ *came* to redeem from the grave, and he is the way, the truth, and the life.

The question before us assumes that we *have*, from some source, *sufficient* evidence for a future life. But in scripture we have taught us, not so much the immortality of separate souls as the immortality of *man*—of the *entire being*; not a sense—a faculty—destroyed or extinct, but the complete identity of each individual preserved, as in Christ's own person. On Christ's death and resurrection hinge all our hopes, for "if Christ be not raised, they who are fallen asleep in Christ are *perished*"—body, soul, and spirit *quenched eternally*! "but *now* we sorrow *not* as those who have no hope," for while some *few* ancients spoke of a *possible* immortality, the world at large *hoped not*; *now* we *know* that we shall be "like *Him*;" that this mortal shall put on immortality, corruption put on incorruption; and we read of a being "not *unclothed*," but "*clothed upon*," and mortality swallowed up of life; we read of a spiritual body, a new creature, retaining identity beyond a doubt, and of a covenant signed and sealed by God himself.

Alas! poor, erratic reason. *Here* she is ready to doubt, often

disbelieves, and wishes to know how these things *can* be? She wants to be satisfied how mind, thought, consciousness, can be preserved after death? *She* cannot tell. But in the resurrection will be a confirmation of Paul's idea as to the sowing in the fields simply grain, from which a perfectly new grain springs, while every particle of the old decays and dies out. We know that identity is more a matter of memory, that of *sameness* of *particles* of body, and that *that* is true on earth, where the body is the same and not the same, changing every hour, and is yet *our* body. God can either preserve the mind intact, without or with temporary spiritual house from heaven, or he may grant to few or to many eminent Christians an after-life privilege, in effect the same as that given to Enoch, to Elijah, and like Christ himself. But this we cannot tell; the time to "those who sleep," from Abel to the last man who dies, may be as short as a summer's dream; but when the waking and the sleeping dream of life and death shall have passed away, the trumpet shall sound, a world-wide jubilee shall begin, a thousand years be as one day, and the dead, small and great, stand before God. N.

WE ARE COMPLICATED MACHINES; and though we have one main spring that gives motion to the whole, we have an infinity of little wheels, which, in their turns, retard, precipitate, and sometimes stop that motion.—*Chesterfield*.

PLEASURES OF OBSERVATION AND STUDY.—What a large volume of adventures may be grasped within this little span of life by him who interests his heart in everything; and who, having eyes to see what time and chance are perpetually holding out to him as he journeyeth on his way, misses nothing he can fairly lay his hands on!

If this won't turn out something, another will; no matter, 'tis an essay on human nature; I get my labour for my pains—'tis enough; the pleasure of the experiment has kept my senses, and the best part of my blood awake, and laid the gross to sleep.

I pity the man who can travel from Dan to Beersheba, and cry, "'tis all barren." And so it is: and so is all the world, to him who will not cultivate the fruit it offers. "I declare," said I, clapping my hands cheerily together, "that were I in a desert, I would find out wherewith in it to call forth my affections. If I could do no better, I would fasten them upon some sweet myrtle, or seek some melancholy cypress to connect myself to. I would court their shade, and greet them kindly for their protection. I would cut my name upon them, and swear they were the loveliest trees throughout the desert; if their leaves withered, I would teach myself to mourn, and when they rejoiced, I would rejoice along with them."—*Sterne*.

Philosophy.

IS MAN THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

Nothing can be more foreign to our notions than the idea of every individual man passing through life, having to do and constantly mixing with his fellow beings, and yet neither imparting influence to them nor receiving it from them. We need not use argument to convince any reader of the *Controversialist* that influence for good or for evil is exerted by every man in proportion to the importance of the position he fills and the talent he possesses, and that all who come within the range of that influence will incline more to virtue or vice in consequence of it. The law by which mind acts upon mind may perhaps be regarded as somewhat analogous to the law which men of science tell us obtains in the material universe, by which every particle of matter influences every other particle, not merely in our own globe, but in the most distant worlds in God's boundless creation.

We do not imagine that any objection can be made to the general statement that man influences man both mentally and morally, or that man's character and condition and habits are, to a certain extent, affected by circumstances not brought about by himself. The great difficulty which presents itself in dealing with this question arises from man's nature. Man is a moral as well as an intellectual being, and as such is accountable for his actions, and is either blameworthy or praiseworthy, according to their character. And this view induces some persons to judge that an inquiry which may result in the belief of the truth of certain propositions, that in appearance do not harmonize with it, must necessarily be attended with danger. We confess ourselves to be of the number who hold that the interests of truth cannot ultimately suffer from the fullest investigation of this or any other subject. It may be there are obstacles which we shall be unable to surmount; yet, if having gone as far as reason can carry us, we be conscious of having reached the limit of the knowable in the matter, and can learn our own weakness and our inability to comprehend the agreement of principles in God's government of the world, apparently antagonistic, though really working in the most perfect harmony, we shall not have laboured in vain.

Our first proposition is, that man is the creature of circumstances in respect of the physical conditions under which he comes into the world.

We are naturally led to remark, that whether a child be born in Britain or Japan, in France or China, in Turkey or Hindostan—

whether the son of a prince or a peasant, a peer or a mechanic, of a statesman in a civilized country or of a savage islander, of a man of the highest morality or of a professional thief,—in each and every case the event happens without the individual having anything to do in causing it. To these self-evident facts no one will be bold enough to give a denial; we think, however, that many do not attach that importance to them with which, in justice, they should be regarded. There are other facts equally self-evident, as whether a child be healthy or sickly, whether it have a robust or a delicate constitution; whether it be possessed of a large capacity, which, under proper training, will be developed in desire to acquire all knowledge and all science, or be wanting in aptitude for learning;—these also, from their nature, are beyond the individual's choice. From these things it will follow, that a youth may be born to wealth, and with it have leisure for the prosecution of any pursuit that may be agreeable to him; or he may be born in poverty, and be destined to live by labour. His position may give him the intimacy of those who are high in rank and superior in intellect; he may be able to command the society of the first minds of the age, whether as statesmen, orators, or philosophers; or he may be the son of grossly ignorant parents, and be destined to move in a sphere in which nought but what is grovelling and debasing is seen or heard. All this may take place, and the individual be entirely passive.

We notice next, and briefly, that the prevalent habits of society at any given time afford an illustration of our position; that in all that relates to the shape of our clothing, the serving up of our food, and the notions of etiquette that obtain, we are clearly the creatures of circumstances.

We proceed now to show that man is the creature of circumstances in regard to his means of obtaining education.

A single glance over the surface of society will convince any man that the different classes composing it exhibit differences in education and mental acquisitions, bearing a near proportion to the amount of wealth possessed. We do not say that education is confined to the aristocracy, nor do we affirm that there are no educated men amongst the poor; but, taking a general view, we believe that the aristocracy stands highest in mental accomplishments, and we have as little doubt that the labouring classes are lowest in the scale of intelligence. We neither seek to exalt the one, nor to depreciate the other; we simply speak of facts. A little consideration will show that it is a state of things which could hardly be otherwise. Reference has already been made to the circumstances that wealth affords leisure, whilst poverty demands incessant toil; and these explain the whole matter. Of this, however, there can be no question, that whether a man's lot be cast in the highest, or the lowest, or the intermediate class of society, he is alike the creature of circumstances. It may be

objected that poverty is not a barrier to a man's being educated, and that there have been numerous instances of poor men becoming intelligent and intellectual. This we do not deny. Mr. G. Combe says, in substance, that persons with large brainal development, indicating great mental power, would by the force of their intellects educate themselves under any circumstances;* and J. Forster, speaking of self-educators, observes that the energetic efforts made by such give a vigour and a force to their minds, which is seen in all their intellectual labours.† It is obvious that these statements apply to a comparatively small number only: taking the poorer classes in the aggregate, the existing state of things, as regards education, amply confirms the principle we have laid down.

An important inquiry now presents itself, namely, the influence of circumstances upon moral character. Every society exerts an influence peculiar to itself. The primary object of many organizations is the intellectual benefit of their members: not unfrequently moral and intellectual improvement are aimed at jointly. A powerful moral influence is exerted upon youth by companions; but the place where the seeds of character are sown is pre-eminently home. Whatever appearances may be assumed in public, here parents discover their real qualities. Here virtue is inculcated by precept, and recommended by example, or thoughts of truth and right are banished. Here the opening mind is watched, and as it manifests either good or bad inclinations, receives check or encouragement; or, on the other hand, there is positive indifference as to the principles which children imbibe, whilst the daily examples that are before them of passion and profligacy infuse a deadly poison into their moral nature, and thus prepare them for a career of crime. Is it not morally certain that impressions produced in youth lay the foundation of a character that will last through life? And if so, what are we in this most important respect but the creatures of circumstances? We grant that character is sometimes modified, and that new elements are added to it, after the parental roof has been left, as admirably described by J. Forster;‡ but in the overwhelming majority of mankind, we believe the moral principles taught in the early stages of life are never eradicated. When an entire change of moral character does take place, the causes that have combined to produce it may be easily traced; and being independent of the will of the person who experiences such change, our position is still further strengthened.

Viewing moral character as affected by education, we might refer to the opinions of numerous able writers, who have contended that crime would diminish in the same proportion as the

* G. Combe's "Phrenology."

† "Essay on Popular Ignorance."

‡ See "Essay on a Man Writing Memoirs of himself."

people were better educated (though we incline to think that too much has been made of ignorance as a source of crime, and too little account taken of poverty). Whatever measure of truth we concede to their representations, we are shut up to this conclusion, that by reason of circumstances not under their control, some of the least fortunate of our species have grown up in ignorance of moral distinctions, and in consequence are easily tempted to commit crime. Appalling as this may seem, we see no way of avoiding the inference.

Our next proposition is, that man is the creature of circumstances in respect to his opinions.

And first, as to his opinions of his fellow men. We cannot think of people according to our wishes. We may feel a kind of attachment for those of whom we cannot think highly intellectually. The will has nothing to do with opinion, except, indeed, it be said that the judgment never acts without the will at the same time choosing to judge. We observe that opinion primarily belongs to the judgment, and that it cannot be predicated of the will. The judgments we form depend upon the evidence presented to our consciousness, and we feel ourselves under the necessity of judging accordingly. We are often desirous of thinking otherwise than as we do concerning persons whose moral dispositions are excellent, but who give unmistakable proofs of mental weakness. It may be said that the affections and passions sometimes warp the judgment, and this we readily concede. We can conceive of many circumstances in which jealousies, envyings, and suspicions carry on their insidious operations, and bias the mind, causing it to regard testimony through a perverted medium. Probably this takes place chiefly amongst those competing for distinction, either at the bar, in the senate, or in spheres more humble. It is perhaps owing to this that great men are underrated by their contemporaries, who feel mortified when their own powers are eclipsed. A case in point is that of Edmund Burke, who was coughed down by the aristocrats in parliament, and who, as Goldsmith says, "thought of dining, whilst the orator went on refining." But, notwithstanding these exceptions, the broad principle is undeniable. A man having to do with the world, and of a reflective turn of mind, will find himself passing judgment upon those with whom he transacts business every hour in the day. The serious looks and demeanour of one, the lightness and frivolity of another, and the unmeaning, senseless talk of a third, impress him, that the first does not speak until he has thought, that the next has a mind of but little solidity, and that the last has no brains at all: and these operations proceed upon the principle already stated.

What has been advanced prepares us for considering man the creature of circumstances in respect of his opinions in general. We believe, in all seriousness, that when a truly earnest mind

addresses itself to the examination of a theory in any department of human inquiry, it can no more affirm beforehand what the conclusions will be at which it will arrive, than a jury can pronounce its verdict in a case previously to hearing the evidence. How many readers of this work have had an entire revolution effected in their opinions on subjects discussed in its pages, by arguments of which they had not before heard, but the force of which their judgments were unable to withstand! Previously to inquiry it is impossible to tell which way the judgment may incline; it is the preponderance of fact and argument this way or that, which causes the mind to decide, as in using a pair of scales, that side which contains the greatest weight necessarily goes down. We are aware, that on many subjects a great variety of motives may influence the mind, and hinder it from forming a just judgment. Perhaps the questions that are most likely to be judged of according to strict reason are those that are purely scientific and literary, affording, as they do, but little scope for the display of passion, inasmuch as those sensitive parts of our nature, so soon touched by opposing arguments in moral and religious inquiries, are not much acted upon in these departments. But whether the mind reaches conclusions in accordance with evidence, or is biased by early education, self-love, or self-interest, will, we apprehend, make no difference to our argument. Some minds are, if we may so speak, of a philosophical construction; they do not inquire if principles that are placed before the world will agree with what they were taught in youth, but if they are established by adequate proofs. Another class adheres tenaciously to long cherished views, and will not be moved by reasoning, however cogent. A third is of such mental construction as that, when reason and interest clash, the former is overpowered, and instead of leading, is led. Now these several qualities are partly natural and partly acquired: if we consider them as the joint result of nature and education, as both are determined by events not controlled by man in judging rationally or otherwise, we are acting out a character that has been formed by influences external to ourselves.

With reference to politics, although, in a free country like this, where every measure of public concern is criticised by the press, most men have their political opinions, it is manifest there are but few who have either time or disposition for profound inquiries touching the rise of our institutions, or the science of government. So true is it of the multitude that they are the creatures of circumstances in regard to their sentiments on national affairs, that (as a great authority has lately declared) if we knew the papers they read, we might pronounce with certainty as to the political party that has their sympathies. The public acts of our statesmen likewise supply an illustration. It would not be easy to fix upon another order of educated men whose conduct is less traceable to the operation of fixed pr

ciples. To conceive of it aright, several things must be taken into account, as the trammels of party, the wishes of the sovereign, but, more than all, the demands of public opinion. When Mr. Fox (that idol of the Whig party, as he had been called) was in opposition, he exerted his eloquence against the slave trade; when he found himself a minister, his zeal abated.* But our proposition derives the most striking confirmation from the career of the late Sir Robert Peel, two of whose most remarkable measures were, the removal of the Catholic disabilities, and the repeal of the corn laws; neither being a natural sequence of his own views, but extorted from him by the irresistible force of circumstances.

With respect to opinion in religious matters, no demonstration is necessary to prove that a man who is a Christian in England would, if born in Turkey of Mahomedan parents, have been a Mahomedan, if of Chinese parents, a Pagan. But to confine our views to England. The children of Episcopalians adhere to the Establishment, and think it right; those of Independents regard the system, in the midst of which they have been reared, as most in accordance with scripture; so of the Baptists, Unitarians, and other sects.

There is another argument which, as it appears to us, may be legitimately used in support of the affirmative of the present question,—we refer to the mode of operation of the mind in the acts of choosing and refusing. Mind is acted upon by motives, and the will always is in the direction of the strongest motive; so that, in preferring one thing before another thing, or one course of action before another course of action, the will is determined by the most powerful motives presented to it, and consequently a man is in respect of such determination the creature of circumstances.

In bringing our remarks to a conclusion, we beg to be distinctly understood, that we do not deny man's responsibility. If asked to reconcile the belief of that doctrine with the views here set forth, we reply, we decline making the attempt. That both are true, we are firmly convinced; that man will ever see their agreement in the present world we think unlikely. We however honestly declare, that our sentiments incline us to regard the all-wise Disposer of events in a very different manner from that in which he is viewed by many good men. We think him more just than their theological notions make him. Where they would represent him as ready to pour forth the vials of his indignation, we should rather conceive of him as bending over his creatures with pity. Various are the talents with which he has endowed us, and the privileges with which, in his providence, he has favoured us; and we do not in the least doubt, that in finally dealing with men, these circumstances will be taken into account, and justice be done.

ALPHA.

* See Brougham's "Statesmen."

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THAT the reign of Elizabeth was, in many respects, one of the most glorious and most brilliant recorded in the annals of our country, no one will deny; but the prudence and wisdom of the sovereign should not blind us to her tyranny and hypocrisy, nor should the talents and learning of the woman be suffered so to dazzle us, as to hide from view her vanity, her pride, and her heartlessness. Much as we may admire the skilful policy which baffled the designs of the formidable league which at one period threatened to overwhelm our country with utter ruin, and the prudent encouragement accorded to commerce and adventure which in a few years raised England to a proud pre-eminence among the nations, there is yet such a dark side to the brilliant picture so often drawn of her prosperous reign, that all the palliations and excuses urged in her behalf are quite insufficient to vindicate her memory from the odium cast upon it by many of her actions.

Among the most prominent of the bad traits of her character, both in her public and private capacities, were habitual hypocrisy and dissimulation. Passing over her feigned observance of the Romish ritual during the reign of her bigoted sister, as her duplicity in this respect doubtless resulted from a praiseworthy feeling of humility, and a sense of her unworthiness to become a martyr for so glorious a cause as the Protestant faith, her conduct with respect to ecclesiastical affairs after her accession to the throne was characterized by such dissimulation, that after alternately raising the hopes of both Romanists and Reformers, she at length disappointed both, by rigourously enforcing submission to a system to which the whole of the former party, and a considerable section of the latter, could not conscientiously give their adhesion. And at a later period, although entertaining as exalted notions of the royal prerogative as any of the infatuated house of Stuart, and repressing with an iron hand the slightest symptoms of freedom of thought or speech among her own subjects, Elizabeth nevertheless, for reasons of state policy, secretly encouraged and aided the subjects of foreign powers in rebellion against their sovereigns. In Scotland, in France, and the Netherlands, under pretence of supporting the

interests of the Protestant faith, this hypocritical queen leagued herself with men whose principles she secretly detested, and aided and abetted them in acts which she in her heart considered as among the most atrocious that could be perpetrated by fallen man.

But the most flagrant instance of hypocritical dissembling on the part of this much-lauded sovereign, was her conduct towards the unfortunate Queen of Scots. Granting that Mary was as criminal as her most inveterate foes assert her to have been—allowing the evidence of her implication in Babington's conspiracy to have been of the most complete and damning character, and therefore allowing also both the justice and the expediency of her sentence,—still the gross hypocrisy of Elizabeth, in maintaining a constant semblance of affection for her frail cousin, though secretly plotting her ruin the while—in alluring her into England by hollow promises of protection and support—in manifesting to the last an affected reluctance to destroy the hated rival whose death she had so long anxiously desired, and even shedding crocodile tears when the consummation of the sad tragedy was reported to her,—reveals a nature so false, treacherous, heartless, and cruel, as to render it utterly impossible to cherish for its possessor anything like “admiration,” however brilliant and estimable may have been some of her other qualities.

We do not think with “Threlkeld” that Elizabeth is “scarcely to be blamed for her bigotry and intolerance,” because it is well known that her attachment to the principles of the Protestant faith was by no means deep-rooted: all her life she displayed a strong bias towards the church of Rome, and therefore her intolerant and persecuting enactments against the professors of that religion, and against those Protestants who refused to comply with her system of compromise between Geneva and Rome, are less justifiable than the sanguinary persecutions of her sister Mary, as the excuse of bigotry cannot be urged in palliation. It has frequently been said, that the persecuting statutes of Elizabeth against the Catholics were political measures, necessary for the protection of her throne; that, as she was under the ban of the Pope, all Romanists were necessarily traitors against her crown, if not conspirators against her life, and therefore justly liable to be dealt with accordingly. But this plea also may be urged with far greater force in defence of the policy of her sister Mary. At Elizabeth's accession there was no general rising of Catholics to deprive her of her throne, nor were there any general manifestations of a seditious feeling on their part which threatened to break out in open rebellion; whereas, at the very outset of Mary's public career, before she had time to give any cause for offence, all the influential men among the Protestants combined to depose her, and place Lady Jane Grey on the throne. If the

presumed hostility of the Catholics justifies the conduct of Elizabeth, the insurrection of Sir W. Wyatt and his colleagues affords a much more plausible excuse for the severity of Mary towards the Protestants ; and as we presume no one of Elizabeth's admirers will permit the latter plea to hold good, the former must in justice be disallowed as equally fallacious. "In fact," as Macaulay observes, "both pleas are worthless alike. If such arguments are to pass current, it will be easy to prove that there never was such a thing as religious persecution since the creation. For there never was a religious persecution in which some odious crime was not, justly or unjustly, said to be obviously deducible from the doctrines of the persecuted party. We might say, that the Cæsars did not persecute the Christians ; that they only punished men who were charged, rightly or wrongly, with burning Rome, and with committing the foulest abominations in secret assemblies ; and that the refusal to throw frankincense on the altar of Jupiter was not the crime, but only evidence of the crime. We might say that the massacre of St. Bartholomew was intended to extirpate, not a religious sect, but a political-party. For beyond all doubt the Huguenots, from the conspiracy of Amboise to the battle of Montconçour, had given much more trouble to the French monarchy than the Catholics have ever given to the English monarchy since the Reformation, and that too with much less excuse."

But if we consider the penal statutes against members of the Romish church as a piece of gratuitous and unjustifiable persecution,—for English Catholics, whatever doctrines they may have theoretically entertained, have ever practically shown their patriotic instinct to be stronger than their attachment to arbitrary dogmas,—what can be said of Elizabeth's conduct towards the Puritans ? *They* could not be accused of paying allegiance to a foreign prince—more true and loyal hearts beat not in the bosom of any of their countrymen ; nor could it be said that their religious opinions made them sworn enemies to the Queen, for the same sacred book, on whose teachings they grounded their refusal to acknowledge their sovereign as their spiritual ruler, commanded them cheerfully to obey all civil potentates as the ordained of God. It might be thought that the Queen's Romish predilections were the secret cause of her virulent animosity towards these zealous Protestants ; but, if so, how is her policy towards the Catholics to be accounted for ? and if it be allowed that her attachment to the Protestant faith was as sincere as she sometimes professed it to be, how is her severity towards some of the members of that faith to be justified or explained ? Her conduct in this matter is, in fact, inexplicable on any intelligible line of policy : it was the promptings of personal feeling, of that stubborn pride and egregious vanity, which Elizabeth seems to have inherited from her father, and

which made her hate all those who presumed to form an opinion adverse to any measures, civil, social, or religious, which she in her wisdom had concocted or approved.

V. V. endeavours to defend Elizabeth from the charge of tyranny by representing that it was her convictions of the necessity of maintaining the royal prerogative which led her sometimes to treat her parliaments and the people "with perhaps a too imperious hand;" but it was not merely in acts arising from such convictions, which no doubt on this point were perfectly sincere, that her conduct was arbitrary and unjust: some of her actions display a tyrannical and cruel disposition, arising from defects in her own personal character. Thus Hume gives two or three instances in which she resorted to martial law on the most trivial pretences, and merely to gratify her own angry passions, whereas the royal prerogative in this respect could only be rightfully exercised in times of insurrection or grave civil disorder; and in reference to one of these cases the learned historian remarks, "It would be difficult to produce an instance of such an act of authority in any place nearer than Muscovy." The rack was used by her on the slightest accusation. On one occasion, had it not been for the humanity of Bacon, this paragon of a queen would have tortured an unfortunate author because he had dedicated a book to the Earl of Essex, when that nobleman lay under Her Majesty's displeasure, she deeming this an act of sedition; and "another time, when the Queen could not be persuaded that it was his writing whose name was to it, but that it had some more mischievous author, she said, with great indignation, that she would have him racked to produce his author." And no doubt this threat would have been carried into execution, if Bacon had not dissuaded Her Majesty from her purpose; for, says Hume, "while so many terrors hung over the people, no jury durst have acquitted a man, when the court was resolved to have him condemned. * * * Timid juries, and judges who held their office during pleasure, never failed to second all the views of the crown. And the practice was anciently common, of fining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing the jurors, merely at the discretion of the court, for finding a verdict contrary to the direction of these dependent judges. It is obvious that juries were then no manner of security to the liberty of the subject." Over the most trivial matters of taste and fashion did the "Virgin Queen" exercise her imperious sway. Did Her Majesty take offence at the smell of woad—she forthwith prohibited the cultivation of that useful plant. Did the long sword and high ruffs then in fashion displease her royal eye—officers were sent to break every man's sword, and clip every man's ruff, which was beyond certain dimensions. Did one of her nobles marry without her permission—a long confinement in prison was the penalty of his

presumption. Did one of the semi-piratical expeditions of her naval captains prove unusually successful, the covetous Queen, not content with the stipulated share of a tenth, must needs extort from the adventurers half their booty. All such actions as these are evidence of a tyrannical, overbearing nature, so essentially unfeminine, as of itself to check most effectually any very warm feelings of "esteem" or "admiration" for the "great Queen Elizabeth."

The excellencies of Elizabeth's character, indeed, are almost entirely of a masculine nature, and were displayed chiefly in her official capacity ; while of all the gentler and more fascinating qualities of her sex she was entirely destitute, and in her private life there is very little to admire. Her hollow-heartedness and cruelty, of which so many instances have been handed down to us, are personal characteristics of no very amiable kind ; and her inordinate vanity, which permitted, or rather exacted from her courtiers, the most fulsome and disgusting flattery, from which a right-hearted woman would have turned with loathing, and her choice of those favourites whose connection with her is of so mysterious and suspicious a nature, are certainly not calculated to raise her character in the eyes of its most devoted admirers. It is to her public life alone, then, that we must look for the evidence of those qualities and virtues which entitle her to our respect ; and what are the conclusions to be drawn from our consideration of that career ? In her reign our country certainly made great progress, both in civilization and prosperity. Literature, learning, and the muses flourished greatly under her patronage ; and many of the most illustrious names in the poetry and the drama of our country belong to "the Elizabethan age." Our adventurous mariners, encouraged and patronized by their Queen, carried the flag of England into countries then almost unknown ; and by the glowing reports they brought home of the surpassing beauty and marvellous wealth of the New World, excited that spirit of maritime adventure which laid the foundation of that gigantic commerce which has made England emphatically the "mistress of the seas." In thus fostering the spirit of commerce and a love of maritime discovery, Elizabeth showed much sagacity ; and in the selection of her ministers she was equally judicious, or fortunate. The men whom she gathered around her to assist in the arduous task of guiding the vessel of the state through the storms and perils which at that period gathered thick around it, whatever may have been their private character and moral worth, were undoubtedly skilful and prudent statesmen, and to them indeed belongs whatever merit attaches to the public measures of a reign in which our country made perhaps greater advances in material prosperity than in any other, before or since. But, as we have before remarked, there is a dark side to this brilliant picture. While England

was thus increasing her wealth and power, extending her commercial operations, and exciting the envy or the admiration of other nations, what scenes of cruelty and injustice were, almost unnoticed, being perpetrated at home! The black gallows-tree at Tyburn could tell of a Barrow and a Greenwood, whose noble spirits there expiated the crime of fearing God rather than man; the stones of the old borough of Southwark could relate a sad story concerning the cruel death of the youthful John Penny, burnt at the stake for a too strong devotion to the Master whom he served; the little town of Bury could add its testimony of a Copping and a Thacker, who there suffered an ignominious death for a similar cause; the gloomy walls of Newgate had seen their tens and scores of the victims of persecution there linger out a miserable existence, till starvation or the polluted atmosphere of their dungeon removed them to their eternal inheritance; the market-places of many country towns had witnessed the mutilations, the brandings, and the scourgings of the faithful servants of Christ; and dismal, pestilential gaols could tell many a harrowing tale of the awful sufferings, through years of weary imprisonment, of hundreds of humble, faithful souls, "of whom the world was not worthy."

"With their names
No bard embalms and sanctifies his song;
And history, so warm on other themes,
Is cold on this."

In conclusion, then, granting Elizabeth to have been a prudent and sagacious sovereign in many respects, and a liberal patron of literature and commerce, when we remember her inordinate pride and overweening vanity—her suspicious favouritism towards some of the most weak and worthless of her nobles—her hypocrisy and her cold-hearted cruelty—her tyranny and bitter persecutions, without even the excuse of bigoted zeal,—we are compelled, notwithstanding her few good qualities, to pronounce her character, as a whole, to be utterly unworthy either of "esteem" or "admiration."

Islington.

B. J.

EXAGGERATIONS.—Never to speak by superlatives is a sign of a wise man, for that way of speaking wounds either truth or prudence. Exaggerations are so many prostitutions of reputation; because they discover the weakness of understanding, and the bad discerning of him that speaks. Excessive praises excite both curiosity and envy; so that if merit answer not the value that is set upon it, as it generally happens, general opinion revolts against the imposture, and makes the flattered and the flatterer both ridiculous.—*Sterne.*

Politics.

WOULD PARLIAMENT BE JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING THE OPENING OF THE CRYSTAL PALACE ON SUNDAY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

SUCH is the innate depravity of man, that he cannot receive Christ's religion unaltered. He either takes from or adds to it; the limit of the former being infidelity, of the latter Romanism. The two classes were personified in the Lord's time by the Sadducees and Pharisees; and their existence in this age is patent to all, there being in our land those who observe gospel institutions with most superstitious reverence, and those who regard them with no reverence at all.

He who would bear himself worthily in the present debate, must strive to attain the golden mean of these extremes, exploring the Divine will with an intelligent belief in the Father's continual carefulness for man's well-being, and an unflinching allegiance to the teachings of his word; but also, as knowing he will find opposed to him, not only the devout, but, as he believes, misguided Christian, but also the Neologian and the infidel, he will be prepared to combat the latter upon their own ground, arguing independently of the Bible: for, blessed be God! that which he ordains is always the most reasonable, the most plausible, and productive of the happiest results.

It will have to be proved that the holy observance of the sabbath is universally and perpetually binding; that the legalized opening of the Crystal Palace on that day will prevent its holy observance, and, without conferring any benefit, will be a source of vast evil to our land; and therefore, parliament would not be justified in allowing its opening on the Lord's day.

That the holy observance of the sabbath is universally binding, is evident from *its original institution, from the fourth commandment, and the example and precepts of Christ and his apostles.*

The sabbath was originally instituted immediately after the creation. This is evident from the words of the Spirit, penned by Moses, Gen. ii. 2, 3. This history is mostly consecutive, and events are mentioned in the order of time. Instituted in the beginning, it was instituted for all the posterity of Adam alike. Its end was twofold—to commemorate God's glory displayed in creation, and to give man the opportunity of attaining and increasing holiness—an end interesting all men alike, and

therefore the obligation to observe the sabbath rests alike on all peoples and all ages.

This passage shows that its institution was anterior to the Levitical dispensation, which fact is evident from many other considerations. The period of seven days is frequently mentioned before the promulgation of the Mosaic law. If there were no stated periods of seven days, how do we account for the fact that that period was so uniformly chosen? For, be it remembered, that the division into weeks is not natural, as is that into months or years. Why, if there were no division of time into weeks, did God declare to Noah that the flood should come in *seven days* (Gen. vii. 4)? or Noah twice wait *seven days* exactly before he sent out the exploring dove (Gen. viii. 10, 12)? or the Israelites eat unleavened bread for *seven days* (Exod. xii. 15)? And why do we hear of the "sixth day" (Exod. xvi. 22), when it is certain, from what is contained in the first verse of the same chapter, that the day of the month is not referred to? And why did the Israelites, without command (for it is plain from the succeeding verses, 23—26, that Moses had not yet told the people what God had told him, ver. 5), gather double on the sixth day? Did they not know the morrow was God's sabbath?

The sacred record does not inform us whether or no the patriarchs observed the sabbath. But this fact can give rise to no argument hostile to us, since it was more than 700 years after the Mosaic law was given before there is mention made of any great departure from the sabbath. The notices respecting the sabbath in Jewish history are few and far between, but they do not go to prove that in the intervening epochs it was unobserved.

By the wording of the fourth commandment, God declared that he had instituted, blessed, and sanctified the sabbath some time previously to the giving of the moral law. It is therefore plain that the sabbath was not a mere Jewish institution, abrogated together with the ceremonial law, but one affecting all mankind, as universal as the institution of marriage.

That the sabbath was instituted in the beginning is also evident from the fact that other nations, who could not have received the practice from the laws, regarded each seventh day as holy. The testimony of Hesiod is—*Εβδομον ἡμεραν ἡμεραν*—the seventh day is holy. Homer says the same. Theophilus of Antioch called it "The day which all men celebrate." Philo declares that "the seventh day is a festival to every nation." Like statements are made by Callimachus, Porphyry, Linus, Lucian, Eusebius, Tibullus, Josephus. It is impossible that this practice was universally fallen into by chance; it could not have come from the Jews, and the conclusion is that they had it from tradition from Noah and his sons. For, what reason could there

be for choosing the period of seven days? As has been said, it is not a natural division of time. "For other divisions of time we can find reasons—obvious, necessary, and natural. The daily rotation of the earth on its axis; the completed cycle of lunar phases; the sun imparting to the revolving worlds the blessings of cold and heat, summer and winter, seed-time and harvest, are phenomena quite adequate to explain why we should break up our life into *days*, and *months*, and *years*; but for weeks we have no such reason, nor, indeed, *any* reason to give, except that it is one of the original appointments and laws of God. It is an arbitrary period, the recurrence of which neither nature nor reason seems in any way to have marked out for us, but which, on the all-commanding authority of revelation, men have been taught to set apart to sacred remembrances."*

The fourth commandment is part of the moral law, which is generally acknowledged to be universally binding. It was given in the like impressive manner, engraved on stone, which typified endurance, promulgated with the same awful accompaniments, and couched in the same absolute phraseology with the other precepts. Unlike the ceremonial observances of the Jews, it was not merely recorded in a book, but was kept in the ark: it was twice written by the finger of God himself. Must it not, then, together with the other nine precepts, be of pre-eminent importance? And is it consistent with common sense to say, that nine of the commandments are to be observed, and one not? For the fourth commandment is of an equally moral character with the other nine, being *universally applicable*; for the ends of its institution were—"to give the laborious classes of mankind an opportunity of *resting from toil*—to be a *commemoration* of the wisdom, power, and goodness of God in the creation of the universe—to furnish an opportunity to man of *acquiring holiness*, and of *obtaining salvation*"†—ends affecting all men alike. All need a periodic rest, as has been indisputably proved by Professor Miller, in his excellent little book, "Physiology in Harmony with the Bible." All have souls to save. And all are bound to admire and adore the power, wisdom, and love of God, as displayed in the creation of the material universe—a duty for which God appoints a time and a method, thus enabling us to perform it in the best manner. From these considerations, it is plain that the fourth commandment is as much a moral precept as the other nine.

None will deny that our Saviour was careful to observe the sabbath; not, however, in the superstitious manner of the formalists, but with intelligent reverence. And many years after, St. John speaks of a Lord's day; and history tells us, that when the exile of Patmos penned the Apocalypse, one day out

* Rev. Daniel Moore.

† Dwight's "Theology."

of every seven was observed by the Christians, under the title of the *Lord's day*, a term which could only be applied to a day consecrated to God, wherein secular affairs were unattended to. If this day were not so consecrated, would the Holy Spirit, through John, have written that word, and given his sanction to a false doctrine, excessively dangerous in its effects? Both in scripture and out of it we have abundant proof that the apostles and early Christians observed a weekly holy day, which, however, was not called sabbath, lest it should cause confusion—the Jewish sabbath not being formally abolished until the fall of Jerusalem.

Nor is the obligation to observe the sabbath lessened by the fact that the day has been changed. It was the *sabbath* God blessed and hallowed, not the *particular day*. The sabbath is still retained—the day is altered. But the change could only be made by God himself: and so he put it into the minds of his inspired apostles. And how reasonable the change! It is a perpetual lesson to Jew and Gentile. A most reasonable change. The seventh day was chosen as a sabbath, that God's creative love, power, and wisdom might be glorified. Shall not this, as pre-eminently evidenced in redemption, be rather celebrated? The end of a work is more worthy than its commencement; the former creation decays, and it is destined to fiery destruction—the latter grows even more glorious, and eternity alone is its boundary. Shall not the latter have superior glory, as reason urges, and prophets foretold, and God declared it should? And shall not our joy-day be rather that on which the Saviour left the tomb, than that on which he lay within it, in the depth of his humiliation?

That the sabbath was observed on the first day of the week after Christ's resurrection, is apparent to every reader of scripture. On that day twice did Jesus meet his disciples; on that day did they meet together; on that day was the Lord's supper celebrated; on that day those of Galatia and Corinth were admonished to make contributions for the poor; on that day John "was in the Spirit."

It is not strange that this observance of the Lord's day is not enforced in the apostolic epistles, for it was taught in a better way—by example; and, moreover, be it remembered, the apostles avoided offending, unnecessarily, Jewish prejudices. Nor need any surprise be felt that it was not mentioned in St. James's letter to the Gentile converts, for that letter merely treated of the points in dispute. That the Lord's day should be observed, seems to have been considered as much a duty as to abstain from theft and murder, concerning which there is no precept in the letter. Just so, in the Christian church, for eighteen centuries, it has, by the majority, been considered since.

And now, how are we to "keep holy" this sabbath? The day, thus instituted by God—its observance by all commanded,

its neglect, cause of direst penalties, its due appreciation, source of so great blessings—is sanctified to God—is to be a day for his work, not our own—for spiritual employments, not secular—is to be observed as he has appointed—is to be a day for public and private worship—for devout praise to God, and for labouring to make our calling and election sure. Time, thoughts, conversation, actions, all are to be devoted to God. We are not to do our own pleasure on his holy day, but are to call the sabbath a delight, the holy of the Lord, and honourable, not walking our own way, finding our own pleasure, speaking our own words (Isa. lviii. 13). And God hath promised with rich blessings to dower those by whom his sabbath is observed, while to him who profanes its sanctity come the fearful tones, “Because thou hast not kept my sabbath from polluting it, but hast followed thy pleasure on my holy day, I will pour out my fury upon thee, I will spew thee out of my mouth.”

“The sabbath was made for man.” Glorious truth! The Father, ever mindful of our best interests, hath prepared an ordinance suitable to our nature, and calculated to aid us in our spiritual progress. But this ordinance, to fulfil the ends of its institution, must be observed in accordance with the will of God. To say man is right in otherwise observing it, is as ridiculous as to declare that a newly-wed daughter, receiving from her father a furnished house, as dowry, would be justified in setting it on fire. And this sabbath, if made for man, is made for all. Some have no right to employ others on that day. But if the Crystal Palace be opened on the Lord’s day, many must be deprived of their sabbath rest—on the railway-lines, in the palace, at the houses of entertainment around. These shall be pressed into unhallowed toil, and for these shall the sabbath bell toll in vain, and their children grow up into vice for lack of parental care and instruction, and their families almost lose affection for the fathers they seldom see.

And then the religious for miles around shall miss their sabbath sanctity. The erst quiet roads shall resound with the din of vehicles and the roar of holiday voices, and at evening shall arise the discordant noise of senseless shoutings and lewd songs as the intoxicated crowds roll by.

Then, forsooth, the sabbath God has sanctioned is to be spent in the Sydenham Palace, and the Christian of the nineteenth century is to worship God one part of the day, and Belial the other—to attempt to do God’s pleasure one half, and his own the other half—to serve God and mammon.

Then shall the sabbath breaker be no longer ashamed. Under the broad protection of a law, legalizing sin, he is to act openly in defiance of Heaven, and (to use the words of an eloquent divine) “with royal countenance on the plea that he wishes to enlarge the powers which God hath given him; nay, it is much if he parrot not, at infidel bidding, the audacious pretence that

he would offer a tribute of admiration to nature and to nature's God! Oh, brethren! when will the race be extinct who seek to betray the Son of man with a kiss?" "Man's heart," says Professor Miller, "by nature turns not to but from the Creator; and it is not by or from nature, but by and from a wholly different source, that the knowledge and love of him can ever come."

Then shall sceptics exult, and Romanists rejoice in increased hope that England shall yet again bow to papal sway. Indeed, "it cannot bode good to the cause of God and his truth when Herod and Pilate are made friends; when the Romanist and the Neologian are urging the same forms of sabbath observance; when Gebal, and Ammon, and Amalek—the man of science, the man of pleasure, and the man of scrip and shares, are all intent on the same scheme of social amelioration."

Can such things be? Is christian England christian no longer? Hath God withdrawn his countenance altogether? And yet it is prated that such a course would elevate our people, advance our national character, benefit our country!

Those who believe in God's Bible can never hold such opinions—they know that they may not by means of evil lay hold of good. But all will not own God's book the book of credence. Therefore it should be shown that, by secular reasoning, the opening of the Crystal Palace will not be productive of good, save, perhaps, to the pockets of a few interested directors, who now, putting on the garb of philanthropy, preach workman-rights, and "wish to keep pace with the age," and—raise the price of shares!

It is owned that the workman needs rest; nature imperatively requires it, both for the body and the brain; and physiology teaches that in seven days we should rest one. And the merciful Father hath chosen this as a rest—appointed a sabbath on which, in comparative repose, the weary body may be rested, and the mind refreshed and invigorated by being turned into a new channel—the spiritual. And again, physiology shows that exactly the species of rest pointed out in the scriptures is the best rest for body and soul.*

It is owned, also, that the working man needs recreation. But this must not interfere with his rest. Oh, that British masters would give up to their white slaves some small portion of the week! Happily, in many cases this is done, and the practice is even now becoming more general.

It is owned that the state of England's working men is deplorable. A remedy is needed. The most obvious remedy is a Maine law. But it is urged, that the sight of nature's beauties, and art's marvels, and fancy's master-pieces, shall raise the workman's mind, shall remove it from the base and ignoble, shall keep him from sensuality and crime. Yet what have the most

* See Professor Miller's "Physiology in Harmony with the Bible."

splendid picture galleries of Europe done for the demoralized population around? "It is well known that the brigands and mountain robbers in the vicinity of Rome pay regular visits to the picture galleries in that great metropolis of ancient art—that many of them are even admirable judges of the merits of a painting; yet who but our English adversaries of the sabbath ever dreamt of such influences as these causing the Ethiopian to change his skin, or exorcising the legion of demons from a demoralized population? This were indeed to 'bind Behemoth with a straw.' "•

Nor is it likely the workman will fall less into debasing vice at Sydenham than at home. For are there not public houses round about the Crystal Palace? and are not intoxicating liquors to be sold within its walls? What scenes of drunkenness and riot have been witnessed in Sunday pleasure gardens, which yet appeal, like the Crystal Palace, to the higher tastes of our nature! It is easy to predict—infallibly, too—the result of the sabbath opening of the Crystal Palace. And there shall congregate the pickpocket, the dissolute, the shame of womanhood, "all coming from far to keep each the sabbath of their vocation—to worship at this great metropolis of immorality and sin."

Once more. If the Sydenham Palace be opened on the sabbath, smaller exhibitions must, and places of night amusement, and shops—thus destroying the public sense of the sacredness of the day, and paving the way for ordinary secular labour; and, by a natural sequence of events, the workman will at length find that for seven days' labour he obtains only the same wage as formerly for six.

This done, will not our land follow in the wake of continental nations? With the sabbath shall religion depart from our desecrated shores. Morality must follow, and with her all national excellence and order, leaving the coast clear for tumults, anarchy, and ruin. "The history of our country and of our working men, would resemble that of Samson. It would be a tragedy in three acts. The first act would be, the working man, like Samson, resting in the lap of sensual pleasure. The second would present him grinding at the wheel, and treading his monotonous round of work, work, work, amid intellectual darkness and moral night. And when once this was the case, might not the third act of the gloomy tragedy be expected soon to follow, and the working man be seen seizing the pillars of the social edifice, and involving himself and his oppressors in a common ruin?"†

God grant it otherwise! Let the working man keep his sabbath well—shut up each public house—and when the sabbath is holily observed, then shall religion, dispensing from full treasures rich blessings, with gentle peace, calm sobriety, smile; affluent domestic love, following in her train, bless our glad land. And

* "News of the Churches."

† Rev. Andrew Thomson, Edinburgh.

from the approach of these shall fly dark superstition, ignorance, and crime, and the Father shall smile upon the land exalted by righteousness.

If these things are so, may Parliament authorize the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Lord's day? If the contemplated opening will open the floodgate to that torrent which has cursed continental Europe; will deprive many of their sabbath rest, and many others of their sabbath quiet; will bestow no benefit upon the workman, but will pave the way to greater crime and greater labour, with unincreased reward, and cause the loss of that good order, morality, and righteousness which exalt a nation; and, moreover, will be an impious affront to God, and a wanton disregard of his commandments, then Parliament may not legalize it. Such an act would be both inexpedient and opposed to the law of God. But even were it expedient, should the christian government of a christian land so dishonour Christ and practically deny his gospel as to do evil that good may come? As says Tupper:—

“Do ill that good may come.—So Satan spake.
Woe to the land deluded by that lie!
Woe to its rulers, for whose evil sake
The curse of God may now be hovering nigh!
Up, England, to avert it!—cast away
The words of bad expedience! Is it wise,
Or right, or safe, for some chance gain to-day,
To dare sure vengeance on to-morrow's skies?
Be wiser thou, dear land, my native home!
Do always good—do good, that good may come;
The path of duty lies before thee plain.”

Camberwell.

THRELKELD.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

WE have passed the dark age when it was thought that too much learning was not good; and now, with mental aspirings, exclaim, as Goethe did on his death-bed, “Light! More light! More light!” A nation's advancement is much dependent on her boundless freedom and mental advantages. If we wish her to make rapid and continual progress, we must not chain her books—shut up her portals of learning and choice works of art from all but the favoured few; we must tear down the barriers which divide desire and great works; we must allow the *jeune d'esprit* to have access to the most choice works of mature age; and then knowledge will spread and blossom as the rose.

It will be our aim to show that the public would be morally improved by the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays, as the current of thought would be more directed to the great First Cause,—if we succeed in so doing, we shall be able to readily grant that Government would be justified in giving sanction to the measure.

We are informed that “the most important objects are to

teach a great practical lesson in art." Now very few indeed but the most ignorant and bigoted could object to a people becoming acquainted with all the productions of man's ingenuity, as those works so well reveal the advanced or retrograded state of a nation, which is of so much importance to the advance of civilization. We perceive that the most enlightened devote more of their time to works of usefulness, whilst the most barbarous devote theirs to the facture of gods of wood and of stone. The former aim rather to delineate nature, whilst the latter strive to form the most hideous monsters. We make comparisons between the past and the present—between the advanced state and the puerile state of barbarism—and are led onward and upward. Without freedom there is no connecting link between the decaying and the rising generations—usefulness ending with the existence of the useful. By opening the Exhibition, we open the gates of freedom and wisdom to the world. We shall have "specimens of the various phases through which the arts of architecture and sculpture have passed, commencing from the earliest known period down to modern times," and shall be enabled thereby to notice the growth of intelligence, and the vast superiority of modern conceptions.

Let us ask those persons who object to the Palace being visited on a Sunday, what injurious effects are likely to result therefrom? One will affirm that it is a defamation of the sabbath; another, that it is a wrong direction of the talents committed to our charge: and it is questionable if either of them have weighed the *pros* and *cons*, or reasoned without prejudice. In the first place, what are the works to be exhibited? Are they in semblance to Tussaud's Chamber of Horrors, or are they of that class which will turn the current of thought into a good, fructive channel? I think none will question the reply—They are neither immoral nor irreligious, but of such a kind as fill the mind with wonder and delight. They create a multiplicity of new ideas, and incite the mind to activity. We notice the busts or paintings of Homer, Milton, Newton, and Franklin, and a thousand covered thoughts flash through more foul ideas into ascendancy and action. Their lives, works, and all our recollections of them flow before us; and as a good sermon filleth the listener with good thoughts, so also doth the sight and study of great men put worthy sentiments into the mind of the contemplator. We turn from the objects in the interior, and view the wonderful works of nature which surround the exterior. Successive scenes seem to rival each other, and perfection in arrangement and beauty seem paramount. The meditative mind is delighted with noticing the characteristic features of nature. To see the lily, the rose, and the whole category of vegetable nature fed from one soil; and all differing in shape, size, odour, and colour. These boundless objects of study enrich the mind, and lead the beholder to use the words of one of our poets:—

“Look around,
And tell me, Shall we to blind chance ascribe
A scene so wonderful, so fair, and good?”

Thus the idea of a God of chance is superseded and changed by one of wisdom and might. The results of a visit can scarcely be otherwise than morally beneficial, and, perhaps, much better than if he had attended the ceremonies of some of our churches, as it is not merely by telling a person that God is all-wise and all-powerful that the full conviction of the accomplishment of such grand results are produced. He must be made to see with his own eyes what the Almighty *has* already done, and what he is now doing in all the regions of universal nature, which lie open to our inspection. And this cannot be effected without directing his contemplations to those displays of intelligence and power which are exhibited in the structure, the economy, and the revelations of the material world. In the works of nature a God is seen—

“In each green tree that proudly spreads his bough,
As in the tiny dew-bent flowers that bloom
Around its roots.”

To a contemplative mind, the good which may be culled from a visit may furnish it with material for weeks of thought; and when the mind is kept in exercise the good is more than superficial and temporal—it is deep and lasting. But we may be told that all who go will not reflect on the works, and trace a First Cause in all things. We would ask, What would be the motives of the majority? Surely something more than idle curiosity would actuate their motives! And even supposing there might be some who would go as such, it would not be presuming too much to affirm that they would be considerably benefited thereby, as the order, beauty, and striking characteristics would enforce themselves even on the superficial and careless mind. Even to such persons an impression must be produced that—

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul.”

It has been our aim to point out the good that would result from the opening of the building on Sundays; and unless better reasons can be shown that the good would not counterbalance any possible evil, then we have no hesitation in saying that Parliament would be justified in giving sanction to the measure.

“There is a lesson in each flower,
A story in each stream and bower;
On every herb o’er which you tread
Are written words, which, rightly read,
Will lead you, from earth’s fragrant sod,
To hope, and holiness, and God.”

Manchester.

J. L. WISHWELL.

Self-Educator.**LESSONS ON FRENCH.**

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

THE French language is the language now current among the descendants of the allied Germans, who styled themselves "Franks," or "Freemen;" of the Celtic and Belgic population that survived the Roman and the Frank Conquest; and of the Romans that remained in the country after its subjugation by the Franks.

The elements of the French language will therefore principally consist of German, Celtic, and Latin; and from the length of the time during which the Romans held France under their power, it is only to be expected that the Latin should predominate.

Formerly, when there was much less communication between the parts of that extensive country than at present, there was great and almost essential difference between the languages of the inhabitants north and south of the Loire; the characteristics of the dialects spoken in the four quarters of the country being as follows:—

In the north-east the High German had more influence than in any other part.

In the north-west the Celtic and Scandinavian.

In the south-west the languages of Spain.

In the south-east the Latin or Italian.

Even now there is very great difference between the French of the capital and that of the southern parts of France. At Issoire and St. Fleur, the provincial dialect is scarcely intelligible to a Parisian, and still less in Provence.

The standard French is of course the French as it is spoken by well educated natives of Paris; and to this we shall, for the future, confine our attention.

In the lessons connected with this course, we shall strive continually to remember that we are writing for "Self-Educators," and this we beg our readers never to forget. We cannot supersede the use of laborious application and patient diligence, but we shall endeavour to give such directions as may prevent loss of time and waste of labour, and such instructions as shall be necessary and sufficient to guide the student by the easiest and shortest way to the attainment of his object.

It will be convenient to adopt the usual divisions of grammar, and to treat in succession of—

I. THE PRONUNCIATION.

II. THE INFLEXIONS.

III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF SENTENCES.

IV. THE LAWS OF VERSIFICATION.

I. PRONUNCIATION.

The French alphabet is like the English, except that it has no *w*, and *k* is found only in foreign words.

The following table exhibits the letters in their usual order, with their alphabetical names, and their usual pronunciation:—

Letter.	Name.	Sounded like	Letter.	Name.	Sounded like
A	ah	a in father	K	kah	k in key
B	bay	b in but	L	ell	l in lamp
C	say	{ c in cinder	M	emm	m in me
		{ c in can	N	enn	n in no
D	day	d in dim	O	o	o in not
E	ay	{ a in ale	P	pay	p in pin
		{ e in met	Q	coo	k in keep
F	eff	f in fan	R	air	r in run
G	jay	{ g in glow	S	ess	s in sit
		{ s in pleasure	T	tay	t in tin
H	ahsh	{ h in hour	U	oo	o in move
		{ h in house	V	vay	v in vain
I	e	{ ee in peep	X	ix	x in axe
		{ i in pip	Y	eegrec	ee in been
J	jee	s in pleasure	Z	zed	z in zeal

Of these letters, it will be seen that some are pronounced exactly as in English, but many of them require particular notice.

C is sometimes pronounced like *s* before *a*, *o*, and *u*, and in these cases a small mark, called a *cedilla*, is placed under it—as, *façade*, *leçon*, *reçu*.

In words adopted from the Italian, like *violoncelle*, *vermicelle*, it has the sound of the English *ch*.

H in French, as in English, is sometimes pronounced at the beginning of a word, and sometimes not. But in French *h* is but rarely pronounced when it stands at the beginning of a word or between two vowels. The following are the most common:—

La Hollande	La Hongrie	Hainaut	Hambourg
Hardicanut	Hanovre	[And other German names.]	
Hâbler	to tell romances	Halle	market-place
Hâche	axe	Hareng	herring
Hagard	fierce	Hardes	clothes
Haïr	to hate	Halebarde	halbert
Hâle	dry winl	Haricots	French beans

Hasard	risk	Héros	hero
Hâte	haste	Heurter	to knock
Hardi	bold	Hibou	an owl
Haut	high		

And still more strongly in—

Haïter	to pant	Harpe	a harp
Harceler	to tease	Harpie	a harpy
Hargneux	peevish, cross		

Q is always followed by *u*, except in *coq* and *cing*. *Qu* have commonly the sound of *k*, as *qui* (kee), *lesquelles* (laykell). In the following words *qu* are pronounced as in English:—

Aquatique *	Equidistant	Liquéfier	Quadruple
Equateur	Equilateral	Quadragénaire	Quaterne
Equation	Equimultiple	Quadrangulaire	Questeur
Equestre	Equitation	Quadrature	Quinquagénaire
Equiangle	Liquéfaction	Quadrupède	Quintuple

R should be pronounced as in English, avoiding the roughness which is sometimes given to its sound by natives of the northern counties in England, and by natives of Ireland. This fault is called in French "*parler gras*."

S has a sharp, hissing sound, like the soft sound of *c*, except where it comes between two vowels, as *ôser*, *user*, and in the words *balsamique*, *presbytère*, *transaction*, *transiger*, *transition*, where it has the flat sound of *z*. But in some compound words the *s* is sharp between two vowels, as in *parasol*, *vraisemblance*.

X has generally the same sound which it would have in a similar position in English; viz., *ks* or *qz*. In *Auxerre* and *Bruxelles* it is sounded like *ss*, and in *deuxième* and *sixième* like *z*.

Y.—In *pays*, *paysage*, *paysan*, and wherever it stands between two vowels, *y* is equivalent in pronunciation to *ii*: so *crayon* is pronounced *crai-ion*.

Z is sounded as in English, except in some proper names, where it has the sound of the sharp *s*, as *Alvarez*, *Metz*, pronounced *Alvarèce*, *Mèce*.

These observations show the sounds and proper pronunciation of the letters in their most common circumstances. We proceed to notice the effect which certain letters have on some others, when they are placed together.

There are two general rules which ought to be always remembered; they are as follows:—

I. Final consonants of words immediately followed by words which begin with a consonant (including a pronounced *h*) are not to be pronounced: so *les bijoux* (the jewels) are pronounced *lé bijoux*—*les héros*, *lé héros*.

* Not in the last syllable.

From this rule proper names are excepted; their final consonants are to be pronounced.

II. But when the next word begins with a vowel or a silent *h*, the final consonant is joined to it at the beginning: so *les hommes* (the men) are pronounced *lé zommes*; *neuf enfans*, *neu venfans*; *plait il*, *plai til*.

The particular exceptions to these rules are given under each letter.

B.—*bb* are pronounced as *b*; that is, one of them is dropped: so *abbé* is pronounced like *abé*. *B* is not sounded in *plomb*.

C.—When *cc* are followed by *e* or *i*, both are sounded just as in English; but in other cases only one is pronounced: as *accès*, *accident* (*aksès*, *aksident*); *accord*, *accuser* (*acord*, *acuser*). Similarly, before *q* it is silent: so *acquis* is pronounced *aquis*.

C is not pronounced at the end of words, except *avec*, *bec*, *sec*, *échec* (in the sense of *defeat*, *loss*, *misfortune*; but *échecs* meaning *the game of chess*, is pronounced *éché*), and also in *donc* in a sentence which expresses strong feeling.

In *second* and its derivatives, in *dracme*, and in the second syllable of *cicogne*, *c* has the sound of *g*.

Ch are pronounced like *sh* in *English*, except in the following words from the Greek and Hebrew:—*Anachorète*, *archange*, *chaos*, *chiromancie*, *chœur*, *eucharistie*, *orchestre*, *Chanaan*, *Achab*, &c, where *ch* are pronounced like *k*; and in *almanach*, where they are not sounded at all.

D.—When *dd* are found only one is pronounced, except in *addition*, *reddition*, and *adduction*, where both are sounded.

Final *d* is included in the general rules of pronunciation and omission of final letters, except that when the word begins with a vowel or silent *h* final *d* is pronounced as *t*: so *un grand homme* must be pronounced *un gran t'omme*; *Entend-il?* *Ententil?* *Quand il fut arrivé?* *Quan til fut arrivé?* *Repond on ainsi?* *Repon ton ainsi?* *Sud* (south) follows the rule of proper names.

F.—Of *ff* only one is pronounced.

F final is generally pronounced as in *bœuf*, *œuf*, *neuf* (new), *nef*; but it is mute in *bœufs*, *œufs*, *neufs*, as also in *cerf*, *êteuf*, and *neuf* (nine); and in compound words, as *chef d'œuvre*. The word *clef* (usually pronounced *clé*) is said to have no good rhyme in the French language.

F final takes the sound of *v* before a vowel: *neuf hommes* are pronounced *neu vommes*; *vif argent*, *vivargent*.

G.—In *suggérer*, as in every case in which *gg* are followed by an accented *e*, both letters are pronounced, the former hard, the latter soft, as if written *sug-jérer*.

Gn in the middle of words have a peculiar pronunciation, very much like that of *n* and *y*, with a very short *e*, only just heard, between them: *agneau* is pronounced nearly as we should pronounce *annéyo*.

The exceptions are—*imprégner, imprégnation, stagnant, stagnation*, and their derivatives, in which the letters have their usual power; and *signet*, where the *g* is silent.

G final is mute, but before a vowel it is pronounced like *k*. *Un long entretien, sang et eau, rang honorable*, are pronounced *un lon kentretien, san ké eau, ran konorable*; but it is always mute in *coing, étang, faubourg, hareng, poing*, and *seing*, by whatever word it is followed; as well as in *legs, doigt*, and *vingt*.

At the beginning of *gangrène*, and at the end of *bourg*, it has the sound of *k*.

L.—*Ll* are generally sounded as *l*. Both are sounded in words formed by prefixing a syllable to a simpler word, such as *illégal, allocution, allusion, polluer*; but it is to be observed, that though in regard to the syllable *il* this is always true, in regard to *al* there are several exceptions, to be learnt only by experience and practice: thus, in *allouer, allier, allonger, allumer*, and some others, with their derivatives, only *l* is pronounced.

Ll in *coll*, when *not* immediately followed by *e*, are *both* pronounced; as in *collation, collision, colloquer, collusion*; but in *collation, a luncheon, collier*, and *colline*, only one *l* is to be sounded.

Ll are both pronounced in—

Apollyon	belliqueux	Pallas	intellectuel
allégorie	constellation	gallique	pusillanime
allodial	gallican	intelligent	

But in some of these the best authorities differ.

Il and *ill* have generally a peculiar sound, called in French *mouillée*, and in English *liquid*. The pronunciation adopted in good society, and even on the stage, differs from that which is recommended in some of the best works on the subject; but such authority warrants its introduction and recommendation here. *L* or *lle* is in such cases to be pronounced very much as an Englishman would pronounce *ě-yěh*: so—

Famille is pronounced like *fammee-ě-yěh*.
Paille " *pah-ee-ě-yěh*.

In the other method to which reference is made above, the pronunciation very much resembles the English pronunciation of *ll* in *brilliant*, or the Italian *gl* in *gli, seraglio*.

This rule has the following exceptions, in which *ill* is sounded as *il*:—

Achille	distiller	jaillir	syllabe
ailleurs	gille	medaille	tranquille
armillaire	idylle	mille	vaciller
camomille	imbécille	pupille	ville

with their derivatives, together with verbs formed from substantives which have only one *l*; as *déciller*, *sourciller*, from *cil*, the eye-lash. Though in reference to the last the authorities differ.

Il is also often liquid at the end of a word, as in *péril*, *sembl*. To this there are about a dozen uncertain exceptions, besides *fil*, *nil*, and *mil* (when it means a thousand, for *mil*, millet, is liquid), and almost all adjectives ending in *il*.

In *gentilhomme* the *l* is liquid; in *gentilshommes* and *fil* the *l* is mute.

M at the end of a word, when it is preceded by a vowel, has the nasal sound of *n*: so *nom*, *faim*, *parfum*, are pronounced like *non*, *fain*, *parfun*. In proper names it has its own sound; as in *Sem*, *Adam*, *Priam*.

M before *b* or *p* has the sound of *n*; as in *compter*, *comparer*, *ambition*, *prompt*.

Mm in the middle of words are usually pronounced as *m*: so *commis* is pronounced as if written *comis*; *commotion*, *comotion*. Except *Ammon*, *Emmanuel*, and all words beginning with *imm*; such as *immense*, *immédiatement*.

Emm in *femme*, and in all adverbs ending in *ement*, are pronounced like the English *am*: *femme* is pronounced *fum*; *prudemment*, *prudamment*, &c.

Em prefixed to some words in the sense of *in* or *from*, is pronounced as *an* (with the nasal sound): so *emmieller*, *emmêler*, *emmener*, *emménager*, &c.

N at the end of syllables, followed by a consonant, and at the end of a word, has a nasal sound, to which we have nothing similar in English. It most resembles our *ng* in *sang*, *song*, and *sung*; and perhaps the best description of the sound would be pronouncing *n* as it is pronounced in words in which it is immediately followed in the same syllable by a hard *g*. The sound of the *g* is in this case sufficiently distinct to be separated; the difficulty is to retain the effect of the *g* on the pronunciation of the *n*, and yet at the same time omit the sound that properly belongs to the *g*.

When *n* is followed by a vowel it loses its nasal sound; so in *brun*, *an*, *sein*, the *n* is nasal; but in *brune*, *âne*, *Seine*, it is pronounced as in English. Except *enorgueillir*, where it is nasal.

Nn are usually sounded as in English, except in *ennui*, *ennuyer*, and *ennoblir*, where the first *n* is nasal and the second natural.

Nt, in the third person plural of verbs, is silent: *parle* and *parlent*, *parlai* and *parlaient*, are pronounced alike.

Final *n*, preceding a word beginning with a vowel or silent *h*, is usually sounded as *nn*, the first with the nasal sound, the second with the natural sound being joined to the following word; as *un bon ami*, pronounced as if spelt *un bon nami*.

Except—1. *Hymen*, where *n* is natural.

2. Where *on* is used in an interrogative sentence, such as *a-t-on eu soin de lui?*

3. *En*, where it is not strictly and grammatically with the following word; as *donnez-m'en un peu*; and so of *bien* and *rien*.

R differs in the following points from its pronunciation in English. We pronounce a word ending in *r* as if a short *e* were introduced before *r*: so *hour* rhymes very nearly with *power*. The French sound the *e* after the *r*: so *pour* is pronounced almost as if it were spelt *poure*.

Of *rr* only one is sounded, and the preceding vowel is lengthened, as in *guerre*, *carrosse*, *pourrai*.

Except—1. *Errer*, *erreur*, and all words beginning with *err*, except *erre* and *errement*.

2. All words beginning with *horr*; as *horrible*.

3. All words with *irr*; as *irradier*.

4. In the future and conditional tenses of *acquérir*, *courir*, and *mourir*.

Final *r* is sounded—

1. In monosyllables; as *cher*, or *sieur*.

2. In polysyllables ending in *fer*, *mer*, *ver*, *cur*, and *ir*; as *enfer*, *amer*, *outremer*, *hiver*, *entrepreneur*, *ressentir*.

3. In *cuiller* and *cancrer*; and of course in proper names.

In all other cases final *r* is not sounded.

But *monsieur* is pronounced *mocien*; and *messieurs*, *mécieu*.

S final is almost always silent, even in christian names; such as *Nicholas*, *Thomas*, *Judas*, *Matthias*, *Jacques*; and in *Paris* (the city), and in *Jésus*.

Final *s* is sounded—

1. In foreign words; such as *as* (Roman money, and ace at cards), *aloes*, *calus*, *iris*, &c.

2. In proper names; such as *Vénus*, *Délos*, *Gil Blas*.

3. In words compounded with *plus*; as *plus-pétition*.

4. In *hélas*, *lys* or *lis*, *filz*, *vis*, *sus*, *laps*, and *vasistas*.

St are mute in *Jésus Christ* (which is pronounced *Jèsu Cri*), but sounded in *le Christ*, *est* (east), *ouest*, *lest*, and *xist* or *xest*.

T.—In words of more than two syllables *ti* is pronounced *si*—

1. When followed by *en*, *al*, *el*, or *on*, and not preceded by *s* or *x*: except *maintien*, *soutien*, and the persons of verbs; as *partions*, *mettions*, *étions*, *appartiens*.

2. In the termination *atie*; as in *primatie*, *Dalmatie*.

3. In the following words:—*balbutier*, *ineptie*, *inertie*, *initier*, *insatiable*, *minutie*, *patient*, *prophétie*, *satiété*.

Th is pronounced as *t*.

T final is generally mute: in *et*, *vent*, *pont*, and *cent*, in words that end in *rt*, and in *quatre-vingt*, *t* final is mute, even before a vowel.

T is pronounced at the end of foreign words, such as *accessit*, *toast*, *zénith*: and also in the following:—*abject*, *correct*, *direct*.

infect, suspect; contact, exact, tact; brut, chut, lut, luth; granit, pr  t  rit; indult, fat, net, dot, rapt, strict, and opiat.

Yacht is pronounced *yak*.

These observations may appear to be too particular to be useful; but an Englishman, who so goodnaturedly endures the mispronunciation of his own language, can ill imagine the effect of a similar fault on the ears of a foreigner.

We next proceed to the vowels, and their pronunciation.

LESSONS OF WISDOM have never such power over us as when they are wrought into the heart through the groundwork of a story which engages the passions. Is it that we are like iron, and must first be heated before we can be wrought upon? or is the heart so in love with deceit, that where a true report will not reach it, we must cheat it with a fable in order to come at the truth?—*Sterne*.

TRUTH.—He that finds truth, without loving her, is like a bat, which, though it have eyes to discern that there is a sun, yet hath so evil eyes, that it cannot delight in the sun.—*Sir P. Sidney*.

THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.—The peculiar manner in which we form ideas is that which constitutes the genius and character of the mind. To form our ideas of things on their actual relations only, betokens a solid understanding, whereas to be contented with their apparent relations, betrays a superficial one. To conceive these relations as they really exist, displays a right judgment: to conceive mistaken notions of them, denotes a wrong one. Those who see imaginary relations, that have neither reality nor appearance, are madmen; while those who make no comparison between them are idiots. The less or greater aptitude to compare these ideas, and discover such relations, is what constitutes a greater or less degree of understanding.—*Rousseau*.

BELIEF.—To believe without examination is no belief in reality, but merely an assent that such and such things are believed by others, and is, in fact, only believing that we believe.

LAW.—He that with injury is grieved,
And goes to law to be relieved,
Is sillier than a sottish chouse,
Who, when a thief has robbed his house,
Applies himself to cunning men,
To help him to his goods again;
When all he can expect to gain,
Is but to squander more in vain.—*Butler*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

13. Could any of your readers inform me how to get quit of a defect in pronouncing the letter R; the vibration is confined to the throat: if they could name any work which treats on the subject, with price, or prescribe a mode of practice in order to overcome it, they would oblige SOORO.

14. Would any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* be kind enough to inform me how to proceed in learning mathematics, after having gone through the first six books of Euclid; whether I should learn trigonometry, or pass it over and commence with the eleventh book. I have been told that all the trigonometry we get in Euclid is of little use. Say whether this is true or not.—A. S. G.

15. Will any of your readers give a list of the best works (with prices) on the following subjects:—1. On the attributes of God; 2. On the attribute of Providence alone; 3. On domestic medicine; 4. On smelting, analyzing, and assaying of gold and other metals; 5. On the Peninsular war; 6. On the Russian war.—A. B., *Inverary*.

16. Will any of your readers mention any good work on *modern French literature*; or, if no such work exist, mention the names of two or three French lyric poets, and the character of their works—poets, I mean—who have flourished since 1800. Also, a glossary of obsolete English words, by which to read Chaucer and Spenser, &c., and I will be much obliged.—J. L.

17. How can I become acquainted with the philosophical teachings of Machiavelli, so often referred to in "My Novel," and other places? Such information will oblige, Yours, very truly, LOMBARD.

18. Would any of your readers inform me what sort of cement is used for fixing the metallic parts of electrical apparatus to the glass parts; its full name and composition? and he would oblige, Sir, A SUBSCRIBER FROM THE FIRST.

19. Will any of your subscribers inform me as to the best and simplest mode of making a galvanic battery?
J. J.

20. Could any of your correspondents inform me as to the best theoretical and practical work on botany as a first book? As I have but little time at my disposal, a work which combined simplicity with accuracy would be of very great advantage. Please state the price.—P. R.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

1. "When was Homer born, and when and where did he die?"—The date of Homer's birth is very uncertain indeed; it is impossible to fix the exact year, though from his writings we may deduce proof enough to arrive within a few years of his era. The ancient writers are very indefinite in their suggestions as to this question. Strabo makes him coeval with Lycurgus. Thucydides says that he lived long after the siege of Troy, and Cicero that he lived before the foundation of Rome. From various incidental circumstances we may assign an early date to the Iliad and Odyssey, and yet we have positive proof that Homer did not witness the events he describes; thus, the elephant was unknown, except to the Indians, till the Macedonians passed into Asia, though works in ivory were of remote antiquity; accordingly Homer, though mentioning

the latter, never speaks of the elephant. He must have lived before the Amphictyonic council existed, for it acquired such extensive importance that he would not have failed to mention it, if he had been alive while it was in operation. Had he lived after the era of the Olympiads the public annals would have recorded his birth. Troy fell B.C. 904. Thucydides gives B.C. 824 as the date for the return of the Heraclidæ. Homer never mentions this last important event, which effected such a revolution in the Peloponnesus and the Greek States on the west coasts of Asia Minor. Homer never alludes to this. Though he mentions Hercules, he has not a word respecting his descendants. In *Odyss. i. 251* Homer says that recent occurrences are preferable for celebration from their nearer interest, which could not apply to the fate of Troy after the return of the Heraclidæ. Hence he must have written before the return of the Heraclidæ. The last event he mentions is the accession of the great-grandchildren of Eneas to the throne of Troy, which brings the date of the *Iliad* to the beginning of the third generation after the Trojan war, and the probable date of Homer's birth is within a few years of this period. Herodotus assigns

this as the probable age of Homer. The father of *history* flourished B.C. 444, and he places the father of *poetry* 400 years before himself; that is, B.C. 844.

The place of Homer's death is also very uncertain. He seems to have settled at Chios in his latter years; and in the life of Homer attributed to Herodotus, it is said that, having undertaken a voyage to Athens, he fell sick at Io, where he died and was buried on the seashore. The date of his death is unknown.—B. A., *Tewkesbury*.

10. The merry monarch, Charles the Second.

Answer to W. H.—1. The profession of reporter for the public press is one of great labour and incessant application, and, save in special cases, is but ill remunerated.

2. W. H.'s present employment (the art of engraving) possesses great beauty, and will, in our opinion, always command good prices for good work. Greatness is achieved despite condition; and in every department of knowledge, as well as in the ordinary avocations of life, it is "the diligent hand that maketh rich." In conclusion, let W. H. read "How to make a fortune," in our next number.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

On Tuesday evening, January 15th, 1856, the members of the *Mutual Improvement and Choral Societies, connected with Ebenezer Chapel, Neckenger Road, Bermondsey*, held a joint tea meeting in the schoolroom attached to that place; the Rev. John Bodington, president of both societies, in the chair. On rising from the "social board" the company retired to the chapel, when, after a short introductory address by the chairman, essays

were read by members of the mutual improvement society. Between the reading of the essays, several first class pieces of music ("The heavens are telling;" "Hallelujah!" &c.) were executed by the members of the choral society. The proceedings of the evening appeared to be attended with unmixed pleasure to the large number of friends present.

Leicester Early Closing Association

Mutual Instruction and Debating Class.

—The members of this association held their usual weekly meeting on Wednesday evening, January 30th, at the Town Library, which is kindly offered for their use by the liberality of the Town Council. The occasion was rendered doubly attractive in consequence of the interesting nature of the after-proceedings. After the debate on an able paper read by Mr. F. Hewitt on "Would a National Militia be a National Benefit?" was over, the ceremony commenced of presenting a testimonial from the members of the association to Mr. J. Burness, their much-respected treasurer, as a mark of their esteem, and approbation of his untiring and unceasing labours in its behalf for the last six years; he having been one of its original founders and its first president. The testimonial consisted of the four volumes of Macaulay's History of England, elegantly bound in morocco, with a suitable inscription, and was presented by the chairman, Mr. J. Carryer, who accompanied it with a most appropriate address, full of encouragement, and urging the necessity and importance of perseverance in the good cause for the advancement of which they were united together. Mr. Burness replied in an admirable speech, and assured the members present that he felt most unfeigned pleasure in accepting this proof of their esteem, and trusted that his efforts and exertions would be found by no means to relax, but that he should be rather stimulated to fresh examples of the deep interest taken by him in the welfare of the association. The interest of the proceedings was much enhanced by the presence of ladies, friends of the members, who were invited to be present on this occasion; and much pleasure was derived from the happy and well-timed remarks of Mons. Calliand, the president of the Leicester Literary and Philosophical Society, who kindly responded to the invitation to be present.

The class has considerably increased in numbers during the present season; and papers have been read on "Addison and Swift;" "Are Pain and Death blessings or curses?" "Is Woman mentally inferior to Man?" "Was the War commencing 1793 Aggressive or Defensive on the part of England?" "On Benjamin Franklin;" "Capital Punishments;" "Is the Use of Alcoholic Stimulants necessary to Mankind?" "On the Present War;" "The Greek Tragedians;" and several others of an interesting character. Two lectures have been delivered on behalf of the association in the Temperance Hall, by the Rev. J. Ratcliffe, on "Oliver Cromwell;" and by W. N. Reeve, Esq., on "Oliver Cromwell"—more especially in regard to his later career. A paper has also been read to the members of the class "On Naseby Field," by J. F. Hollings, Esq.; and several entertainments have been given by the committee, of a musical and literary character.—W. T. N.

Young Men's Mutual Improvement Association, Wesleyan Chapel, Lower Abbey Street, Dublin.—The first annual soirée of this association was held on Friday evening, February 1, 1856. After tea the Rev. Charles L. Grant was called to the chair, and after a few remarks from the chairman, the secretary read the report, the substance of which is as follows:—That this society was formed by the Rev. W. Crook, jun., as a bible class, and was carried on for two years successfully as such, when the Rev. C. L. Grant became president, and amongst other improvements introduced the practice of writing original essays, and subsequent criticism on them, which practice has been found of great benefit to the members. That the association also commenced, and still carries on, a MS. magazine, on the plan recommended by the *British Controversialist*; and the society steadily increases in numbers. After the report was read, addresses were delivered by

the Rev. B. Bayley and Messrs. S. M'Comas, Correll, and Lawrance. After a vote of thanks to the chairman

the meeting separated, much pleased with the success of their first annual meeting.—W. R. D.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Mr. Henry Mayhew, author of "London Labour and the London Poor," is again in the field, with a complete moral, analytical, and descriptive survey of the "Great World of London." The prospectus is prolific in promise, and from his great knowledge of the subject, we expect an admirable filling up of an extensive outline.

Her Majesty has knighted Colonel Rawlinson, the celebrated Eastern traveller and philologist; and the University of Dublin have made Mr. William Russell, the *Times* correspondent, a D.C.L. Mr. Russell, we hear, is not to return to the Crimea, but will join the Baltic fleet. Mr. Woods, late of the *Morning Herald*, has been named as his probable successor.

"Rose Clark," by Fanny Fern, is, like all her writings, smart—clever—effective—but over-done.

The "Lump of Gold" and other Poems, by Charles Mackay, the well-known author of "There's a Good Time coming," is simple, melodious, and beautiful. We shall, if possible, give an extended notice of it in an early number.

A "Child's History of the United States," suggested by Charles Dickens' "Child's History of England," is rather more free in language and style than would be pleasing to English readers; and the epithets heaped upon the heads of our English kings, lords, and commons, are anything but complimentary.

The author of "Eothen" complains of the use made of his fame, and the *Times* announces, under authority, that the author of that popular book "never published any other."

Shortly will be published, by Messrs. Hall and Virtue, Paternoster-row, "The History of a Man," edited by George Gilfillan. A curious medley of biogra-

phy, description, and speculation, recounting conversations with many of the greatest men of the day, filled with incident, as well as abounding in descriptions of scenery and in pictures of intellectual and spiritual progress.

The Queen has granted an annual pension of £50, chargeable upon the civil list, to Mr. John d'Alton, of Dublin, the author of several Irish historical works, including the "Army List" of King James II., the latter not yet completed; and another, of £100, to Mr. S. Lover, author of "Handy Andy," and many well-known Irish songs, &c.

The Rev. J. W. Major has been elected as the editor of the *Photographic Journal*, and secretary of the society. There were forty-four candidates for the office. The salary, we believe, is £200 per annum.

Messrs. Gambart and Co. have issued the first part of a new series of war illustrations, under the title of "The Allied Fleets in the Baltic." The sketches were taken on the spot by Mr. Carmichael.

The police of Leipsic arrested M. Constantine Simonides in that city a few days ago, on the charge of having sold to the King of Prussia, for 2000 thalers, a manuscript which he pretended contained three books of Uranios, on the most ancient epoch of the history of Egypt, but which has been discovered to be a forgery. It is stated that the forgery was so skilfully imitated that it deceived the Academy of Berlin, and that it was by its recommendation that the king purchased it. The arrest of M. Simonides will create considerable sensation throughout the learned world in Europe, as he has long been known in all the principal capitals as a literary antiquary, and as the proprietor of several rare manuscripts.

Religion.

HAVE WE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, APART FROM SCRIPTURE, TO BELIEVE IN THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

"The appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and *immortality* to light through the gospel."—2 Tim. i. 10.

"The *dread* of something after death
* * * PUZZLES the will."

IN the above quotations we have, in our humble opinion, a sufficient proof in behalf of a *negative* answer to the present interesting question. *First*, we have the word of inspiration distinctly telling us that the great truth of man's immortality was brought to light, that is, established on "sufficient evidence," by Christ through his gospel. How any one professing a belief in Christianity, and in the inspiration of the New Testament, can resist the argumentative force of such a declaration, we are at a loss to conceive. If there was "sufficient evidence" for the immortality of the soul, independent of the scriptures, how could the gospel be said to have brought this truth to light? What is the literal signification of the word "evidence"? Is it not the bringing a truth out of (*ex*) obscurity, and placing it before the mind in such a light as to enable us clearly to behold (*video*) it? How, then, shall the words of Paul be harmonized with the views of our opponents in the present debate? *Secondly*, we have the testimony and conclusion of the great analyst of man's mental and moral nature, Shakespeare. In the most elaborate and philosophical of his dramas the foremost character touches upon the great theme of man's immortality, and reasons upon it. What are his conclusions? Does he speak of certainty? Has he sufficient evidence to rest a belief of a future state upon? No! Forsooth, he has but a *vague* and *indistinct* "*dread* of something after death," arising from the utter want of reliable evidence. He attempts in vain to solve the question. There is nothing the mind can rest upon. The problem "*puzzles* the will." The truth of the delineation is *felt* by every one. Perhaps there is scarcely an uninspired passage which has so often been quoted, thought over, read, and commented upon, as this "*celebrated* soliloquy of Hamlet." Ask the poet or the philosopher, the sceptic or the divine, the cultured or the clownish, and they

will all admit that the lines in question are among the master-efforts of one of the world's greatest geniuses. "To be, or not to be?"—are we, or are we not immortal?—that is the question. A *dread* of a possible something after death *puzzles* the mind, and paralyses the will—that is reason's only answer. It certainly seems to us a most extraordinary fact that this celebrated passage, the very embodiment of *doubt*, should be quoted by our friend "L'Ouvrier" as a motto for the *affirmative* side of the present debate.

It cannot be denied that man, in all ages, and whether favoured with the *direct* light of divine revelation or not, has had some vague belief of the immortality of the soul. But the point raised for our discussion is not,—“Has the doctrine been believed?” but,—“Has it been believed on *sufficient* evidence?” The two questions are far from synonymous. We doubt not that millions have believed in the juggleries of witchcraft and absurdities of superstition, but we most strenuously deny the rationality of the belief, and the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it was founded. All men, in every age and country, appear to have believed in the existence of a god or gods; yet in heathen countries the belief has invariably been of such a nature as must lead every one to admit that it was founded on *insufficient* evidence. The gods of the heathen are no gods, but mere embodiments of human frailty and passion, invested with superhuman attributes of power. Yet how utterly unable the human mind appears to have been to divest the grain of truth from the husk of folly and falsehood in which it was enveloped. Socrates seems dimly to have comprehended the sublime truth that there is *one* God, and yet in his dying moments he yielded homage to the superstitions of his age, and sacrificed a cock to *Æsculapius*, thus showing that his powerful mind could not rise and soar into that light of truth whose brightness seems to have been dimly visible to his mental gaze. Now, we think that it is evidently a much easier task to *separate* the *absurd* from the truthful than to *discover* a truth as yet unknown. If, then, the highest order of minds were thus unable to separate the follies of the pagan belief and worship from the principles of truth which they contained, how much more improbable is it that they could have arrived at such truths without any hint or guiding clue! These considerations, then, evidently point to a *former* revelation of these great truths—to a light that once shone on man, but which had in time become obscured and darkened. This supposition at once accounts for many of the beliefs and traditions of the heathen world in accordance with known facts of revelation and history. The common origin of mankind, as descendants from a common parent, at once points to a common source of traditionary belief. We know that Adam enjoyed direct intercourse with Deity, and we may reasonably conclude that

during the period of his innocence he was made acquainted with many great spiritual truths beyond the reach of unaided reason; these would naturally be transmitted by him to his immediate descendants, and would thence descend, increasingly corrupted and perverted at each stage, to the various nations of the earth. History, teaching by example, confirms this conjecture. In the case of the Mohammedan faith, we have a living testimony of the manner in which a false religion grows out of a purer faith, of which its votaries become in time totally ignorant. The disciples of Islamism are to the Christians of the present day what the ancient heathens were to the Jews; the one possess the *direct* light of *revelation*, the other have an indirect and imperfect light, borrowed from the *same* source, but dimmed by falsehood and folly. The follower of the Prophet believes "there is but One God, and Mohammed is his prophet." Does he believe this creed on "sufficient evidence"? Certainly *not!* for the one half of his belief is a falsehood; and that there can be sufficient evidence for the belief of an untruth, is a moral impossibility. And if the one half of the creed thus fall, the other must fall also; if the grounds of belief are insufficient for the one fact, they are insufficient for the other also; and yet that other *is a truth*. Can the Mohammedan, then, have stumbled by accident on the sublime truth of the unity of the Godhead? Ask the Arab or the Turk *whence* he derives his knowledge? He will point at once to the Koran; and on studying its pages in the light of Christianity, the *primary* source of the sublime truth contained in the Moslem creed is at once seen to be the Christian scriptures,—a true revelation, of which the Turk of to-day is as ignorant as Socrates or Plato were of the books of Moses. Hence, we are justified in identifying many of the doctrines of the ancient heathen world as shattered fragments of divinely revealed truth, which had descended through many ages from our common parents. It is thus, we believe, with the widely spread belief of the soul's immortality. It was doubtless revealed to Adam, and from him was handed down, with other primary truths, to his descendants.

In our opening remarks we have already endeavoured to adduce a *direct* proof, from the scriptures, that man could not, by reason alone, have arrived at a rational belief in a future life. We shall now offer an *inferential* argument from the same source. The Jews enjoyed a *typical revelation* of gospel truths; hence, the belief of this important truth of man's immortality was more genuine and uncorrupted with them than among other nations. They read in their sacred pages of Enoch, who, having "walked with God, was *not*, for God took him." Some future existence was evidently darkly shadowed forth in this narrative of sublime simplicity. Yet, in spite of all their advantages, how dim was the Jewish belief in a future state! The Sadducees,

who denied that there was "any spirit," were by no means an un-influential, though, perhaps, never a numerous sect. And when Christ condescended to reason with them, what was the course of argument which he adopted? Did he appeal to the "sufficient evidence" of reason, or to revelation? He at once argued from the *latter*, "Do ye not therefore err, because ye *know not* THE SCRIPTURES? * * * Have ye not read *in the book of Moses*, how in the bush God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living." Christ did not fail to appeal to reason, when it *could* afford a sufficient answer. When the Jews tried to entrap him with respect to the tribute money, he placed his opponents in a purely logical dilemma,—*"Show me the tribute money. * * * Whose image and superscription is this? * * * Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's."* So when his disciples were "affrighted, and supposed they had seen a spirit," he *reasoned* with them,—*"Handle me, and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have."* He well knew the boundaries of human reason, and where it could ascertain truth he failed not to address argument to his readers.

We think, then, that we have already established a strong *primâ facie* proof of our position, and have explained the apparent difficulty arising from the general belief of the soul's immortality among heathen nations. As to the trembling, doubtful, and utterly *insufficient* character of that belief, we have great pleasure in pointing to the details respecting the last moments of Socrates, furnished in the able article of "Clement." The *popular* belief was so interwoven with the merest absurdity, that we can scarcely repress a smile at the supposition that the minds which could feign and believe such fables were even capable of reasoning on so grand a truth as man's immortality.

But we need not make this a question of *history*. Have we sufficient evidence, apart from scripture, to warrant a belief in a future state? What evidence *can* we have on a subject entirely beyond experience or consciousness? Positive or circumstantial evidence there can be *none* whatever. The state after death, if any, is an undiscovered country, from whose bourne *no* traveller has ever returned. Evidence, in the sense of *testimony*, there is and can be *none*. We cannot even argue on the score of probability from the past to the future, as in some other cases. Independent of all astronomical knowledge, we have reasonable ground for believing the sun will rise to-morrow, because we know that it has risen regularly for ages. We have sufficient evidence for believing that *we* shall die, in the knowledge of the fact that millions of our race have died, and are dying around us daily. But as to a future existence beyond the grave, on what can the mind hang an inference? Is not all our knowledge

summed up in the words of the poet,—is not our life, as far as experience can speak,—

“ A life of nothings, nothing worth,
From that *first nothing* ere our birth,
To that *last nothing* under earth ” ?

Have we any ground for denying the “ *last nothing*,” which would not as well serve to establish our pre-existence, by denying also the “ *first nothing* ” ? The truth is, our opponents are confined to speculative and *conjectural* arguments, which they can never *test*. What is the worth of *such* evidence ? Instead of *evidence* to *warrant*, they are driven to hunt up *excuses* for *entertaining* their belief. We have no means of ascertaining that a belief of the immortality of the soul *ever did* arise within the mind of man, except as *suggested* from without. But even supposing that to be the case, do not the details of the belief point to a probable source ? The Brahmin, wrapt in contemplative thought, dreams of an immortality in the absorption of his soul into the infinite essence of the Deity. The *wish* is evidently *father to the thought*,—a thought, nevertheless, self-contradictory ; for if separate existence and consciousness are lost, how can we speak of a personal immortality ? The untutored Indian dreams of a happy hunting land, where he shall enjoy a transcript of his earthly pleasures. The *wish* is *father to the thought*. The disciple of the Crescent pictures to himself a paradise of Houris, and believes, or tries to believe, that he will establish harems in the sky, to compensate him for the seraglios he left behind on earth. Again the wish is father to the thought. If, then, the immortality of the soul be a possible idea, independently of all outward suggestion, may we not trace it to the wish that it may be so ?

Thus far we have argued as though the *onus probandi* lay on our side of the question, whereas it evidently lies with our opponents. Is there “ sufficient evidence ” ? If there be, let it be produced by those who assert its existence. Our part of the debate is to *examine* the evidence *offered*, to weigh it, and to expose its insufficiency. We turn, therefore, to the articles of “ L'Ouvrier ” and “ La Pensée.”

First, then, with respect to L. P.* Has any reader failed to smile over his glaring inconsistencies ? We find it stated in p. 55 that there is “ ample testimony to *prove* ” the immortality of the soul, because, “ *firstly*, the soul is immaterial.” Turn to the top of the next page, and we read,—“ The immateriality of the soul does *not* prove its immortality ” !! After this extraordinary self-contradiction, L. P. proceeds to “ *another* argu-

* Why are all our friends bent on abjuring the time and space-saving system of initial signatures ? They are a great convenience in every way, and more real, while equally anonymous.

ment"! We cannot help wondering whether the writer did not originally intend to take the opposite side to that he has professedly espoused. He afterwards returns to this topic, and remarks, that "the soul of man, being immaterial, it appears evident that it can never be destroyed." Is this argument or assertion? Is He who created unable to destroy? Look at that trembling, new-born infant, which, but yesterday, was among the things that were not! *Now* it is more helpless in mind than in body. It can see, but cannot recognise; it can hear, but cannot recognise. It is speechless, and unable to understand the speech of others. Its mental powers are in abeyance; in point of actual present intelligence it is on a level with the beasts that have no understanding. Yet thirty years hence that infant may shake a senate by his might of intellect; he may extend the discoveries of a Newton, and almost outvie all his predecessors in mental acumen and power. Can the power who thus raises up the spirit to a meridian height be unable to cast it down to the nothingness from which it came? Can that, whose law of being has been *growth*, be necessarily beyond the possibility of decay? This we know,—that the *body* of man, *as a body*, is annihilated by death; analogy, therefore, would lead us to suppose that the spirit, *as a spirit*, would be annihilated in like manner. But there is a previous question. How can we prove the immateriality of the soul, independent of scripture testimony? L. P. asks, "Can any impediment offered to the body stay the sublime aspirations of man's wondrous soul? We reply, unhesitatingly, "*Yes!*" We may ensure *idiocy* of mind by compressing the brain of the infant. We can drug the body with poisons which shall reduce the mind to torpor, or madden it into frenzy. Look at the drivelling drunkard, staggering along the street,—can he *understand* a complex problem? Strike but one heavy blow upon the brain of a Bacon or a Newton, and though the body may live on, the mind is reduced to unconsciousness in a moment. L. P. refers to the phenomena of dreaming, arguing that the mind is independent of the body, because we can think when the body is unconscious. But what does this prove? Will he argue that the heart is independent of the body, because it *beats on* while the body sleeps? But there are still more striking phenomena in sleep. We laugh, we speak, we move, we even *walk* and work occasionally. Take the instance of the somnambulist, and the utter futility of L. P.'s arguments is seen at once. The body is asleep, and "unconscious of all that is passing around;" and yet the body is engaged in actual employment. Will L. P. thence infer that the body is independent of the body—that there are *two* bodies, which "are not synonymous existences"? How comes it, also, that when the sleeper wakes, his mind can give no account of the doings of its slave, the body? Truly, if we be shut out from

the pages of that book which declares, "There is a spirit in man," reason is likely to do but little towards proving the soul's immateriality.

L. P. next proceeds to argue that we have "an innate consciousness" of immortality. How can we be *conscious* of things future? We might conceive of innate *prescience* of immortality, or of an innate idea that we *shall* be immortal, but *consciousness* of a future event is a mere contradiction of terms. But we will assume that he meant "innate belief." Surely it shows a good heart to build an argument on the *tacit* assumption that the philosophy of Locke is false. The "great Englishman" surely deserves a more courteous treatment. But suppose men have innate ideas, what proof does L. P. offer that the immortality of the soul is *one* of such ideas? A *bare* assertion! We are asked, if there is sufficient *evidence* for a given belief, and L. P. replies that the belief is innate—a necessity of man's mental constitution!

Another proof adduced by L. P. is "the desire of nations"! This is out-Heroding Herod. Such arguments as this would make short work of debate. We are immortal, *because* we desire to be. Would it not be as rational to say that poverty is a fable, because all men long to be rich? Why did not L. P. use his potent argument in the debate on eternal punishment (vol. vi.), and suggest, that since all men long for a happy immortality, therefore there can be no future punishment—the wicked and the good must alike be sharers of eternal joy?

Lastly, we have an Addisonian argument, drawn from "the continually unfolding powers of man." But is this a truth? Is second childhood a fable or a reality? What is more among the soul's attributes than memory? and yet is there one man in ten thousand whose memory at ninety is as vigorous as it was at thirty? Does not everything seem to afford a *prima facie* proof that each mind, like each body, has a full stature, which it reaches only to decline again? Is the *last* work of genius always the masterpiece? Did Milton's mind soar higher than in "Paradise Lost"? Can you catalogue the discoveries of Newton, and say this is the last *because* it is the *greatest*? Will any one say that the almost dying efforts of Sir Walter Scott in "Count Robert of Paris" and "Castle Dangerous" show unfolding powers when compared with "Waverley" or "Guy Mannering"? Is there no prototype in garrulous old age of the picture Dogberry drew of his companion—"A good old man, sir; he will be talking: as they say, *when the age is in, the wit is out*"? Is the touching appeal of the aged Lear a poet's fancy, or a *sad reality* of human life?

"Pray do not mock me;
I am a very foolish, fond old man,
Fourscore years and upward."

No, alas ! to all outward appearance the mind decays with the body ; and as regards the earthly life of the spirit, no less than the body,—

“ The last scene of all,
That ends this strange eventful history,
Is *second childishness*, and *mere oblivion*.”

Contemplating the wreck of mind so often seen in advanced age, it requires a strong exercise of *christian* faith to believe that a spirit so feeble *can* exist through eternity. To us the reasoning of Addison seems at utter variance with the realities of life.

We turn, then, to the pages of “ L'Ouvrier.” What evidence has he to offer ? We have not to travel far for a self-contradiction of the most surprising character. “ This *material* world and its manifold laws * * * are the *boundaries of reason*.” Scarcely has this statement been made, than its author continues, “ The terms of the present question demand proofs of the immortality of the soul *by reason alone*.” The sentences are irreconcilable, except on the supposition that the immortality of the soul is a question of the *material* world. Was ever a more complete act of logical suicide !

“ L'Ouvrier ” then proceeds to argue, that since man is a sentient being, and is capable of certain actions, those actions cannot be separate existences, and must have an efficient cause, which cause is represented to be a spiritual personality, existing in, but distinct from, the body. It is not our intention to dwell upon the *vis consequentiæ* of his logic, though it bears a strong likeness to the reasoning by which the Chinese satisfied themselves that a *watch* must, on account of motion and sound, be a living creature. We accept the reasoning without special demur, and judge it by its *results*. Man, says “ L'Ouvrier,” is a “ feeling, seeing, hearing, desiring, loving, hating, understanding, and thinking being,” and therefore has a spiritual personality, or immaterial soul. Now our favourite *terrier* can lay claim to all these powers, except that of thinking, and if he cannot think, he can at least do something which bears a strong resemblance to thinking. If “ L'Ouvrier's ” logic be true, therefore, the dog has a spiritual personality, or immaterial soul. And consequently, if the further arguments of our opponent be supposed valid, he has succeeded in proving the *immortality* of the brute creation. In the case of the faithful and affectionate dog, we know that “ L'Ouvrier ” may find many to agree with him. The Indian hunter admits his dog to share “ an equal sky ; ” and there are many able thinkers who have withheld direct assent from the current belief by which the dog is—

“ Denied in heaven the soul he held on earth.”

Locke “ doubted,” without denying, that brutes survive the grave ; and Dr. Priestley inclined to think they might in some degree be benefited by the general resurrection. But has any

one gone to the extent of "L'Ouvrier," and placed the immortality of man and of moths on an *equal* basis of "sufficient evidence"? If his argument holds good of *all* of the sentient actions mentioned, it holds good of *any one*; and therefore the power of vision alone is at once a proof and charter of immortality. Truly the new year hath ushered in a somewhat startling truth, if truth it be! Each insect that flutters for an hour in the summer's sunbeam; each fish that cleaves the briny deep; each reptile that crawls upon the earth, has an *everlasting* destiny. Does it not approach the burlesque to find a grave writer employing arguments, which, if admitted, will inevitably prove that a Dutch cheese in its decay is peopled with countless millions of immortal spirits?

And how does "L'Ouvrier" attempt to substantiate the position that an immaterial spirit is also immortal? His argument is, in brief, this:—If the immaterial spirit is not immortal, it must be liable to annihilation or disorganization. But it cannot be annihilated, because annihilation is not discernible in the world of matter; and it cannot be disorganized like matter, because it is not material. Thus, we are first asked to reason by *direct* analogy—there will be no annihilation of spirit, because there seems to be none of matter; and then by *inverse* analogy—there will be *no* disorganization of *spirit*, because *matter* is disorganized! The two arguments are mutually destructive. If we infer the non-annihilation of spirit by analogy from the apparent non-annihilation of matter, then we must, in consistency, continue the analogy, and infer disorganization of mind from disorganization of matter. It must surely be a difficult case to argue, when a writer of such general consistency as "L'Ouvrier" thus turns himself into a logical acrobat, and stands first on his head, and then on his feet! It is impossible to reason safely from opposites. Supposing we granted that matter never will be annihilated, do we not see a possible reason for this in the fact that it can be disorganized and combined afresh? To annihilate one form of matter, and create a new form in its stead, is a waste of power on the part of Deity, if he could have reformed the old into the new in accordance with the laws he has imposed on matter. On the other hand, if we suppose spirit to be inseparable and incapable of disorganization, we must either admit the possibility of its annihilation, or suppose that Deity is unable to wield the sceptre of absolute power.

"L'Ouvrier" next argues his case from the moral constitution of man in respect to the theory of rewards and punishments. Is *death*, then, no punishment to man? Still more, would annihilation be none? Might not these events be attended with the utmost pain and terror, or softened into an unconscious change? Has human life no pains or pleasures? Besides, who, apart from revelation, could suppose that the acts of threescore years

and ten could merit the reward of *eternal* bliss? Is every one, even in the light of scripture, able to yield implicit faith to the doctrine of eternal punishment? Shall we, the creatures of to-day, "whose breath is in our nostrils," presume to talk of "full, and impartial, and perfect justice" *due* to us, and requiring eternity to complete its payment? The very idea is a paradox of assertion.

Lastly, "L'Ouvrier" appeals to the fact that we cannot realize the conception of annihilation, and are compelled to describe it by negations. Are we more able to grasp the grand idea of *eternity*? Are not immateriality and immortality negations? Can "L'Ouvrier" realize the word "creation" more easily than "annihilation"? Or does he believe in the pre-existence of mind and matter from all eternity? Will he raise a new Trinity—God, mind, and matter? Will he lift matter and spirit to the throne of Deity, and grant them one of his greatest attributes—self-existence? Are they, in "L'Ouvrier's" esteem, like Him, "without beginning of years or end of days"? Can *reason* plume her flight thus high, and gaze with unfaltering look upon the dazzling brightness of endless being? No! ever and anon "a sullen answer slides betwixt." It has always been so; the voice of reason fails to answer the voice of doubt. Many have doubtless hoped, but—

"The still voice laughed! I talk, said he,
Not with thy *dreams*."

We have done. Let the reader judge fairly, and we doubt his judgment will be against those who would rob revelation of this gem-like truth of man's immortality, to bind it on the brow of Reason. We feel that the truth itself is but ill evidenced, if evidenced at all, until we turn to the pages of revelation, and read a mansion in the skies, "undefiled, and incorruptible, and which fadeth not away." B. S.

"I WAS in company," says a gossip, "with the late Thomas Campbell, the poet, when some one made a remark on Rogers's habit of saying ill-natured things. Campbell, in the high tone of voice he sometimes spoke in, said, 'There is a way of preventing Rogers saying ill-natured things, either to you, or about you.' 'Indeed!' was the somewhat incredulous reply, 'pray how is that to be managed?' 'Why,' said Campbell, 'just borrow money of him, and you will never hear an ill-natured word till it is repaid.'"

WISDOM AND FOLLY.—Ferdinand (not the beloved) King of Spain used to say, that he could distinguish a wise man from a fool by the following marks:—Moderation in anger, government in household affairs, and writing a letter without useless repetitions.—ANON.

Philosophy.

IS MAN THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"Man liveth from hour to hour, and knoweth not what may happen;
 "Influences circle him on all sides, and yet must he answer for his actions:
 "For the being that is master of himself bendeth events to his will,
 "But a slave to selfish passion is the wavering creature of circumstance.

* * * * *

"For outward matter or event fashion not the character within.
 "But each man, yielding or resisting, fashioneth his mind for himself."

Martin F. Tupper.

"Is man the creature of circumstances?" Is individual character, which is the real man, superinduced by circumstances? or, Does man elaborate a character for himself, by dealing with circumstances, from a principle of free will conjoined to intellect? We affirm the latter proposition; and in so doing answer the question before us in the negative. In a most comprehensive sense, everything that has any connection with, or sustains any relation to, man, is "a circumstance" in his regard. Thus taken, the term includes the Providence of God, with all its spiritual machinery and appliances; and the attributes of man, as consisting of will, intellect, idiosyncrasy, conscience as well as birth, position, education, present means and opportunities, and the procession of events. But we apprehend the "circumstances" meant to be indicated in the question before us are those extrinsic ones which occur to man as contingent, and as having an unforeseen and undesigned presence and influence. It is a question whether there *really* are any circumstances of this latter description; but there can be no question that there are some that so *appear* to man. For our own part, we deny the existence of chance, and hold to "Providence in all things." We believe that the preservation of the freedom of man's mind intact is a special end with Providence, in order that character or self-hood may attach to him. To this end, we opine that "circumstances"—internal and external, spiritual and natural—are, under the view of Omniscience as to their effects, equilibrated about man, analogously as his natural body acts in freedom, in virtue of an equilibrium of natural forces. Thus no man is "tempted, above that he is able to bear;" nor is the good and the true forced on the voluntary and intellectual faculties, respectively, of any one. We believe that where a man's intentions are right, as well in regard to the true as the good, that in such a case "circumstances," under Provi-

dence, will be found to favour and further his ends ; for is it not written, " Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness, and all other things shall be added unto you " ? Who, we ask, is not conscious of being able to exercise freedom of volition and thought, which no extrinsic influences can take away, albeit they may deter the outward action and expression ? Who, again, is or was without conscience of some order or degree, or without some cognizance of the broad distinctions between good and evil ? We have, at least, " guarantees of a *standard* of morals in human nature," *per se*. All know how they would be done by ; and, knowing that, they know what they ought or ought not to do to others. Action implies volition and thought, and these, we have seen, are guaranteed to man in freedom ; therefore, decision and choice are implied in human action ; nor does the fact, that foregone practices may render habit all but invincible, detract from the essential truth that man is made " master of himself," with the power to " bend events to his will." A man may, indeed, render himself the " creature—the 'slave'—of circumstances," may " sell his birthright" for a " mess of pottage ;" and by allowing his sensual propensities to dominate over the promptings of conscience and the directings of intellect, become subjugated to those " circumstances" that excite and furnish the means and opportunities for their activities. But is this the normal position of man, or is it a degraded condition ? We opine the latter, and say that where an individual is " a creature of circumstances," there is a perverted nature, and one unheeding of the means of raising itself above its mere animal or sensual nature. Writers of fiction may furnish a fancy picture of circumstances inducing character, but surely they " imagine a vain thing," and " God is not in all their thoughts ;" for the implied assertion is little short of a libel on the divine goodness and justice, since it supposes man born without the hope or chance of attaining to the heavenly character or state ; whereas we hold that " a heaven out of the human race" was the grand end of the Almighty in creation. The scope of our argument is just this. Man, while surrounded by circumstances, both spiritual and natural, is, under Providence, held in a state of freedom as to will, judgment, and ultimate determination in respect to those circumstances ; and this in order that he may become the free and appreciating recipient and reciprocator of his Creator's love, and the voluntary and intelligent agent for dispensing good services to his neighbour ; *ergo*, man is not " a creature" but *a user* (or, it may be, an abuser) of " circumstances." Some such tenets as those we have propounded must, we conceive, be regarded as axiomatic in any sound system of religious philosophy held to in connection with Christianity : for on an opposite hypothesis, how can man be held to be responsible for his actions, and the subject of a final judgment, involving an eternity of bliss or woe, as the " reward of his deeds" ? on the

occasion of which judgment, however, we are assured that the righteous decrees of the Judge shall be made manifest, even to those who suffer by his sentence. Again, on an opposite hypothesis it is hard to see how man can be regarded in any other light than as a machine, a mere puppet, acting in a given direction by the influence of forces of an extrinsic origin, and so undeserving either of praise or blame.

"Who acts by force impelled, can nought deserve."

Such a being were altogether inadequate for his Maker's highest regards, and far inferior to what even human wisdom can conceive of, as a more excellent production of divine power, wisdom, and beneficence.

By way of further evolution of argument in this debate, we may proceed to notice the opening affirmative article of "*Vinculum*." There seems to us to be a mistiness and confusion of ideas pervading his production, analogous to the effects of one of those "November fogs" he writes about; a "circumstance" which is certainly accessory with him to the perpetration of argumental "suicide." The question, we opine, is one that requires a categorical answer. "Is man a creature of circumstances," or is he not? Aye, or Nay. But "*Vinculum*" does not deal with it in this aspect; but while professedly arguing for, and formally concluding in, an affirmative answer, he makes such admissions and qualifications as are, to our mind, tantamount to a negative conclusion. If man can, indeed (as "*Vinculum*" admits), "blend the woof of his own energy and foresight with the warp of circumstances," and so "make himself a garment" that shall cover and protect him from untoward influences, then he cannot, in any proper sense, be called the "creature of circumstances." There is a vein of admissions, recognizing man's voluntary faculty as a principal or active agent, running through his article: thus he speaks of man as "*voluntarily*" incurring the influence of circumstances; of surrounding "the youthful *aspirant*" with adjuncts. He would *not* make man "the facile victim of principles which he is unable to resist;" and what he *would* "wish to insist upon," we will proceed to notice. He asserts broadly that the "something" in man (by which, we presume, he means the mind) "is sufficiently plastic to allow of its being moulded into *any shape* by those influences that are brought sufficiently early to bear upon it:" but anon, "it is sufficient if we are allowed to consider man as a fair subject for a kindred process to that which changes the wild crab to the garden apple." Now, the analogy here implied is at best but partial, and, therefore, calculated to lead those wrong who, like "*Vinculum*," adopt and proceed upon it. The members of the vegetable kingdom are all passive subjects; and in dealing with them we can rely on certain effects as the result of the application of certain means. But man, we have seen, is

an active and free will endowed subject, and who can predict with certainty what views and courses he will take under any given influences. Is it too much to suppose that the determinations of the free will and intellect endowed mind of man may offer a problem even to Divine wisdom? It is revealed to us that "man was created in the image of God;" and on the occasion of his "fall," "the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil;" and we know that God addresses us in his word in the language of persuasion and reason, promise and threatening; but to what end, we ask, if more cogent and direct appliances were available? What, too, means the great work of redemption, furnishing us, as it does, with the means for "working out own salvation" by the voluntary and intelligent acceptance, on our part, of those "means of grace," if more obvious and certain measures would effect the same result? Do not most of us know of instances where decidedly good influences have been averted, and rare opportunities abused, by perverse specimens of humanity? and conversely, are there not instances of men who have achieved an honorable repute, despite obstacles and adverse circumstances? But to accept the analogy, so far as it holds,—what does it prove to support "Vinculum's" assertion? The changes that can be induced on the "wild crab," or any other member of the wild vegetable tribes, are limited in extent and to well-ascertained directions. A "wild crab," passive though it be under the operations of human reason, cannot be "moulded into any shape;" much less, then, the free will endowed mind of man.

Apropos of "the appliances of "education" to the minds of our children and pauper population," the question, "Would education eradicate crime?" has been fully discussed in these pages, and has helped us to form a negative conclusion on that point. The arguments there adduced will hold good on the present occasion, to the extent the present question is affected by conclusions on that subject. If education, the most pointed of all the "circumstances" incident to man, cannot certainly effect its main design, much less can such dominancy over man be claimed for any other "circumstances." "Vinculum" may have proved that *children* are *more* the "creatures of circumstances" than *men*; but results, as exemplified in any and every family, are not of that frequent and uniform character necessary to constitute the "circumstances" of the parental relation a *law*, conforming its subjects to a set "pattern." Even children exercise a degree of volition and judgment which modifies the action of parental influences and family circumstances; and this power continually increases as they advance in years, and in concomitant strength of will and judgment, so that the obedience that was rendered mainly from mere natural affection and a sense of dependence, is, at length, given from a principle of duty and

intelligent affection; so that we give credit for moral goodness, which implies a free and intelligent source of action, as contradistinguished from the doings of "a creature of circumstances." Thus, we may admit that "family characteristics and the attributes of race are something definite and real," without committing ourselves to the conclusion that "man, in the individual," is the "resultant" of "distinct (i. e., extrinsic) moral and physical forces." We quite concur in the statement that "every individual is affected by the circumstances of locality, association, and habit which he has himself voluntarily incurred, or to which he has been accidentally exposed." This is the modicum of truth in "Vinculum's" argument; but the pervading defect in his reasoning is a march of discrimination between causes *principal* and causes *instrumental*—between active causes and causes passive or reactive. Yet in this distinction, we conceive, lies the *gist* of the question at issue. If it is true that circumstances influence man, it is equally true that man modifies or creates, adopts or rejects, circumstances at his will; and in deciding whether "man is the creature of circumstances," or whether circumstances constitute the pabulum of man's activities, we have to determine which is the principal or active, and which the instrumental or passive, agent in producing results in man's regard. The question fairly before the mind, the judgment cannot well err in its decision. Man's will and intellect, going forth into action, encounter "circumstances," which reach in various ways. They may occur as opportunities or obstacles, adjuncts or temptations, incitements or deterrents; and according as he uses or abuses, overcomes or succumbs, acts or remains supine, will be the results to his individual character and destiny—results clearly attributable to his free determination as the cause principal. Perhaps we have now sufficiently answered "Vinculum's" arguments respecting "man in the individual;" so we will pass on to test his hypothesis respecting "man in the aggregate," as being the "resultant of grand political and social laws." What laws are here meant? Laws are for the most part of a prohibitory and conformative character, and so negative in the matter of producing positive results or "resultants;" they may conform the conduct, and even conduce to enlighten the intellect, but they are powerless to reform the heart or will of man. Such a proposition, as the one we have under notice, should have been supported by facts and illustrated by examples. We will endeavour to supply the defect. The Jewish nation was blessed with "political and social laws," expressly framed for and adapted to it by the Divine Being himself. We know its history and final consummation. Can we say of that community that it was a "resultant" of its truly "grand political and social laws"? Such an assertion would reflect on the Divine Lawgiver. But if not, why not? What answer have we but this,—that they were *not* the "creatures of

circumstances"—of laws the most cogent we can conceive of for producing a given "political and social" "resultant"? We are told by "Vinculum," that "the irregularity of coast-line, the luxuriance of vegetable productions, or the beneficence of climate, render one nation prosperous and civilized, and by their absence retard the development of another, and keep it in a state of semi-barbarism." But what sort of a commentary do the respective histories and present circumstances of Holland and Turkey furnish to his text! A contemporary periodical,* speaking of the former country, says, "The nation in Europe, by far the thriftiest and most frugal, *has in a great measure created its own country*. By running out into the shallow sea dykes and embankments, and then pumping off the brine, the Hollanders have reclaimed a vast surface from the watery waste; and now, on spots where fishes used to be caught, and where ships rode at anchor, cattle graze, gardens blossom, and people go out and in among the thriving villages." Turkey, on the other hand, is second to none in geographical position, climatical advantages, and in vegetable and mineral riches; yet her resources remain undeveloped, and the great bulk of her inhabitants are little, if any, removed from a state of "semi-barbarism." Surely, "Vinculum" must have written in the spirit of the merest theorist, when he thus tempts the apposition of facts altogether condemnatory of his propositions. We wonder if the modicum of truth in *Homo est, quod est propter stomachum*, which "Vinculum" appears to confess to, had anything to do with the matter; the symptoms he so *feelingly* describes might account for such crudity. We are to be libelled as "not merely the 'creatures' but the 'slaves' of circumstances," because objects and events transcribe themselves on the tablet of the memory, and produce "ideas"! Parallelizing this mode of expression, we might proceed to characterize the eye as the slave of light—the lungs, of breath—the heart, of blood—or the soul, of affection! and we might go on to enumerate other equally felicitous and astute propositions *ad infinitum*. Apropos of Sydney Smith, and his remarks. It might answer the purpose of the "witty philosopher" to represent the order and relation of things to men, and men to things, in an inverted aspect. Such inversion is frequently made the vehicle for evolving wit; and wit is never better employed than in holding up to ridicule this inversion of true order, when it has place in the depraved or supine human subject. But propositions of this order are not those which judgment would choose to construct its philosophy withal; "Wit is not wisdom." It is propounded by "Vinculum," as "by no means an unworthy subject for consideration, whether that ungenial element, which more or less pervades the national (English) character, may not fairly be

* "Excelsior," No. 25, Art. I.

attributed to the variability of our climate." The drift of the suggestion renders a notice of it desirable. What if the reverse of the proposition be true? It is, at least, as susceptible of proof. Scripture tells us of lands rendered barren for "the wickedness of them that dwell therein;" and of nations which, at the time prophecies were uttered against them, "flowed with milk and honey," and were the seats of wealth, power, civilization, and luxury, but which became, as predicted, "howling wildernesses." We opine a connection, as of cause and effect, between their sin and their visitation. We have heard of, and believe in, the spiritual nature of the occult causes of epidemics and diseases of all sorts; and it is by no means an unworthy subject for consideration, whether what occur to us as accidents, of every description, are not, under the permission of Providence, conduced and induced by spiritual agencies? whether all objectivities are not the natural exponents of spiritual realities? whether all evil and deleterious qualities are not referable to the common origin of evil, and result from the perverse use man has made of his free will, in averting himself from God, and perverting the good qualities and influences freely imparted to him, to selfish, proud, covetous, and sensual determinations? In short, it is a question, which we regard affirmatively, whether "man in the aggregate" has not a special influence on "circumstances" in the aggregate; and, in his fallen state, the remote but fundamental cause of all evil and deleterious qualities and influences in the ground we tread on, the air we breathe, in plants and animals, and in events, while circumstances in themselves harmless, or calculated to be beneficial, may become harmful, in a relative sense, as affecting the individual? "There is nothing good or ill, but thinking makes it so," says Shakspeare; so true is it that the aspect of circumstances is altogether relative to the state of the individual affected by them. We conclude, in the hope that we have adduced considerations that will uphold the dignity of man against those who would degrade him, by their reasonings, to a "creature of circumstances." The general subject is one that induces strong reflection on the influence man has on his own character and consequent destiny. May some of our observations be found conducive to those actions which are the genuine fruit of noble aspirations and true principles, and without which such aspirations and principles are mere barren abstractions, effective only for the condemnation of those who "knew their Lord's will, and did it not."

PERSONA. 

CONTEMPT.—The basest and meanest of all human beings are generally the most forward to despise others. So that the most contemptible are generally the most contemptuous.—*Fielding*.

VIRTUE is the only nobility.—*Seneca*.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THOSE who would defend the character of any great historical personage are placed in a position of no slight difficulty. "Without spot, and blameless," is an epitaph unbecoming any stone which covers the dust of humanity; and yet if the advocate admit great failings, his candor is not unapt to *prejudice* his hearers or readers against the cause he supports. "Eulogy and invective," says Macaulay, "may be had for asking."

In duly weighing the character of Elizabeth, let us first ask ourselves the question, Do we not find in the page of history evidences of a transition era of convulsion, violence, and persecution,—a whirlpool of passion, into which the greatest and best are drawn? Can we be surprised that the central figure of these troubled groups failed to come out calm and spotless? He who knew the human heart bade us pray that we might not be led into temptation; surely, then, as we utter the prayer for ourselves, it behoves us to be very guarded in condemning those who were so sorely tried, and whose greatest failings are directly traceable to the prevalent influences and ideas of the age in which they lived.

Persecution for religion's sake is in these days classed among the most odious of human crimes. The last vestiges of such a spirit have been expunged from our own code, and its slightest movements in other lands are watched with a jealous eye, and met by remonstrance or direct interference. Most deeply do we glory in the pre-eminence of England in her religious freedom, and earnestly do we long for the extension of that freedom to every nation under heaven. But in the present debate, we feel that there is considerable danger of our readers being *unduly prejudiced* by the fact, which no candid admirer of Elizabeth can deny, that she was, to some extent, a persecutor. We had hoped that the candor of "Threlkeld" would have been copied by his coadjutors, and that, like him, they would have admitted that "Elizabeth is scarcely to be blamed for her bigotry and intolerance;" but we regret to find that B. J. only quotes those words to differ from them, and to open the way for an attack upon Elizabeth's character on these specific grounds. Surely our readers will not endorse so prejudiced and unfair a

method of reasoning! Need we add, to what we have already said, a *statistical* comparison between the victims of persecution under Mary, and those who suffered under Elizabeth? Need we point to the persecutions which took place even during the short reign of the amiable and truly religious boy-king Edward VI.? Need we demand that one, who lived in an age of fierce religious strife and persecution, should be judged with a due regard to the darkness and ignorance of *that* age, and not by the light and knowledge of the nineteenth century?

We have thus far taken the very lowest ground of argument, and have met those opponents who adopt the arguments of B. J. on *their own* statement of facts. But ere we pass to other topics, let us call in the evidence of those who knew Elizabeth, and spoke from *observation* and experience. Lord Bacon tells us that "it is certain she was in her sentiments averse to the forcing of conscience, * * * She concluded that to allow a liberty and toleration of two religions, by public authority, in a military and high mettled nation, that might easily fall from difference in judgment to blows, would be certain destruction. Thus in the beginning of her reign, when all things looked suspicious, she kept some of the prelates, who were of a turbulent spirit, prisoners at large, though not without the warrant of the law; but to the rest of both orders she used no severe inquisition, but protected them by a generous connivance." Now these remarks quite concur with acknowledged history. Elizabeth succeeded to the throne on the 17th of November, 1558, and "instantly gave an earnest of the principles which were to govern her reign, by accepting the same day a note of advice on the most urgent matters from Sir William Cecil," the secretary of state under Edward VI. Yet, so cautious was she and her councillors, that "in the service to be performed before the Queen, she was advised to admit no more changes than her conscience absolutely required, until the whole should be reformed by *parliamentary* authority." In reading such words, we feel almost at a loss to conceive that they form a part of the history of 1558. They seem to refer rather to the eighteenth than to the sixteenth century. And this tenderness, too, is shown towards a faith "from which every part of her personal conduct evinced an irreclaimable estrangement."* Let this be compared with the conduct of Mary, of whom Hallam says:—"This bigoted woman could not even wait the legal authority of a

* When I cite the name of Sir James Mackintosh as the author of these words, I am sure that every reader will feel I have sufficiently answered, what I cannot help terming, the *utterly unfounded* assertions of B. J. (p. 18), that Elizabeth's attachment to Protestantism "was by no means deep-rooted," and that "all her life she displayed a strong bias towards the church of Rome!" The same remarks apply to the *anonymous* quotation of "Threlkeld," p. 23.

servile parliament; the Latin liturgy was restored, the married clergy expelled, *and many Protestants imprisoned, before any change had been made in the established laws.*"

When Parliament met in January, 1559, their deliberations were chiefly turned to matters ecclesiastical. Mackintosh speaks of some of their enactments as "manifestations of a tolerant temper, * * * very extensive compared with the practice of the age." And again, of some of the penalties imposed, as "probably *then* blamed, if at all, for laxity and feebleness." Thus we find Bacon's account amply substantiated by the testimony of later writers.

The early part of Elizabeth's reign, then, was marked by comparative toleration, and calls rather for *praise* than *censure*. Afterwards there was an unhappy change in this respect. The true cause of this, we think, is propounded by Bacon, who thus commences his account of the change:—"About the three and twentieth year of her reign, the face of affairs changed. This difference of the times is not artfully feigned to serve a turn, but stands expressed in the public records, and engraven, as it were, in leaves of brass; for, before that year, none of her subjects of the Romish religion had been punished with any severity by the laws formerly enacted. But now the ambitious and monstrous designs of Spain to conquer this kingdom began to open themselves; a principal part of which was to raise a faction in the heart of the kingdom. * * * Their hopes of effecting this were grounded upon the difference there was amongst us in religion, whence they resolved to labour this point effectually." He then traces this idea, through the facts of history, to the *inevitable* deduction of those days, that "in such an impending storm of dangers, the Queen was obliged, *by the law of necessity*," to adopt those more stringent measures which characterized the later years of her reign. He reminds us of the natural earnestness of her ministers to execute the laws they had framed, and, contrasting this with the few who actually suffered, declares, "And thus we think we have made it appear that the Queen was moderate in point of religion, and that the change which ensued was not owing to her nature, but to the necessity of the times." We may not entirely coincide with Bacon, and altogether acquit the "Virgin Queen" of all blame on the score of intolerance; but when we remember the times in which she lived, and picture to ourselves a woman surrounded by the "bearded majesty" of Burleigh, Bacon, and Walsingham, all counselling these extreme measures, and using these specious arguments of necessity, it appears to us as impossible to *condemn*, as it would be unworthy wholly to justify.

Again, the treatment of the Puritans is to be judged with like leniency. Can we justly condemn Elizabeth because she failed to rise above the level of her instructors—because she showed

no higher appreciation of the true spirit of Christianity than the Whitgifts, and Parkers, and other dignitaries of the church ? Was it in human nature to yield the ecclesiastical supremacy tacked to her crown without a struggle ? Does not her conduct find a palliation, amounting almost to justification, in the utter extravagance of some of the doctrines maintained by the sectaries of her day—doctrines leading immediately to the very destruction of all human society and civil government ? Let any one study the wild and utterly anarchical views propounded by “the family of the Essentialists,” “the family of love,” “the family of the mount,” “the Anabaptists,” and other sects, and then remember the Tudor notions of prerogative and power in which Elizabeth had been nurtured, and we venture to think that he will feel that, if Elizabeth persecuted, it was neither without provocation nor without excuse. She lived amid the turbulence and despotism of three centuries ago ; can it then excite surprise that she erred on the side of intolerance ? If any readers think so, let them remember that the “*Times*” has, within a few months, preached a crusade against the Mormons, and argued against extending the protection of the law to their doctrines. Mormonite doctrines may be bad indeed, but they can scarcely be as startling to the nineteenth century as the dogmas of those who “denied the propriety of prayer,” held “all outward actions to be indifferent,” deemed themselves a community of “sinless purity,” and (as such) “neither allowed ministers in the church, nor magistrates in the state,” must have been to the councillors of Elizabeth.

We now pass on to consider the next most striking charge, her conduct in respect of the Queen of Scots. Had Mary been less beautiful, less had been heard and said of her treatment. The beauty of the Queen of Scots, like the real or affected piety which marked the closing hours of Charles I., leads us, from feelings of pity, to forget great faults on her side, and to exaggerate the wrong and injustice of her imprisonment and execution. We frankly admit that Elizabeth would have been *more* worthy of admiration had she acted otherwise than as she did, just as we admit that Cromwell would have stood higher, had he opposed the execution of Charles ; but we think that in both cases a calm consideration of the circumstances, and a remembrance of human frailty, will lead the really candid mind to admire the manner in which true greatness struggled with temptation, ere it fell beneath its power. Let us slightly advert to the position in which Elizabeth was placed.

First of all, it should be borne in mind that Elizabeth, as a *woman*, must necessarily have been compelled to trust herself greatly to the guidance of her counsellors. She wore a crown which might be disputed on many grounds. Her position thus insecure, prudence, and every consideration of policy, necessi-

tated the use of all justifiable methods of strengthening her power. She was liable to be threatened from without by other nations ; and she was in jeopardy from within on account of the religious differences of her people. Amongst the greatest dangers to her crown, and to the lives and liberties of herself and her ministers, were the claims of Mary of Scotland. The sagacity of Cecil seized upon this truth instantly. "Within a few days of her accession," we are told, this warm friend of Protestantism laid before her his views in a paper (which has come down to us in the pages of Strype), entitled "A Device for the Alteration of Religion." In this paper he points out the danger which would certainly arise from Rome, France, and Scotland, without, and from many of the old faith, who "would see in the change their ruin," within. Nay, the dangers of ultra zeal among his own party, some of whom would be sure to condemn moderation as "a cloaked papistry," did not fail to engage his statesmanlike attention. "Against these perils he recommended every effort to make peace with France, which would be followed by peace with Scotland ; but if these efforts failed, to augment the hopes of those who incline to good religion in both those countries."* Here we have the key to the whole of Elizabeth's after policy. Even towards the Pope she behaved at first with courtesy, and directed Sir Edward Carue, her ambassador, to announce her succession, and her determination "to offer no violence to the conscience of any class of her subjects." The Pope replied to this noble message of toleration, "that England was a fief of the apostolic see, and that she could not succeed, being illegitimate !" And this menace he followed with a bull, depriving heretical sovereigns of their dominions. The breach was complete and final with Rome ; and after reading these facts, we can scarcely be surprised either at Elizabeth's persecutions of the Catholic party at home, or her dealings with the Protestant party in other nations.

The recommendations of Cecil show the policy with which Elizabeth set out upon her career ; and it is in every way worthy of our highest admiration. It may be summed up in a sentence,—"*first, peace ; and, failing that, self-defence.*" How were these advances met by Mary ? By the assumption of the regal title, arms, and seal of England ! We find, from Cecil's diary, that Mary and her husband even executed a grant of land to Lord Fleming by their title as King and Queen of England as well as Scotland ! Matters were thus early brought to an issue—an issue pointedly and eloquently expressed by Sir James Mackintosh :—"The claims of a Roman Catholic pretender, wedded to the heir-apparent of such a monarchy as France—while Scotland was divided between the contending communions,

* Mackintosh, vol. iii. ("Cabinet Cyclopædia" Edition.)

while Ireland was altogether Catholic, and while Catholics predominated in the northern provinces of England—were in the highest degree formidable to the Protestant succession in England, and seemed to threaten an instant overthrow to Elizabeth's tottering throne." In such a juncture it became, in our view, not merely a justifiable expedient, but a duty, and an exercise of admirable political wisdom, to engage in those cautious interferences which "Threlkeld" thinks fit to brand as "intermeddling," "machinations," &c. One other course was open to Elizabeth,—that of open war and bloodshed. That she avoided such an extremity, and husbanded the resources of her country against the days of the Spanish Armada,—that she spared England the curse of a war, and accomplished the security and establishment of her throne by no other means than those "intermeddlings" at which "Threlkeld" aims his condemnatory epithets and suppositions,—are facts which suffice at once to raise the fame of the "Virgin Queen," and to vindicate her claims to the gratitude and admiration of posterity. We only ask each reader to consider the negotiations of 1560, when Mary pointedly refused to acknowledge Elizabeth's title to the English crown, or to peruse the reasonings of Cecil, in his paper entitled, "A Brief Consideration of the Weighty Matter of Scotland," and we feel sure the result will be to increase his admiration of Elizabeth in her capacity of sovereign. The same arguments might be brought to bear on each successive phase of events in respect to the closely connected subjects of Elizabeth's foreign policy, marriage negotiations, and Scottish policy, all of which were conducted with consummate skill, so as to work together for the security and protection of the Protestantism and independence of England. It was no part of her duty to raise a religious war to put down Popery in this or that kingdom. Her object was to secure England from foreign domination or spiritual enslavement; and in doing this, she played off one foe against another, and gained her great ends by the skill with which she used means apparently the most insufficient. Up to the last scene we cannot but *admire* her conduct; but upon the execution of Mary Stuart we would let the curtain fall. We cannot justify *this*. Yet, nearly all that can be said in favour of Cromwell's execution of Charles, may be urged with equal strength in the case of Elizabeth. How few would blame the English Government, who condemned Napoleon the Great to perpetual imprisonment on a barren rock in the midst of the Atlantic ocean! May we not fairly suppose that Elizabeth would have been more merciful if she had possessed a St. Helena on which to imprison the captive of Fotheringay Castle.

The remaining objections are such as may well pass with but slight notice. B. J., with remarkable hardihood, accuses Elizabeth of "tyranny." Does he forget that what would be tyrann

now was unusual liberty *then*? In condemning a sovereign in this respect, we are bound to judge with regard to the age in which that sovereign lived. Let this be done in the case of Elizabeth; let it be remembered that she was the daughter of Henry VIII., and let her reign be compared with the exactions, bloodshed, and oppression of that monarch. Let it be compared with that of Mary, her immediate predecessor, or even of James, her successor, and we think that the charge of tyranny must fall to the ground in an instant. B. J. alludes to the use of torture. Let her long reign be compared in this respect with that of Mary, of whom Hallam tells us that "torture is more mentioned in her short reign than in all the preceding ages of our history put together." It was from no want of precedent, therefore, if Elizabeth was even *merely moderate* in these respects. But we need not continue—the *popularity* which Elizabeth always enjoyed is a sufficient disproof of *this* accusation.

"Threlkeld" descends to the aspersion of Elizabeth's moral character as a woman. The accusation befits a writer whose estimation of the sex is such that he cannot speak of the mutability of fame without travelling out of his path to throw out a taunt condemning "all females" as fickle. He who *thus despises* the sex may not unnaturally be ready to catch at any insinuation against Elizabeth.

Again, we find Elizabeth accused of "soul-cankering egotism," amounting to mere selfishness. To this accusation her popularity seems a sufficient reply. It was not court favorites alone, but grave statesmen, authors, poets, and the people at large, who flattered Elizabeth, and showed sincere admiration for her character. Some kinds of egotism naturally accompany greatness. Self-reliance is an egotism peculiar to great characters; and this species of egotism Elizabeth undoubtedly had. But of selfishness there are no distinct traces, beyond that vanity which was probably the necessary result of the position of political greatness at which she arrived, and the personal flattery by which she was surrounded.

Our opponents allow to Elizabeth almost all the characteristics which should command admiration (see especially pp. 21, 27, 117, 121, *ante*), but they plead certain accusations as eclipsing all. It is now for our readers to say whether we have succeeded in exposing the injustice and unreality of these accusations. The "Elizabethan era" is a household word, which carries us back to a proud page of English history. In arts and arms, in commerce and literature, England then received an impulse which proved the source of her present greatness and freedom. Whence came that impulse? Was it from the "avarice," "hypocrisy," "duplicity," "selfishness," "injustice," "cruelty," "despotism," and "tyranny" of England's Queen? *Risum teneatis amici!* Was it not rather from the energies of a people

breathing something of manly freedom, and guided by the wisdom of a great and patriotic sovereign? Proud should the patriot be of such a Queen! She found England weltering in the blood shed by persecution, and (to say the least) she checked the stream. She found it grovelling beneath the Romish yoke, and left it in secure possession of a purer faith. She ascended a tottering throne, and left that throne secure as a rock. She found her country almost an appanage of Spain, and left it in the front rank of European power and fame! Under her auspices the first germ of our mighty colonial empire sprung into life. Under her commerce first established herself in the Exchange of London. These things are utterly inconsistent with the accusations of our opponents, and convict them of mistaken views and false arguments. In her own day the people cried around, "Long live the good Elizabeth;" in our day, we trust that the majority of the reflecting classes, and all who are not blinded by prejudice, will take up the echo which reverberates through the pages of history, and, crowning her memory with deserved admiration, will style her "the Great Elizabeth!"

B. S.

TEMPERANCE in pleasure is essentially necessary to be observed, particularly by youth, that they may beware of that rock on which thousands, from race to race, continually split. The love of pleasure, natural to man in every period of his life, glows at this age with excessive ardor.—Novelty adds fresh charms, as yet, to every gratification. The world appears to spread a continual feast; and health, vigour, and high spirits invite them to partake of it without restraint. In vain are they warned of the latent danger.—The old, when they offer their admonitions, are upbraided with having forgot that they once were young. And yet, to what do the counsels of age, with respect to pleasure, amount? They may all be comprised in few words:—not to hurt ourselves, and not to hurt others, by our pursuit of pleasure; and these will be fully effected by temperance. Within these bounds pleasure is lawful; beyond them it becomes criminal, because it is ruinous.—*Dr. Blair.*

BODILY AND MENTAL EXERCISE.—It is certain that as in the body, when no labour or natural exercise is used, the spirits, which want their due employment, turn against the constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in a soul or mind unexercised, and which languishes for want of action and employment, the thoughts and affections, being obstructed in their due course, and deprived of their natural energy, raise disquiet, and foment a rancorous eagerness and tormenting irritation. The temper from hence becomes more impotent in passion, more incapable of real moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily takes fire by the least spark.—*Shaftesbury.*

Politics.

WOULD PARLIAMENT BE JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING THE OPENING OF THE CRYSTAL PALACE ON SUNDAY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“Keep the sabbath holy, for its use both to body and soul: but if anywhere the day is made holy for the mere day’s sake,—if anywhere any one sets up its observance upon a Jewish foundation,—then I order you to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to feast on it, to do anything that shall reprove this encroachment on the Christian spirit and liberty.”—*Luther.*

WE very much regret the spirit in which this question is discussed. “Threlkeld” proclaims, that to advocate relaxation on the Sunday for the poor man, after his week of exhausting toil, denotes “infidelity or Romanism.” Has he no more respect for the great champions of Protestantism, Luther and Calvin, than to class them with infidels and Romanists?

In reality, the question before us is not whether we should regard or disregard the sanctity of the Sunday, but rather, to what extent ought Government to go, legitimately and fairly, in enforcing the observance of that day?

It is no more the duty of Government to prevent the poor man from going to the Crystal Palace on the Sunday, than it was to compel him in days of yore to go to church. The unprejudiced observer must acknowledge that religious restrictions are productive of evil; every man has a right to think for himself and act for himself, so long as his thoughts and actions do not interfere with the thoughts and actions of other men. We maintain that the morals of the lower orders would improve, and the sabbath would be kept more holy, if, instead of framing obnoxious bills, which only excite the hatred of the poor against the rich, the Crystal Palace, reading rooms, museums, public gardens, picture galleries, grounds for recreation, &c., were thrown open to the public in the *intervals between divine service.*

But we advocate the opening of the Crystal Palace on religious grounds. We propose showing that it is not contrary to the word of God. *All that we ask* is, that the poor may receive the same instruction and amusement in the Crystal Palace, that the rich enjoy in their mansions, without rebuke from any one. What right have religious people to prevent the poor obtaining the same recreation that they do not deny themselves?

1st. We intend showing that the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday would be decidedly beneficial to the social

well-being of the people. The observant traveller on the continent must have been struck with the absence of drunkenness;—*scenes of drunkenness on a sabbath evening, such as are a disgrace to this country, are there never seen.* And why? Because there the *necessity* of innocent recreation is acknowledged and duly legislated for; and until this is done in England, all attempts at a general improvement of the lower classes will be nugatory. If philanthropists, instead of engaging in a vain, useless, and Quixotic war against public houses, would provide intellectual and sedentary amusements for the operative classes, England would no longer possess the unenviable notoriety of being the most drunken country in the world.* *What is the cause of intemperance?* It is this:—human nature requires excitement; the same thirst for amusement and change is implanted by the great Creator—

“Along the scale of ranks, through all;”

and it is not only foolish, but sinful, to ignore this great instinct, which was evidently ordained for some wise end, and that—the *preservation of our species in health and activity.* The rich and prosperous man gratifies this natural desire by seeking scenes of stirring amusement, by frequenting the opera, the ball-room, the social party, or by visiting foreign climes. How fares the poor man? What is left for him? The common tap-room, or the singing saloon of some “musical tavern,” where he may for a time forget the cares, anxieties, and realities of life. He is *driven* to partake of the Lethean stream, which first affords him pleasurable excitement, and then sinks in oblivion for awhile all his sorrows, all his humiliations. The laboring classes must and will have excitement: after a hard day’s work some change is required, something that will be a relief to the business of life. How is the sobriety of the French to be accounted for? Simply by the fact that innocent amusements are within the reach of all. Witness the crowds that flock to the museums, the pleasant gatherings in the public gardens, the dance on the village greens, and the other merry doings that are never abused or disgraced by scenes of licentiousness or drunkenness. As *indoor recreation* is more needed in England than in any other country, on account of the frequency of wet weather, the operative classes should have every facility afforded them for seeing works of art, such as are to be found in the Crystal Palace. They will then in time acquire a true feeling for the beautiful; it will follow that as they become *more intellectual* and *less animal*, they will view with disgust those amusements and pleasures in which they once so freely indulged. I think every unprejudiced observer

* “From all I have read and seen, I am compelled to coincide with the generally received opinion, that we are yet the most drunken people on earth.”
—“*A City Missionary’s (Vanderkiste’s) Notes and Narratives.*”

will agree with me as to the effects produced on the morals of a people by constant intercourse with works of true art. At present the English artizan is prevented from seeing any works of art, of which it is worth speaking. The British Museum is opened to him, certainly,—wonderful to relate!—free of charge, a few days in every year. The incalculable advantages the people might derive from the Crystal Palace are at present lost. The Crystal Palace is a school of art, of geography and geology, of ethnology and astronomy, of botany and zoology—a fit resort for the studious and contemplative. Open it on the Sunday, and thousands of artizans will be led to devote their leisure hours to profitable pursuits, in which interest was first awakened by some sight thus thrown in their way; thousands, whose work hours are spent in close, pestilential atmospheres, will be able to reinvigorate their constitutions, by breathing the pure, balmy country air to be found therein; thousands, who are now thirsting for knowledge which they cannot obtain, will receive both instruction and enjoyment; thousands, who are almost sinking under their unceasing toil, will obtain amusement and rest at the same time; thousands, whose intellects are now dormant, will have them roused into activity; and lastly, but not least important in its results, thousands, who now spend the sabbath in drunkenness and debauch, will pass it amidst the beautiful in nature and art, to their own and society's advantage.

2ndly. We now propose considering the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday, more especially in relation to its religious bearing.

We, as a nation, are never tired of boasting of our civilization (or, in reality, commercial greatness), whereby a few are raised to affluence, and are polished, refined, and civilized, whilst the bulk of the people are veritable slaves, seemingly made only to toil incessantly, uncared for, unthought for. The six days are to be spent in toil, and the seventh in listless inactivity. But the working man feels that it would be beyond his powers of endurance to spend six days in unrelieved toil, and a seventh in gloomy meditation and austere mortification; and as no innocent recreation is provided for him, as a necessary consequence, he is tempted to indulge in what is bad. They would do well to ponder these words of Dr. Johnson's:—"Life is a pill, which none of us can bear to swallow without gilding; yet for the poor we delight in stripping it still barer, and are not ashamed to show even visible *displeasure, if the bitter taste is ever to be taken from their mouths.*" Those who advocate the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday wish to give the working man an opportunity of obtaining a little healthy and innocent amusement, knowing that it is a necessary of life; they wish to make his only day a real sabbath, a day to be desired, to be enjoyed, and to be thankful for. We wish to transform the sabbath from

a day of gloom, as it is now, to a day of sunshine. A part should be devoted to religion, and a part to innocent recreation and amusement, which, we contend, would not be contrary to the commandments of God respecting the observance of that day. The sedentary should seek exercise, the hard working, actively engaged artizan should seek repose; the pent-up, closely confined, should breathe the pure air of heaven, and gladden their eyes by viewing the works of his Creator: and where might all these be obtained so conveniently and profitably as in the Crystal Palace and its surrounding grounds? Those who are enabled to divert their minds and instruct themselves on the other six days *need not* visit the Crystal Palace; it is for the poor man we demand the boon; with him it is—Sunday, or not at all.

There are vast numbers of our fellow men without a place of worship. Whither is the poor man to go? The pew system and pew rents, both in churches and chapels, forbid his entrance, unless he be willing to pay for the privilege of adoring his God in an edifice devoted to that purpose. In our opinion, nature is God's temple,—

“ Each cloud capp'd mountain is a holy altar;
An organ breathes in every grove;
And the full heart's a psalter,
Rich in deep hymns of gratitude and love ! ”

But acknowledging, as we do, the desirableness of attending some place of worship, we do not wish the opening of the Crystal Palace to interfere with church service; all we ask is, that *when the doors which lead to degradation be thrown open, let not the portals which lead to instruction, improvement, and innocent recreation, be barred*. Although innocent recreations on the Sunday have been allowed from the earliest dawn of Christianity, yet “Threlkeld” affirms that “those who believe in God's Bible can never hold such opinions.” “Threlkeld” also says that the holy observance of the sabbath is perpetually binding, and that the change of days was “made by God himself.” His views are opposed to those of all the reformers. The first founders of the Christian church, and all Protestant continental nations, have always opposed the ascetic observance of the first day of the week, and have maintained that there is no divine appointment binding the church to observe any particular day at all as a sabbath. His sabbatarian views were unknown until about two centuries back, when they were first introduced from Holland. To uphold such a doctrine, is altogether a return to Judaism. The law of the sabbath was a divine law, but only for a period; it was given to the Jews, and to them alone; it was a sign,—“I gave them their sabbath, to be a sign between me and them.” The fourth commandment is not binding upon Christians, since it was demolished with the whole decalogue. There are only two commandments of the Christian church,—“Thou shalt love

the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. *This is the first and great commandment; and the second is like unto it,—Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.*" Can we want higher authority than the words of Jesus Christ himself? The fourth commandment is nowhere re-enacted in the New Testament, although the other nine are laid down in various passages. Evidently the true meaning of the passage, "The sabbath was made for man," is, that the sabbath was given to serve man, and not man to serve the sabbath. If the fourth commandment be still binding upon us, it should be accepted in its strict and literal interpretation. It will not do to observe one day in seven, but the seventh day, as originally instituted, must be selected. "But the day has been changed," says "Threlkeld," though, strangely, he does not show by what authority. He considers it evident that the first day was observed, because "on that day twice did Jesus meet his disciples," &c. We fail to perceive sufficient grounds in any of the reasons given for changing the observance of the Jewish sabbath to the first day of the week. What were the disciples doing when Jesus appeared to them on one of these occasions? *Fishing, and on a Sunday!* Not only has the law of the sabbath not been repealed, but there is no commandment in the New Testament enforcing any day of rest at all. *On this point all the great men of former times have concurred.* We refer "Threlkeld" to Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Barclay, Locke, &c. Milton affirmed that no day was appointed for divine worship in preference to another, except such that the church might set apart of its own authority. Luther went through the Bible verse by verse—he was perfectly acquainted with the scope and meaning of the commandments of God as therein expressed—yet he says, "*that there was no necessity for the observance of Sunday; and if we did so, it was not because Moses commanded it, but because nature taught us to set apart a day for rest, and because it was desirable for the due hearing of the word of God.*" Calvin, than whom no man was more scrupulous in observing what he considered God's words, says, "*By changing the day, and yet attributing to this day the same sanctity which the Jews did to their sabbath, we retain the same typical distinction of days as had place among the Jews. Those who now cling to them go thrice as far as the Jews themselves in their gross and carnal superstition of their sabbath worship.*" And yet we, who are only acting upon the views of the founders of Protestantism, are taunted as being enemies to God. We do not wish the sabbath to become a work day, as our opponents contend it would, if our views were carried out, we simply wish it to be observed in the true spirit of Protestantism. We venerate the sabbath as one of the noblest institutions of man—as a day of rest from the affairs of mammon

and selfishness—as a day of worship. The early Christian church did wisely in thus instituting one day in seven to withdraw man from the cares of the world—to give him an opportunity of resting, of worshipping, and of obtaining such refreshment of body and soul as would enable him to resume his work on the Monday with renewed strength.

Every step gained from debasing habits is so much gained towards a religious result; and by opening the Crystal Palace on the Sunday we attract the working man from the gin palace, and lead him to indulge in pursuits better than those to be found in the public-house. By “straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel,” we allow the public-house to spread out its attractions on the sabbath, whilst we shut up most rigorously all places of an improving and elevating character. The time will come when a more practical generation will wonder at our folly.

Space forbids us to say more: but we have said sufficient, we think, to show that the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday would be beneficial to the social well-being of the people, and that it would not be contrary to religion; we must, therefore, come to the conclusion that Parliament “would be justified in sanctioning the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sunday.”

Bradford.

TALIESIN.

RULES OF LIFE.—We frequently fall into error and folly, not because the true principles of action are not known, but because for a time they are not remembered; he may, therefore, justly be numbered among the benefactors of mankind who contracts the great rules of life into short sentences, that may early be impressed on the memory, and taught by frequent recollection to occur habitually to the mind.—*Dr. Johnson.*

PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE.—It would be an unpardonable degree of arrogance in an assemblage of the wisest men that ever lived, supposing that they could be brought together, to circumscribe any subject whatever within the narrow boundaries of their own opinions. It would betray a total misconception of the relations of the human mind to the objects that surround it. I have contended, that men in the present day are superior in knowledge to their predecessors,—but, on the same grounds, those who come after us will be superior to the existing generation. It is highly probable, indeed, however mortifying the reflection may be to our personal consequence, that we, in this age, are mere barbarians compared with the race who shall hereafter fill the earth: and surely for us to erect a standard of opinion for beings likely to be so infinitely superior to ourselves is too absurd to need exposure, and can scarcely fail to provoke many a compassionate smile in the future ages of the world.—*Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, &c.*

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART I.—PRONUNCIATION.

(Continued from page 140.)

THE vowel system of the French language comprises the following sounds:—

1. A pronounced like	a in fat	9. I, Y	i in twin
2. A	a in arm	10. O pronounced like	o in hot
3. AA	a in father	11. O	oa in roam
4. AI, É, È, Ê, EI	a in ale	12. OI	wa in war
5. AU, EAU, O	o in bone	13. OU	oo in tool
6. E	e in hen	14. OU	w in we
7. EU, ŒU	e in nerve	15. U	oo in good
8. I, Y	ee in between		

16. U, EU with no similar sound in English.

In uttering this sound the lips should be forward, and kept away from the teeth; not quite closed, of course, but more nearly than in pronouncing *o*; the tongue should also be kept from the teeth, and raised in the middle towards the roof of the mouth. Keeping the muscles in this position, let the reader *try* to pronounce the English word *you*. This he will not be able to do; but he will utter a sound very closely resembling that of the French *u*.

From the examples given above, it is intended that the student should observe that the sounds marked 3, 4, 8, 11, and 13, are the same in nature as 2, 6, 9, 5, and 15 respectively, but longer in regard to the time of their enunciation. He will also find that 14 is a still shorter utterance of 13 than 15 is. But there are certain fine distinctions which no language can describe, which experience alone can enable him to appreciate, and which practice alone can teach him to make. Our vowels in English seldom receive the care that is necessary to their full and accurate expression, and this deprives us of the means of communicating, as well as, to a great degree, of the power of detecting, the delicate inflexions of sound which are so evident to the ears of a native. Some of these distinctions (as, for instance, between *Ê* and *É*) we have not attempted to draw: they are useless in England, and are to be most easily acquired by intercourse with French people.

The sound marked 1 is the ordinary utterance of *a*, as in the words *amateur*, *oracle*; and of *e*, followed by *mm*, as in *femme*; and by *nn*, in the words *solennel*, *hennir*, and the words related to them.

2 is the sound of *a* in monosyllables, and in words where it is followed by *r*: as *a*, to; *rame*, an oar; *car*, for.

3 is the sound of *â*, and where *a* is followed by final *s*: as in *pas*, a step; *bas*, low; *las*, tired; *âge*, age; *mâle*, male; *âme*, soul; *âne*, ass.

4 is the common sound of *ai*, *é*, *e*, and *ê*. So the last syllables of *parler*, *parlé*, *parlai*, *parlais*, *parlait*, *parlaient*, are all, before a word that begins with a consonant, pronounced like the English word *lay*. And the last syllables of *système* and *Angoulême* are pronounced like the English *tame* and *lame*.

In the verb *faire*, to do, where *ai* are followed by *s*, they are commonly pronounced as short *e*: so *faisant* is pronounced *fesant*, &c.

8 and 9. The long sound of *i* and *y* is heard when they end a syllable, the shorter when the syllable in which either of them is found ends in a consonant: so *cri*, *ri-mer*, are pronounced *cree*, *reemay*, while the first syllable of *immense* is pronounced as in English. *Thyrse* is pronounced like the English *tierce*.

12. The principal difficulty in this sound is to annex it to a consonant. *Oisif*, idle, is pronounced *wâ-siff*; but when *oi* follow *m* or *r*, &c., the pronunciation requires some degree of practice. *Moi*, *mwâ*; *toi*, *twâ*; *soi*, *swâ*; *roi*, *rwâ*; *boite*, *bwât*; *Thoyras* (the historian, better known as Rapin), *Twârus*.

E and *U* after *g*, when they are followed by another vowel, are not sounded. They are employed in these cases to indicate the pronunciation of the *g*, which is soft before *e*, and hard before *u*: so *geai*, a jay, is pronounced *gé* (*zhai*). *Manger*, *mangeai*, *mangeais*, *mangeait*, *mangé*, and *mangeaient*, are all pronounced alike, if the next word begins with a consonant.

Guigue is pronounced *gig*; *guérir*, *gay-rere*; *guère*, *gare*. Of course *ge* are not followed by *e* or *i*, nor *gu* by *a* or *o*, except in *geindre*, to moan, and the foreign word *guano*, *guano*. *Ein* in the former of these will be spoken of below, in the latter the *u* has the sound of the English *w*.

17. *IN*, *AIN*, *EIN*, in those cases in which *n* is nasal, and *IM*, *AIM*, at the end of syllables, are all pronounced like the *an* in *sang*. See page 138.

18. *AN*, *AM*, *EN*, *EM*, are pronounced nearly like the *on* in *song*. The corners of the mouth should be a little retracted from the position necessary properly to pronounce the word *song*, and this will produce a sound between the *an* of *sang*, and the *on* of *song*, which is the sound required.

In *ON*, *OM*, the vowel sound is the *o* of *comb* or *Rhone*.

19. *UN* and *UM* represent the sound of the *u* in *bud*, combined with the nasal *n*.

E, when unaccented, is called *e mute*, and is to be hardly heard in pronunciation; but it is wrong to pronounce *aimé* exactly like the English *aim*: the *e* should be faintly pronounced. So in words like *taire*, *patte*, *noblesse*, the sudden termination of the sound given to the English words *tare*, *pat*, *distress*, should be avoided, and a slight emission of the breath should be allowed after the consonant.

In *Caen* the *e* is silent. In *paon*, *paonne*, *faon*, and *Laon*, the *o* is not to be heard, but they are to be pronounced *pan*, *pane*, *fan*, *Lan*. In *Août*, *aoriste*, *Saône*, *taon*, *a* is not sounded; but in *aoûté*, ripened, it is pronounced.

Bearing in mind the observations which have been made on the sounds of the letters, the following list will assist the student in overcoming some of the difficulties of French pronunciation.

LIST OF WORDS AND SYLLABLES WHICH ARE PRONOUNCED
VERY NEARLY ALIKE.

French.	English.	French.	English.
<i>l'aime</i>	<i>lame</i>	<i>pipe</i>	<i>peep</i>
<i>nez, né, née</i>	<i>nay</i>	<i>âmes</i>	<i>alms</i>
<i>mes, mais</i>	<i>may</i>	<i>au, aux, eau, caux</i>	<i>owe</i>
<i>mer, mère</i>	<i>mare</i>	<i>maux, mot, mots</i>	<i>mow</i>
<i>mède</i>	<i>made</i>	<i>fort</i>	<i>fore</i>
<i>fer, faire, frère</i>	<i>fare</i>	<i>aune</i>	<i>own</i>
<i>cher, chère, chaire</i>	<i>share</i>	<i>sot, sots, seau, sceau, } sceaux }</i>	<i>so</i>
<i>oué, ouait, ouais, ouet</i>	<i>way</i>	<i>doux</i>	<i>do</i>
<i>même</i>	<i>maim</i>	<i>chou</i>	<i>shoe</i>
<i>mi</i>	<i>me</i>	<i>tout, tous</i>	<i>two</i>
<i>oui</i>	<i>we</i>		

ACCENTS.

The French has no accent such as that which in English distinguishes the verb and noun in *absent*, *contract*, *object*, *rebel*, &c. All the syllables of a word are pronounced with the same stress of the voice, except that in a long word, or an emphatic word, the pronunciation of the last syllable is somewhat stronger and a little lengthened. What are called the French accents are three marks, which serve to distinguish—1, the sounds of the letter *e*; 2. Some few words which are used in two different senses; and, 3. To mark the disappearance of a consonant and the compensating lengthening of a vowel.

The ACUTE accent (a dash from right to left), is placed only over *e*, to indicate that it is to have the sound of *e* in *there*, in cases in which, without the accent, it would be mute; as *vérité* (*vai-re-tay*, which, without the accent, would be pronounced very nearly *v'reet*), *désastre*, *préfé rer*.

The acute accent is placed—

1. Over *e* final in the participles of all verbs of the first con-

jugation, and in many nouns, and some adjectives; as *aimé, parlé, bonté, aisé*.

2. Over *e* followed by another vowel which does not belong to the same syllable; as *réel, réunion, armée, préau, agréée*.

3. Over *e* final of the first person singular of the present tense of the indicative mood, when used interrogatively; as *je parle*, I speak; *parlé-je?* do I speak?

The GRAVE accent (a dash from left to right) is placed over *e*;—

1. In the last syllable of a substantive in the singular number, an adverb, or a preposition, ending in *es*; as *procès, très, après*.

2. In the last syllable of words ending in *e* mute, preceded by a consonant; as *père, modèle, je préfère*.

But the termination *éje* takes the acute accent; as *sortilège*.

3. Over *à*, to; *dès*, from; *là*, there; *où*, where; to distinguish them from *a*, has; *des*, of the, some; *la*, the; *ou*, or.

The CIRCUMFLEX accent is used—

1. To indicate that the vowel over which it is placed has a long, full sound; as *fâcheux, finîmes, trône, fûmes*.

2. Over words which were formerly spelt with an *s*; as *être*, to be; *maître*, master; *nôtre*, our; *même*, even; formerly spelt, *estre, maistre, nostre, mesme*.

3. Over *crû*, grown; *dû*, due; *mûr*, ripe; *sûr*, sure; and *tû*, the participle of *taire*, to be silent; to distinguish them from *cru*, believed; *du*, of the, some; *mur*, a wall; *sur*, upon; and *tu*, thou.

The use of the Apostrophe, Hyphen, Parenthesis, &c., is very much the same as in English, and will be learnt much more easily by practice and observation than by rules.

In the separation of syllables, it is to be remembered that each syllable is to be terminated, if possible, by a vowel; if not by a vowel, by a single consonant: thus *vé-ri-té*, not *vér-i-té*; and also that the *e* mute, with its preceding consonant or consonants, is to be regarded as a syllable: so *fan-tô-me, pré-fè-re, ai-mé-e, Sy-ri-e*.

Finally, in pronunciation, let the student carefully avoid a slovenly utterance of the vowels. In English we drawl out or shorten a syllable without meeting with either the censure or the ridicule which such carelessness deserves; but while politeness forbids laughter in the presence of one who, in private conversation, mispronounces the French, no rules of etiquette can prevent detection, or screen the absent offender.

IMPOSSIBILITIES.—Be not angry that you cannot make others as you wish them to be, since you cannot make yourself what you wish to be.—*Thomas à Kempis*.

The Review.

"THE SONG OF HIAWATHA," BY HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW.

A FEW months since, and the literary world had been startled by the publication of Tennyson's "Maud," only to be still further thrown into amazement by the advent of *Hiawatha*, from the pen of Longfellow. The one was ushered into existence with expectation stretched to its utmost tension; the other came in like the evening twilight, the peeping stars. "Maud" met with an equivocal reception; and "Anti-Maud," published with the hope of exposing its predecessor's faults and foibles, only drew out its beauties, when contrasted with the poverty of ideas, and the vindictive tone which marked its own pages. "Hiawatha" was exempt from these infantine embarrassments, although, by-the-bye, it suffered rather rudely from the pen of an indifferent critic, rejoicing in the name of *Idler* (and how appropriate his title!), who denounced it as twaddle ere he read it, but who subsequently made the *amende honorable* in an abject apology, and, after he had perused it, warmed into as indiscriminate a praise as he had before been unanimous in his censure.

The "Song of Hiawatha," its author tells us, is an Indian Edda, "founded upon a tradition prevalent among the North American Indians, of a personage of miraculous birth, who was sent among them to clear their rivers, forests, and fishing grounds, and to teach them the arts of peace;" with other traditions, which our author has successfully worked up into a fine piece of "picture writing."

It was a work of supererogation to criticise Longfellow as a poet, and time thrown away to descant upon his previous success. His credentials have long since been endorsed with the flattering approbation of critics and readers. It would be as impossible for Longfellow to write doggerel as for Macaulay to give a Tory credit for a noble action or a patriotic aspiration. His poetry is full of feeling, redolent with an autumnal mellowness. Here he starts the tear, there he calls "bleak melancholy" from its depths to run riot; now he fascinates the mourner, here he charms the wayward and the stingy. He is sensitive yet manly, dignified yet pathetic, philosophical but not mystical.

"Hiawatha" substantially corroborates our estimate of its author's powers. Gems of beauty cluster here and there,—

"As thick as leaves in Vallambrosa."

The subject is allegorical, but well sustained. There is a tone, free, full, and sweet, pervading its chapters—a depth of colour, a comprehensiveness, a ring and melody peculiar to itself. There is moreover a dignity of thought, and a “moral which adorns the tale,” which we strongly suspect the poet never extracted from the misty legends of the prairie, or the songs of Chibiabos—a masculine beauty, which he never borrowed from Kwasind. Hiawatha is a miraculous personage. His accomplishments are varied and unique. He would span a mile in one stride; such the strength of his arm, that he would discharge ten quivers from his bow ere the first returned to *terra firma*; and such the speed of his feet, that he would shoot an arrow, and—

“Run forward with such fleetness,
That the arrow fell behind him!”

The characters associated with him are equally extraordinary, but are actuated by ambitious impulses, and more selfish motives. It was a cold maxim of Napoleon I., that all men were moved either by interest or fear. We deny the truth of this, unless in a very wide acceptance;—certainly such an one was not Hiawatha.

Passing over the legend of the peace-pipe, and that unwillingly, we come to the “four winds,” one of which, “Mudjekeewis” (west), father of Hiawatha, performs wild exploits and deeds of daring, which are only to be excelled by Hiawatha himself.

Kabibonokka (north wind) is fierce and cruel; Shawondasee (south wind), fat and lazy, too indolent, indeed, to prefer the “soft impeachment,” and—

“Only sat and sighed with passion
For the maiden of the prairie.”

Nokomis,—

“In the unremembered ages,
Fell a wife, but not a mother,”

from the full moon. Her first-born was a daughter, rejoicing in the euphonistic name of Wenonah. She “grew up a tall and slender maiden,” and was cautioned against Mudjekeewis, who, however, wooed her,—

“Till she bore a son in sorrow,
Bore a son of love and sorrow.
Thus was born my Hiawatha.”

As we have said, Hiawatha was taught in all the rudiments of the warrior; taught the stars “that shine in heaven;” made familiar with the death-dance; heard the whispering of the pine tree;

" Heard the lapping of the water,
Sounds of music, words of wonder ;"

of birds and beasts he learnt their language, names, and secrets ;

" Learned in all the lore of old men."

Merging into manhood, he scorns the treachery of his father towards his mother. He becomes, to some extent, undutiful, and determines to be avenged. He seeks Mudjekeewis in "the kingdom of the west wind ;" but we follow him not thither. We catch him on his return, as he calls at the "ancient arrow-maker's" in "the land of the Dacotahs," where, for the first time, he sees his fair daughter, Minnehaha. However strong in combat, he yet is susceptible of the darts from Cupid's bow.

The Indians had neither sign nor symbol with which to perpetuate the memory of their kindred. Hiawatha laments thus :—

" Great men die and are forgotten ;
Wise men speak ; their words of
wisdom
Perish in the ears that hear them,

Do not reach the generations
That, as yet unborn, are waiting
In the great, mysterious darkness
Of the speechless days that shall be."

Friends he had. Kwasind, the strong man, but—

" Most beloved by Hiawatha
Was the gentle Chibiabos,
He the best of all musicians,
He the sweetest of all singers,
Beautiful and childlike was he,
Brave as man is, soft as woman,
Pliant as a wand of willow,

Stately as a deer with antlers.
" When he sang, the village listened ;
All the warriors gathered round him,
All the women came to hear him ;
Now he stirred their souls to passion,
Now he melted them to pity."

Kwasind is vividly portrayed, as is Hiawatha's sailing—the first movement undertaken towards fulfilling his mission. The legend of his fishing follows, and he becomes a second Jonah, having hooked Nahma, the king of fishes, which swallows Hiawatha and his canoe to boot. Eventually he is liberated from his prison cell through the interposition of sea-gulls.

The tradition of Hiawatha and the pearl fisher is a piece of luxurious imagery, and we would linger over its gentle cadence, but the dulcet notes of our hero's wooing catch and enrapture our ear and senses. We scarcely know which most to admire, the chivalric devotion of Hiawatha, and his plaintive pleadings, or the lovely squaw, the pretty Minnehaha. The damsel's thoughts had been lingering over the visit of Hiawatha, when returning from his combat with Mudjekeewis. "Would he come again for arrows?" thought she; might she again hear the silvery tones of love and sympathy which, like a pellucid stream, ran through her heart? In her reverie, happy girl, lone in the "ruling forest," her eyes are dreamy, her hands idle. The old arrow-maker, her father, is plying his fingers busily; but, hark! what bursts upon the pensive solitude?

"Through their thoughts they heard
a footstep,
Heard a rustling in the branches,
And with glowing cheek and forehead,
With the deer upon his shoulders,
Suddenly from out the woodlands
Hiawatha stood before them.

* * * * *
"Then uprose the Laughing Water,
From the ground fair Minnehaha,
Laid aside her mat unfinished,
Brought forth food and set before
them,
Water brought them from the brooklet,
Gave them food in earthen vessels,
Gave them drink in bowls of bass-
wood,
Listened while the guest was speak-
ing,
Listened while her father answered,
But not once her lips she opened,
Nor a single word she uttered.

* * * * *
"After many years of warfare,
Many years of strife and bloodshed,
There is peace between the Ojibways
And the tribe of the Dacotahs.'
Thus continued Hiawatha,
And then added, speaking slowly,
'That this peace may last for ever,
And our hands be clasped more closely,
And our hearts be more united,
Give me as my wife this maiden,

Minnehaha, Laughing Water,
Loveliest of Dacotah women!'

"And the ancient Arrow-maker
Paused a moment ere he answered,
Smoked a little while in silence,
Looked at Hiawatha proudly,
Fondly looked at Laughing Water,
And made answer very gravely:

'Yes, if Minnehaha wishes;
Let your heart speak, Minnehaha!'

"And the lovely Laughing Water
Seemed more lovely as she stood there,
Neither willing nor reluctant,
As she went to Hiawatha,
Softly took the seat beside him,
While she said, and blushed to say it,
'I will follow you, my husband!'

"This was Hiawatha's wooing!
Thus it was he won the daughter
Of the ancient Arrow-maker,
In the land of the Dacotahs!

"From the wigwam he departed,
Leading with him Laughing Water;
Hand in hand they went together,
Through the woodland and the mea-
dow,
Left the old man standing lonely
At the doorway of his wigwam,
Heard the Falls of Minnehaha
Calling to them from the distance,
Crying to them from afar off,
'Fare thee well, O Minnehaha!'"

We must not follow our author through the romance, whose story he has so sweetly sung. We would fain linger over the scenes he depicts, but we must hasten on to the touchingly melancholy death of fair Minnehaha, for she, too, must die. Gaunt famine spreads his desolation around their land. Hiawatha, burning with mental anguish, and all but consumed by agony, implores the great Spirit, Gitche Manito:—

"Give us food, or we must perish;
Give me food for Minnehaha;
For my dying Minnehaha."

He scales mountains, dives into the valleys, traverses the moaning forests, but all is desolate and dreary, and amid the solitude of his path, far away from the home of his heart, he—

"Heard that sudden cry of anguish,
Heard the voice of Minnehaha
Calling to him in the darkness,

'Hiawatha! Hiawatha!'
"Over snow-fields waste and path-
less,

Under snow-encumbered branches,
Homeward hurried Hiawatha,
Empty-handed, heavy-hearted,
Heard Nokomis moaning, wailing,
'Wahonowin! Wahonowin!
Would that I had perished for you.
Would that I were dead as you are!
Wahonowin! Wahonowin!"

"And he rushed into the wigwam,
Saw the old Nokomis slowly

Rocking to and fro and moaning,
Saw his lovely Minnehaha
Lying dead and cold before him,
And his bursting heart within him
Uttered such a cry of anguish,
That the forest moaned and shud-
dered,
That the very stars in heaven
Shook and trembled with his an-
guish."

The time of Hiawatha also draweth nigh. A vision somewhat prepared him for the event. He had labored for his people, sung their songs, joined their war-dances, fought their battles, done his duty. Every trace of sorrow was erased. A smile of joy and triumph played upon his serene countenance, and he bade—

"Farewell to all the warriors,
Bade farewell to all the young men;"

and launching the birch canoe for sailing—

"From the pebbles of the margin
Whispered to it, 'Westward! westward!'
And with speed it darted forward,"

leaving upon the level water "one long track and trail of splendour."

"And the people from the margin
Watched him floating, rising, sinking,"

and he departed with the valedictory benedictions of those he left behind him :—

"And they said, 'Farewell for ever!'
Said, 'Farewell, O Hiawatha!'
And the forests, dark and lonely,
Moved through all their depths of
darkness,
Sighed, 'Farewell, O Hiawatha!'
And the waves upon the margin
Rising, rippling on the pebbles,
Sobbed, 'Farewell, O Hiawatha!'
And the heron, the Shuh-shuh-gah,
From her haunts among the fenlands,

Screamed, 'Farewell, O Hiawatha!'
"Thus departed Hiawatha,
Hiawatha the Beloved,
In the glory of the sunset,
In the purple mists of evening,
To the regions of the home-wind,
Of the Northwest wind Keewaydin,
To the Islands of the Blessed,
To the Kingdom of Ponemah,
To the Land of the Hereafter."

It now only remains for us, after the imperfect sketch of this wild romance, to commend it to the notice of our readers. In Minnehaha they will find the modesty of Lucretia, and an appropriate counterpart in Pocahontas, the lovely daughter of Powhattan, whose excellencies and graces are admirably portrayed by Captain Murray in his "Lands of the Slave and the Free." Hiawatha is a noble-minded, exalted, patriotic man.

He possessed the constancy of Cato, with the virtues of Epaminondas ; and whilst following the thread of the story, you scale mountains, delve the stream, sink into the bosom of the valley, listen to the music of the babbling brook, the songs of the woodland songsters, mingle with the "reeling forests," breast the wave, warmed at the camp-fire, the whole being invested with a twilight mellowness, a rich and sensuous tone, which fills the soul, and fascinates the mind.

THE Sultan, Abdul Medjid, after listening to the performance of a very energetic French pianist, called the delighted professor to his side, and remarked—"I have heard Thalberg—I have heard Liszt—but of all the men I have ever heard, I have never seen one perspire so much as you do."

READING.—History makes men wise, poetry witty, mathematics subtle, philosophy deep, morals grave, logic and rhetoric able to contend : nay, there is no impediment in the wit but may be wrought out by fit study, where every defect of the mind has its proper remedy. Those that have the excellent faculty of using all they know, can never know too much.—*Lady Gethin*.

ALCHYMY.—The pursuit of alchymy is at an end. Yet surely to alchymy this right is due, that it may truly be compared to the husbandman whereof Æsop makes the fable, that when he died, told his sons he had left unto them a great mass of gold buried under ground in his vineyard, but did not remember the particular place where it was hidden ; who when they had with spades turned up all the vineyard, gold, indeed, they found none ; but by reason of their stirring and digging the mould about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the year following : so the painful search and stir of alchymists to make gold, hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitful experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature, as the use of man's life.—*Bacon*.

WORDS AND THINGS.—Though a linguist should pride himself to have all the tongues that Babel cleft the world into, yet if he have not studied the solid things in them as well as the words and lexicons, he were nothing so much to be esteemed a learned man, as any yeoman or tradesman, competently wise in his mother dialect only.—*Milton*.

HUMILITY.—When the two goats, on a narrow bridge, met over a deep stream, was not he the wiser that laid down for the other to pass over him, than he that would rather hazard both their lives by contending ? He preserved himself from danger, and made the other become debtor to him for his safety. I will never think myself disparaged, either by preserving peace or doing good.—*Feltham*.

HOW TO MAKE A FORTUNE.

Most nations inhabit countries ready-made. They land on an island, or they press onwards into some unappropriated wilderness, and there they sow fields and plant vineyards. But the nation of Europe, by far the thriftiest and most frugal, has in a great measure created its own country. By running out into the shallow sea dykes and embankments, and then pumping off the brine, the Hollanders have reclaimed a vast surface from the watery waste; and now, on spots where fishes used to be caught, and where ships rode at anchor, cattle graze, gardens blossom, and people go out and in among the thriving villages.

To the people of the Netherlands their territory has been an excellent teacher. Says the shore gently shelving, "Take pains, and I will repay you. Drive a few piles, and wattle and puddle them, and at once you have an estate—a little croft of your own, on which you may grow roots and herbs, or pasture kine. And if you take the produce to the nearest market, you will get money; and with that money you may hire labor, and take in more land from this shallow ocean, or this oozy marsh; and thus, adding field to field, you may at last bequeath a goodly freehold to your grateful children." Which is just the philosophy of Industry. Every one of us is born on the edge of an ocean, not very deep at the margin; and under that ocean there lies a boundless expanse of wealth, knowledge, moral worth, ascendancy over others: but every man has to conquer his own acquisition for himself. Many lazy or sanguine spirits are content to lie half slumbering on the shore. They hope that some happy morning fame, or a fortune, or a fine estate, may rise to the surface, and come floating to their feet; and whilst they drowse and dream, life wastes away, and they die inglorious and poor. But others begin the battle of existence like these brave old Batavians. They say, "I have a goodly heritage; but it is still under water. It is still a matter of faith; for it is a thing not seen as yet: but I must raise it from the deep; I must bring it to the light. I must redeem a little portion to begin withal; and when I have made sure of that first instalment, it will be a little capital, on the strength of which I may proceed to conquer more."

Such, we repeat, is the philosophy of Industry. Solomon expressed it when he said, "The hand of the diligent maketh rich." The Saviour expressed it when he said, "To him that hath shall be given." It is by a process of steady industry and cheerful perseverance that the most learned man has reclaimed his information from the abyss of ignorance; and it is by a growth in goodness,—by line on line, and by improvement upon im-

provement,—that the holiest man, with God's help and blessing, has gained for himself his present excellence and well-earned reputation. And it is of great moment to be rooted and grounded in this first principle—this universal law of individual progress is of great importance, dear friends, to you. The principle is, that however poor, ignorant, or prone to evil we are born, God gives to each of us a glorious opportunity. If true to him, and if rightly alive to our great advantages, we may make our fortune. We may become rich intellectually, morally, spiritually.

At the Roman Propaganda there are always in process of training, with a view to their becoming missionaries, young men from all the ends of the earth, and representing nearly all the races of mankind; and on the day which concludes the yearly session, it is curious to hear essays read and orations delivered in Italian, French, and English; Russ and Polish; Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic; Chinese and Hindostanee; Gaelic, Welsh, and Irish. And had you been present ten years ago, you might have heard an old man conversing fluently in every one of these, and, if needful, speaking fifty languages “almost as correctly as a native.” And you could not but have wondered at the prodigy; and, probably, the only explanation would have been, “Mezzofanti has been born a linguist.” But Mezzofanti was born just such a linguist as the rest of us,—linguists who, for the first year or two, cannot speak our mother-tongue: and it was by diligently attending that, after learning his mother-tongue, he learned first Greek, and then other languages, till his one talent had gained fifty talents more.

So extended has the domain of science latterly become, that no man now has universal learning; but two hundred years ago there were such men. And it was an august and impressive thing to look upon Bacon, or Grotius, or Selden, and think, “There is a living encyclopædia. There is a man who knows all that is knowable—a man who has taken a survey of all nature, and who has read the story of the world.” And yet there was a day when that paragon of erudition knew nothing: there was a day when every page of that living encyclopædia was still blank paper: and it was by steady perseverance, stumbling over many difficulties, and denying himself many youthful indulgences—it was by bracing up the spirit, and bringing the body under—that at last he came in the pantathlete, the victor of all fights, and the winner of every prize.

And so, to our youthful readers, you who are still at school or college, or who, having quitted them, have not yet lost the learning faculty, we would say, God invites you to a splendid heritage. You have your choice. As the subject of your study, you may select the glories overhead or the wonders under foot—the architecture of the starry canopy or the structure of the solid globe. You may try to investigate those mechanic or mimetic arts in

which the hand of man multiplies its force in overwhelming enginery, or evokes and expresses the indwelling spirit in its painted or sculptured creations. You may prefer the treasures of beautiful thought and exquisite diction which have descended to us in the cold but pellucid page of classic authorship, like Alpine relics entombed in their crystal catacombs; or you may devote yourself to glean the wisdom and the momentous lessons for the future which come hurtling down the noisy stream of modern history. But whatever topic you select, be sure that it is worthy, then cling to it and work it well. The hour of study which the dishonest scholar spends in shamming, in gazing at a task which he is not learning, or in copying a theme which he has not composed,—do you bestow in earnest industry; and the evening hour which idle companions spend in mischief, in sport, or in needless slumber, do you employ in mastering the solid book, in writing out your abstract, or in revising former acquisitions. And thus, although you should not become a first-rate scholar or a famous sage, you will amass a fund of information which will enrich all your future years, and which, whilst embellishing every sphere you fill, and adding to your mental stature, will unspeakably enhance your power to serve your generation.—*Rev. Dr. Hamilton, in the "Excelsior."*

SUPERFICIAL OBSERVERS.—There are some persons that never arrive at any deep, solid, or valuable knowledge in any science, or any business of life, because they are perpetually fluttering over the surface of things, in a curious or wandering search of infinite variety; ever hearing, reading, or asking after something new, but impatient of any labour to lay up and preserve the ideas they have gained: their souls may be compared to a looking-glass, that wheresoever you turn it, it receives the images of all objects, but retains none.—*Dr. Watts.*

COMPLAISANCE, though in itself it be scarce reckoned in the number of moral virtues, is that which gives a lustre to every talent a man can be possessed of. It was Plato's advice to an unpolished writer, that he should sacrifice to the Graces. In the same manner, I would advise every man of learning, who would not appear in the world a mere scholar or philosopher, to make himself master of the social virtue which I have here mentioned. Complaisance renders a superior amiable, an equal agreeable, and an inferior acceptable. It smooths distinction, sweetens conversation, and makes every one in company pleased with himself. It produces good nature and mutual benevolence, encourages the timorous, soothes the turbulent, humanizes the fierce, and distinguishes a society of civilized persons from a confusion of savages.—*Addison.*

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

21. Can any of your readers inform me by what means the art of ventriloquism can be learnt, or if there is any work published upon the subject?—A SUBSCRIBER.

22. I have often been told, by persons who have lived for many years beside rookeries, that crows and magpies *invariably* commence to build their nests on the FIRST SUNDAY of March; and I have observed the same circumstance myself for two or three years past. Can any person say what reason can be assigned for it? for, without a satisfactory explanation of it can be given, it appears to me that the crows must have not only reason, but that of a high order.—R. C.

23. Will any of your readers be kind enough to furnish me with a list of the best works (with prices and publishers) in the English language on Pantheism?—JESSIE.

24. What are the average yearly expenses at Oxford University?

25. How is the gum dammer and naphtha varnish made?—the proportion of gutta percha and benzule? Each of the above is for photographic purposes. What is the American invention "Hillotype," that professes to accomplish, in one process, the exact colours of the object taken, even to the colour of the eyes? Is the apparatus different, or only the manipulation?—J. L.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

12. *Foreign Languages.*—The languages most in request among the mercantile portion of the community are French, German, and Spanish. The first is now becoming, in most

cases, essential to a young man before he can offer himself for a government appointment, or a clerkship in a merchant's counting-house. German and Spanish are, of course, requisite in offices immediately connected with those nations. "Aspirant Edmund" should first study French, with which, in a year, by great perseverance, he may become sufficiently familiar to converse with tolerable ease; Spanish will then be more readily learnt, as the one language gradually leads on to the other. They may be studied without the assistance of a master, although one, of course, would be preferable. German will be found much more difficult; and, I am of opinion, cannot be studied without the instruction of a professor, or some one acquainted with the language.—F. W. B.

13. I am not aware of any book upon the subject. The defect may be remedied by pronouncing the letter in a deep whisper till it becomes easy to do so, and then pronounce it aloud slowly and distinctly.—T. T.

14. Proceed with trigonometry, passing over the rest of Euclid. The formulæ employed in trigonometry are based on propositions in Euclid; but trigonometry, as taught by Euclid, is of little use, not being given in a practical form.—T. T.

16. Le Page's "Museum of French Literature," published by Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange, will give the information required. A glossary to Chaucer and Spenser can only be obtained with a good edition of their works.—T. T.

17. A biographical dictionary, or Knight's "Cyclopædia," now publishing, will give the information required about Machiavelli.—T. T.

18. As follows, is the composition of a cement, the formula for which is given in Grey's "Supplement to the Pharmacopœia," under the title of "Chemical and Electrical Apparatus Cement," and which, I doubt not, will answer the purpose of "*fixing the metallic parts of electrical apparatus to the glass parts*;" viz., resin, 5; bees' wax, 1; red ochre, 1; plaster of Paris, 2 oz., mixed together with the aid of heat.—J. W. S.

19. Of the various modifications of the galvanic battery, I think the one invented by Mr. Cruikshank, though, perhaps, not the most portable, is the most devoid of superficial apparatus, and, consequently, the readiest and easiest made. The following is a sketch of the plan to be adopted:—Obtain a trough made of mahogany or hard wood of certain dimensions, say 24 in. in length and 8 in. in width, into which arrange, at equal distances, as many zinc and copper plates as convenient, remembering always to have the same metal on the same side, or otherwise opposite currents would be generated, resulting in both being neutralized to an extent equal to the different forces. The plates are made water tight by cementing them into grooves in the sides and bottom of the trough. Thus constructed, the battery

is set in operation by filling the cavities between the pairs of plates with diluted sulphuric acid, the electric fluids being conducted by means of wire of platinum or other metal attached to the outer zinc and copper plates. A more simple, though less durable and convenient form of galvanic battery, is the original pile of Volta. It consists of merely a number of zinc and copper plates piled on each other, and separated by placing between them pieces of cloth, a trifle smaller than the plates, moistened with a solution of salt or diluted sulphuric acid, which serves to generate the electricity. The electric fluids are, as in the former case, conducted by means of wires.—J. W. S.

20. Any of the following works, I think, will meet the requirements of P. R., viz., Lindley's "School Botany," price 5s. 6d.; Lindley's "Elements of Botany;" or Balfour's "Outlines of Botany," price 7s. 6d. The first of these works was originally compiled for the use of the students at the London University, and combines both "*simplicity and accuracy*." As an introductory work, I can heartily recommend it to any one wishing to gain a knowledge of the important and interesting science of botany.—J. W. S., *Scarbro'*.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Glasgow.—*Clydesdale Literary Society.*—This association held its second annual soiree on the 1st of February last, when about seventy ladies and gentlemen sat down to tea, after which the chairman made a few introductory remarks, explaining the state of the society, and the objects it had in view. Animated addresses on the Battle-Field, Passing Events, Female Influence, Decision of Character, What we can do, and practical remarks on

debating societies, were delivered during the evening by members of the society, the intervals being agreeably filled up with vocal and instrumental music and recitations. This society is now assuming a very important position; and any readers of the *Controversialist* in Glasgow, unconnected with a similar society, and desirous of becoming members, are earnestly requested to enrol their names here. The meetings are held every Tuesday.

evening, at a quarter past eight o'clock, in Milner's Temperance Hotel, Buchanan-street, corner of Bath-street.—A. M.

Pimlico Literary and Scientific Institution.—This useful and important society has been established upwards of six years. Several noblemen and influential gentlemen are the patrons and supporters of it. The number of its members has considerably increased since September, and the institution is now in a more prosperous condition than it ever has been since its foundation. In the reading room various magazines and periodicals, including the *British Controversialist*, have recently been added. The lectures are invariably well attended, and the weekly meetings of the discussion class are very popular. The subjects for discussion have been—"On the Rights of Woman;" "Was Cranmer a Martyr or a Criminal?" "Novels;" "Superstition;" "The Crystal Palace;" "Temperance;" and several others. The forthcoming ones are entitled—"Patriotism;" "Popularity: what is it?" "Oratory;" "On the Genius and Influence of Female Poetry;" "Temporizing;" "Impulse," &c. It should be observed, that no political or theological subjects are allowed. Many of the members are desirous of enlarging the sphere of debate; but the managers have hitherto conceived that it is far more beneficial to the general interests of the institution that such topics should be studiously excluded.—J. G. H.

The Castle-hill Chapel Mutual Improvement Society, Northampton, held their third half-yearly tea meeting on Wednesday, the 13th instant, when the attendance and excellent entertainment given fully demonstrated the rapid progress of the society. After tea, the Rev. J. Bennett, minis-

ter of the chapel, was voted to the chair. A paper was read by Mr. H. Bonham on Dr. Young's "Night Thoughts," and another by Mr. R. Brookes. The chairman made an excellent speech to the members of the society, urging them on in the improvement of the mind, &c.; after which the secretary read a short report of the past six months. A present of a microscope was then made by the society to the rev. chairman, who, much affected by the surprise, and the kindness shown him, expressed his gratitude in an eloquent answer to the presentation speech. The proceedings of the evening were enlivened with music, concluding with the "National Anthem." There were more than 120 persons present, and every one seemed well satisfied with the evening's entertainment.—A MEMBER.

Music.—The "Creation" was performed at Exeter Hall on Wednesday evening, March 12, by the London Sacred Harmonic Society, preceded by Dr. Elvey's anthem, "O be Joyful in God, all ye Lands." Conductor, Mr. Surman. Principal vocalists, Miss Witham, Miss Chambers, Mr. Lawler, and Mr. W. Cooper. The performance was good; the principals, band, and chorus acquitted themselves admirably; and the veteran conductor led with his usual care and precision.

The "Messiah" was performed at St. Martin's Hall on Monday evening, March 17; conductor, Mr. John Hullah. The principal vocalists were, Mrs. Sims Reeves, Miss Dolby, Miss Banks, Mr. Sims Reeves, and Mr. Weiss. The chorus, consisting of the pupils of Mr. Hullah's upper school, was numerous, and thoroughly efficient; and the whole went off in the most satisfactory manner. Indeed, the *chef-d'œuvre* of the great *Maestro* is seldom rendered better than it was on this occasion.

"Life's Holidays Illuminated." Seeley, Jackson, and Co. This volume, the recreation of leisure hours, consists of Poems on Birthdays—Meetings—Partings. It is marked by earnest thought, deep feeling, extensive reading, and by a religious fervor, which, though unusual, is not unpleasant, and at once prove the author a Christian, a scholar, and a poet. Being well got up, it is just the book for a present.

"The Four Witnesses" is a powerfully written tract on the sabbath question, by "Threlkeld," and well worth the perusal of all interested in this great controversy.

"Necessity of Early Closing to Self-Culture," two prize essays, issued by the Early Closing Association of Leicester. They are able, clear, and forcible, though the first is well entitled to its priority.

"Reform of the Civil Service," by a Public Office Man. A masterly reply to a Pamphlet by a Practical Man. All who have read the one, or who are interested in the service, should read this answer.

A year or two ago the discovery, at Weimar, of a wholesale manufactory of forged autographs, mostly of Schiller, created a considerable sensation among the autograph collectors of Germany. The case has now been brought to a close, and the forgers have been sentenced to two years' imprisonment and hard labour. Even Frau von Gleichen, the surviving daughter of Schiller, was taken in by their tricks. She bought of them what she thought to be her father's letters and manuscripts, for an amount of 1,400 thalers; the Royal Library at Berlin bought papers for 300 thalers.

The commissioners appointed to examine candidates for the civil service have published a report, in which they give an analysis of the examination, and of the causes which have influenced the rejection of candidates. All they have insisted upon has been a

good knowledge of spelling, writing, and arithmetic, and only in some departments have they required a knowledge of history, geography, Latin, or some foreign language. And it appears that five-sixths of the rejected candidates have been rejected on the ground of gross ignorance of the three simplest rudiments of the most ordinary education—spelling, writing, and arithmetic. Since June last, 1078 candidates have been examined, and 309 have been rejected. Of these, 250 were deficient in the three branches of knowledge above named.

Mr. Panizzi is now the superintendent of the British Museum, and his place at the head of the printed book department has been taken by Mr. J. Winter Jones, whose place is, in turn, occupied by Mr. Watts, and there is a general promotion of a step throughout the Library.

The return of Mr. Ingram to parliament, as member for Boston, is an event not remotely connected with literature. Mr. Ingram is the proprietor and founder of that journal which enjoys a numerical circulation second only to the "*Times*" itself—the "*Illustrated London News*."

Mr. Layard has been unanimously re-elected Lord Rector of the University of Aberdeen. An attempt was made to bring forward the Duke of Newcastle, who refused the nomination, and after his refusal, the Lord Advocate was applied to, but he also declined a contest.

The novels known as "Bentley's Standard Novels" were last week sold by auction at prices beyond the offer which Mr. Routledge is said to have made for them. Mr. Routledge offered five thousand five hundred pounds, and the series sold for six thousand three hundred pounds. Of this sum, the Marryats produced three thousand three hundred pounds. "Peter Simple" realized the largest sum. The next in amount was Mr. Albert Smith's "Ledbury."

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

"THE divine significance of life" has in all ages attracted the attention of Time's noblest children. Is it a game or a warfare? If either, what is the stake at issue—and how is the triumph to be won? What a net-work of sympathy, feeling, passion, thought, action, and suffering is woven together into the web of human existence! Surely for no purpose other than a serious one have so many energies, anxieties, affections, hopes, fears, and intellectual faculties been massed together in man!

"We do think
The soul was never put into the body—
Which has so many rare and curious pieces
Of mathematical motion—to stand still,"

To what end, then, is this soul-life given? An answer to that query, whatsoever its nature may be, will constitute a philosophy of morals, provided that answer is reasoned, not dogmatic. Some solutions of this intricate problem have floated hazily before the conceptions of men, and have been the basis of law as well as the seed-thoughts of fable and poetry. In Greece alone was the attempt made to establish and confirm a doctrine regarding the purposes and duties of human life, by bringing into one the feelings and traditions of men, and subjecting them to the refining processes of the Reason. The earliest systematic, logically coherent, system of morals we owe, so far as we know, to Pythagoras. He, first among the early searchers for wisdom,—

"Treading the steps of common life with eyes
Of curious inquisition,"

posited the thought that men were living souls, bound to each other by a common destiny, that destiny to struggle out of the prison-house of life and the bonds of passion into pure, free infinity, from which life had its source. To him we are indebted for imparting a grandeur to human existence, by representing it to the mind as a scene in which noble and heroic work had been given man to do; for laying before society, as its chief end, and the consummation of its perfectness, the stimulation of the intellect and will, and, through them, of the whole powers of

humanity, to resist the blossoming of sin in the soul, and to strive for the attainment of a purer life. Not only so, but he, with boldness of design, decision of character, and grandeur of administrative talent, exemplified in his life the theory he taught. We have already attempted to outline his ideas, and to draw up a sketch of the chief doctrines of which he was the propounder. A part only of our design has as yet been accomplished. "*Ingens iterabimus æquor*"—"We shall sail again on the great ocean" of his thoughts.

The Pythagoric *Monad* is *one*. In that, as in a germ, all that exists, has existed, or may exist, is implicitly contained. It is the *even-odd* (ἀπριο-πέρισσος), which holds in its own essence all the elements and constituents of being, spiritual or material. Creation is the result of the collision and subsequent disentanglement of the finite and the infinite; and the perpetual development and reabsorption of the former from and into the latter forms the life of the universe. The Divinity is then not only the origin, but also the very soul of all—the creative, harmonizing, regulating, yet indiscernible Existence from which the All germinated, as well as the interpenetrant and permeating spirit of the All. It is, therefore, both Spirit and Matter. Matter, detaching itself from Spirit, becomes the Dyad; and so much of spiritual being as is incorporated with and enveloped in matter, at the period of evolution, is therewith hurried into the very midst of imperfection, divisibility, and unrest. It becomes then, like that in which its life-manifestation is produced, mutable, multiple, and transitory. All that is changeful, imperfect, and migratory, is illusive and false—*unreal*. The spirit, imprisoned in this wilderness of unreality, is the victim of continuous deception, until he learns, through the variabilities around him, the grand eternal invariabilities of which they are the evolutions, until in *phenomena* he can detect *noumena*, and exchange an acquaintance with the facts of *experience* for a knowledge of the laws of *science*. There are of course affinities of spirit, which should attract man towards the Monad; but there are also the changeful joys of material being to occupy attention, and attract, or rather distract, the soul. When the intelligence, strong in its affinity with the spiritual source, whence it was hurried, breaks the bonds of the variable, *i. e.*, the existence in which experience is the sole guide, and takes upon itself the strict bondage of scientific thought, it is ready for reabsorption into the Monad, for being taken again into the bosom of the Deific.

Science has for its grand object the reduction of the multiplex into the unical. Of all sciences, those which treat of *quantity* and *form*—as they concern themselves with the inevitable relations of material things—are the centre and start-point. Upwards from these the mind reaches to the *one* chief source of being—the summit-point of science—the *Monad*. Thus is the

intelligence redeemed from the thralldom of sense-seeming, and enabled to behold the ultimate reality of the Many and the All.

But man is more than intelligent: he is an agent of whom good and evil may be predicated, and from whom good or evil results chiefly flow. In imitation of the divine Monad, each spiritual being seeks to concentrate itself into *one*. This tendency towards self-centrement educes in each the feeling of personality, at the very basis and root of which is the will. The will, in its personal manifestation, may resign itself to the stream of circumstances in which it finds itself, and glide adown its current, receiving its highest joys from the transient and illusive, if not delusive, sensations which the multiple impresses upon it; or it may, with noble bravery, resist the delicious charming of Circean pleasures. Hence the need of abstinence, moderation, and meditative fasting, that the dominion of the material may be weakened, and the power of the intelligence, covenanting with that of the personal will, may work together for the emancipation—"a consummation devoutly to be wished"—of the soul from the Dyadic state.

Not all at once, however, can this result be accomplished; for by bands, numerous, strong, and well fastened around it, is the soul enslaved—habits retain their irksome enchainment, and pleasure flatters with continual promises of good to come; so that deliverance must be gradual—not by one brilliant stroke of exquisitely tempered resolution, but by the persistent effort of sustained, though often tried, willingness to be free. It may be, too, that the spirit has become so enwrapped with Dyadic swaddling-bands, has been so nursed in the luxurious lap of material dalliance, as to have lost, or, at least, to be in the process of losing, its primal affinity. To these a lesson of woe must be given. They must experience the hardness of the lot of those who sign their adhesion to the slavery in which the Dyad binds them. In these necessities the doctrine of Metempsychosis finds its reason.

The human mind, conscious of its own power, cannot assent to any doctrine which announces *nihilism* as its ultimate doom. Uninspired by any higher thought than that to which experience gives birth, it is incapable of conceiving for itself any condition or mode of existence in which the laws of organization are inoperative, *i. e.*, an incorporeal life. What, then, remains for the human soul, but to re-vesture itself in other bodies, and thus to stretch onward the life it feels to be imperishable? This, however, is but a *first* thought of the soul—a natural recoil against the idea of "shrinking into nought." Were there no more than this, life would be only an unending circle of differing births, modes of existence and deaths. Something besides the fortuitous transmission of being through other forms, *viz.*, the progressive development of being—the moral perfectionment of

the individual spirit—is the grand purpose of life. It is in consequence of this great thought that he so emphatically affirms the opinion so exquisitely expressed by the author of “Philip Van Artevelde :”—

“ Life never dies.
Matter dies off it, and it lives elsewhere:
* * * The type is changed,—
Is ever in transition; for life's law,
To its eternal essence, doth prescribe
Eternal mutability: and thus,
To say I live, says, I partake of that
Which never dies.”

This great thought Pythagoras wedded to the Orphic and Egyptian conception of transmigration, and life was made worthier by the union. It was now no longer one link of an inevitable series of changes, having no reference to the past or the future. It was a state of estrangement from the Divine Essence—an enslavement of the spirit, designed to expiate evil, to free from vice, to train to virtue, and to educate for a higher, nobler, and worthier life in the Infinite itself. Then only is the salvation of the soul complete, when, having undergone all needful transformations, it is reabsorbed into the Absolute Unity, and the power and dominion of the transient and multiplex is exchanged for incorporation into the eternal harmony of the Monad. All morality centred in the intellect and the will. In their harmonic action the highest good was found, and the highest good was the highest truth.

The true object of government, the proper aim of politics, is to realize the harmony of thought and will, and, in the state, as in each individual, to shadow forth the order and harmony of all things. In this thought originated the school at Crotona, of which he was the head. It is a signal mark of his wisdom, that he did not think that society was to be bettered by a revisal of its outward forms, or by the external pressure of new laws, but by the gradual diffusion of newer and nobler thoughts. The Crotoniate which he established was an association or order which combined in itself a school of science, a religious institution, and a political club. Its members were bound together by a vow, and by external symbols of union, such as dress, diet, ritual, &c. It consisted of the ablest men to be found in Crotona and the adjacent cities. Special care was taken to culture both the minds and hearts of his disciples, and to train them to be a genuine aristocracy. The government of Crotona was then vested in a council of one thousand of the heirs or representatives of the chief original proprietors and founders of the city. To train any considerable number of these to comprehend the true principles of government was no valueless contribution to the progress of humanity, as it was no slight boon to the states of

Magna Græcia. The object of this association was to secure the ascendancy of the wisest and the best—the supremacy in the councils of the state of the minds which were most thoroughly enlightened by philosophy, and most perfectly purified by moral training. It was, however, only a legislative training school, not an actively operative senatorial assembly. Its students were not the council of the thousand, but a voluntary congregation of such as desired to learn the true theory of politics, and the preferable practice of legislative power. Such as wished admission were subjected to an intellectual as well as a physiognomical examination by Pythagoras. Those who were accepted were subjected to a novitiate of silence for two years, during which time they were called (*Acoustici*) “hearers,” and were compelled to submit to a most rigorous system of living, prescribed even to the minutest particulars of food, dress, conduct, &c., by the great master. After this, they received the name of (*Mathematici*) “disciples,” and were allowed more freedom in living as well as in asking questions and proposing objections. In the last term of study they were initiated into the opinions of their tutor upon the all-important topics of philosophy, morals, and religion. The members dwelt together in the constant and rigorous exercise of their respective duties, under the direction of their intellectual chief, and were regularly trained to the practice of conscientious and righteous conduct towards each other.

Besides the large number of members or disciples which constituted the school, and to whom the Esoteric or peculiar Pythagorean doctrines were taught, a large number received from him a general outline of his views, more adapted to the popular comprehension, and bearing the name of Exoteric instruction.

In this confederate institution, so excellent in its aim, so lofty and pure in its design, so successful in its early years, what do we chiefly note? This: that true civilization consists in the harmony of our life with the condition in which it is to be passed—that the sun of human happiness depends on the training, the thoughts, and the doings of each—that the unseen, inner thought of man is the germ of all his external acts—and that harmony of intellect, will, and condition are, in the eternal covenant of nature, the only terms on which the stability and permanence of society can be secured—in other words, that the performance of duty was the only safeguard and bulwark of humanity.

“ Powers depart,
Possessions vanish, and opinions change;
Even passions hold a fluctuating seat.
But by the storm of circumstance, unshaken,
And subject neither to eclipse nor wane,
Duty exists.”

REMARKS.—How singular, in the dim twilight of a semi-legendary age, to find a thought so noble—a system of ethics which propounds the great fact that in the government of the reason and the passions man's true good consists! What are Time and Space but the grand planes on which the eternal Geometer works out the infinitely varied theorems and problems of creation? Time and Space are admeasurable, and, therefore, subject to numerical laws. Number, therefore, is the prime thought in which they both culminate and find their highest utterance. This notion of Number continually necessitates the conceptions of proportion and relation; and the last term in which these two thoughts blend themselves into one all-embracing harmony is Order. Thus the thought rises upwards to the Highest; nor is its efficacy less in descending into human activity. Duty is the geometry of the soul—the practical correlation of circumstance and being. At the time, and in the then state of human society, this was no vague, semi-mystic, philosophic dream—the fountain-gush of an untrained ardent mind; it was a deep, abiding, settled, and significant conviction, actualizing itself as such in the school of Crotona. Nor is the thought even yet effete. Its gorgeous radiance gleams along the whole pathway of speculation, and is effectful at the present hour.

The Pantheistic *tendency* of the whole Pythagoric theory is clear and palpable; yet this was not a tenet of the school. The human mind is adverse to an impersonal deity, and tends more naturally to frame some visible, or at least thinkable, form in which it may embody its idea of the Divine. No system of sheer abstract Pantheism *could*, in such an era of thought, be received by men. The Pythagorean Monad was not, therefore, to his mind, an abstraction in which no personality inhered; but a true living God, out of which All is, and in whom All exists; the eternal Being, out of which Existence springs, and from which Life, in its individual and personal forms, deciduates. We object to the attribution of *our* inferences from the opinions of the philosophic zetetics of antiquity to them, and contend that charity demands that wherever we can we should credit those great men with all that is most favourable in their speculative creed. Truth is charitable; Error alone is jealous of her dominion over human thought. To us let every creed be sacred, which has been in any degree useful in erecting those—

“Scaffoldings, by which the soul climbs up
To an eternal habitation.”

NOBLE SENTIMENT.—The Creator does not intend that the greatest part of mankind should come into the world with saddles on their backs, and bridles in their mouths, and a few ready mounted and spurred to ride the rest to death.—*Rembold*.

Philosophy.

IS MAN THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

By an analysis of the convertible terms of the proposition under discussion, the present question is virtually resolved into an inquiry respecting the operation and subsequent identity of causes as distinguished from effects. The new and equivalent formula, therefore, as now implied, may be stated thus:—Is man the creature or the creator of circumstances? Are all his important actions the causes or the effects of the events by which he is surrounded? Is he possessed of a specific, organic type of character, which, by the force of its inherent vital principle, must ever assert its peculiar identity; or is the idiosyncrasy of his mind the pure resultant of circumstances? Are his affairs guided and controlled exclusively by external things, or is he the presiding genius of his own destiny—the pilot at the helm, invested with power to steer his own course, and to choose his own track—the conqueror of froward circumstances, who constantly presses forward, with hands ever ready to turn to self-advantage every fickle wind and wave, but never allowing these, or other things, to thwart or impede his onward career?

It is in this latter capacity that man is beheld in his best and truest light; and it will, therefore, be our purpose to prove that such is indeed his true and natural position, and that he is the great ruler of external events and the sole arbiter of his own fate. For “it is a poor and disgraceful thing,” says Foster, “not to be able to reply, with some degree of certainty, to the simple questions, What will you be? What will you do?” Nor can it be believed but he

“That made us with such large discourse,
Looking before, and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To rust in us unus’d.”

A spectacle more pitiable than that of an intelligent and independent being, compelled to succumb to the force of circumstances, can scarcely be conceived. Indeed, in cases like this, the victim generally appears in the light of an unconcerned spectator, rather than the prime actor, of his own downfall. Events would seem to be allowed to flow over him, so submissive is he; passive he is to the last, and then gives up the ghost without a murmur or a struggle. Such is the end of a man who is said, by sym-

pathizing friends, to be the victim, or creature, of one species of circumstances. But in a world where life is ever a battle, destruction, for individuals of feeble mind and fickle will, is clearly inevitable. The goddess of fortune, like the god of war, must have sacrifices; and these are her victims, just as Falstaff's recruits were food for powder. In instances such as these, the man is inevitably the creature of unfortunate circumstances, precisely as, in ordinary life, simplicity is the tool of cunning, or as irresolution is the slave of the resolute.

But in the great majority of cases it must be acknowledged that man is the adjudicator of his own ends. For whatever may have been the temporary effect of the causes which were brought to bear upon his early character, such impressions, if they contravened the original genius of his disposition, are now, by the force of his individual vitality, either completely expunged from the tablets of his mind, or else, if they were genial, they now prove so much intensity added to the first bent of his disposition; either of which views must lead to the same conclusion, and be confirmatory of the fact, that from first to last, the unconquerable vitality of man's soul must ever raise him superior to circumstances. By a judicious application of means, it is easy to develop the faculties of the human mind, or even somewhat to repress its objectionable features; but all this, even in the most plastic of subjects, will never change or modify the primitive character to such an extent as to make man the "creature of circumstances;" for the human mind is composed of separable and counteracting elements, which, in every individual, assume a different degree of strength and development. The functions of the mind may thus be compared to a table of arithmetical figures, the several equations from which (to continue the simile) may be said to present fair criteria of the preponderance of the leading characteristics. It therefore follows that circumstances, in order to produce any tangible effect, must adapt themselves so as to act both negatively and positively—repressing one faculty, and stimulating its antithesis. Now, who can point out an instance in which events have had a force so nicely adjusted, and an influence so intelligently discriminating, as to be available against a multiform structure like this of its own? Man is not a piece of dull inertia—a plastic negation—else it might follow that events would rise up to enslave him. He possesses an essential and a repellent individuality. Like a strong tree, which spreads its rough limbs abroad, from whence spring the tender leaves of summer, against which alone have the winds of autumn terrors—after every tempest the parent stem is left again and again to assert its vitality—so is it with the human heart; the rough usage of adversity may strip it of its tenderest impulses, or even turn to gall its well of everlasting hope; but the deep lineaments of the primitive character will

still remain in all their native dignity. In corroboration of this, let us trace the successive stages of mental growth. During infancy, it will be observed that the mind is solely occupied in acquiring knowledge of external objects. The memory only is now employed; as yet, therefore, there can be no capacity for influence. Next are awakened the imitative and constructive faculties, which evidently may either be incited or retarded from progressing for a time, but only for a time; as in either case the natural tendency or aptitude of the mind will subsequently maintain its right to rule, of which myriads of examples exist. Last of all rises into vigour the noblest part of man—his reason. Now, it is only after this last epoch in his life-history that he becomes fully susceptible of the influence of circumstances. His previous existence was one in which only the dumb aspirations of his being asserted themselves. These, it is true, may, during this time of probation, have had their currents turned another way, or, possibly, completely dammed up; but now that reason has put on her strength, all these previous petty intermeddlings are swept away, and the man stands revealed in all his original identity. At this period he becomes self-reliant in thought and independent in action. An instinct for self-examination arms him against the insinuating operations of circumstances, and he thus rises superior to their influence. Therefore, by availing himself of those events over which he has power, and by means of a judicious management of, and adaptation to, those affairs over which he has no sufficient control, he compels them all to work together for his own good; and thus, instead of being their slave and creature, they become his silent yet powerful servants, and bow to his administrative intelligence.

For what are circumstances? They are the results of that weaving of events which is ever going on by man and time. Man, having many aims, has covered the world with an invisible net-work, by which to entrap the objects of his desire. Life is thus filled with cross purposes. These are the eternal barriers—the rough and rude circumstances—against which the timid beat their wings and die. But it always has been, and ever will be, that the business of life is to pursue our calling and to attain our ends, in direct opposition to all circumstances and all obstacles of every kind. Or can it be supposed, that the power which placed man a responsible and independent being upon the earth should have committed the anomaly of neutralizing this condition, by making him the plastic dupe and impotent creature of the very circumstances of his existence? No; for such a supposition contravenes all our experience of the infinite wisdom of the Creator, and is detrimental to our belief in his administrative omniscience. This consideration alone appears sufficient to decide the question in the negative.

It will thus be seen, that we readily admit, in a certain qualified manner, the existence of a class of what is commonly called the creatures of circumstances. But an affirmative reply to the question at issue must imply that all men, or, at least, the majority of them, are in the like predicament, which we deny; and it therefore follows, that the question, considered in this new phase, has now become one of degree. Consequently, Are the majority of persons the mere slaves of circumstances? To this query the reply is undoubtedly in the negative. And in order to establish this conclusion in an emphatic manner, it will be necessary to inquire, first, whether it be not a peculiar organization, or original natural defect of constitution, which renders some men too highly susceptible of influence—influence in its generic principle, and independent of its being objective or subjective? and, secondly, what is the extent or prevalence of this organic predisposition? Now, with regard to the first point, it is certain that if we acquiesce in the veto of all philosophers, poets, and men whose extended observation of the human heart entitles them to authority in the matter, it will at once be acknowledged, that this too ready facility, with which some individuals are led away by generic influence, arises usually from the presence of innate defectiveness, and not from the inherent force of circumstances: and as to the second point, it will also be acknowledged that this mental defect is the characteristic of two separate classes of the community; viz., the feeble in purpose, and the plastic in nature. These classes may otherwise be designated, the slaves of impulse, and the slaves of circumstances. Now, the latter class, in point of numbers, is undoubtedly in the minority. Thus, therefore, by this further separation, we advance another step towards the final negative conclusion.

But this analysis may be carried still further into the character of the two classes above (to which the discussion is now confined and narrowed), and it will then appear still clearer that, as a rule with few exceptions, man is the prime mover of all those events which affect his mental character and terrestrial well-being. Since, then, man produces circumstances, he is their first cause—their originator. They are consequently his creatures, not he theirs. Let this fact be granted,—and who can deny it?—and then it must follow, as the day follows night, that man and circumstances are, as far as this question is concerned, virtually identical, the man and his acts being, in this abstract bearing, one and the same thing. When, then, in ordinary life, we are said to combat with circumstances, we consequently combat, at the same time, virtually with men. We then stand in the same relation to the one as we do to the other. And hence, by extending the principle here implied, it follows, that if we are the creatures of circumstances, we are also, at the same time,

the creatures or slaves of one another. Now it will universally be granted that this conclusion, though it logically flows from the premises, is absurd. The true inference, therefore, is, that as we ourselves are not the slaves or creatures of one another, consequently we are not the creatures of circumstances either; but that the same relationship, which subsists between man and man individually, subsists also between man and circumstances generally. And this being the case, it follows, that although in common life we may observe many isolated instances of one individual character having great influence over another, or of some strange concatenation of events compelling a person to a special line of action, yet these cases are rare, and form striking exceptions to the ordinary rule; and although circumstances may thus apparently surround a person, and press him into a given course of operations, yet even here he is not their creature, for beyond them lies an *object*. Now it is to gain this object that a person thus labours under these special instigations of circumstances, and not because events hurried him, like an atom, to an unknown end. For man never acts without a motive; and as a clear human object always underlies a train of such events as we have in question, it follows that this object is the magnet, the main spring of the person's actions. Such cases as these, however, are extremely exceptional, and they merely make up the chapter of world-accidents, nothing more. But obviously there is no approach to subjection or slavery in the matter. One man, except in extreme instances, is never the creature of another. How much more rare, then, must it be that a living and an intelligent individual is the creature of dead circumstances—positive power controlled by passive inertia! Impossible. But let us extend the question, for a moment, to our whole-world experience in the matter. What, now, let us inquire, is the amount of alteration which the example of collective man effects in individual character? An extended and discriminating observation of the human mind in all its stages, from infancy to old age, will show that the common opinion respecting the force of personal example, and the power of circumstances, is a great delusion. For, notwithstanding all the fears of ill effect which good men anticipate from bad example, and notwithstanding all the assertions which are daily made concerning the plastic nature of man and infancy, we still believe that the head and heart of humanity are too hard, and have a vital identity of character too strongly impressed, to be readily affected, either by ennobling influence or by debasing example. But whatever may be the amount of impression which the aggregate of human ascendancy produces on the unit of individuality, it is certain that the effect of mere circumstances is but a small fraction of that amount.

But in order more effectually to explode the common idea that all persons of wavering disposition and fruitless pains are the

creatures of circumstances,—thereby swelling the ranks of this order of beings, as well as laying a flattering unction to the souls of the feeble and the irresolute,—we proceed to point out more clearly the broad distinction which obtains between the two classes before alluded to; by which process it will be evident that a material decrease will be effected in the number of that class to which the question applies.

We proceed to show, then, that although between the creature of circumstances and the child of impulse and passion there is much in common, yet that they are possessed of a striking and definite individuality of character. Any attempt, therefore, to treat them in common must be attended with utter confusion, for they present types of two different classes of humanity. But the idiosyncrasy of the one is the complete antithesis of that of the other. The creature of impulse is swayed and incited by the emotions, the passions, and doubts, which arise exclusively in his own being. External circumstances have little effect on him. He is wholly subjective. Before any movement can be effected or resolution enforced, there must be a time of perplexity, of vacillation, and doubt; while often, amidst the indecision thus caused, we may find that one impulse and faint preference after another will spring up, and successively lead the poor dupe captive, each impelling him towards its own peculiar end; so that when at length this tumult of conflicting impulses has subsided, it is questionable if some totally different passion, with its "little brief authority," does not finally make captive this infirm and wavering spirit.

With such semblances of men society abounds. Their characteristics assume various degrees of development, but in all of them the organic defect is presumed to be that of extreme sensibility to the modifying power of external things; whereas, on the contrary, the defect is inherent, and they are the creatures of their own fantasies.

Having thus disposed of all extraneous matter, as well as advanced several principles for after application, let us now turn our attention to some of those circumstances which are said to affect man's individuality. In the foregoing pages it will be observed, that the discussion has been made to assume a somewhat metaphysical bearing. This method appears to be the only one calculated to set the question finally at rest; for we thereby discuss the immutable principles of the human mind, and are thus enabled to base our conclusions upon the results of a rigid examination into the springs and sources of human actions, and into the laws of human character; while, on the contrary, "Vinculum," after an introductory piece of vague speculation, has rested in supreme contentment with having produced a few isolated examples, from which no satisfactory inference could logically flow.

Turning, then, to the opening article by the above writer, we find him at the very outset of his career contending somewhat unsuccessfully with a metaphysical difficulty. However, he has stumbled over it in the best way he could, by informing his readers that it is "a something." After this satisfactory and philosophical explanation, he proceeds to add, that this "something" is "inherent in the human mind;" but that any farther knowledge of it is "irrelevant to his present purpose." Now it is generally considered that—

"A little knowledge is a dangerous thing;"

but, in the present case, "Vinculum" appears to have had a dim forecast of the fact, that sometimes "more knowledge is a still more dangerous thing." Indeed, there is often wisdom in silence. "Vinculum" found it so in the present instance; for this inexplicable "something" appears to be the rock on which his arguments will split.

Let us examine it closely and fairly. After several adventitious observations, "Vinculum" approaches the point at issue, and, after premising that man possesses "certain specific attributes," *i. e.*, that man's mental character is always of a certain essential type, he appends the following proposition, *viz.*, that the mind of man "is, at the same time, sufficiently plastic to allow of its being moulded into any shape by those influences which are brought sufficiently early to bear upon it." And this, without informing us any further concerning it,—without aiding us by the slightest definition to a sense in which he employs this "something,"—without even adducing an iota of proof of its existence in the human mind,—but in the midst of this thick darkness "Vinculum" proceeds to incorporate it, as a recognized element, in his arguments, and gravely admits it into the discussion as an understood thing, about which there could be no question. This, to say the least of it, is a very extraordinary proceeding. We knew that man possesses a *capacity* for education, and that his various faculties are *susceptible* of culture; but that he is the inheritor of "a something" which renders him so extremely plastic that he is thereby necessarily absolved from all responsibility for the part he takes in the affairs of life, is a discovery—a doctrine—quite new.

"Vinculum" errs in so grossly overrating the degree of man's plastic nature. This point, however, has been alluded to before, and our own views were then stated at large; further comment is, therefore, unnecessary. But "Vinculum's" chief error lies, not so much in exaggerating one assumed fact, as in altogether ignoring the presence of another. For this "something," this plastic element of the human mind, which renders it susceptible of the impressions of outward things, and on which "Vinculum"

rears his affirmative fabric, is effectually counteracted and rendered nominal by a powerful, a vital, and ever-active positive element. This is the redeeming feature, this the fiery element, which raises man above the power of circumstances. Opposed to this, the feeble chains of external things are as shreds and straws. Its fiery ascoradance permeates the whole mind, giving it a compact form, an obduracy of resistance, and a composite strength, against which the arms of circumstances are lame and impotent.

In the same paragraph, also, "Vinculum" advances another doctrine, to the effect that man's condition in life is the "resultant of grand political and social laws." We may at once dismiss this statement, together with all corollaries which arise out of it, with the remark, that "Vinculum" has here, as will be evident from the foregoing, substituted the cause for the effect. What he afterwards states respecting the minds of "our children and the pauper population," has the disadvantage of not being intelligible. Poverty, according to the sense of the proposition in question, though evidently a "circumstance," is still an element quite foreign to the argument. And hence we can see no reason why it is introduced here.

It is rather a foolish thing to create a giant for the express purpose of slaying him. But this is "Vinculum's" next feat. He foreshadows, in vivid colours, and with touching pathos, "an helpless and unskilled infant," whom he describes as the very type and representative of "a creature of circumstances;" but after allowing him to bask for a time in this happy immunity from responsibility, he is suddenly transformed into a state of proud and glorious adolescence, and thus at one fell stroke cut off. This "young creature of circumstances" is next provided with a "mother," who is then called a "circumstance," and discussed as such.

Nor is this writer more fortunate in his succeeding examples, of which we have space but for one. It is that of the method by which "a sailor, a savant, a prescher, and a poet," are made. The operation is a curious one. To make a sailor, it is only requisite to place the "young creature" aforesaid near a "pool," and supply him with mimic ships; and then, whatever may have been the original bent of his character, he is now straightway a perfect mariner. And thus, concludes "Vinculum" "then fashioned the plastic mind into that afterwards destined to exhibit." Now all this nonsense, and revolting to common sense. It is

proof that the circumstances of early life do not as the infant mind is found in the fact, that the family, who are evidently all subject to similar not characterized by one special peculiarity; but,

on the contrary, if there be any rule in the matter, it is that of the complete converse to the assumption of "Vinculum" in the matter; for the dispositions and tastes of the several branches of a family are almost universally in direct antithesis. Also, instead of parental influence causing each successive generation to pursue a particular line of conduct in life, or business, or profession, or to entertain one set of principles in religion and politics, how exceptional are such cases, and how universally is it the case that the parent has to regret that, notwithstanding a most careful training, the son has imbibed widely different tastes, and is bent on a widely different worldly career from his own! Such facts as these must prove that the infant mind possesses a vital identity of its own, and that the creative fiat has impressed upon its individual mental features an innate, an indestructible, unyielding characteristic type. Instead, therefore, of man being the creature of circumstances, we should rather affirm that—

"There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will."

E. S. J.

MODERN CRITICISM.—It is a singularity in morals that criticism, which pre-supposes a spirit of toleration and candour in its professors, should have proved itself weak and incapable, precisely in those points where it ought to have been strongest. It has been weighed and found wanting, even in metal. It has been tested, and discovered to be dross. It is deficient, therefore, according to the standard, both in quality and quantity, both in sincerity and knowledge. Critics should be learned—yet they are not; true,—yet they are not; modest,—alack for modesty! Amongst all the scribblers and blotters of paper who have said a thousand things worse than nothing,—amongst all the simpletons who have passed their lives in spoiling the foolscap which they deserved to wear, none are so impudent or worthless as the false critic. He is the true serpent who has stolen into the literary garden. He is the great enemy of knowledge.—*Reflector.*

REMARKS ON READING.—For general improvement, a man should read whatever his immediate inclination prompts him to; though, to be sure, if a man has a science to learn, he must regularly and resolutely advance. What we read with inclination makes a stronger impression. If we read without inclination, half the mind is employed in fixing the attention, so there is but half to be employed on what we read. I read Fielding's *Amelia* through without stopping. If a man begins to read in the middle of a book, and feels an inclination to go on, let him not quit it to go to the beginning. He may perhaps not feel again the inclination.—*Johnson.*

Politics.

WOULD PARLIAMENT BE JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING THE OPENING OF THE CRYSTAL PALACE ON SUNDAY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WE think that we approach this important theme in an impartial spirit. At the outset, we desire it to be understood that we entertain no bigoted or ascetic notions respecting the observance of the sabbath. Many a man, engaged the week through in sedentary pursuits, or who toils and sleeps in the murky atmosphere of a large town or city, may, without sin we think, occasionally on the only morning he can call his own, wander forth to purer air and rural scenery. We decry all authoritative interference with individual action on that day; we would leave every man free, and, at the same time, without power to trench on the freedom of others: as far as practicable, we would extend the privilege of immunity from labour to every creature, and, in consistency, would, of course, continue to shield the employed of exhibitions and places of amusement generally from the exactions of their unconscionable master—the public. Against the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday we protest, not merely from an opinion that the act in itself and in its consequences would be a godless act, but also from a thorough conviction that it would assuredly prove a first step towards the gradual undermining of those incalculable blessings—individual and national, physical and social, moral and religious—which are now derived from the hallowed institution of the christian sabbath.

None, we presume, will deny the manifold advantages secured to society by a periodical rest-day. To whom, then, or to what, it is natural to inquire, is society indebted for the institution? Manifestly not to parliament; to no earthly legislature whatever; for to no human source can its origin be referred. Beyond all doubt its essence and its only possible maintenance lie absolutely in the unshaken belief of the religious public, that it is as a Supreme Ruler, and that He has attached to it eternal and lasting conditions. It is meet and just, in respect of anything touching the sabbath, to consult the opinion of this religious public: parliament, we hold, is justified in acting defiantly thereof. And that the religious community, including not merely the doctor of divinity, and the clergyman, but like-

wise the devout laic of every rank of every Protestant denomination, is wholly against the opening of any kind of exhibition on the Sunday, seems abundantly clear by the late demonstration. Indeed, it seems so difficult to imagine a sincere Christian approving, or anybody, on strictly christian grounds, defending, the opening of such a place as the Crystal Palace on the Lord's day, that we are led to look upon all maintainers of the affirmative in this controversy, if not as downright sceptics, at least as persons who are nothing loth to canvass religious topics from the stand-point of infidelity.

Again : in these kingdoms the entire scheme of government is, both in principle and form, essentially christian ; the religion of the Bible is recognized, sanctioned, and built upon by the national law. Whether this distinct characteristic of our fundamental polity be beneficial or noxious, reconcilable or repugnant to this or that eminent philosophy, is not to the point. Is it so, and does it remain so, with the consent of the national will ? Undoubtedly. Then, by fair assumption, for parliament in any degree to compromise its christian character would be against the sense of the majority : of an absolute certainty it would be contrary to the sense of the most religious, moral, and intelligent—that is to say, the most worthy, portion of the people. Applying the proper test, as we have shown, the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday is decidedly unchristian. Parliament, therefore, would not be justified in sanctioning the act.

Of all the benefits of the great charter of the sabbath, the one most universally appreciable is the general release from toil ; to be free one-seventh of all his days the English worker has come to consider as his inalienable birthright. To open the Crystal Palace on the sabbath would be directly to break in upon the principle ; would, more effectually than any previous public act, clear the way to still further innovation ; and every move forward, or rather retrograde, it is easy to perceive, must tend to weaken, in proportionate ratio, the barrier raised against the encroachment of that power which sets the hand to the hammer and the head to the desk—a power ever needful vigilantly to guard, and so potent, as to be utterly immovable from any once gained vantage ground. There would be the staff of officials at the Palace itself ; an additional police force ; on each of the metropolitan railways a considerable increase of hands ; not a few extra of the men of cars, cabs, and omnibuses, to say nothing in behalf of the poor horses, indifferently fed, and most cruelly wrought throughout the six days ;—it is much within bounds to say that the opening of the Palace of Sydenham would involve the loss of a weekly rest-day, with all its advantages, to some hundreds, or perhaps even thousands : “ the day would be changed from a rest and a moral aid to a tyranny and a demoralization,” marring the happiness and the social enjoyments of

scores of families. Would this be a thing of nought? On the contrary, a weighty plea, indeed, must be set up to justify it.

But the opening of the Crystal Palace could not, in the nature of things, be a solitary act; it is not so pretended on the part of our opponents. Were parliament to grant consent in this instance, on what principle could parliament refuse the same to Wyld's Great Globe, to the Panopticon of Science and Art, to Madame Tussaud's, or even to the Opera House and the theatres? One and all are conducted by proprietaries whose sole object is precisely identical with that of the trader in general. And gradually, yet surely, would the channels of ordinary business open, inexorably demanding the drudgery of a sabbathless race: it would be an easy stage from the pastrycook's to the grocer's, from Post office work to Exchange duties; very soon, as in Paris, would one-half of the city shops ply their craft; the banker be found at his counter, the blacksmith at his anvil.

What can be adduced as a set-off to all this evil, positive and contingent? Clearly there is no injustice involved in the keeping of the doors of the Exhibition closed one day of the week to every class indiscriminately. It is perfectly consistent with "a free Sunday for the people"—the catching cry of those, forsooth, who are doing their utmost to deprive of this very freedom many who now rejoice in it. There is no more and no less "prohibition" for the Joint Stock Show House than for the Joint Stock Cotton Mill. An equal law can practically recognize no distinction between the two, and therefore wisely restricts each alike, and to the same intent—to afford to the servants of both physical rest, and the opportunity to join in public worship. It is obvious that the permitted business of the publican or of the railway company is essentially different. A potion from the one may be necessary to human health, nay, perhaps, in some cases, to human life; and the possibility of setting a broken limb, or of regarding the dictates of filial affection, may, in certain cases, imply the means to travel. But no deed of mercy, no human urgency whatever, can depend on the open doors of either show house or mill.

Thus, then, the shutting of the doors of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday is a wrong to no one, and a great and precious principle is conserved; whereas the contrary, as we have seen, would inflict actual injury on hundreds, and seriously compromise that principle. It follows that some unmistakeable, some overwhelming positive advantage must needs be assigned still to justify the opening of those doors on that day. And what is it? Nothing more real or definite than a supposed promotion of the "intellectual and moral improvement" of persons in and around the metropolis who can visit the Palace on no day between Sunday and Sunday. Now we might prefer the question, "To what class do such persons chiefly belong?" that we might be enabled

to judge what probable effect a visit to the Palace might have; and whether, for the most part, such persons would or could make the visit on the Sunday if the opportunity served. But we simply answer, that the influence here imputed to the Crystal Palace is somewhat wrong in kind, and vastly magnified in degree; that "intellectual and moral culture," though incumbent on every one, is not to supersede every other duty, may not be pursued irrespective of order or of time, in all circumstances, at any cost, in spite of any consequences; and that "intellectual and moral improvement" is attainable without a Crystal Palace at all. "Intellectual and moral improvement" is hardly a thing which can be thrust upon a man, with or without his consent; it implies some measure, at least, of faculty and will on the part of him whom it is desirable to improve; and we maintain that whoever is so qualified can and will better his head and his heart without, if need be, a single visit to Sydenham, certainly without scandalizing the religious mind of his country, or taking upon himself any share in reducing a single fellow being to sabbathless misfare and sorrow.

It would, in sooth, be a good thing to sever some men from the lazy and low habits, the folly and the vice, which unhappily wholly claim them on every sabbath throughout the year. But would these go to the Palace? A few might, we dare say. Would the ordinary labourer go? We appeal to the individual experience of our readers, whether we are not borne out in stating that a labourer is rarely or never known to visit any exhibition whatever which involves an outlay of twelve pence besides railway fare or cab hire. Do you plead for the skilled workman? Many of them are free at an early hour on the Saturday; thousands voluntarily absent themselves from work on the Monday; almost all can and do take a holiday whenever they choose. It is notorious that no class are less absolutely tied; assuredly, beyond all others, they need not lose one iota of benefit simply because the great Sydenham Exhibition remains closed one day of the seven.

That every possible good accruing from an opening of the Palace on the day set apart for rest, and for the performance of the most solemn and momentous anti-secular duties, would be more than counterbalanced by the various attendant evil, must, we think, appear palpable to the dispassionate consideration of the enlightened mind. Who, for example, would be indifferent to the moral well-being of the thousands of young persons of both sexes newly left to their own care and guidance? They are compassed with temptations enough already. The greater part of them, it is to be feared, lapse too frequently from the teachings of conscience or of fond and solicitous parents. Of these, too, how many would the opportunity to visit the Palace on the Sunday be just sufficient to incline their whole course

downward, be the one thing only wanting to plunge them headlong into that general Sunday dissipation, which the inmates of our gaols and penitentiaries, for the greater part, concur in stigmatizing as the dread starting-point of their criminal career.

A word with "Wishwell," who advocates the opening of the Crystal Palace on the Sunday, because "the public would be morally improved" by the power which, according to his philosophy, the Exhibition exerts of "directing the current of thought to the great First Cause." Does "Mr. Wishwell" seriously affirm that this is not far more likely to result from frequenting those temples in which the great First Cause is openly proclaimed and worshipped? He attributes a degree of moral influence to art, which history and experience do not warrant. Does he find that the memorable thirty years between 1490 and 1520, in which flourished such demigods of art as Leonardo da Vinci, Michael Angelo, Raphael, Correggio, and Titian, left a marked moral impress on society in classic Italy? At this day, as the excellent article of "Threlkeld" tells us, brigands and robbers habitually visit the incomparable galleries of Rome, and are quite adepts in estimating the merits of a painting. And in Munich, the most conspicuous of modern cities for the studious cultivation of the fine arts, the state of public morality is sufficiently indicated by the fact, that out of every hundred births, fifty are illegitimate.

"Mr. Wishwell" expatiates, in glowing terms, on the wonders and the glories of external and visible nature; but we cannot conceive why, in order "to see the lily and the rose," we must needs have the Crystal Palace open on the sabbath. Surely he requires not to be told that "green trees with proud spreading boughs," and "tiny blooming dew-bent flowers," are by no means peculiar to Sydenham on either Sunday or Monday. Granting "that the ceremony of some of our churches" be deplorably ineffective for good, what then? Why, by this disputant's logic, that our contemplations can be directed to the displays of almighty "intelligence and power" only by a Sunday visit to the Crystal Palace!

For religious reasons, as ably set forth by "Threlkeld"—for reasons of a more secular and political character, which we have here touched on rather than elaborately wrought out, because of the excessive weakness of our opponents in debate, as exemplified by the vagaries of their redoubtable leader, "Mr. Wishwell,"—we conscientiously and boldly affirm that parliament could not possibly be justified in sanctioning the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays.

SAXON.

HEREDITARY sin is not more extraordinary than hereditary jurisdiction.—*Zimmerman.*

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

“Those, therefore, who, on the authority of an expression occurring only once in scripture, keep holy a sabbath day, for the consecration of which no divine command can be alleged, ought to consider the dangerous tendency of such an example, and the consequences with which it is likely to be followed in the interpretation of scripture.”—*Milton*.

“In regard to the origin of the sabbath, we may observe, that whatever our interpretation may be, God could not be said really to rest at any period. His creative energies are eternal in their operation, and what we call the fixed, as well as the apparently more occasional laws of nature, are alike sustained *only* by the ceaseless interposition of his hand, and could neither be altered nor suspended from any inherent necessity.”

We cannot reasonably affirm that the seventh day was one of relaxation to God. Indeed, such an opinion would be entirely inconsistent with a general conception of an omnipotence. Godliness is opposed to rest; our ideas of carnality lead us to assume similar ones of a Deity. The supposed resting could not be any injunction for us to devote the whole of the day to formal worship. The very constitution of our nature shows that God never designed that even the seventh day should be one of uninterrupted rest. There are labours devolving on the civilized which are not only *necessary*, but also *essential*, to the preservation of our lives; and, again, we have the same need of occupation even for the animal creation. The very fact of the cow requiring attention, and systematically yielding her stores of milk, show the impossibility of a suspension of labour. That one day in seven has been apportioned to a partial suspension of labour, from the earliest period, we readily admit; but we deny its being observed, or yet commanded to be a day devoted exclusively in worship. Originally it was a day of cessation; subsequently it has been observed both as a day of rest and worship. To show that these views have been entertained by some of the greatest men that have ever lived, we will give a few instances. St. Chrysostom, whose prayer is read every Sunday in all churches, says, “After the congregation is dismissed, every man may apply himself to his lawful business;” and St. Athanasius says, “We keep no sabbath as the ancients did, except an eternal sabbath, which shall have no end.” Eusebius, the ecclesiastical historian, in speaking of the patriarchs, says, “They cared not for corporal circumcision—no more do we; nor for the observation of sabbaths—no more do we.” The celebrated John Selden wrote, “If there be any superstition truly and properly so called, it is their observing the sabbath after the Jewish manner.” And although we might adduce volumes of opinions, we will only add that of Dr. Arnold to the list:—“That Sunday should be a day of greater leisure than other days,

and of the suspension, as far as may be, of the common business of life, I quite allow, but then I should have much greater indulgence for recreation on a Sunday than you might have; and if the railway entitles the people in the great towns to get out into the country on a Sunday, I should think it a very great good." Such are the opinions of some of earth's great worthies, expressed clearly and unmistakably.

We will now sift one or two of "Threlkeld's" arguments. He refers us to a number of scriptural passages in support of the negative side of this question; yet subsequently he ingeniously moulds those very sentences to suit his diction. He informs us that "it was the sabbath God blessed and hallowed, not the *particular day*." In the use of these words he commits a most glaring error; as, in another portion of his essay, he refers us to those very verses in which it is said that "THE seventh day is the sabbath of the Lord thy God;" and again, "God blessed *the* seventh day, and hallowed it." Surely it is unnecessary to inform "Threlkeld" of the great difference in meaning between *a* sabbath and *the* sabbath, or *a* seventh day and *the* seventh day. "Threlkeld," therefore, makes an affirmation regarding the scriptures which he *cannot substantiate by a single passage in the sacred book*. The two instances adduced from that volume clearly refute his affirmation. Verses which are applicable to one man are applicable to all. Yet he binds us with words, and then actually *deviates from their* expressed injunction, when those words have the slightest influence on his mode of reasoning. Surely this is not conducting oneself either consistently or "worthily in the debate."

Again, when we inform "Threlkeld" of the influence which the works of nature have on the human mind, he retorts, "Yet what have the most splendid picture galleries in Europe done for the demoralized population around?" and then quotes the following passage in support of his assertion:—"It is well known that the brigands and mountain robbers in the vicinity of Rome pay regular visits to the picture galleries in that great metropolis of ancient art." We wonder what inference any reasonable mind can gather from this. Certainly not that the paintings demoralize and *make thieves* of the population,—as "Threlkeld" presumes,—but that those classes move with the crowd, as the most fitting time for their reaping that which they have not sown. He infers that such characters would visit the Palace; and we do not disguise the fact that it would be utterly impossible to protect either it or any public building, however good in design, from craving thieves and the "shame of womanhood." Still this would not justify our closing the building from the honest thousands. Indeed, on this false mode of reasoning we should have to close *every* public place. Not only would our Crystal Palace have to be closed during the seven days of the

week, but also the very institutions which "Threlkeld" is labouring to uphold, as we have had numerous instances of "black sheep" even in Christ's fold.

When we are told that paintings are baneful productions—that nature is a substance which tendeth to lead man's mind from his Creator—we are cautious of receiving such tainted doctrines, and would rather allow our reason to guide us, than our prejudices to blind us. We will put a test to the affirmation. If a large collection of "splendid paintings" are injurious, a small collection must necessarily be more so. Therefore the walls of our homes are jotted with pernicious and depraving works—which conclusion runs in opposition to what is almost universally acknowledged, that paintings make a home cheerful, without containing the alloy of ungodliness.

There is a class of people who would not object to the Palace being opened, but conceive that it would only be a precedent to the opening of other public places, and ultimately to a conversion of the sabbath into a general work-day. As such an apprehension arises entirely from too much anxiety and an excessive nervous temperament, we will endeavour to elucidate the matter with as little party feeling as possible. Look at the general aspect of society. Review its different acts and general tendencies in bygone ages, and any unbiassed mind will admit that it is the *will* of the community to diminish rather than to increase the hours of labour. Whether we look back to the days of blind idolatry, or to those of sceptical infidelity, or even to those of scourgeful papishism, we shall find that the sabbath has never been more *universally* observed than it is at the present time. To allay the apprehension, we may notice the reforms which have been enacted during the last half century. The ten hours' bills and the Saturday half-holidays are both indubitable proofs of our assertion. There is, then, not only a law to abstain from general labour on the sabbath, but there is also a *desire* amongst the people to make it a day of general cessation. Again, it is the interest of the public to keep it as such, as the working on that day would not only be detrimental to the operatives, but also exceedingly unprofitable to the employers. Nature requires a periodical rest, and all classes are alike interested and benefited by its observance.

The leading paper in the metropolis says, "Of course it takes only a drop of ink and a stroke of the pen to pronounce any poor creature, who gets into a boat or an omnibus on the Sunday afternoon, 'a child of perdition,' and have nothing more to do with him. This is not the way to make anybody better. It has made many a bad man and many a hypocrite, but it tells nothing, teaches nothing, and comes to nothing, but darkness and bondage in body and soul. No doubt all people could spend the Sunday much better than they do. In private society it is a high and

precious gift to be able and ready to guide a Sunday evening's conversation to the holy purposes of the day. But this is only to be done by initiating, suggesting, and supplying the topics. It is not to be done by throwing a wet blanket on every spark of wit, or burst of feeling, or natural expression that may break through the tedium of the day." Our end may be well served by reference to the constitution of society, which comprises a Pharisee party, a liberal party, and an irreligious one. The former are zealous but unwisely restrictive, and would enact a score of acts of parliament to *force* the unwilling mind into the house of God. The liberal section aim, by persuasion, to *lead*, rather than to *compel*; knowing that man is a compound of mind and flesh, they strive to concoct means to divert the earthly nature into the way of spirituality. The last section is the depraved and ungodly, a class that are continually sowing the seeds of their evilness. It is to this latter class that we must give a helping hand; and a slight acquaintance with them will naturally suggest to our minds the best way to deal with them. They abhor religion as they do hell, and have the same bitter enmity against professing Christians. A something, therefore, is needed which will embue recreation, and point the mind to its Maker; and such a desideratum would be attained by the opening of the Crystal Palace.

In the first place, all persons would be required to conduct themselves with propriety; and this alone would have a great moral tendency on the minds of all parties present. Their propensities would be curbed, and a recognition of law necessarily embued. The observation also of those magnificent works would tend to refine the tastes of the vicious, and point their minds to a great First Cause. Some persons, however, believe that nature has a tendency to direct the mind from God rather than to him. Still such is only the belief of the few, and a minute investigation would satisfy any reasonable beings of the fallacy of it.

God designed the most beautiful works of nature for Adam's innocence. Yet few, having a belief in him, will affirm that he designed them to divert man's thoughts from heaven and the Creator to earth and the creature.

If we wish to improve anyone, we must not designate him as a child of perdition, and have nothing more to do with him, or yet compel him to do that which he detests. We must use rational means. We might just as well wish for the moon as the reformation of society by any compulsive method. The mind must be guided and advised, as we never have nor ever can *force* religion on the multitude.

Other pressing matters prevent our giving a more lengthened dissertation. Our aim, however, will be attained, and mankind benefited, if we have engendered a more reasonable and christian spirit, and done the least towards lessening the bigoted, the

popish, and the Pharisee feelings that too frequently pervade our acts, and blast the most promising buds of reform.

Manchester.

J. L. WISHWELL.

THE IMITATION OF JESUS CHRIST.

THE finest of christian books next to the gospel sprang, like it, from the horror of death. The death of the ancient world, the death of the middle ages, bore those germs of life. The first known MSS. of the middle age seem to belong to the end of the fourteenth century, or the beginning of the fifteenth. From 1421 the copies became innumerable—twenty were found in one monastery alone. The newly-born art of printing was chiefly employed in reproducing the “Imitation.” There are two thousand editions of it in Latin, a thousand in French, with sixty different translations; in Italian thirty. All nations have laid claim to this book universal of Christianity as to a national work. The French point out the Gallicisms in it, the Italians the Italicisms, the Germans the Germanisms. All orders of the priesthood, which are, as it were, so many nations of the church, equally contest the authorship of the “Imitation.” The priests claim it for Gerson, the canons regular for Thomas à Kempis. The monks for one Gerson, a Benedictine. Many others, too, might advance pretensions to it, for we find in it passages from all saints, all doctors. St. Francis de Sales alone has pierced to the truth of this doubtful matter. “Its author,” he says, “is the Holy Ghost.” Nor is the date less a point of controversy than the author and his country. The thirteenth, fourteenth, and the fifteenth centuries claim the honour. It is in the fifteenth that the book makes a sensation and becomes popular, but it wears all the appearance of having seen the light at an earlier period, and of having been prepared in preceding ages.

THE DUTY OF EVERY ONE TO AID IN THE PRESERVATION OF A FREE GOVERNMENT.—If we are bound to protect a neighbour, or even an enemy, from violence, to give him raiment when he is naked, or food when he is hungry, much more ought we to do our part toward the preservation of a free government; the only basis on which the enjoyment of these blessings can securely rest. He who breaks the fetters of slavery, and delivers a nation from thralldom, forms, in my opinion, the noblest comment on the great law of love, whilst he distributes the greatest blessing which man can receive from man; but next to that is the merit of him, who, in times like the present, watches over the edifice of public liberty, repairs its foundations, and strengthens its cement, when he beholds it hastening to decay.—*Robert Hall.*

The Essayist.

GALILEO.

A RETROSPECT of the past will show that in the midst of widespread ignorance and superstition, accompanied, as such generally is, with old and inveterate prejudices, a stray individual will be found, in whom genius sheds some bright rays through the surrounding gloom. We dwell on such with feelings of mingled pleasure and pain; gratified to observe truths made known for the first time to humanity, and openly asserted in the face of opposing bigotry, and false, though time-honoured preconceptions; while we heave a sigh, coupled with a sort of honest indignation, at the treatment those truths and truth-seeking individuals received from the hands of those by whom the very opposite ought to have been displayed. Among those who have distinguished themselves in this respect, Galileo is entitled to a prominent position.

Notwithstanding the progress made in Italy during the sixteenth century in literature and painting, so as to be termed, in that particular, "the golden age," as well as in the arts of sculpture and architecture, yet it appears that the various branches of science were most imperfectly understood, and the sublimities of astronomy obscured and distorted by the falsities of the Ptolemaic system. When erroneous dogmas are once established and long received as the truth, little inquiry as to their tenability is usually made, and ignorance and error, undisturbed, exercise their degrading influence. Galileo, however, was not one of those to be fettered by the opinions of the day, but boldly made inquiry, and rejected what did not stand the test of reason, and contradicted plain facts, although at the same time held up as infallible, and maintained at all costs against the least appearance of innovation. He early displayed that spirit of inquiry and independence of thought which afterwards so much characterized him. Being placed at the University of Pisa at the age of nineteen, the young student soon distinguished himself, not only by his capabilities, but also by his superior powers of application. The first work of Galileo, which was an essay on the "Hydrostatic Balance," excited attention, and secured for him the acquaintance of Guido Ubaldi, a learned Pisan, who recognized his rare gifts and showed a warm interest in his progress. Although designed for the medical profession, he showed so decided a bent for the pursuit of science, that the study of medicine was laid aside, with the reluctant consent of his father, who knew very well

that the latter would be a much surer road to respectability and worldly comfort.

The progress of Galileo in philosophic truth was maintained against a keen opposition by the abettors of the baseless and indefensible dogmas then taught by the schoolmen of the day. Ubaldi succeeded in introducing him to the Grand Duke Ferdinand I. de' Medici, who appointed him, in 1589, when only in his twenty-fifth year, to the mathematical chair at Pisa. This office, although most congenial to his tastes, yet he soon discovered that he had to assume the disagreeable position of supporting, in his turn, doctrines which he clearly saw could not bear a candid examination. This, however, he did not long submit to, and, as occasion offered, assailed these errors, not by mere assertions to the contrary, but by incontestable facts and self-evident demonstrations. One of the erroneous dogmas held at that time was, that bodies of unequal weights will fall to the ground with a velocity proportioned to their relative difference in that respect. Galileo, who is said to have been the first who formed a proper notion of the material nature of the atmosphere, at once saw the futile character of this established tenet, and justly accounted for the difference in the descent of various substances to the unequal resistance of the air. In order publicly to settle this disputed point, he went up to the top of the famous Campanile, or Leaning Tower of Pisa, from which he let fall a number of substances, differing considerably in weight, all of which came to the ground at so short intervals as at once to exhibit the incorrectness of the popular belief in this respect. Like other material substances, he supposed that, however comparatively little, the atmosphere must have weight: and an incident occurred which very well illustrated, if not proved (at least, to his own satisfaction), the correctness of this idea. In the course of the erection of certain public works under the auspices of the then reigning Grand Duke of Tuscany, the water, it was perceived, could not be made to rise higher in the pumps than about thirty-two feet. The reason then alleged for water rising in a pump was, that nature abhors a vacuum; but when it was found that after all the rise of the water was limited, the dogma had to be mended; and instead of saying that "nature abhors a vacuum," it was necessary to say, "she abhors it only to the height of ten yards or so." Galileo, however, conjectured, and rightly, that the water rose from the pressure of the atmosphere; and as its weight was limited, it would only cause the liquid element to rise to a point at which it would be counterbalanced by it. Torricelli, a disciple of our philosopher, carried out the idea, which resulted in the invention by him of that useful scientific instrument, the barometer.

The views maintained by Galileo, and the able manner in which he defended them, so threatened the downfall of the

existing philosophy, that nothing less than his removal would satisfy his opponents. They did not oppose him by fair means—for they could not—but raised such a persecution and annoyance against him, that he thought it prudent to resign his office and set out for Florence. There he was well received by some of his friends, and met his former supporter, Guido Ubaldi, who also on this occasion rendered him valuable assistance. He was now appointed to occupy the mathematical chair of the university of Padua, and though he was engaged only for the space of six years, yet, at the expiry of which, was re-appointed for the same period with increased salary. Still continuing his inquiries while holding this situation, he invented the thermometer, and the proportional compass, or sector; and wrote some useful treatises on mechanics, astronomy, and other subjects. But perhaps the most important discovery, or rather invention, ever made by this remarkable man, was that of the telescope, which he succeeded in doing before quitting Padua, where he received that encouragement to which he was so much a stranger in after years. In narrating this discovery, we cannot do better than make the following quotation from one of his biographers:—"The year 1609 was signalized by a discovery on the part of Galileo which forms one of the most solid foundations of his glory. In the month of April a rumour was circulated in Venice that a Dutchman had presented to Count Maurice, of Nassau, an instrument, by which means distant objects appeared as if they were near at hand. On this slight and cursory hint, Galileo immediately applied himself to discover whether the thing was possible, conformably with the passage of the luminous rays through spherical glasses of various forms. Some attempts made with lenses, which he had at hand, produced the desired effect; and next day he gave an account of his success to his friends, which, in fact, was nothing less than the invention of the telescope. A short time afterwards, he presented several of these instruments to the senate of Venice, accompanied with a description, in which he unfolded the immense consequences for nautical and astronomical observations which would certainly result from the discovery; and in recompense of his ingenuity, his commission as professor was continued for life, with an allowance of salary triple that which he had previously received. Galileo neglected nothing calculated to evince his gratitude, or to add to the claims which had merited these favours. Indefatigable in his researches, he invented the microscope; he also improved the telescope, and soon brought it to a state fit to be applied to the observation of the heavens. He then perceived what as yet no mortal eye had ever seen,—the surface of the moon, like that of the earth, bristled with high mountains and ploughed with deep valleys; Venus, presenting, like the moon, phases which prove her rotundity; Jupiter, environed with four

satellites, who accompany him in his course; the milky way; the nebulae; in a word, the whole heavens, bespangled with a countless multitude of stars, too small to be even perceived by the naked eye. It is more easy to conceive than describe the pleasure and delight which the first view of so many wonders must have inspired him withal, as well as the admiration which they could not fail to produce when they were known. A few days having sufficed to pass them in review, he hastened to announce his observations to the world, in a publication entitled 'Nuncius Sidereus; or, Celestial Courier,' which he dedicated to the princes of Medici, and which he continued at intervals in proportion as he discovered new objects. He also observed that Saturn sometimes appeared under the form of a simple disc, and sometimes with two appendages, which seemed two small planets; but it was reserved for another astronomer, Huygens, to demonstrate that these appearances were produced by the ring with which Saturn is surrounded. Galileo also discovered moveable spots on the globe or disc of the sun, whom the peripatetics had declared incorruptible, and did not hesitate from these to infer the rotation of that planet. He remarked that feeble light which, in the first and last quarters of the moon, renders visible, by means of the telescope, the part of her disc which is not then directly enlightened by the sun; and he concluded rightly that this effect was owing to the light reflected towards the moon by the earth. The continued observation of the spots of the moon satisfied him that that planet always presents nearly the same aspect; but in these he nevertheless recognized a species of periodic oscillation, to which he gave the name of libration, the exact laws of which were afterwards made known by Dominic Cassini. In a word, not less profound in following new truths to their consequences than subtle in discovering them, Galileo perceived the use to which the motions and eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter might be turned for the measure of longitudes; and he even undertook to make a sufficient number of observations of these stars to enable him to construct tables for the use of navigators."

Galileo being invited to Florence by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who gave him the name of Mathematician Extraordinary, he left his comfortable situation at Padua. However willing the Grand Duke might be to afford liberal encouragement in the prosecution of his inquiries, yet, being subservient to the court of Rome, he soon found his mistake in quitting the Venetian states for the capital of Tuscany. Though he had friends in Florence, he had also enemies, who speedily assailed and reported him to the Inquisition, whose cruel bigotry and stupid ignorance, as displayed in the manner it dealt with him, are strong arguments against popish infallibility.

The Ptolemaic system of philosophy, though half a century

before shaken by the discoveries of Copernicus, was still maintained; and, impressed with the infallible seal of the church of Rome, it was held as scriptural, and consequently, any one attempting to gainsay, was denounced a heretic. This theory, among other things, held that "all the celestial bodies were perfectly round, self-luminous, and not corrupted by any terrestrial tarnish;" that the sun, being the centre of the universe, did move round the earth from east to west. It is astonishing how far Copernicus went in his discoveries without the aid of the telescope. His only substitute for it was a rude triangle made of wood by his own hands, by means of which, however, he completed his great work on the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Galileo, having a great advantage over Copernicus in the telescope, confirmed the discoveries of the latter. Indeed, the simplicity of the Copernican theory, when compared with the Ptolemaic, commends itself to every candid thinker, and the discriminating mind of Galileo did not fail to perceive, as he did not fail to avow, its correctness. Instead of holding that the celestial bodies were perfectly round and self-luminous, he affirmed that, like the earth, the moon was irregular in its surface, received its light from the sun, and was possibly inhabited; and instead of supporting the notion that they were uncorrupted by any terrestrial tarnish, he declared there were spots on the sun, which has since been amply confirmed. However correct and ably supported by sound arguments Galileo's views might be, it appears they made little impression in his favour on his enemies, who employed all available means to bring into discredit them as well as himself. Ridicule and falsehood were resorted to, and he finally was held up as a heretic who wished to deceive the people. In the defence which he made to the latter charge, a sentence occurs which shows how well he could assign a proper place for the book of nature without encroaching on that of revelation. It is the following:—"In these and such other positions, which are not directly articles of faith, no man doubts but his holiness has always an absolute power of admitting or condemning them; but it is not in the power of any creature to make them to be true or false, otherwise than of their own nature and in fact they are." His arguments completely failed to avert the persecution hanging over him. The Inquisition ordered depositions to be drawn up against him. He appeared personally at Rome, and by his arguments temporarily silenced his persecutors, and afterwards obtained an interview with the pope, by whom he was required to abstain from teaching the heretical doctrines of the Copernican theory relative to the motion of the earth. Afterwards an assembly of Romish dignitaries issued a deliverance, denying as incorrect and heretical the doctrines held by Galileo, of the truth of which, by his own unwearied observations, he had not the least doubt.

Being now interdicted from teaching these interesting truths, Galileo, like his predecessor, Copernicus, proceeded to bring together and arrange his proofs relative to the motion of the earth, and the knowledge he had acquired regarding the heavenly bodies, and publish them to the world. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to enumerate the many formidable obstacles he had to contend against, ere he succeeded in publishing this elaborate work, in which he was engaged for sixteen years; but, in spite of them all, it appeared before the eyes of the world in 1632. If the teaching of Galileo was offensive to the bigoted supporters of error, not less so was his book; and it could scarcely be much otherwise expected, considering the character of those with whom he had to deal. His opponents persuaded the pope that a part of the work was written for the purpose of turning him to ridicule; and notwithstanding influential attempts made to prevent it, he was summoned to answer before the Inquisition for what he had dared to broach, and his work condemned by that arbitrary court. His book was now prohibited from being either published or perused, and himself condemned to prison as long as the Inquisition thought proper; and among other acts of intolerant persecution, he was compelled, on his knees, to declare to the following effect:—"I abjure, curse, and detest the error and heresy of the motion of the earth, and promise never more to assert, verbally or in writing, that the sun is the centre of the system, or that the earth is not the centre of the universe, or that it is moveable." Upon rising after doing so, he is said to have remarked to one beside him, "It moves still." We cannot regard this transaction but as one of the most barbarous which history records against humanity. It has been supposed, and not without foundation, that Galileo was put to the rack before he consented to abjure what he knew to be true. He was ever afterwards kept in confinement by the Inquisition, by whom he was allowed small liberties indeed; but in his solitude he composed a work entitled "*Dialogues on Motion*," which he thought was of such a nature as would cause no offence to his enemies. It was printed some years afterwards by a Dutchman; for such were the terrors of the Inquisition, that none in Italy were found daring enough to attempt it. At length, weighed down by old age and accumulated afflictions, Galileo ended his days; but his name will be handed down to latest generations as one far above the men of his age, and as one who made some of the most important contributions to science under the sternest difficulties.

In contemplating such a character, we are at first sight led to regret that, instead of living in an uncongenial, bigoted age, he had not rather flourished in the nineteenth century, when his merits would have been appreciated, and himself honoured as one deserving admiration. New truths, however, must needs be

introduced by some one, and those who do so will generally find that, like the Tuscan philosopher, they will have their enemies, who, from certain motives or prejudices, will do their utmost to baffle them. The place, therefore, assigned to Galileo by the omnipotent Ruler of the universe was an important one. Had he or some similar individual not occupied such a place at such a time, for aught we know, the world would have been behind in many things, even at the present day, to a degree of which we can form no adequate conception. How easy was it to sail to America after it was discovered by Columbus! and how comparatively easy is it to follow out and make additions to the various sciences, when their first principles are discovered and clearly laid down. It is the ease with which information is now acquired, compared with former times, which is one great cause of the superior intelligence and advancement of the nineteenth century.

Porth.

J. W.

CHARACTER OF RALEIGH.—With all these higher elements of character Raleigh joined a violent ambition, a stern pride, and an unbounded passion for renown. These latter passions, fostered by the circumstances amid which he was thrown, soon overmastered his religious and poetical impulses, and drove him from that calm haven of rest which his fancy dwelt upon so fondly in moments of reflection, to take part in the most active and least scrupulous movements of the time. He became a soldier, fearless, cruel, and unsparing; a courtier, intriguing, dark, revengeful; a buccaneer, who pursued his prey with as little remorse of conscience as a Kid or a Morgan; and it is easy to imagine that amid the storms of violent passion which so incessantly agitated his breast, his life could never have been happy, and that he must often have recurred with a bitter pang to the sense of what it might have been had he lived true to the purer and better part of his nature.

JUSTICE.—We ought always to deal justly, not only to those who are just to us, but likewise with those who endeavour to injure us. And this, too, for fear lest by rendering them evil for evil, we should fall into the same vice. So we ought likewise to have friendship; that is to say, humanity and good will, for all who are of the same nature with us.—*Hierocles.*

HEALTH.—O blessed health! thou art above all gold and treasure; 'tis thou who enlargest the soul, and openest all its powers to receive instruction, and to relish virtue. He that has thee has little more to wish for; and he that is so wretched as to want thee, wants everything with thee.—*Sterne.*

BENEFITS.—He who receives a good turn should never forget it; he who does one, should never remember it.—*Charron.*

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 179.)

By *inflexions* we mean the changes which words undergo to express number, gender, case, mood, tense, person, &c.

It is evident that without an exact knowledge of the inflexions of a language no one can speak it correctly.

There are two ways of learning them. One is the method now so extensively employed, of giving a short rule for each inflexion, and then endeavouring to impress it on the memory by a large number of examples and exercises. This suits those who, like children, have plenty of time and little application.

The other method is indeed less amusing, but far more certain; more laborious, but more satisfactory: and for these reasons we shall adopt it. It is, to learn the inflexions *at once*, THOROUGHLY; so as to know them *perfectly*. The student is then qualified to use a dictionary, and he will be able, with very little difficulty, to translate any author that may be put into his hands.

We recommend the student to write out on a card a portion of the inflexions (say those of the pronouns), to be carried with him and learned in those brief intervals of time which he can devote to nothing else; and so on, till he has learned the whole. The short delectus following each paragraph should be first translated, and then learnt, so that the English is immediately suggested by the corresponding French, and *vice versa*.

The best dictionary is that of Spiers. Marin de la Voye's contains all the forms of all the irregular verbs, and is a very convenient book for use. Wilson's is merely a reprint of Chambaud. But any dictionary will serve the purpose of acquiring a competent acquaintance with the language.

For the sake of brevity, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the ordinary definitions of the grammatical terms: if this should not be the case, he should get the Abridgement of Murray's English Grammar, which will, at small cost, afford him all he needs.

The French language has nine parts of speech, which are the same in nature as the English. They are divided into the INFLECTED and UNINFLECTED.

The inflected are the substantive or noun, the article, the adjective, the pronoun, and the verb.

The uninflected are the adverb, the conjunction, the preposition, and the interjection.

1.—THE SUBSTANTIVE.

The substantive has only one inflexion, namely, the change necessary to express the difference in number.

In French, as in English, there are two numbers, the singular and the plural.

The plural is commonly formed from the singular by adding *s*, as *le roi*, the king; *les rois*, the kings.

But, 1. When the singular ends in *au* or *eu*, the plural is formed by adding *x*, as *gâteau*, cake, *gâteaux*; *jeu*, game, *jeux*. Except *landau*, landau, *landaus*.

2. When the singular ends in *al*, the plural is formed by changing this termination into *aux*; as *cheval*, horse, *chevaux*.

Aval, endorsement of a bill; *bal*, ball; *cal*, callosity; *cantal*, cheese of Auvergne; *carnaval*, carnival; *chacal*, jackal; *nopal*, the tree on which the cochineal insect lives; *regal*, feast; and, according to the Académie, *bocal*, a short-necked bottle, or mouthpiece of an instrument; and *local*, habitation, form their plurals by adding *s*.

3. Substantives of more than one syllable, whose singular ends in *nt*, may drop the *t* in the plural; so, *instrument* makes either *instruments* or *instrumens*; *diamant*, diamond, *diamants* or *diamans*. The Académie preserves the *t*; common usage omits it. In monosyllables, however, the *t* must always be preserved; as *dent*, tooth, *dents*; *pont*, bridge, *ponts*; *gant*, glove, *gants*.

4. Substantives ending in *s*, *x*, or *z*, are alike in both numbers; as *le fils*, the son; *les fils*, the sons; *la noix*, the nut; *les noix*, the nuts; *le nez*, the nose; *les nez*, the noses; *le gaz*, the gas; *les gaz*, the gases.

5. A substantive compounded of an adjective and a substantive has both the parts altered; so, *monsieur*, sir, *messieurs*; *gentilhomme*, gentleman, *gentilshommes*.

6. When a substantive is formed of two substantives connected by a preposition, as *arc-en-ciel* (arch in heaven), rainbow; *chef-d'œuvre* (chief of work), masterpiece; only the former takes the sign of the plural, thus, *arcs-en-ciel*, *chefs-d'œuvre*. When both the parts of a compound word are indeclinable, or when, one of them being a verb, the other is already in the plural, both numbers are often alike; as, *une essuie-plume*, a pen-wiper, *des essuie-plume*; *un bec-figues*, a fig-pecker (bird), *des bec-figues*; *un appui-main*, a hand-rest, makes *des appui-main*; *un essuie-main* (a hand-wiper), a towel, makes *des essuie-mains*.

7. Of the few substantives that end in *ou*, the following take *x*: *bijou*, jewel; *caillou*, pebble; *chou*, cabbage; *genou*, knee; *joujou*, toy; and *pou*, an insect (*pulex*). The rest take *s*. *Hibou*, owl, has both forms; but *x* is preferable.

8. Of substantives that end in *ail*, the following change *il* into *ux*. *Bail*, lease; *corail*, coral; *émail*, enamel; *soupirail*, airhole; *vantail*, folding-door. All others are regular.

9. *Ciel*, heaven, sky, makes *cieux* and *ciels*; *cieux* in its proper and natural sense of *heavens*; as *les cieux annoncent la gloire de Dieu*, the heavens declare the glory of God; *pareil au cèdre il cachait dans les cieux son front audacieux*, like a cedar he hid in the skies his audacious forehead. But in the senses—1, the roof of a stone quarry; 2, the testers of a bed; 3, climate, atmosphere; 4, the sky in a picture—*ciels* is to be used; as, *en termes de mineurs, on désigne sous le nom de ciels les premières couches de terre*, in the language of miners, the uppermost strata of earth are designated *ciels*; *la forme des ciels de lit change tous les six mois*, the shape of bed-testers alters every six months; *l'Italie est sous un des plus beaux ciels de l'Europe*, Italy is under one of the most beautiful skies of Europe; *ce peintre fait bien les ciels*, this painter does his skies well. *Aïeul* makes *aïeux* in its general sense

of ancestors, and *aïeuls* in the strict sense of grandfather; as, *mieux vaut être grand par soi que par ses aïeux*, it is worth more to be great through one's self than through one's ancestors; *ses deux aïeuls assistaient à son mariage*, her two grandfathers were present at her marriage. *Œil*, eye, in its common uses, makes *yeux* in the plural; as, *le bandeau de l'erreur aveugle tous les yeux*, the veil of error blinds all eyes; *il y a un proverbe espagnol qui dit qu'il faut choisir du fromage sans yeux, du pain qui ait des yeux, et du vin qui saute aux yeux*, there is a Spanish proverb, which says, one ought to choose cheese without eyes (solid, without holes), bread which has eyes (light, well mixed), and wine which leaps to the eyes (clear, bright). But when it is used by way of analogy, and expresses some sort of similarity between the object to which it is applied and that of which it recalls the idea, then, to prevent ambiguity, the plural is *œils*; as, *les pierres appelées œils de poisson*, the stones called fishes' eyes; *les œils de serpent sont des agates onyx*, serpents' eyes are onyx agates.

Travail, work, makes its plural *travaux* in its ordinary meaning; but in the senses, 1, of ministerial audiences with the monarch, or reports of a secretary of state, and, 2, of a farrier's brake, it takes *travails*; as, *ce ministre a eu plusieurs travaux cette semaine avec le roi*, this minister has this week had several audiences with the king; *cet étalon a rompu deux travaux*, that horse has broken two brakes.

In French, as in English, there are some substantives that are used only in the singular, others only in the plural number. They are not many, nor of sufficient importance to deserve mentioning.

GENDERS OF NOUNS.

The great difficulty connected with French nouns is the gender. In French, all things that exist are either masculine or feminine: that is, in speaking of a table, for instance, French people say, "*she* is round;" or of a hat, "*he* is new;" and so of everything else. Now, as far as genders are found in English, the English will guide us in the French; but the difficulty is to know when to use *he* or *she* in reference to what we call neuter substantives. Scarcely anything but practice and the dictionary can make us always right, but the following rules will be useful.

GENERAL RULES.

1. The names of the days, months, seasons, and winds: of colours, minerals, and letters: of trees and shrubs; except *épine*, thorn; *ronce*, bramble: compound words, as *un parapluie*, an umbrella; *un tire-botte*, a bootjack; *un chèvrefeuille*, a honeysuckle; except *après-midi*, afternoon, and the names of months compounded with *mi*, signifying *middle*; as *la mi-Avril*, the middle of April: adjectives, adverbs, and verbs used as substantives, as *le bon*, the good; *les biens*, the property, goods; *le manger*, eating; *le boire*, drinking; *les si et les pourquoi*, the ifs and the whys:—are MASCULINE.

2. The following terminations are masculine:—

(1) *a*, as *un opéra*, an opera.

(2) *é* not preceded by *t*, as *un pré*, a meadow.

(3) *i*, as *un cri*, a shriek: except *la loi*, the law; *la foi*, the faith; *la fourmi*, the ant; and *la merci*, mercy.

(4) *o*, as *le cacao*, cocoa.

(5) *u*, as *un chapeau*, a hat; *un chou*, a cabbage: except *eau*, water; *glu*, birdlime; *la peau*, the skin; *la tribu*, the tribe; *la vertu*, virtue.

(6) Any consonant except *x*, *eur*, *ion*, and *son*, preceded by a vowel. To this rule, which includes several thousand words, there are only the following exceptions:—

<i>clef</i>	key	<i>façon</i>	shape	<i>brebis</i>	sheep
<i>nef</i>	nave of a church	<i>leçon</i>	a lecture	<i>fois</i>	a time
<i>soif</i>	thirst	<i>moisson</i>	harvest	<i>souris</i>	mouse
		<i>mousson</i>	monsoon	<i>vis</i>	screw
<i>faim</i>	hunger	<i>rançon</i>	ransom		
				<i>dent</i>	tooth
<i>fin</i>	end	<i>chair</i>	flesh	<i>dot</i>	dowry
<i>main</i>	hand	<i>cour</i>	court	<i>forêt</i>	forest
		<i>cuiller</i>	spoon	<i>hart</i>	halter
<i>boisson</i>	drink	<i>mer</i>	sea	<i>mort</i>	death
<i>chanson</i>	song	<i>tour</i>	tower	<i>nuit</i>	night
<i>cuisson</i>	cooking			<i>part</i>	part

(7) *acle*, except *débâcle*, thaw.

age, except *cage*, *image*, *page*, and *rage*.

ège, *ige*, *uge*.

aire, except *grammaire*, grammar; *affaire*, affair; *chaire*, pulpit; *paire*, pair.

aume, *isme*, *ôme*.

ême, except *la crème*, cream.

oire, except *décrottoire*, shoebrush; *la gloire*, glory; *l'histoire*, history; *la mâchoire*, the jaw; *la mémoire*, memory; *la nageoire*, the fin; *une passoire*, a colander; *une poire*, a pear; *une râcloire*, a strickle; *la victoire*, victory; *une écritoire*, an inkstand.

3. Of course all other terminations are feminine:—

eur, as *la chaleur*, heat: except *le bonheur*, happiness; *le chœur*, the choir, *le cœur*, the heart; *un croiseur*, a cruiser (ship); *le deshonneur*, dishonour; *l'équateur*, the equator; *l'honneur*, honour; *le labeur*, labour; *le malheur*, misfortune; *les pleurs*, tears.

ion, as *la nation*; *la confession*: except *le bastion*; *un champion*; *le croupion*, the rump; *un lampion*, a small lamp for illuminations; *un million*; *un pion*, a pawn at chess; *le septentrion*, the north; *un scorpion*.

son, preceded by a vowel; as *la maison*, the house; *la garnison*, the garrison: except *un oison*, a gosling; *un peson*, a steelyard; *le poison*; *un tison*, a firebrand.

té, as *la bonté*, goodness; *la fermeté*, firmness; *la santé*, health: except *un arrêté*, a resolution; *un comité*, a committee; *un comté*, a county; *le côté*, the side; *l'été*, the summer; *un pâté*, a pie; *le traité*, the treaty.

e mute, if not previously noticed in these rules; as *une armée*, an army; *la vie*, life; *la terre*, the earth: but to this there are about a hundred exceptions, and some of them are very uncertain.

Gens, people, is of both genders; feminine, when the adjective precedes; masculine, when the adjective follows; as, *des gens dangereux*, dangerous people. When *tout*, all; *certain*, some; *quel*, what; and *tel*, such, precede it immediately, and when *tout* is separated from it by an article only, they agree with it in the feminine; but they agree with it in the masculine, if the adjective should not immediately precede it, or should be the same in both genders; as, *tous les honnêtes gens*, all honest people; *toutes les vieilles*

gens, all old people; *quelles gens*, what people; *quels braves gens*, what good people.

It may be observed, that most of the words which form the exceptions to the above rules are derived from foreign languages, and, without regard to their termination, preserve their original gender; words like *préjudice*, *proverbe*, *régime* (rule, diet), *sceptre*, which are *neuter* in the original language, becoming *masculine* in French.

Some nouns in *eur*, which, as denoting the office, occupation, &c., of man, are masculine, take also a feminine form by changing *eur* into *rice*; as *acteur*, *actrice*: but *chanteur*, a singer; *menteur*, a liar; *vendeur*, a seller; make *chanteuse* (and *cantatrice*), *menteuse*, *vendeuse*. *Gouverneur* makes *gouvernante*, a governess.

Vengeur, an avenger; *pécheur*, a sinner; *enchanteur*, an enchanter; *chasseur*, a hunter; and the legal terms, *bailleur*, sleeping partner; *défendeur*, defendant; *demandeur*, plaintiff; and *vendeur*, vendor, make their feminine in *resse*; as *pêcheresse*: but *chasseresse* is poetical.

CASES.

Substantives have no grammatical inflexion to distinguish their different relations to other words in the sentence; so, *la reine le veut*, the queen wills it; *banc de la reine*, the queen's bench; *il offrit un livre à la reine*, he presented a book to the queen.

2.—THE ARTICLE.

In French there is only one article, answering to our definite article *the*; our indefinite article being represented by *un* before a masculine substantive, and by *une* before one that is feminine; as *un homme*, a man, or one man; *une femme*, a woman, or one woman. *Un* is, properly speaking, a numeral adjective, differing from the others of the same class only in having a distinct form for the feminine gender.

The definite article is *le* for the masculine singular, as *le puits*, the well; *le roi*, the king; *la* for the feminine singular, as *la mer*, the sea; *la reine*, the queen: and *les* for the plural of both genders, as *les astres*, the stars (masculine); *les oraisons*, the orations (feminine).

When the word that follows the article begins with a vowel or silent *h*, the *e* or *a* is elided; so, *l'homme* for *le homme*; but *le héros*, the hero: *l'eau* for *la eau*; *l'image* for *la image*; *l'oison* for *le oison*.

Before *un*, one; *onze*, eleven; and *oui*, yes, the article is not elided; so we say *le un*, the one; *le onze*, the eleven, when we are speaking of the numbers abstractedly; and *le oui et le non*, the yes and the no. But *l'un des deux*, the one of the two; *l'un et l'autre*, the one and the other (that is, both); *l'un ou l'autre*, the one or the other.

But the plural article *les* is never elided.

When *le*, the masculine article in the singular, is preceded by the preposition *de*, of, both the article and the preposition are altered, and, instead of *de le*, we write *du*; as *l'ambition du roi*, the ambition of the king; *le milieu du jour*, the middle of the day.

Similarly, the preposition *à*, to, unites with *le*, and forms *au*, to the; as *il alla au secours de l'empereur*, he went to the assistance of the emperor; *exposer au vent*, to expose to the wind.

The feminine article *la* does not form these combinations; but we must say, *de la reine*, of the queen; *il conduit à la gloire*, it leads to glory.

But before a vowel or silent *h*, *de l'* and *à l'* are to be used for both genders; so, *de l'aigle*, of the eagle; *à l'aigle*, to the eagle; *les maladies de l'âme*, the diseases of the mind; *dedié à l'amitié*, sacred to friendship.

And in the plural, *des* is to be used for *de les*, and *aux* for *à les*, in both genders; so we say, *des yeux*, of the eyes; *aux yeux*, to the eyes; *des amis*, of the friends; *aux amis*, to the friends, in the masculine: and in the feminine, *des fleurs*, of the flowers; *aux fleurs*, to the flowers; *des louanges*, of the praises; *aux armées*, to the armies.

Du, *de la*, *de l'*, and *des*, are also employed as we employ the word *some*; as *donnez moi du pain*, give me some bread; *avoir de la patience*, to have (some) patience; *avoir de l'argent*, to have some money; *avoir des amis*, to have some friends; *des écureuils se jouaient dans l'ombrage*, squirrels were playing in the shade of the trees.

EXERCISE 1.

L'harmonie du langage.
Les sentiments de l'âme.
L'insouciance de l'armée.
Les écrivains du dix-huitième siècle.
La naïveté d'un fabuliste.
Le succès d'un artifice.
Les succès d'un général.
Les flots de la mer.

Une multitude d'animaux.
Les branches des ormeaux.
Le mugissement des flammes.
L'époque des croisades.
Les horreurs de la guerre.
Les beautés des fleurs.
L'ombrage de la forêt.
La pêche de la baleine.

LITERARY LONGEVITY.

AN opinion has been expressed that literary labours, or habitual excursions into the regions of imagination, are adverse to the continuance of health, or even the integrity of intellect. Grave charges, truly! and examples to the contrary may easily be adduced.

Premature death and mental declension are confined to no profession or condition of life. Too early or undue stress laid on the organs of the brain, is doubtless fraught with disastrous consequences. Still their constant and even severe exercise may comport both with physical welfare and longevity.

It is indeed true, that Swift "expired a driveller and a show," but not until he had passed seven years beyond the span allotted to human life; and the amiable author of the "Task" closed his pilgrimage in a rayless cloud at thirty-six; and Walter Scott sank at sixty-one, under toils too ambitiously pursued for the safe union of flesh with spirit; and Southey, whose reckless industry precluded needful rest, subsided ere sixty-eight into syncope and the shadow of darkness; and Henry Kirke White faded at twenty-one, in the fresh blossom of his young renown; and Byron, at thirty-six, rent the fiery armour of genius and of passion, and fled from the conflict of life.

Yet Goethe, unimpaired by a strong excitement of imagination, saw his eighty-second winter; and the sententious architect of the "Night Thoughts" reached four-score-and-four; and Voltaire, at the same period, was still in love with the vanity of fame; and Corneille continued to enjoy his laurels till seventy-eight; and Crabbe, at an equal age, resigned the pen which had sketched with daguerreotype minuteness the passing scene. Joseph Warton, until his seventy-ninth year, made his mental riches and cheerful piety sources of delight to all around him; Charles Wesley, on the verge of eighty, called his wife to his dying pillow, and, with an inexpressible smile, dictated his last metrical effusion; and Klopstock, the bard of the "Messiah," continued until the same period to cheer and delight his friends. Watts laid down his consecrated harp at seventy-four; the illustrious Metastasio detained the admiring ear of Italy until eighty-four; and Milton, at sixty-six, opened his long-eclipsed eyes on "cloudless light serene," leaving to the world the mournful memories of "Lost Paradise," with living strains of heroic and sublime counsel. Mason was seventy-two ere the "holy earth," where his "dead Maria" slumbered, admitted him to share her repose; and the tender Petrarch, and the brave old John Dryden, told out fully their seventy years; and the ingenious La Fontaine, seventy-four; while Fontenelle, whose powers of sight and hearing extended their ministrations to the unusual term of ninety-six years, lacked only the revolution of a few moons to complete his entire century.

Those masters of the Grecian lyre, Anacreon, the sweet Sophocles, and the fiery-souled Pindar, felt no frost of intellect, but were transplanted as evergreens in the winter of four-score; at the same advanced period, Wordsworth, in our own times, continued to mingle the music of his lay with the murmur of Rydal's falling water; and Joanna Baillie, to fold around her the robe of tragic power, enjoying until her ninetieth year the friendship of the good, and the fruits of a fair renown; Montgomery, the religious poet, so long a cherished guest, amid the romantic scenery of Sheffield, recently departed at the age of eighty-two.—*L. H. Sigourney.*

INIQUITY OF EQUITY.—Equity is a roguish thing; for law we have a measure, we know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. It is all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be! One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: it is the same thing in the chancellor's conscience.—*Selden.*

HUME'S PHILOSOPHY AND STYLE.

THE chief element of Hume's mental power was its scepticism. From this sprang his novelty, strength, and profuse fertility. He was born to doubt. At sixteen, if not long before, we have evidence that he had cast aside many of the prevailing modes of belief. The principle grew stronger as his intellect matured. His scepticism in metaphysics, commencing in early youth, gave rise to those novel inquiries into the mental constitution, which gave to the science of the mind a new fertility. From the doubts of Hume sprang up new schools of philosophy. He found, indeed, few followers, but he gained what pleased him almost as well—many opponents. Reid and the Scottish thinkers, driven by his subtle reasoning from the old basis of the science, called in a new ally, which they called common sense. By a single doubt Hume created the Scottish metaphysical school. In Germany, his opponents fled to the opposite pole. Kant, after long labours, produced a theory laden with mystic technicalities, by which he believed he could refute the ingenious sceptic. He declared the mind to be self-creative, producing its own cognitions; and while thus isolating the intellect, in order to defend it from materialism, gave rise to that transcendental philosophy, which has gradually faded into the dreams of Fichte and Hegel. France, meanwhile, excited by the impulse from Germany and Scotland, sought to build up an eclectic philosophy of her own, more satisfactory to her modern thinkers than the analytical school of Des Cartes. Such has been the power of Hume's scepticism in a single science. In politics it has been no less destructive of ancient creeds. His essays and political discourses, so new and surprising in their day, gave a strong impulse to the study of political economy. They excited men to think upon topics which had been hitherto neglected. They aroused in England a class of reasoners, who soon discovered the falseness of many of the prevailing views in trade and commercial legislation. Adam Smith developed Hume's doubts in his able treatise on the wealth of nations; and each succeeding writer upon political topics has owed much to Hume's novel inquiries. Bentham, Malthus, Brougham, and Ricardo have discussed and studied the questions which he proposed. In France, the effect of his writings was still more wonderful; they made political economy a popular study, and directed the attention of the best minds of that country to the subject of political reform. No little share of that free spirit, which led to the first Revolution, was due to the influence of Hume.

In literature, however, Hume's scepticism was strangely silent.

Here he bowed superstitiously before the oracles of ancient criticism and the borrowed taste of Paris. He could approve nothing in tragedy that was not modelled after Sophocles, or in poetry that was not a reflection of Virgil. Shakespeare was to him a wild and savage genius, and Milton barbarously sublime. Even Homer had not that charm for him which he professes. He enjoyed the smooth and easy flow of Tasso and Virgil, better than the majestic ballads that have been woven into the Iliad and Odyssey. In this spirit of deference to antiquity he always wrote. His style has nothing of that boldness with which Milton asserted his mastery over his native tongue, or with which Johnson, diving deep into the wells of English lore, drew forth the pearls of his powerful diction. Hume never doubted that the classical models were to be implicitly followed, both in style and manner. His history he formed upon the model of the Greeks, neglecting all the suggestions which the enlarged inquiries of modern times demanded. He recommended Robertson to write biographies after the manner of Plutarch, and would himself have sunk into a mere imitator of Thucydides, had not his earnest doubts in religion, politics, and character lent an interest to the history, which animates its classic style with vital fire, and gives it a novelty which no classic has attained. From this singular exception to his general scepticism, Hume's criticisms are valueless. His literary history is without a novel thought. You anticipate his judgment before it is uttered. You see whom he will condemn, and where will be the fatal fault. He mows down the fairest flowers in the gardens of English poetry with a hand more relentless than that of time. He aims vain blows at the greatest English dramatist, and the lord of English poets. Bacon he ranks below Galileo; and Spenser, imaginative and harmonious, for him had written in vain. On the whole, he had little respect for English literature, and looked rather to Scotland, with its Wilkie and Home, to redeem the nation from the reproach of deficiency in taste and genius.

His style has an endless rhythm like the verse of Shakespeare, and never fails in harmony. Melody, the offspring of true genius, is unattainable by common minds. It was the charm of the Greek historians, and has descended to a few modern writers. Hume's rhythm is peculiar to himself. It differs from that of Robertson or Gibbon, and the latter declared that he listened to it in despair. It has no resemblance to the sounding periods of Jeremy Taylor, or the simpler flow of Addison. Hume's ear for harmony was perfect, and his great thoughts shaped themselves into delicate modulations of language as naturally as those of Homer compressed themselves in verse. To preserve this harmony, he uses an easy flow of words. He never condenses; his thoughts are all broadly presented to the reader. There is no trace of the study of the elder English writers in his prose, and

to him they were, probably, all barbarians. He had read little of Taylor, Barrow, or Burton. His thoughts never rise into artificial periods like those of Johnson, or contract into concise novelty like those of Bacon. He sought rather to utter his peculiar views in a language almost conversational, and distinguished from conversation only by its pleasing modulations. He uses the plainest Saxon; but he does this not from any acquaintance with Anglo-Saxon literature, but because he found that language the best to express his meaning. He has plainly studied the French writers diligently, but he has carefully shunned the measured and stilted tone assumed by the writers under Louis XIV. He has none of the declamation, the repetitions, the contrasts, and antithesis that mark the eloquence of Massillon and Bossuet; he has even less of Voltaire's flippancy and satire; and his style is simply that of a wise and thoughtful mind addressing minds as thoughtful and as earnest as itself.

ORIGIN OF GASLIGHT.—Coal, as fuel, drives the railway train and the steamer; it works in every factory, it burns on every hearth; it is to England more precious than gold and costly jewels. Its gases, the terror of the poor miner, who but too often falls a victim of the terrible "fire-damp," have been changed from a death-bringing enemy into a most useful servant. To drive them out from the mines, they were at first conveyed in tubes to the outer air. By accident it was found that they would ignite; and from this simple attempt to effect an escape for a nuisance, men derived the light which now rivals the noon-day brightness, and gives peace and security even to overgrown cities.—*Stray Leaves from the Book of Nature.*

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

26. What are the studies requisite to pass an examination for a situation in the Custom House, London, and if French is required?—A CONTRIBUTOR.

27. Will any of your readers tell me how to proceed in articling a boy to a surgeon, and what amount of education is required?—J. W. S.

28. Please say whose dictionary is the best at the present day?—C. M., Junior.

29. In reading a history of Scotland

in the times of Robert Bruce and David II., there is frequent mention of the meeting of the *three estates*. As they give no information about them in the book, would any of the readers of the *B. C.* be kind enough to give a short explanation?—ARDROSSAN.

30. Will some of your readers kindly inform me the particulars of the examination to be undergone, and before whom, in order to obtain the degree of "Doctor of Music?"—J. J. G.

31. I should be glad if you would say what French grammar is the best

to use in connection with the lessons in the *B. C.* for self-educators?—D. Y. G.

32. A correspondent says, "The natural number of the logarithm 2.504970 is shown in Wallace's "Universal Calculator's Guide," p. 36, to be 319.869. Will you be kind enough to explain to me the process by which this natural number is discovered?"

33. In his review of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," Dr. Warren quotes the following passage:—"It was another life—a life which, once believed in, stands as a solemn, significant figure before the otherwise unmeaning ciphers of time, changing them to orders of mysterious, unknown value." Now, in the collected edition of the doctor's miscellanies, there is a note referring to this passage, which states that "the idea is taken from the writings of a living English author." Could any of your correspondents oblige by letting me know who the author spoken of is, and where "the idea," in its original garb, is to be found?—RUFUS.

34. Can any of your readers recommend me an edition of Cicero which contains the "*Pro Cluentio*?" Any other information respecting the price, &c., would greatly oblige.—C.

35. Would any of your readers kindly furnish me with information respecting civil appointments in India; viz., subjects of examination, class of candidates, testimonials required, and prospects? Likewise the names and addresses of any officials who might be corresponded with on the subject.—ALPHA.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

6. *Civil Engineering*.—A civil engineer should have a *general acquaintance* with most of the sciences, as the kinds of construction which come under his notice are so varied in character. An *intimate knowledge* of mathematics, geology, and mineralogy is indispensable. "Spero" would do well to procure the following rudimentary works

published by Mr. Weale, with which to commence his studies:—"Art and Practice of Surveying," 2s.; "Civil Engineering," 3s.; "Art of Building," 1s.; "Art of Making Foundations and Concrete Works," &c., 1s.; "Geology," 1s.; "Mineralogy," 2s. If "Spero" will communicate with me through the medium of the *B. C.*, I shall be most happy to give him any other information he may require, being myself in the engineering profession.—TALIESIN.

13. *Burring*.—Answer to "SCOTO."—I am afraid T. T.'s answer to this query will not aid "SCOTO" in getting over his difficulty. I would recommend him to study "The Principles of Speech and Elocution," by Mr. A. Melville Bell, of Edinburgh. If, however, his defect is not of a very serious nature, and is only in the formation of the letter "r," the following directions (which are quoted from Mr. Bell's book) may be of service to him. He must remember that *patient* vivâ voce practice is the only means of getting over the difficulty. I may add, that half an hour's *drill* from a practical elocutionist will do more to relieve him than pages of advice.

EXTRACT (p. 163).—The *uvular vibration* constitutes what is called burring. * * * The burrer should, therefore, exercise himself in separating the uvula and soft palate from the tongue as far as possible. After a little practice he will generally be able to do this so effectually, that the uvula will shrink to a point, and the soft palate will form but one arch instead of two.* When he can retain the organs in this position at will, let him commence his practice to acquire the new articulation, *by very slowly raising the point of the tongue* during the prolonged utterance of the open vowels *ab* and *aw*, till it comes upon the palate obstructively, and so forms the letter *d*. If the under jaw be kept down, it will be almost impossible to

* See the mouth.

do this without sounding an *r* during the progress of the tongue to the palate. Then endeavour to stop the tongue at various intermediate elevations, continuing the voice at each, and keeping the lips and teeth perfectly motionless. When some power of action in the tongue has been thus acquired, strike it upwards quickly and repeatedly during the flow of voice; and, probably, a very tolerable *r* will be at once produced.

Let "SCOTO" also practise such combinations as *bre, dre, &c.*, with all the vowels, and such sentences as "*Rob Low's burn reeks,*" &c.—J. L.

21. *Ventriloquism*.—"A Subscriber" will find his question answered at considerable length in the *British Controversialist*, p. 155, vol. iii.

32. If our correspondent at Tipton will take any table of logarithms of six or seven decimal places, and look among the logarithms for .504970, according to the directions given, he will find that the number whose logarithm is 2.504970 is 319.8674 very nearly. The process cannot be explained further than his tables will explain it, except by investigating and expanding the logarithmic series, which our limits do not permit.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

The Aberystwith Welsh Literary Society.—This society held its first public meeting on Friday evening, March 14th, 1856, for the purpose of awarding prizes of books to the two best readers of Welsh poetry. The judges, at a previous meeting, had selected the four following members to compete at the public meeting; viz., Messrs. D. Hughes, J. Mathews, J. Morgans (1st), and J. Morgans (2nd). The poem selected was "*Cywydd ar Orllifiad y Mor tros Gantref y Gwaelod*" ("Poem on the Overflowing of the Sea over the Lowland Hundred"). After a careful and accurate deliberation, the following were declared winners; viz., Mr. D. Hughes and Master J. Morgans (2nd). (The latter is only twelve years old!) The chairman (Mr. Mathews) then, after a complimentary speech, presented the former with "*A History of Wales and the Welsh*," by Carnuhanawc, price 16s., and the latter with Stewart's "*Philosophy of the Mind*," price 8s., in the society's name. The audience were enlivened, at various intervals, by the singing of solos, duets, trios, &c., by amateurs; and two prac-

tical lectures were delivered, by Mr. R. Jones, on "*Man's Real Advancement*;" and Mr. J. Thomas, on "*The Cultivation of Mind*." The meeting, which was numerous, separated, highly pleased with the whole proceedings. In conclusion, I may add, that this society is working its way steadily onward. During the winter months, essays have been read on "*Light*;" "*The Advantages of Literary Societies*;" "*The Causes of Britain's Greatness*;" "*History*;" "*John Howard*," &c., &c. Debates have been held on "*The War with Russia*;" "*Which is the most hurtful to Society, the Miser or Spendthrift?*" "*The Maine Law*;" "*The Crystal Palace Question*," &c. Several of the essays in the *British Controversialist* have been translated into Welsh, in order to gratify the minority, who do not understand them in the original. The society also encourages the original effusions of poetic genius, as well as elocution. It is gratifying to be able to state that the advantages which it confers are appreciated, not only by the young, but by the old, who assist the younger members. The fact that

it numbers 100 members is most cheering. Its example has been followed by the young men of Penllwyn (a village four miles off), which promises to become a flourishing society.—JOHN W.

Chapel Street Chapel Mutual Improvement Class, Salford.—The first annual soirée was held on Wednesday evening, March 5th, at seven o'clock, when upwards of seventy persons were present. After tea, the Rev. S. Clarkson, president of the society, took the chair; and, after a few introductory remarks from the chairman, the secretary read the report for the past year, which stated that the society was in a flourishing condition, numbering thirty-three members, though the average attendance has only been fifteen; but there has been no lack of energy manifested by the members in the discussions of the various subjects which have been brought before them, many of which have been taken from the *British Controversialist*; as, for instance, "Is Reason confined to Man?" "Maynooth Grant;" "Maine Law;" "Is the Present War with Russia Justifiable?" "Ought Government to Provide a Secular Education for the People?" and a host of others too numerous to mention. After the report had been read, Mr. Chadwick was called upon to read an essay, "Would the Opening on the Lord's Day of the British Museum, National Gallery, and Similar Institutions throughout the Country, prove a Moral Advantage to the People?" which occupied twenty minutes, in which he very minutely endeavoured to prove that it would not improve the morals of the people. After which a discussion took place amongst the members, and was taken up with spirit, following *pro* and *con*. The following gentlemen took part in the discussion:—Messrs. Charlton, Leach, Crossland, McLean, Powell, Openshaw, and Wood. The essayist was allowed ten minutes to reply, and the chairman ten minutes for remarks, according to the rules of the society, and the meeting terminated

at a quarter past ten, the evening having been very profitably and agreeably spent.

The Law Students' Mutual Corresponding Society (the London Section).

—This society is established "to provide a universal system of intercommunication amongst the law students of this kingdom," and is divided into ten sections, whose operations *extend over no less than twenty-seven counties!* In order that one of the main objects of the society—"the extension of feelings of friendship and unanimity amongst law students"—should be more *directly* promoted, it was resolved by some of the members of the society, resident in the metropolis, to form a London section, to meet periodically at such place, and for the discussion of such subjects of legal, jurisprudential, and general interest, as should be appointed. That resolution was carried into effect, and the London section meets fortnightly at Anderton's Hotel, Fleet Street. Debates on the following subjects have already taken place:—"Is the Public Character of Queen Elizabeth worthy of Admiration?" which was opened by Mr. Thomas W. Rogers, in the affirmative; and "Ought the Law of Primogeniture to be Altered?" opened by Mr. J. W. Rouse, in the negative. The question for our next consideration is, "Was the System of Colonization practised amongst the Ancient Romans more efficient than our own?" and is to be opened by Mr. E. Rivington. Our progress hitherto has been gratifying. We hope shortly to be able to report that the London section has been permanently established, and that the accession of members thereto has fully justified our anticipations. The *British Controversialist* has a fair circulation amongst us. It shall surely increase.—THOMAS W. ROGERS, *Hon. Sec. of the London Section.*

Seacombe Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The first soirée of this society was held on the 21st

March last, at which all the members were present. The president, Mr. R. Entwisle, was in the chair. After tea, he gave a lecture on "Mutual Improvement Societies," and said that societies of this kind were of no small importance, as they took for their chief consideration the most dignified and happy of human occupations—the improvement of the mind; and that it was no less pleasing than instructive to prefer the refined and elevating pleasures of knowledge, than indulging in low, sensual gratification. After which he showed how our feelings of wonder and admiration were called forth by the study of the sciences. The meeting was afterwards enlivened by recitations, from Cowper and Shakespeare, by the members. After singing the National Anthem, the meeting separated about ten o'clock.—THOMAS PEERS, *Hon. Secretary*.

Milngavie Mechanics' Institution.—The members and friends of the above institution celebrated the termination of a very successful lecture session by a social meeting in the village hall, on the 12th March. H. Carmichael, president of the institution, occupied the chair, and delivered an able address. Addresses were also delivered by the Rev. D. S. Maxwell, of the Quoad Sacra Church, "The Importance of General Knowledge;" and by the Rev. G. McQueen, M.A., of the U. P. Church, "The School, in its relation to the Pulpit." For the entertainment of the meeting, the directors had engaged Mr. J. Muir and Miss Smith, the well known vocalists, from Glasgow; and Mr. H. Ross, Junior, a member of the institution, favoured the company with two recitations. Refreshments were served during the evening. In conclusion, the chairman briefly congratulated the members on the course of lectures just terminated, and the present prosperous condition of the institution in this the twentieth year of its existence, and forcibly pressed its claims upon the audience.

The meeting was characterized by its lively interest and good feeling.

The Woodbridge Young Men's Association for Mutual Improvement, in connection with the Quay Chapel, held their first public meeting in the school-room adjoining the chapel, on Friday, March 21st, 1856. After tea, of which about 130 friends partook, the Rev. A. Duffy, the president of the society, delivered a lecture, entitled, "Recollections of a Recent Visit to Paris." At the close of the lecture, the secretary, Mr. D. J. Munro, presented a report, which set forth that the society had recently attained to a very flourishing condition. Several new members have lately been added, and some donations had been received, so that the society was enabled to purchase and circulate several periodicals, among which are "Excelsior" and the *British Controversialist*. In addition to numerous recitations, lectures had been given, during the past quarter, on "Architecture;" "China and the Chinese;" "History of Woodbridge;" "Natural History;" "America and the Americans;" and "Popular Superstitions." Lectures are to be delivered, in the course of the next quarter, on "War and Peace;" "Physiology;" "The Human Eye;" "The Ruins of Babylon;" "Biography of Eminent Artists;" "Plants mentioned in the Bible;" and "The Steam Engine." The meeting was addressed by Messrs. Kerridge, Fisk, Munro, senior, and Bruckets; and poetical recitations were given by Messrs. Wilson, Elvia, Booth, and Taylor. The pleasure of the assembled company was also contributed to by frequent brilliant performances on the harmonium, by Misses Clapp and London. The attendance and proceedings on this interesting occasion were such as to stimulate the young men of the association to determine to persevere in the path of mental improvement, progress in which has hitherto been so delightful.

Petersfield Young Men's Improve-

ment Society.—A *conversazione* was held on Friday evening, December 28th, 1855, at the National Schoolrooms, at which upwards of 200 persons were present. The chair was taken by the Rev. J. Williams, vice-president of the society. After a congratulatory and encouraging speech from the rev. gentleman, recitations and addresses were given by members. A public discussion also took place on the question, "Was Elizabeth justified in signing the warrant for the execution of Mary Queen of Scots?" which was taken part in by Messrs. Meeres, Blackman, Henson, and Macfarland. The entertainment was varied with vocal music, very efficiently conducted by Messrs. J. Jones and E. Sears. The company broke up at half-past ten o'clock, apparently pleased with the evening's entertainment.—G. H., *Secretary*.

London—St. James's Literary and Scientific Society, 15, Clifford Street, Bond Street.—A *soirée musicale*, by the members of the vocal class, conducted by their professor, Mr. R. E. Lyon, and assisted by Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Gilbert and Miss Susanna Cole, R.A.M., took place at the Hanover Square Rooms, on Wednesday evening, March 12th. The entertainment consisted of solos, duets, glees, madrigals, part songs, and choruses. We are happy to state that the musical talent displayed by the class was sufficient to call forth the loudest applause from the crowded audience that thronged the rooms. We are also happy to learn that although the members of the society were admitted free, yet the amount realized for tickets sold to their friends was sufficient to cover every expense. On Tuesday, March 25th, the members of the elocution class gave their second public entertainment in the rooms, 41, Brewer Street, Golden Square, the chair being filled by Edward Swaine, Esq. The programme, which was selected with the greatest care, included extracts from the speeches of Cicero and Curran;

the dramatic literature of Shakespeare, Addison, and Sheridan Knowles; the poetry of Sir Walter Scott, and enlivened by selections from the comic writings of Dickens, Hood, Ingoldsby, and Douglas Jerrold. The gentlemen who more particularly distinguished themselves in the course of the entertainment, and who well deserved the loud applause they received from the audience for the very high elocutionary talent which they displayed, were, Mr. E. Godart, for the recital of "Cato's Soliloquy on the Immortality of the Soul;" Mr. S. Key Watson, for the delivery of an extract from "A Speech, by Curran, in Defence of Hamilton Rowan;" and Mr. E. Ashmead, for the humorous rendering of Dickens's parish sketch, "The Election for Beadle." About 400 persons were present.

St. James's Junior Mutual Improvement Society, Hull.—The third quarter of this society began on the 1st of April, 1856. The members have had, during the past half-year, several instructive and interesting papers read to them by various members; the majority of which have caused animated discussions at the close. The following are the principal:—"On Mutual Improvement Societies;" "Solar System;" "Earthquakes;" "War;" "Desecration of the Sabbath;" "Learning;" "Oliver Cromwell;" "Capital Punishment;" "Is Episcopacy Scriptural?" &c. A library is in course of formation. The number of members already amounts to between forty and fifty, and the average weekly attendance is about thirty. The meetings of the society are held every Friday evening, commencing at a quarter past eight.

Glasgow Polytechnic Society.—Persons desirous of forming such a society, for mutual improvement, are requested to communicate, stating their own opinion relative to the fee to be charged (which should be as low as possible), &c., with Hugh Cunningham, Glasgow Post Office.

LITERARY NOTICES.

A monument to William Roscoe, the historian, has been erected in the Unitarian chapel, Renshaw Street, Liverpool, where Roscoe was interred. The monument consists of a bust of the historian, placed in a niche of grey marble. The inscription is, "William Roscoe, Historian, Poet, Patriot, and Christian Philanthropist, born in Liverpool, March, 1753; died, June, 1831. This Monument was erected by his Fellow-worshippers, 1852."

At a sale of the engravings, drawings, &c., of Messrs. Hering and Remington, which took place this week, by Messrs. Southgate and Barrett, a copy in water-colours, by Louis Haghe, of David Roberts's grand picture of the "Destruction of Jerusalem," was sold for £210, and the stock and lithographic stones of the same work realized £700, while the other lots in the same sale brought good prices.

Heinrich Heine, the poet, has left all his MSS. to his nephew, Herr Embde, a resident of Hamburg, with the intention of having them revised, and, when put in order, incorporated in the entire edition of his works, which is now preparing for the press.

The proposal of erecting a monument to the memory of Alexander Wilson, poet and ornithologist, in his native town, Paisley, is likely shortly to be realized.—Prof. Hopfgarten, of Biebrich, has repaired to Paris, in order to execute, in Carrara marble, a monument of the late Prince Ypsilanti.

Mr. Layard, in re-assuming the office of Lord Rector of Aberdeen, has offered two prizes to competition. The first is offered for a paper, "On the Influence of Liberty and Commerce on Literature and the Arts, as illustrated by the Greek and Italian Republics," and is to be a copy of Mr. Layard's own works.

The second is offered for a paper on the question, "Whether are Despotic or Free Governments more likely to pursue an aggressive policy towards other States? the discussion of the question to be illustrated by references both to ancient and modern history," and is to be a complete set of Mr. Hallam's works.

Abd-el-Kader has been made a member of the Paris Zoological Society of Acclimation. The Emir having been informed during his sojourn at Broussa that the society was desirous of acclimatising Angora goats, sent a flock of these animals as a present.

The celebrated Bowyer Bible, in forty-five folio volumes, and containing 6,000 engravings, was sold by auction at Bolton, and bought by Robert Heywood, Esq., for £550.

The Marquis Wielopolski, who has inherited the immense fortune of the late Count Swidzinski, is about, in compliance with the testator's wishes, to establish a library and museum at Warsaw, and he has purchased the large Zaluski Palace for the purpose.

The two statues of "Tragedy" and "Comedy," by Flaxman, and the two bas-reliefs by the same artist, on the Bow-street front of Covent-garden Theatre, have happily escaped uninjured from the fire.

A Brussels paper reports that a portion of a printing-press, bearing the initials of J. Guttenburg, and the year 1441, in Roman numerals, has been discovered in digging a well near Mayence.

The Duke of Cambridge has consented to preside at the 67th anniversary dinner of the Royal Literary Fund, which is fixed to take place at Freemason's Hall, on the 7th of May.

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL—IDEALISM— XENOPHANES.

METHODIZATION is the all-paramount demand of the scientific intellect. The mere groupings or sequences of facts or feelings do not suffice for the thoughtful inquirer. He desires to find a pathway from phenomena, sense-known or consciously perceived, to the Eternal True, the Unity in which they all find their ultimate synthesis. Philosophy desires to subordinate all thought to the laws of the reason, and believes that the causative "logic of facts" is as effective and real as the illative "logic of ideas." The development of a new method originates a *school*.

The method of the Eleatic School is highly logical—its tendency is idealistic. The vague, semi-conscious notions of God and Duty which every human soul feels palpitating into life, first find articulate utterance in religion and law (see "European Philosophy," *B. C.*, vol. v., p. 81). These two notions, when they become consciously present to the soul, produce, as we have seen, two parallel lines of thought—a philosophy of nature (Ionicism), and a philosophy of morals (Italicism). These two systems having uttered themselves, became the subjects of criticism. This criticism took upon itself, not the *interpretation*, but the *anticipation* of the progress of thought. Yet this is only what is natural; for the human mind is impatient, and will not condescend "to labour and to wait," but will push on to the ultimate conclusion, despite of all obstacles whatever. The great facts of *being* wholly overcame the facts of *thought*, and he sought, not so much the elucidation of that which lay before him, as that which worked within him. How he succeeded, we shall see in the sequel.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH.—Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic School, was born at Kolophon, in Ionia, one of the seven cities which claimed, after his death, the honour of having been the birthplace of Homer. Of the position in life held by his father, Orthomenes, we know nothing; but that it must have been one of eminence, we may infer from the fact, that otherwise he could not have given his son the splendid education which we must suppose he had, to enable him to become the laureate of his native city. Neither have we any means of judging of the

influences amid which he was reared, except such inferences as we may make from the fragmentary snatches of verse which form our only sources of internal evidence regarding his life and philosophical tenets.

The chief external authorities, from which the few known facts of his life are to be gathered, are as follows, viz.:—The Life contained in Diogenes Laertius, a quotation from Apollodorus in Clement of Alexandria, a fragment in Sextus Empiricus, a casual mention of his name by Lucian, Timæus, and Censorinus, an anecdote in Plutarch, and a few notices scattered up and down in the numerous treatises of Aristotle. We purposely except the work of Aristotle (or Theophrastus?), entitled, “Xenophanes, Zeno, and Gorgias.”

Apollodorus assigns the 40th Olympiad, 616—612 B.C., as the date of his birth; he adds besides, that he lived till the days of Cyrus (559 B.C.) and Darius (521 B.C.) Diogenes Laertius, on the authority of Sotion, makes him the cotemporary of Anaximander (610—547 B.C.), and adds, that he flourished about the 60th Olympiad (540 B.C.) Eusebius gives the date at which he flourished as Olympiad 56 (552 B.C.) Lucian tells us that he was living at the age of ninety-two;—we have verses of his own which represent him as having reached, at the time in which they were composed, the ninety-second year of his age,—while Censorinus makes him live somewhat more than a century. He is said to have attacked the speculations of Thales (639—547 B.C.), Epimenides (fl. 604), and Pythagoras (539 B.C.), so that he must have reached maturity subsequently to the publication of the latest of these doctrines. In one of the fragments of his poems preserved by Athenæus, he mentions the arrival of a Mede. This may either mean Harpagus, the Medish general of Cyrus, who invaded Asia Minor and Ionia about 546 B.C., or the Xerxian invasion of continental Greece in 497 B.C. The weight of probability attaches to the former, for he, being an Ionian, would naturally be more impressed with what befell his own immediate circle, than that which passed at a distance, and was comparatively unimportant to himself. Heraclitus (fl. 505 B.C.) and Epicharmus (b. 540 B.C.) mention him, and Diogenes Laertius recounts a saying of his, which occurred in a conversation with Empedocles (fl. 444 B.C.). Plutarch and Timæus combine in representing him as flourishing in the days of Hiero, tyrant of Sicily, who began his reign in 478. The city from which his school receives its name was founded during the 56th Olympiad, 522—526 B.C.; and Zancle, one of the towns in which he found a refuge, was not settled in by the Messenians before 596 B.C. Hermippus, too, directly affirms that Empedocles was a disciple of the earliest Eleate.

The problem that is set before us, then, is to find a century in which all these circumstances *might* have happened, or to make

as near an approach to that as possible, and account, as well as we can, for any discrepancies. It will be observed, that the time-space which lies between the most distant dates is about 170 years. If we suppose that Hiero had reached mature years,—say fifty-eight or so—it will be quite within the range of probability that Hiero, *afterwards* tyrant of Sicily, who died in 467 B.C., may have conversed with the aged minstrel sage. We must stretch hypothesis even further in the next instance; for we must either reject as fabulous the relation which connects the names of Xenophanes and Empedocles,—a relation which the loving tradition of ages has hallowed,—or we must suppose that the useful life of Empedocles was prolonged almost as long as that of his master. And why not? These were the days in which—

“ Men lived like gods, with minds secure from care,
 Away from toil and misery; then was not
 Timid old age, but age in hands and feet;
 Equally strong the banquet they enjoyed,
 From every ill remote. They died as if
 O’ercome with sleep, and all good things were theirs.
 * * * In quietness
 Their works, ’mongst numerous blessings, they pursued.” *

Yet we do no violence to probability in this, for we know that the calm philosophic temper is favourable to longevity; that in ancient times men had an aversion to permitting young men to acquire influence in the state or otherwise; and we know that at the date given, this Empedocles was engaged in the planting of the colony of Thurii, on the site of the ancient Sybaris. Let us suppose, then, that Empedocles, a young man of station and means, in his early youth, on his travels, had, led by the fame of the hoary-headed wise man of Elea, visited that city, and held that conversation with the “old man eloquent,” from which he for ever after dates the origin of impulses, which ended in his devoting himself to pursuits of a nature higher than even statesmanship. If we regard the visit as paid in the ninety-eighth year of Xenophanes, when the young man had attained his twenty-fifth birthday, we shall make Empedocles about ninety-three years of age at the founding of the Post-Sybaritic colony in 444 B.C. We do not say these things *have* been; we only assert that they *might* have been; if they *could*, we have done all that is requisite in us, viz., to show the possibility of colligating, in a given space, the seemingly contradictory events which had led to such serious differences of opinion among the historians of philosophy,—Meiners, Tüllebon, Eberhard, &c.,—and had even bewildered the acute mind of Victor Cousin.

* Hesiod’s “Works and Days,” v. 112.

We may assume, then, that he was born somewhere between the years 617—612; that he was of respectable parentage, well educated, and comfortable as to means. His taste for philosophic poetry seems to have manifested itself early, and his love of virtue and truth seem to have made him perfectly fearless, if not rash. We have fragments of his Elegiac verses preserved, which abundantly prove this. Athenæus quotes a considerable number of lines, apparently the introduction to a Symposium elegy, in which a festal hall is beautifully described, and the guests are exhorted, after having sung due hymns to the gods, to recite no more the fabulous myths of the Titans, giants, and centaurs, but to chant the praises of the brave and good for the encouragement of youth. In this age Kolophon, which had at one time been distinguished for its almost stoic contempt of luxury and grandeur, had its thousands clothed in purple, their public games, and other haunts of pleasure and pomp, where the rich forget their humanity in pride, and the illusions of the hour are more valued than the high thoughts and noble deeds in which the truest nobility consists. Against these social vices, as they appeared to his eye, Xenophanes protested, in the melodious tones of the poet, and with the clear, logical thought of a sage. We assume, but the assumption has only its plausibility to recommend it, that the poem "On the Founding of Kolophon," mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, belongs to the date of his early manhood, and that the honest, hearty mode in which he had therein attacked the higher classes of society, and the zeal with which he denounced the worship of the ordinary gods, formed the excuse, if not the cause, of his exile: for Diogenes Laertius expressly states that he was banished. He had been married, but his children died in their early youth, and the loving, yet brave-hearted father buried them with his own hands. His home-gods shivered around him, and the outlawry of his birth-place registered against him, before manhood's vigour had departed, he has become a wanderer, almost resourceless, friendless, alone. In this extremity the amusement, probably, of his sunnier hours—poesy—offered him the help his need demanded, and he became a rhapsodist, *i. e.*, a chanter of epic verse. Shall we say this was a woful lot, or shall we rather, acquiescing in the destiny which was allotted him, aver that—

" Each has his functions, his acknowledged post,
In the great scene of life? "

True, the wandering minstrel, even though a Homer, finds but scant provision for his body's grosser wants; but surely there are joys which cannot be expressed, in the impartial providence of Heaven, granted to those who, while the listening throng around them press, and gaze, and think, can feel—

" The glow of thousands centered in their heart."

Could it be altogether chance and changing fate that made him choose the vehicle of verse as that by which he would transmit his thoughts in sounding cadence down the stream of time? Verse is the mnemonics of the vulgar. Homer and Hesiod had filled the mind with errors of profoundest moment. To the forms of their own glowing imaginations they had imparted the life of genius, and the people had accepted the coinage of the poets' thoughts as the spiritual realities of worship. The prosaic utterance of any thesis opposed to such notions would be ineffective as a pointless arrow. These Titan fancies could only be subdued by thunderbolts, moulded in the armoury of the God whose throne they aspired to occupy.

Whither could he turn in such a crisis of his fate, with such a purpose breathing in his soul? Certainly to the newest and freest-minded people he could reach. The Messenians, from 682—596 B.C., had braved the tyranny of Sparta, and, failing to secure in Greece the freedom they loved, had sought an asylum where their diminished numbers might enjoy the birthrights of men "without let or hindrance." This they found in Zancle (Messina), in Sicily, and thitherward the poet-philosopher of Kolophon bent his steps. Of his life at Zancle we know nothing; but if we interpret the following verses, found in Diogenes Laertius, we shall obtain some clue to the time of his entering Zancle. The verses are these:—

"Since first my doctrine spread abroad thro' Greece,
Threescore and seven years are quite gone by,
And 'twixt that time and when I saw the light,
Six lustres more must surely added be,
If I am right at all about my age,
Which wants but eight years of a century."

If we take the time at which he became famous, his thirtieth year, to signify the date of the publication of the poem on Kolophon, and allow due time for his accusation, trial, and sentence, we may say that he entered Zancle about B.C. 580. From Zancle he went to Catania, where Hiero, the patron of Pindar, had afterwards his palace. As he wrote a poem "On the Colonization of Elea, in Italy," which took place in consequence of the reduction of Ionia by Persia, 540—530 B.C., we may assert that he, as an Ionian, and likely to take an interest in the fact, must have had a share in, and had a personal knowledge of the causes of, the emigration. Besides, there would be no surer way of gaining the renown, which is the continual object of thirst in noble minds, so ready or so likely to be agreeable to such a spirit of his, as uttering in tuneful lines the deeds of daring which the resistance to Persia excited, and the sacrifice of the patriot's love of country to the man's love of freedom,

which was exhibited in their relinquishment of their lands, rather than their liberties, to the oppressor. About this same period, as we have already seen, Pythagoras had established the Krotoniate, and hence his doctrines must have been well known in the neighbouring cities of Magna Græcia. If we accept the traditions of history, rendered more forceful by the considerations of probability noted above, we shall find him now surrounded by a three-fold philosophy, represented by the names of Homer, Anaximander, and Pythagoras. To all these his intense idealism presented objections; in all he found a tendency to elevate Sense above Reason—Reason in its higher moods companioning with Faith.

Of the manner of his death, as of the manner of his life, we know nothing; but we can think of him under the influence of—

“ Old age, that winter drear, which into spring
Breaks never,”

gazing in sadness on the unsolved problem of his whole life, fretting his noble soul that he cannot fly, in thought, beyond the narrow bondage of the earth's confine, and uttering, as he passes away into that sleep of death wherein all mysteries are solved, the mournful record of his long years of toil, so finely conceived by Timon, the Sillograph:—

“ Oh, that mine were the deep mind, prudent, and looking to both sides!
Long, alas! have I strayed on the road of error, beguiled,
And am now hoary of years, yet exposed to doubt and distraction
Of all kinds; for, whenever I turn to consider,
I am adrift between the *One* and the *All*.”

Death, the *Revealer*, is with him; and he follows him—*Whither?* The solution to that query is concealed behind—

— “ That curtain of obdurate woof
Which limits mortal vision; whose dim folds
Perpetually do stir, but never rise.”

Can the curtain be *to us* the picture? Surely, no!

THE DOING TO OTHERS AS OTHERS SHOULD DO TO US.—How are we to behave to our *fellow creatures*? How must we answer it? What rules shall we lay down? Shall we say we ought to spare the effusion of *human blood*? How small a matter it is not to hurt him whom we are bound by *every obligation* to do all the good in our power. A prodigious merit, indeed, if man is kind and gentle to his fellow man! We are all limbs of *one great body*. Nature produced us with *mutual love*, and made us social. According to her laws, it is a more wretched thing to do an injury than to suffer death.—*Seneca*.

Religion.

DOES GEOLOGY CONFIRM THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

TRUTH is one and indivisible, but its apparent inconsistencies have been many. Ever since science began to make any real progress, by exchanging the figments of the fancy for the inductions of a true philosophy, its results have appeared to be antagonistic to the teachings of the Bible. Galileo, and the cardinals of the Inquisition, have been ever-recurring types of the relative positions of science and religion. But true science, though compelled by the stigma of heterodoxy and heresy to retract its assertions, has ever maintained its stand, and continued to advance, until it has compelled all candid minds to an entire, though reluctant, belief. Amid the odium cast upon it by theologians, its watchword has been, "It moves still." Not only astronomy and geology have been supposed to enter the ranks of the opponents of biblical veracity, but ethnology, comparative grammar, and even the revelations of mesmerism and animal magnetism, have been brought forward as tending to invalidate the claims of scripture on our regard as a veritable and divine revelation. But the antagonism in all cases has arisen, either from the imperfect or empirical state of science, or from a too narrow interpretation of the sacred records. Thus, while from the manifold diversities in the various races of mankind it seemed that there must have been more than one original pair of human beings to produce so many varieties, the researches of ethnologists have fully confirmed the biblical statement; and geology, by showing the complete extinction of species after species of animals, and the successive creations of new ones, has completely crushed the theory of development of the "Vestiges of Creation," and shown that there is no principle on which man can be considered as a developed ape.

To those, indeed, who believe in the inspiration of the scriptures, however they may vary in their modes of reconciliation, there ought to be no question as to the ultimate accordance of science and revelation. Are they not both the manifestations of the same almighty and omniscient Mind? Can his works be inconsistent, or clash with each other? While at present it may be for his glory to conceal much from the mortal gaze, yet even now, in true and established science and just exegesis, we

can find nothing really tending to invalidate the teachings of either.

Geology has now attained the rank of a well-founded and firmly-established science; its results are as certain as those of astronomy or any other science. Though cosmological theories innumerable have been broached by geologists, it is not at all founded on theory. Facts after facts have been accumulated, and its conclusions drawn therefrom by an irrefragable inductive process. If we cannot trust to the teachings of geology, our own faculties are not reliable, and we cannot be certain that we know what we read in a book, or even that the book actually exists. It has been objected that it is in a state of change. It has not, indeed, attained perfection. It is still progressing, but every new advance only tends to confirm what has been previously established, and to show the harmony which exists between its general principles and the teachings of the Bible.

But we will now proceed to consider in what manner this science may be shown to be confirmatory of revelation with regard to the creation.

It must be noted, in the first place, that the narrative in Genesis is necessarily a divine communication. No mortal was present when the Almighty called the world from nought, and gave the stars their courses. However the account may have been handed down by tradition, it must, in the first instance, have been revealed by the only witness. It cannot be a mere statement of the cosmogony generally adopted in Moses' time, without any reference to its veracity, for it was given to enforce great religious and moral obligations; and if we can cast doubt on this portion of the record, the whole of it must be invalidated.

But what does the account teach us? That God formed the universe out of nothing; that the earth was for a period of indefinite extent in a chaotic state, and unfit for vegetable or animal existence; and that its conversion to its present inhabitable condition took place in six successive periods, which were followed by a period of rest. In the first of these periods, light was evolved and separated from darkness; in the second and third, the waters were divided into seas, and the dry land was clothed with vegetation; in the fourth were appointed the sun, and moon, and the stars, to give light to the earth, and to order the seasons; in the succeeding periods followed the creation of reptiles, fishes, and birds, of mammals, and lastly of man. Does geology present any antagonism to these teachings? On the contrary, none of the above statements are invalidated, but most of them are specifically taught by it. That all things had a beginning, and that this was from God, is not, indeed, expressly indicated by geology, but would be most naturally inferred from the limited succession of the strata; but that several distinct periods elapsed before the appearance of vegetable or animal

life; that the creation took place in successive stages of progression; that each race of beings was distinct from the others, and resulted from a separate act of creation; and that man, being last in order, is of comparatively recent origin;—these truths are as plainly denoted by the geological strata as they are by the biblical narrative.

If we could be satisfied with general accordance, this would be sufficient. But the account in Genesis speaks of the creation as having been accomplished in six *days*, while geology assigns to each period an indefinite extent, but comprising at least several thousand years. Here, then, we find an apparent antagonism. It may not be asserted that the conclusions of geologists are not well established, and that the various stratifications and fossils have been caused by the deluge. Such an assertion could only now be produced from total ignorance of the facts of geology. Nor can it be maintained that God created the strata with their fossils in six natural days. It is true all things are possible to that Almighty Hand which made the universe; but can we believe that the beautiful and regular order of the strata, apparently telling of gradual formation and development, and inclosing species after species of inorganic and organic remains, succeeding each other in almost infinite multitude and variety, progressing from the smallest sea-weed to the most gigantic of trees, and from the minutest animalcule to the extinct races of the mastodons, the megatheriums, and the saurians,—can we believe that these wonderful displays of creative energy and wisdom were, so to speak, a mere freak of omnipotence, and calculated, if not designed, to lead man by a lie to adore his Maker? Would, we ask, such a procedure be in accordance with the usual mode of God's dealings? Does he manifest his power and wisdom by sudden and wanton displays? Do we not find in all the processes of nature a gradual and progressive development—"first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear"? Does not God also testify his goodness and lovingkindness to his creatures by maintaining the laws of nature, and by not overstepping their bounds, except for such wise and benevolent purposes as even man is able to appreciate and admire? We might as well suppose that the buried palaces of Nineveh, with their carvings and inscriptions, tell only a fictitious tale of former inhabitants, of mighty kings and conquerors, who lived and died here, and that all these appearances formed part of the original creation, as that the palæozoic and secondary strata of the earth's surface present no record of former races of existences, who thousands of years before the creation of man lived their life on this earth, and finally found within it an adamantine tomb.

Since, then, the conclusions of geology admit of no doubt, and cannot be explained away, we must look for a new method of

reconciliation in a different interpretation of the Mosaic narrative; and in this, we believe, no difficulty will be experienced. Our limits will not permit us to enter into the various methods of reconciliation which have been proposed; we shall merely present that which appears most satisfactory to ourselves, and which has been adopted by all the most able recent investigators of the subject.

In the narrative of the creation in Genesis the word "day" appears to have six meanings. In the fifth verse, light in general is called day, and, in the same verse, evening and morning make the first day. In the fourteenth verse, the interval between the rising and setting of the sun is denominated a day; and, in the same verse, the term is used in connection with "years," evidently meaning a period of twenty-four hours. The term "day" is also applied to the period of rest succeeding the work of creation, but neither evening nor morning is mentioned in connection with it; and, finally, in the fourth verse of the second chapter, "day" means the whole period of creation. Here, then, we have six different uses of the word "day." How can it for a moment be maintained that the periods of creation were each of only twenty-four hours' duration? In the first three periods the sun and moon were not appointed (or, as some say, *created*) to mark the duration of the days, nor, after their appointment, is any change made in the phraseology to indicate any abbreviation of the periods. There also seems to be an indication of the distinction of the periods of creation from ordinary days in the use of the phrase, "evening and morning," without any immediate reference to day or night in this connection. We believe, then, that without any violence, the days of the sacred narrative may be interpreted to mean periods of indefinite but prolonged duration—the earlier may have been longer than the closing periods, but each of them comprising at least many thousand years. On this principle we found our scheme of reconciliation and confirmation.

With regard to the state of the earth previous to and during the first day, we can learn little from geology. We are led to suppose that it was a huge mass of matter in a state of intense heat, and surrounded by a dense and extensive atmosphere. From chemical science, however, we learn that light is the result of chemical and molecular change. "The command, 'Let light be,' was, therefore, the summons to activity in matter. The Spirit of God moved or brooded over the vast deep—an abyss of universal night—and light, as the initial phenomenon of matter in action, flashed instantly through space at the fiat of Deity. This science, in its latest developments, declares, as distinctly as the Bible, that 'on the first day light was.' "*"

* "Bibliotheca Sacra," January, 1856, p. 114.

In the second and third days the waters were divided and the dry land appeared. The earlier azoic strata bear evident marks of the action of water, being formed by crystallization in the primitive oceans. They also appear previous to any fossil remains of vegetable or animal production. On the third day, also, vegetation was introduced. We know that vegetation was necessary before animal life, in order to purify the air from noxious gases, as well as to afford the means of subsistence. There are, indeed, no remains in the strata of vegetable life previous to those of animals, but we find azoic rocks which are manifestly of organic origin; and if this be not considered sufficient evidence of its previous creation, we may consider the character of the period as being derived from the superior development of vegetable life, but not to the entire exclusion of animal existence. "In the first, or Palæozoic division, we find corals, crustaceans, molluscs, fishes; and in the later formations a few reptiles. But none of these classes of organisms give its leading character to the Palæozoic; they do not constitute its prominent feature, or render it more remarkable as a scene of life than any of the divisions which followed. That which chiefly distinguished the Palæozoic from the secondary and tertiary periods was its gorgeous flora. It was emphatically the period of plants—'of herbs yielding seed after their kind.' In no other age did the world ever witness such a flora; the youth of the earth was peculiarly a green and umbrageous youth—a youth of dusk and tangled forests, of huge pines and stately araucarians, of the reed-like calamite, the tall tree-fern, the sculptured sigillaria, and the hirsute lepidodendron."*

Of the creation or appointment of the sun, moon, and stars on the fourth day, we cannot, of course, expect to find any confirmation in the rocks; but we know well from other sources that light is necessary for organic life, and that it would naturally precede the creation of animals and man.

On the fifth day were produced the lower tribes of animals: and here we have a beautiful confirmation of the biblical account in the successive and not simultaneous creation of the tribes disclosed in the secondary division of the strata. These strata indicate a period which was marked by the predominance of fishes, reptiles, and birds; species after species were exterminated, but each was succeeded by another. There were also plants in this age, but they were less magnificent in their dimensions than in the former, and did not give a character to the period.

On the sixth day were created mammals and man. A few of the smaller species of mammalia have been found in the earlier ages of geology, but it was in the tertiary epoch that the higher tribes of the vertebrata became distinctive of the period. But in

* Hugh Miller's Lecture, "The Two Records—Mosaic and Geological."

none of the strata have any fossil human remains been found, thus affording the final confirmation of geology, that man was created last, as the highest and best of those good works which had thus "in continuance been fashioned" by the direct power and wisdom of the Almighty. Science tells us of no new species or tribes having been created since man, and of no new changes of moment in the condition of the earth's surface. This, in analogy with the other days of Genesis, would lead us to regard the seventh as a period of indefinite extent, and as still in progress. And what more fitted to occupy the divine mind during the period of rest than the plan of redemption? Does not this view give the most complete sanction to the command, "Six days shalt thou labour, but the seventh shall be hallowed"?

We believe, then, that geology affords the fullest confirmation of the Mosaic record, and that in the further progress of the science much will yet be disclosed that will furnish further corroboration, and will yield an inexhaustible source of wonder and admiration at the power and wisdom of Him who, while he called the universe from nought by a single fiat, yet provides with a bounteous hand for the necessities of the meanest of his creatures.

S. R. A.

HAPPINESS.—Happiness consists in the multiplicity of agreeable consciousness. A peasant has not a capacity for having *equal* happiness with a philosopher: they may be equally *satisfied*, but not equally *happy*. A small drinking glass and a large one may be equally full, but the larger one holds more than the smaller.—*Dr. S. Johnson*.

POPULAR COMMOTION is always to be dreaded, because bad men always arise to mislead its efforts. How desirable it is that it may be prevented, by conciliatory measures, by timely concession of rights, by redress of grievances, by reformation of abuses, by convincing mankind that government have no other object than faithfully to promote the comfort and security of individuals, without sacrificing the solid happiness of living men to *national glory* or *royal magnificence*.—*Knox*.

EDUCATION.—In the education of children, there is nothing like alluring the appetites and affection; otherwise you make so many asses laden with books, and by virtue of the lash, give them their pockets full of learning to keep; whereas, to do well, you should not only lodge it with them, but make them espouse it.—*Montaigne*.

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE.—I could have wished to have been born in a country where the sovereign and the people have only one interest—where all the movements of the political machine tend to the common good; which can only happen where the sovereign and the people are one.—*Rousseau*.

History.

IS THE CHARACTER OF QUEEN ELIZABETH WORTHY OF ADMIRATION?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

AGAIN we enter the lists, once more to mingle in the tourney fight for virgin truth—the peerless paragon of our choice. Again would we break a lance with those who extol the virtues, exalt the claims, and contend for the honour of Queen Gloriana. Fairly matched have the combatants been; say, O ye spectators! to whom belongs the victory.

One of our opponents' choicest weapons is an argument drawn from the indisputable fact, that in fame, influence, wealth, and power, the England of 1600 was immensely superior to the England of 1558. As the cause of this, they refer us to the sovereign. History points out other, likelier, more potent causes. It was a step in that progress which must result from the English character, rendered the greater by a mighty incubus removed from, and a mighty stimulus applied to, thought, motive, action. There was the disenthralment from Popery, the revival of learning, the discovery of America. The influence of the two former, which began to manifest itself in the reign of Henry VIII., was stayed from operation while Mary was Queen. Authoritative Popery closed up the avenues of thought. But with outward conformity to Roman Catholicism, there was intense repugnance at heart. On Elizabeth's accession, the impediments were removed, and with the *veritas* the *vita* came. The spirit of the Reformation, and the genius of knowledge, smiled upon the land; and Protestantism, moreover, removed the shackles from men's minds, taught them their own worth, and afforded nobler impulses; while the transitional spirit itself was a bold and onward one, and one that pervaded more than religion.

And the very age itself had its influence. It was the fifth of the great ages of literature (the ages of Pericles, of Demosthenes, of Augustus, of Leo X., of Shakespeare). May we not attribute some amount of influence to the works of—

“The world-wide Shakespeare, the imperial Spenser,”

and hosts of others? Have the plays of the former no elevating efficacy? Does it seem possible that Spenser's poems should fail to incite to deeds of physical daring and moral bravery?

And it is not difficult to account for that adventurous spirit,

the results of the indulgence of which won the foundation of our maritime renown and the elevation of England to the foremost rank of power. The discovery of America—the marvellous tales adrift concerning fabulous Golcondas and El Dorados—roused the greed of many; accounts of wondrous scenes excited the curiosity of adventurers; and recitals of stupendous difficulties awoke chivalrous spirits to daring deeds. And afterwards was there, besides these, the hatred of Popery, the character of which they now understood, and their revengeful, almost diabolical, hate of the Spaniards.

The action of these influences the Queen rather hindered than otherwise. For she was never a genuine Protestant, as we shall see hereafter; was by no means a munificent patron of literature—in this being far surpassed by the lords of her court; nor did she greatly encourage maritime expeditions, merely “allowing” adventurers to voyage, generally leaving them to bear all expenses and loss, but, should they be successful, demanding of them the lion’s share.

To this tripartite step in progress (in religion, in thought, in maritime operations), and not to the Queen, who partly hindered it, do we attribute the rapid amelioration of the condition of England in the reign of Elizabeth. B. S., however, will of course term these “mistaken views and false arguments.” But a writer who takes a joke concerning female fickleness for a sober statement of conviction, may be expected to confound true arguments with false.

Now let us join in closer combat with our opponents, after two preliminary observations. Some of them seem to think, that because we admit Elizabeth possessed excellence, we have therefore taken up the wrong side of the debate. Was there ever a falser idea? Besides, in this matter we are about equally balanced. For our opponents admit “faults,” “heavy and manifest,” &c. And so it must be—there are good and evil traits in all.

None have denied the justice of the remark, that Elizabeth should be tried by a biblic standard. Yet, were she so judged, how manifestly, even from our opponents’ articles, would she be unworthy of admiration!

We will now notice—1. Elizabeth’s conduct in religious matters. That she conformed to Romanism during her sister’s reign is asserted by all trustworthy historians. Macaulay speaks of her as being an Adiaphorist, having no scruple about conforming to the Romish Church, when conformity was necessary to her own safety, retaining to the last moment of her life a fondness for much of the doctrine and much of the ceremonial of that church. On her accession, she re-established Protestantism. V. V. is compelled to admire her because she did so, “when she viewed so many considerations tempting her to adopt

the opposite policy." Where did V. V. study history? We commend to his notice the words of Mackintosh:—"Elizabeth continued to consolidate her throne on the basis of the Protestant religion, which her *enemies*, as well as her friends, taught her to contemplate as the only secure foundation of her title and government." Policy urged the measure, and she herself, as Macaulay says truly, "was a Protestant rather from policy than from conviction." And throughout life (to quote Mackintosh, vol. iii., in opposition to B. S.'s statement) she "scrupled about the abolition of the honours shown to the statues and pictures of holy men; she harboured prejudices favourable to the superior sanctity of a single life; she was indulgent to the affectionate practice of praying for the souls of the departed."

According to the principle already laid down, that "Elizabeth is scarcely to be blamed on account of her bigotry and intolerance, since all of that age seem to have had these failings," she would be acquitted, if it could be proved that she persecuted from religious motives. There is, however, the greatest reason to conclude that she did so on purely political grounds. B. S. comes to the conclusion that the early part of Elizabeth's reign was marked by comparative toleration, and calls rather for praise than censure, and this in the face of the law made immediately after her accession, "prohibiting the celebration of the rites of the Romish Church, on pain of forfeiture for the first offence, of a year's imprisonment for the second, and of perpetual imprisonment for the third;" which was followed by the act of 1562, rightly called by Macaulay "*a retrospective penal statute against a large class*." But of course B. S. will accuse such a man as Macaulay of "mistaken views," much preferring the contemporary (and almost necessarily prejudiced) testimony of Bacon, a man who scrupled very little to tamper with truth.

2. Her conduct with respect to foreign relations. And first the case of Mary. Our opponents all seem to have overlooked the fact that Sadler had been appointed and the insurgents aided by Elizabeth before Mary quartered the arms of England. She, then, was the aggressor in a struggle wherein not one phase of her conduct was unblamable. Her admirers can only excuse her conduct by pleading expediency—truly, no "God-taught" or Christian rule. "Threlkeld's" accusations of Elizabeth, in connection with foreign powers, are as yet unanswered. V. V., however, eulogizes Elizabeth on account of the courage and determination she displayed in her dealings with foreign potentates, as when, to use his own expression, Pius "fulminated his bull." Who can wonder at it, seconded by a nation enthusiastic, daring, proud, and desirous of glory?

3. In relation to her people. The admirers of Elizabeth reply to statements respecting her tyranny by urging the character of the age. But was the Bible more difficult to understand then,

or the divine law of politics less clear? So you excuse her on account of the influences of the age. You declare that Charles I., who was less despotic, was executed in defiance of all justice; and James II. dethroned without equitable cause. All the results of the Queen's despotic conduct were obviated by her wondrous *finesse*. The commons knew they could dethrone her when they liked, but they allowed her to cajole them into passiveness. Since the time of Eve, man has constantly been fooled by woman. T. W. R. thinks her parsimonious habits were adopted to pay off the national debts. Did none of the money go to the queen's gorgeous appointments and fabulously grand wardrobe? One of V. V.'s sentences we are unable to understand—"When the credit of the government, which had been completely lost," &c., "and which had been forced to Antwerp." The credit of the government forced to resort to Antwerp! A very agreeable *compagnon de voyage* now-a-days, since, being so small, it would take up little room!

4. Her conduct as a woman. We complain that all our opponents have unfairly limited the question. "The character of Elizabeth does not merely mean her character in her capacity of sovereign." Agrippina's administration was wise, but was her character admirable? Our opponents (with great policy, but how much of straightforwardness?) narrow the question, and talk of "descending," when one treats of the queen as a woman. They have not denied her immodesty, her vanity, her meanness, her duplicity, her cold-blooded cruelty. Truly she was—

Nec rigidâ mollior esculo,
Nec Mauris animo mitior anguibus."

It is true, that "Without spot and blameless" is an inscription unmeet for the stone which covers human dust, but there are many of whom it may be said, "She hath done what she could." We cannot, if we would, say this of Elizabeth. We are compelled to loathe her character, and deny its claim to the admiration of posterity.

Turn we from the selfish, the vain, and the mean, to gaze with true admiration upon the heroine of to-day, strong in faith, rich heart-gifts, whom dying hundreds have prayed for, and whose name living thousands bless—the sacrificer of comfort, and ease, and affluence, for a career of toil, discomfort, and danger—the woman who has immolated self upon the altar of love, and given to the world an impersonation of charity—the honour of her nation, her age, her sex—Florence Nightingale!

IMPOSTURE.—It generally happens that when danger attends the discovery and profession of the truth, the prudent are silent, the multitude believe, and impostors triumph.—*Mosheim*.

Politics.

WOULD PARLIAMENT BE JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING THE OPENING OF THE CRYSTAL PALACE ON SUNDAY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

“To improve the physical condition of man as a sensitive being, and to enlarge his knowledge as an intellectual, while we overlook his eternal interests, is to neglect one of the most important duties of christian philanthropy.”—*Dr. Dick's "Philosophy of Religion."*

“What will it profit a man, if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?”—*Jesus Christ.*

THE righteousness of this disputed question is so ably and so fully vindicated by “Threlkeld,” in the March number of this serial, that from whatever point of view our opponents may be pleased to regard it, answers to all their objections may be found, either in the article itself, or in the principles upon which his arguments are founded. “Threlkeld” has “well done”; and whoever, upon a careful and dispassionate reading of his article, is not convinced of the obligation devolving upon mankind to observe the sabbath as a divine injunction, must have a very obtuse understanding indeed. Believing, as we do, “Threlkeld's” arguments, as far as they go, to be unanswerable, we propose to adopt the same mode of argumentation, taking up the subject where he has left off, and supplying what he has left unnoticed.

The word *sabbath*, as most are aware, signifies rest, or cessation from labour; and besides being instituted to preserve the memory of the creation, is, in many passages of the sacred writings, employed to represent or typify something else; thus, in Ezek. xx. 12, 20, we learn that the sabbaths were signs between God and his people; also St. Paul, in Heb. iv., undoubtedly considered it to typify the “rest which remains for the people of God.” If, then, the sabbath was designed to be something more than the commemoration of an event—if it is also a type of heaven, where, after the conflicts and storms of this terrene existence, the good man is to enjoy eternal repose—then it is obvious its moral obligation must continue so long as this dispensation lasts; and hence, if, by any legislative enactment which shall tend to derogate from its sanctity, or any teaching which shall have for its object the rendering nugatory this divine precept, this heavenly boon should become void of interest to mankind, lose its moral power to bind the sympathies

and affections of the soul to the Great Father, or vitiate the heart-springs of humanity, a most foul and devilish act will have been perpetrated. Nothing, in fact, could better subserve the base purposes and wicked designs of the wily and inveterate foe to God and man than the annulling of this sacred day. And we venture to affirm, that the attempt to procure the sanction of the legislature to the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays originated with and is an emanation from this most dark and vile spirit.

But to the question of parliamentary interference. We entirely repudiate the right of Parliament to legislate upon any matter affecting the conscience; but more especially when, by such interference, they "make the word of God of none effect." Now, supposing that in the British Houses of Parliament there should be found a majority of members with sufficient temerity to vote for this measure, and, consequently, that it passed into a law, would they not be furnished with another argument in favour of further encroachments on God's prerogative whenever it suited them? What right has the British Parliament to sit in judgment upon God's commands? What right to alter laws made by the Eternal for all men throughout all time? What right to subordinate everlasting things to mercenary purposes? What right to deprive the British nation of a heaven-bestowed privilege? We have before hinted, that the British legislature already possess a precedent for any future aggressive act which it may deem expedient to make upon God's prerogatives. And we ask, Does not the sanctioning of Sunday railway traffic and travelling bear testimony to the fact? Senators overstep their proper bounds when they presumptuously interfere with the rights of conscience. Let them attend to those reforms which imperatively demand their attention, and which the social system so sensibly need. Let the cry of the widow and orphan stimulate them to active and present ameliorating measures. Let the condition of the miners and factory slaves be an object of their attention and solicitude. Let them devise means and enforce laws for lessening the burdens of the poor, and for securing to them proper seasons of relaxation from toil after the fatigues of the working day. This is their proper business—this their bounden duty—this is their limit.

We are not insensible to the wants of suffering and prostrate humanity, and would rejoice in any plan being adopted calculated to mitigate its sufferings and to allay the bitterness of toil; but we are also firmly convinced of the ineffectiveness of any scheme or project devised for this purpose which, in its developments, shall be in antagonism to God's laws. Nay, farther, we venture to prognosticate the utter abortiveness of any mere human contrivance to effect the renovation of society. Neither the opening of the Crystal Palace, British Museum,

National Gallery, pleasure grounds, &c., on Sundays, could meet the felt wants of humanity; this would not reach its heart—its aspirings. “When some one was enlarging to Coleridge on the tendency for good of some scheme which was expected to regenerate the world, the poet flung up into the air the down of a thistle which grew by the road-side, and went on to say, ‘The tendency of that thistle is towards China, but I know, with assured certainty, it will never get there; nay, it is more than probable that, after sundry eddyings and gyrations up and down, backwards and forwards, it will be found somewhere near the place in which it grew.’”^{*} This sentiment of the poet is but the echo of that plaintive sigh which, nearly six thousand years ago, first issued forth from Adam’s inner being, conscious of his helplessness and loss of moral power. The wants of the soul are radical, and infinitely beyond the possibility of man’s ingenuity or power to reach. Again, these wants are experienced by all alike, irrespective of condition, rank, or education. They are *soul-wants*; they are the *uphevings* of prostrate but not crushed humanity—the “*strong crying and tears*” of *conscious feebleness*; in a word, they are the voice of the *captive* supplicating deliverance.

But by what process in the art of calculation, or upon what principle of ratiocination, is it to be inferred that the opening of the Sydenham Palace on Sunday shall meet the above requirements? We have sought in vain among the resolutions of the Sunday League, in the profound erudition and weighty (P) arguments of editors of the daily and weekly press, in the lucubrations of essayists, and in the sentiments of a host of “small fry,” for one sensible and rational inference, founded upon the principles of eternal rectitude and man’s relations to his Maker, to justify this contemplated act of aggression upon the Christian religion. If this were a matter for jesting, certainly the promoters and abettors of this wild scheme have given ample occasion for provoking our ridicule. As it is, however, they have our pity and earnest prayers for their conversion. But who are the men that, under the assumed garb of philanthropists, seek to get a license for our operatives, &c., to violate the law of the sabbath? Who are the “Sunday League”? What are their antecedents? What their present moral character? Have they been among the foremost ranks in the great battles of right *versus* oppression? Does their past history or present conduct entitle them to be ranked in the list with the reformers and philanthropists of this and bygone ages? But admitting, for argument sake, the sincerity and disinterestedness of their motives, are they necessarily right? There are numbers of sincere persons to be found in all classes of society, and among the

* McCosh.

many religious sects which obtain in the world, but whose conduct, in certain particulars, is nevertheless very prejudicial to the best interests of man. We argue, therefore, that not only is it required of a man to be sincere in his endeavours to promote the best interests of society, but he must also have the fullest certitude as to the reality and adaptedness of his purpose to meet the exigency. Further, the means employed to effect this desideratum must harmonize with those divine laws imperishably engraven upon our constitution.

Throw open public places of amusement for the working population on Sundays, and then write "Ichabod" upon this nation's escutcheon—upon the doors of our places of worship—upon the cottager's door! Then, indeed, will the glory be departed from England; then, indeed, will her standard be lowered; then, indeed, will scoffers laugh and jeer; then, indeed, will religion be at a fearful discount.

In further support of our position, we beg to adduce another argument equal in importance to any of the foregoing; namely, the relation which, as parents, we bear to our children, and their relation to us; and it is of paramount importance that parents should realize their obligations and responsibilities in order to the proper cultivation of their children's minds. There are, we know, many drawbacks to a working man's efforts to give or provide suitable education for his children; there are also stumblingblocks in his pathway; the whole, however, by painstaking and perseverance, may be overcome. His case is not so desperate as to be beyond the possibility of cure; he has still some fraternizing souls with him, ready to give a helping hand. But he must also grasp this hand; he must help himself, and be conscious of his own helping power. Next to his own salvation stands that of his children. He cannot, in the nature of things, delegate his parental authority to another, nor discharge his duties by proxy. If he neglect the moral culture of his children, he is culpable. To provide for their subsistence, &c., is his duty, but this is not all; infinitely beyond and above this is that higher, nobler knowledge of God which it is his bounden duty to teach them. With thousands of our working population, the sabbath is the only day in which the whole of the family are brought together; their circumstances necessitate their separation the whole of the week besides; but on this day they are permitted to congregate. This assembling of the whole family on this day is peculiarly the parent's opportunity; and he should embrace it. Let the sabbath day be revered, the house of God frequented, and we venture to predict, that in those homes and around those parents shall grow up an offspring that shall bless and revere their memories, and be a praise in the earth. But throw open places of amusement for sabbath employments, and you introduce to the notice of those families a

subtle enemy, who would gloat over their downfall, and endeavour to effect their dismemberment—an insidious poison, artfully insinuated, that would vitiate the fountain of their blood—a snare, cunningly contrived, and set to entrap them! Are the works of art, or (with deference we say it) even those grander exhibitions of infinite power, wisdom, and intelligence which abound in, upon, and above the earth, calculated to awaken the soul, soften the heart, or mould the will? No; they may produce admiration, wonder, awe, and even reverence; but will they inspire love? The works of art are good, very good in their place, but they must not be permitted to supersede religion. Are works of art calculated to make men and women good fathers and mothers, or children dutiful and affectionate? Would not the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sunday nip many a promising young plant in the bud, blast many reputations, destroy the peace of many families, “bring down the grey hairs of many parents with sorrow to the grave”?

We have not space left to criticise “Taliesin’s” article; we have read it through very carefully, and we sum up the whole by advising him to employ his talents in a better cause than the one he has espoused. We recommend him to re-consider what he has affirmed of the decalogue, and to study so as to realize the obligations of the two great precepts he has quoted, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,” &c., “and thy neighbour as thyself.” We fancy we detect symptoms of anti-nomianism in our friend’s countenance. Are we right?

Southampton.

J. E. P.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

THE preservation and improvement of morality among the people ought to be the chief consideration with every one who proposes to alter their social condition. If any change should be submitted to the people, which would in any way tend to the subversion of their moral or social rights, they would be bound in duty to resist it. No avowal of sincerity, no declaration of good intentions, no profession of disinterestedness on the part of those seeking such a change, ought to be permitted to sway our judgment, or prevent us from making full inquiry into the merits of their proposal.

The present question touches upon the physical, moral, and social position of the people. In all these respects it must be viewed, in order to be thoroughly understood. In these respects, therefore, we will proceed to examine it.

The state of the working classes in England, and especially in this metropolis, is not such as to afford any great degree of satisfaction, either to themselves or to those who are nearly connected with them. In too many instances we find them shut up in miserable dens and hovels, from Monday till Saturday,

and on Sunday, having nowhere else to go, they betake themselves to the bacchanalian enjoyments of the public-house. This we say, is to be deplored. But it is in many cases the result, not of extreme poverty, but of their inability to find access to purer and healthier scenes of enjoyment on the Sunday. It is true that the churches and chapels are open to them. But, tied down as they are all the week to painful and harassing toil, they feel no desire to attend these. Besides, many on principle decline to go there. Many of no principle find nothing there to interest them. Many of those who *do* go there would feel annoyed at the presence of a ragged suit. The working people in the lowest districts know this, and cannot be expected to mingle with those with whom they have no sympathy.

But is it attendance upon church or chapel that would best meet the wants of such parties? It is very doubtful. We are told mankind require a day of rest once in seven. True. But that which is rest to one man, or class of men, is but continuance of toil to another class. The hard-working mechanic may find that which he requires in a state of inactivity; but certainly to those who follow sedentary and other occupations, where physical exercise is not much required, the best "rest" is *recreation*. To prescribe the same medicine for all diseases, is but an evidence of quackery; to prescribe the same kind of rest for all classes, is but an evidence of ignorance, or disregard of the wants of many. A ramble in the fields, where could be obtained the pure, invigorating air of heaven, and the blissful, gladdening sunshine; a walk through the Crystal Palace, and the grounds pertaining to it, would be to many the best antidote to the toils of the week. And thus, even in a physical point of view, the condition of a large class of workers would be improved. Let not those who take the negative side of this question slight this fact. It is all-important to those whom it concerns. Hampton Court, Kew Gardens, Kensington Gardens, and other such like places, which are open on Sunday, testify that the people feel it to be their interest, as well as their duty, to recruit their energies by such means.

We maintain that the physical condition of the working classes would be improved by the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays. We maintain, also, that by the same means would their morals be elevated. As a low, filthy, and debased condition is the natural source of corruption, vice, and crime, so a pure, healthy, and active physical constitution is the natural soil for the germination of moral principles. Once bring the mind to appreciate the beautiful, the pure, and the good, and it will naturally turn towards the cultivation of taste, and the pursuit of virtue. To accomplish this, the Crystal Palace is eminently adapted—more so, perhaps, than any other institution in the kingdom. In it are the works of the greatest minds—the repre-

sentations of the noblest men. There is nature in its simplicity, and art in its fullness ; a congregation of useful suggestions to the mind, and of elevating influences to the heart. These are the objects we would set before the aimless thousands who now lounge lazily about the streets, or perchance partake in the revelries of the gin-palace. These are the attractions we would place in competition with the dark and foetid cells, the murky gloom and shadows of their daily life. These are the instruments by which we would raise the aspirations of those who live but to labour, and who labour but to live.

Let not the bigoted zealot sneer at the efforts of the artist to improve mankind. It is not by mere words that you will teach morality. Deeds, and pictures of deeds, teach a much more impressive lesson than many volumes. The sight of a good man inspires us with holier resolves than will the reading of a good book. The lecture and the sermon are of little avail, if the lecturer and the preacher be not objects for our imitation. So, when we view the portraits of the noble, the patriotic, and the good, to use the words of "J. L. Wishwell," "their lives, works, and all our recollections of them, flow before us." To those who possess any knowledge of the lives of great men of genius and of worth, the liveliest pleasure is experienced upon recognizing their statues or portraits ; and those, who may be ignorant of such particulars, will be eager and inquiring to obtain the information, that they, likewise, may be impressed with the same sentiments.

But how will the opening on Sundays of the Crystal Palace affect the *social* condition of the working classes ? That is the great question. Your correspondent, "J. L. Wishwell," has not thought proper to treat that part of the subject. We shall endeavour to supply the defect. If we cannot meet this view of the case, we had better give up all thoughts of the physical and moral advantages attending it, and seek to find them in something else.

It is absolutely necessary that some amount of labour be performed on Sundays. Many things there are that must be done, otherwise an incalculable loss of property and capital would be the result. The Sunday must always be compromised, to some extent, by labour. It is necessary to employ on Sunday, as on every other day, large bands of police. It is necessary to work our sailors on that day, when wind or tide is favourable. Many other portions of the working classes, from the very nature of their occupations, must toil on Sunday. It is true, many at present work on that day, who might, if they pleased, refrain from working. But there are also many who have no such choice. So, then, the strict observance of it, recommended by "Threlkeld," is totally impracticable. It is altogether unsuited

to a commercial nation, but might have answered well enough with the agricultural people with whom it originated.

Fears are entertained by some, that if the Crystal Palace were opened on Sundays, the condition of the working classes would be very much lowered, and that they would ultimately have to work seven days for the wages of six. If we thought such would be the result, we certainly should reverse our advocacy. The working classes are, alas! low enough already. It is their elevation, not their degradation, which we desire. And we feel convinced that their elevation socially would be enhanced by this means.

We have shown that the working man's physical and moral good would be promoted by this measure. His mental faculties would be sharpened, his observation would be rendered more acute, his whole being improved. Is it likely that he would be willing to part with his one day in seven, to gratify an avaricious capitalist? Does it follow as a consequence of increased intelligence that men become less careful of their rights and liberties? Has a moral man no regard for his social well-being? I maintain that, so far from in the least yielding to the demands of greedy employers (and there too many such), so far from consenting to give up the day in which they experienced the most heartfelt enjoyment, they would become more and more tenacious in their hold of it. As the weekly harbinger of health, recreation, and instruction, they would cherish it dearly, and throw around it a sanctity, which no efforts of tyrannical men could remove or destroy.

It is desirable that working men should see and enjoy the wonders of the Crystal Palace. But when are they to obtain such gratification? The opportunities and means of the working classes are few and meagre. They cannot go on a work-day without sacrificing a day's wages. They cannot go in the evening, for then it is not open; nor would it be desirable to have it open so late as his convenience would require. When he could go, it is closed, and he may not enter. How, then, do many of them contrive to see it at all? They must either sacrifice a day's wage, which they are little able to do, or they must work on Sunday to obtain the means of going on a week-day. That many voluntarily labour on Sundays cannot be denied, though it cannot be affirmed of all who do so that it is for the object we have named. Nevertheless, true it is, by reason of the restraint which is put upon all things that can interest or instruct them, many choose rather to labour than to lounge about in idleness. These may choose the lowest gratifications of their senses, but certain it is, they will never seek more refined pleasures, unless they be placed at their disposal.

As to the increase of labour which would be required from

the Crystal Palace officials, were it opened on Sunday, little need be said. The difficulty lies more in words than in reality. A system might easily be established which would preserve to every one a day of rest once in seven. And thus, by the labour of a very few, hundreds of thousands would find their wants and necessities supplied. In this unhealthy, densely-populated metropolis such considerations ought to weigh but little against the immense advantages which would attend it.

Religiously, we have not deemed it necessary to treat this question. It is a social, not a religious question. Yet even on religious grounds it can be argued that parliament would be justified in sanctioning the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays. "*It is lawful to do good on the sabbath day.*" So said the Great Doer of good. So said He who denounced the observance of Jewish ceremonies. So say we who have come under a different *régime*. The good of the masses is what we seek. They will find it in the Crystal Palace. They will find there such a display of beauty, such an array of truth, such incentives to morality, that their lives will be sweetened by visiting it, and their aspirations raised to a more rational elevation.

Near the close of his article "Threlkeld" observes, that "with the sabbath religion and morality will depart from our desecrated shores." If religion and morality have no more stable foundation than the observance of particular days, religion and morality are very little worth observing. But it is not so. Morality is essential to human nature. It is as deep as man, and as high as nature. No custom, no rule of tradition, can supersede its existence. No political tumult, no social anarchy, can disfigure its beauty. No revolution in religion, in politics, in philosophy, can involve it in ruin. No. There it is, everlasting, pure as ever.

HONESTES.

THE JEWS.—The Jews exhibit one of the most striking instances of national formation, unaltered by the most various changes. They have been scattered for ages over the face of the whole earth; but their peculiar religious opinions and practices have kept the race uncommonly pure; accordingly, their colour and their characteristic features are still the same under every diversity of climate and situation.—*Lawrence's Lectures*.

BRIBERY.—The Spartans were the only people that for a while seemed to disdain the love of money: but the contagion still spreading, even they at last yielded to its allurements, and every man sought private emoluments, without attending to the good of his country. "That which has been is that which shall be."—*Bishop Horne*.

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

SOME may be disposed to attempt a solution of the present question, by inquiring what would be the general effect on society if every one were to become a spendthrift or a miser? This would not be a proper method. It would be necessary for the spendthrift to have a disposition to acquire, which, if the world were composed of spendthrifts, could not be carried into practice. On the other hand, from the disinclination of each to spend, there would be little opportunity of obtaining the requisite wealth to enable one to become a miser. The question must not, then, be looked at in this extreme view, but simply in relation to society as it is, and to the results which flow from the conduct of the spendthrifts and misers whom we observe around us.

The miser is defined by Walker to be "a wretch covetous to extremity;" and the spendthrift, by the same authority, as "a prodigal, a lavisher." The meaning is very obvious, by the many characters in ordinary life to whom the words respectively apply. It is seldom that a spendthrift can be considered simply as one who squanders money on dress, or some other luxury, which he could have applied more profitably. A predominant love for some article, indulged in at the expense of what more immediately calls for expenditure, is to be condemned, but the evils which flow from it are comparative. We have to deal then, chiefly, on the one hand, with the miser, essentially such, and with the spendthrift as a prodigal, inclined to reckless profusion, in order to gratify evil passions and desires. The evils caused by the spendthrift, who is merely actuated by an inclination for dress or jewelry out of proportion to his means, are bad enough; and the very great wretchedness, which the spendthrift *in general* entails, appears to us sufficient to show that his influence is more pernicious than that of the miser.

The peculiar injuries which the spendthrift and the miser each inflict upon society are both negative and positive. The spendthrift injures by squandering, the miser by withholding, but both do positive mischief of a serious kind. Which, then, produces the most injurious effects on society, the spendthrift or the miser? The injuries produced by the latter are chiefly negative, and are less detrimental than those caused by the former, which are in most cases positive and direct. This applies both to the

evils which they inflict on themselves and on others ; and it will be generally acknowledged that this is a legitimate mode of reasoning on the question before us, as society is sooner or later injured by the evils which a man brings on himself, as well as those which he directly entails on society.

The miser in general has the advantage of industry. This keeps him from the long train of evils which result from idleness. His money stands for work,—industry ; something which both satisfies himself and benefits society. He is sober, and keeps from transgressing those laws of morality which, as they are essential to the existence of civilized society, human laws reaffirm, and sanction by penalties. He accommodates himself to circumstances, or to his inclination to hoard, and thus feels little discomfort. His fare may be plain, and his garments coarse, and he may have no happy home, but he is contented with his situation, and looks forward to no change in it. He rarely contracts connections, to whom he would do injury by his parsimonious disposition. He is a solitary creature, causing misery to no family circle by his avarice. Supposing he does form such connections, originally he belonged to an inferior rank in life, took to saving money, and became a miser by too strong an attachment to money in relation to his habit of acquisition ; hence his wife has been drawn from that rank to which he continues ostensibly to belong, and she and her family are unaccustomed to luxury. His disposition may arise from an instinctive dread of worldly ruin : so naturally and gradually does this disposition gain ground that, in view of his positive excellencies, he may long be influenced in some measure by motives not altogether low or evil. True, his money is kept from circulation to a certain extent. Except in a few extreme cases, he does expend money in order to acquire wealth, though parsimony be his distinguishing characteristic. He certainly keeps money from circulation ; he hoards it. What he spends is much within what he receives. This is unjust, and injurious to society. But he leaves his money at his death to his relations, or he bequeaths it to found some charity. Society then gets the benefit. His money has been saved during his lifetime ; it was not squandered on pernicious indulgencies, injuring the community—it is entire, to apply to useful purposes. Say we have twenty misers in this city ; their wealth, at their decease, is set free and is circulated. Twenty misers will do the same for the succeeding generation, and society, in the end, will be no loser. Take now the case of the spendthrift. He rushes into every kind of folly. One vice leads on to another. His fortune is soon irretrievably squandered. He has been accustomed to luxury, and poverty is taken ill with, both from the circumstances in which he formerly was, the habit of wasting he has acquired, and the consciousness of his inability to attain again to affluence. He becomes a burden

on his relations, or on society, and he dies a premature death. He forms a multitude of ties, and brings disgrace on his connections. He deprives them of the assistance he owes. He has some violent or seductive passion. His money affords him the means for its gratification; his indulgence inflames his evil propensities; harpies hang upon him, who feed his passions, help him to squander, and ultimately laugh at his misfortunes. True, he circulates money, but that so rapidly, that he soon has none to spend, and in fact becomes a burden on others. Some people suppose that it is quite enough if money be circulated, without a rigid inquiry how it is circulated. This argument is advanced in favour of an aristocracy of birth; but the manner or the channels of expenditure are no trifling matter in estimating the value of this expenditure to society. It is not in general in luxuries, a legitimate method of spending money in the case of the wealthy, that the spendthrift wastes his gold. What are the whole host of betting or gambling houses, stews, horse races, &c., which are a curse to the community, upheld by but simply by the spendthrift? To him we owe, to a large extent, the encouragement given to theatres, and casinos, and the gin palace, in the case of the spendthrift who has much command of money, but especially as to the labouring man who squanders the greater part of his earnings on drink. The mischief which the spendthrift does may be estimated by the good which would be done if the instrumentality now referred to, to which the spendthrift largely contributes, were abolished. Say not that the spendthrift does no direct injury to others in the very act of spending his gold. His money has a powerful influence over the facile mind of woman, and he frequently leads her astray. In some cases, when he loses his fortune, he becomes a sharper himself, which is even worse than if he sunk, a wreck in consequence of vice. If it be replied, that the instances mentioned are not in fair argument, as they refer to parties who are moved by some desire or passion independent of that of squandering money, we answer that it is obvious enough, that while the miser may come to hoard money for its own sake, the spendthrift has not simply a desire to waste money for the sake of squandering, but to gain some ulterior end; and that we must look on the matter in this light—the only one possible.

It appears, from the considerations now advanced, that the miser is his own worst enemy—that the spendthrift more obviously and more fatally injures both himself and society. In opposition, it may be contended, that the money which the miser leaves may do as much injury, by being improperly spent, as that of the spendthrift; but this is only a contingent evil, which may not happen. At any rate, the miser's successors are responsible agents; they are not led into evil by any direct means used by the miser; and this objection to the miser's case seems much

more than balanced by the wretchedness and crime which the direct acts of the spendthrift cause to himself and society. It is true the miser's meanness awakens contempt; but the selfish expenditure of the spendthrift, so opposite to true generosity, excites indignation; and whether or not these feelings point respectively to greater or less shades of guilt, the question under discussion has reference solely to the injurious effects upon society of the spendthrift or the miser. These views have been presented, though the writer is not very confident on the question, either the one way or the other, in the hope of assisting in the elucidation of the truth. He trusts it will not be understood that, in taking the position he does, he wishes to inculcate that if a man inclines either to reckless extravagance or to become a miser, he approves of his going in the one direction any more than in the other, or in preference to the other. Moral questions cannot be properly treated with such an object. It is hoped, however, that the discussion may tend, by exhibiting the distinctive evils which the spendthrift and the miser each entail, to induce increased vigilance against those seductive temptations to which these characters have yielded—

“Thou tread'st upon enchanted ground,
Perils and snares beset thee round;
Beware of all; guard every part,
But most the traitor in thine heart.”

T. U.

DEATH.—Death is a part of life. It is nothing more than the negation of life. If life, therefore, be no general good, death is no general evil. Who shall decide it? Not women and children, but wise men. Thales, the chief of the sages, held life and death as things indifferent. Socrates, the greatest of all philosophers, speaks of death as a deliverance, and so does Cicero; and Solomon, who had tasted all the sweets of life, condemns the whole as vanity and vexation.—*Fielding*.

GAMING.—It is possible that a wise and good man may be prevailed on to game; but it is impossible that a professed gamester should be a wise and good man.—*Lavater*.

JUDGMENTS.—When misfortunes happen to such as dissent from us in matters of religion, we call them judgments; when to those of our own sect, we call them trials; when to persons neither way distinguished, we are content to impute them to the settled course of things.—*Shenstone*.

POVERTY is, except where there is an actual want of food and raiment, a thing much more imaginary than real. The shame of poverty—the shame of being thought poor—it is a great and fatal weakness, though arising, in this country, from the fashion of the times themselves.—*Cobbett*.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 230.)

3.—THE ADJECTIVE.

Adjectives are inflected to agree with the substantives to which they belong in gender and number; so, *un bon livre*, a good book; *une bonne plume*, a good pen; *de bons livres*, some good books; *de bonnes plumes*, some good pens.

THE GENDER OF ADJECTIVES.

The feminine gender of adjectives is in most cases formed from the masculine by adding *e* mute; as *un joli oiseau*, a pretty bird; *une jolie bague*, a pretty ring (for the finger); *un grand homme*, a great man; *une grande femme*, a great woman.

Adjectives ending in *e* mute are alike in both genders; as *un homme aveugle*, or *un aveugle*, a blind man; *une femme aveugle*, or *une aveugle*, a blind woman.

Those that end in *eur* change *r* into *se*; as *un maître grondeur*, a grumbling master; *une humeur grondeuse*, a grumbling humour.

Exceptions.—*Intérieur*, interior; *extérieur*, exterior; *inférieur*, inferior, and *supérieur*, superior; together with *meilleur*, better; *majeur*, superior; *mineur*, less, add *e* for the feminine; *intérieure*, &c.

Those that end in *x* change *x* into *se*; as *un sentiment noble et courageux*, a noble and courageous feeling; *une âme courageuse*, a brave spirit.

Doux, sweet; *faux*, false; *préfix*, determined, appointed; and *roux*, red, make *douce*, *fausse*, *préfixe*, and *rousse*.

F becomes *v* in the feminine; as *un habit neuf*, a new coat; *une habitude neuve*, a fresh habit. So *veuf*, a widower, and *veuve*, a widow.

Adjectives whose masculine ends in *el*, *eil*, *en*, *et*, and *on*, form their feminine by doubling the final consonant before *e* mute: so, *un air naturel*, a natural manner; *une vie naturelle*, a natural way of living; *un cas pareil*, a similar instance; *une occasion pareille*, a similar opportunity: so, *chrétien*, christian, makes *chrétienne*; *muet*, dumb, *muette*; *bon*, good, *bonne*. *Complet*, complete; *replet*, replete; *concret*, concrete; *discret*, discreet; *secret*, secret; *inquiet*, restless; and adjectives in *er*, as *fier*, haughty, form their feminine by adding *e* mute, and take a grave accent on the penultimate syllable, as *complète*, *fière*.

The following adjectives, *bas*, low; *épais*, thick; *exprès*, plain; *gras*, fat; *gros*, big; *las*, tired; and the substantive *profès*, a monk; together with *bellot*, pretty; *sot*, foolish; *vieillot*, stale; *gentil*, pretty; *nil*, no, none; and the substantive *paysan*, a peasant, double the final consonant before the *e* mute; as *un jour gras*, a day on which meat may be eaten; *dormir la grasse matinée*, to sleep late in the morning.

Beau, fine; *nouveau*, new; *fou*, mad; *meu*, soft; *vieux*, old, become *bel*, *nouvel*, *fol*, *mol*, *vieil*, when followed by a word beginning with a silent *h* or with a vowel: so, un *beau* temps, fine weather; le *bel* âge n'est qu'une fleur, youth is but a flower. These five adjectives form their feminine from this less common termination, *belle*, *nouvelle*, *folle*, *molle*, *vieille*. In the same manner, *jumeau*, a twin, makes the feminine *jumelle*.

The following cannot be classed:—

Masc.	Fem.	English.	Masc.	Fem.	English.
blanc	blanche	white	Grec	Grecque	Greek
franc	franche	sincere	long	longue	long
sec	sèche	dry	oblong	oblongue	oblong
frais	fraîche	cool, fresh	bénin	benigne	benign
public	publique	public	malin	maligne	malign
caduc	caduque	frail	coi	coite	quiet
Turc	Turque	Turkish	favori	favorite	favourite

THE PLURAL OF ADJECTIVES.

The plural of adjectives is formed from their singular, according to the rules already given for substantives.

Adjectives in *al* form their plural in *aux* (according to the rule) if they are frequently used in the masculine plural; as, *brutal*, *grammatical*, *immoral*, *original*, &c. But when in the plural they are used in the feminine gender more commonly than in the masculine, the masculine plural is formed by adding *s* to the singular: such are *austral*, *boréal*, *doctoral*, *ducal*, *crucial*, *paroissial*, *parochial*, &c. With such a rule it is easy to imagine that great uncertainty must prevail in reference to many of these words.

Tout, every, loses the final *t* in the masculine plural; as *tous* les hommes sont mortels, all men are mortal.

In the plural of adjectives ending in *nt*, the *t* should be preserved: des hommes savants et prudents, some wise and learned men; not savans, prudens.

THE COMPARISON OF ADJECTIVES.

There are usually reckoned three degrees of comparison, the POSITIVE, the COMPARATIVE, and the SUPERLATIVE.

The POSITIVE is the adjective in its simple form; as *un homme prudent*, a discreet man; *les femmes savantes*, learned women.

The COMPARATIVE expresses—1, equality; 2, superiority; 3, inferiority.

1. The comparison of Equality is denoted by placing *aussi* before, or *autant* after, the adjective, and *que* before the substantive, adjective, or pronoun, which stands second in the comparison; as *il est aussi éloquent que savant*, he is as eloquent as learned; *Hannibal était aussi habile que brave, et admiré autant qu'estimé*, Hannibal was as skilful as (he was) brave, and as much admired as esteemed.

When, in a negation of equality, the subject does not immediately precede the adjective, *si* is used instead of *aussi*; as *vous n'êtes pas si grand que lui*, you are not so tall as he; *la vue de l'orfraie n'est pas si nette que celle de l'aigle*, the sight of the osprey is not so clear as that of the eagle; but *l'orfraie n'a pas la vue AUSSI nette que l'aigle*, the osprey has not the sight so clear as the eagle (which is quite as good French, though inferior English).

2. The comparison of Superiority is formed by prefixing the adverb *plus*, and using *que*, where in English we should use *than*; as *il est plus grand que*

vous, he is taller than you; *le bien* est *plus* ancien dans le monde *que* le mal, literally, good is more ancient in the world than evil.

There are three irregular forms which are the only true comparatives in French, viz., *meilleur*, better; *moindre*, less; *pire*, worse.

3. The comparison of Inferiority is formed in a similar manner, only using the adverb *moins*, less, instead of *plus*; as *Alexandre était moins coupable que son frère*, Alexander was less culpable than his brother.

The SUPERLATIVE degree, strictly speaking, does not exist in French. But to express the highest degree of any quality, the comparative form is used with the definite article. So, "*the wisest man*" is in French "*the more wise man*," *l'homme le plus sage*. Thus, too, *le plus grand* homme de son temps, the greatest man of his time.

In French the meaning of an adjective often depends on its position before or after the substantive to which it belongs. The place of the adjective is after the substantive; but when it has any other than a simple literal meaning it is placed before it. This general rule is subject to some few exceptions, of which the following are the principal; the examples will serve as an exercise to be translated by the student.

La plupart des jeunes gens. Les plus grosses fèves du meilleur café. Les moindres défauts des plus grands écrivains. Les belles plumes des petits oiseaux. Les beaux palais des vieux rois.

The numeral adjectives require no special notice, as they are not subject to any inflexions.

Before we proceed to the other inflexions, it may be worth while to give a few hints on the close connexion of many words in English with those in French. This connexion arises from their being derived from a common source; the Latin, for the most part, furnishes both. To those of our readers who understand Latin well these hints will be of great value.

Verbs in French are mostly derived from the present infinitive,—in English from the supine; thus, *prohiber* comes from *prohibere*; *prohibit* from *prohibitum*; *accélérer* from *accelerare*; *accelerate* from *acceleratum*.

Verbs which are derived from the Latin through the French are derived from the French present infinitive: so, *abuse* from *abuser*, *excuse* from *excuser*, &c.

Similar observations apply to adjectives and substantives. They suggest the following rules for finding the words which correspond in the two languages.

1. Most English verbs ending in *ise*, *use*, *ute*, become French by adding *r*; as *baptise*, *baptiser*; *refuse*, *refuser*; *refute*, *réfuter*.

2. Most English verbs ending in *ate*, *fy*, or *ish*, become French by changing *ate* into *er*; *fy* into *fier*; *ish* into *ir*; as *calculate*, *calculer*; *ratify*, *ratifier*; *punish*, *punir*.

3. Adjectives and substantives ending in *ary*, *ory*, *cy*, *ty*, *our*, *ous*, *or*, and *ive*, change these terminations respectively into *aire*, *oire*, *ce*, *té*, *eur*, *eux*, *eur*, and *if*: as *primary*, *primaire*; *glory*, *gloire*; *clemency*, *clémence*; *verity*, *vérité*; *favour*, *faveur*; *fibrous*, *fibreux*; *professor*, *professeur*; *adjective*, *adjectif*. To these may be added many substantives that change *y* into *ie*; as *allegory*, *allégorie*; *autopsy*, *autopsie*; *melancholy*, *melancolie*. The former is more frequently the case with nouns derived from the Latin; the latter with those derived from the Greek.

4. Most substantives in *ce*, *de*, *ge*, *ne*, *ion*, and *ure*; and most adjectives in *ble*, *al*, *an*, and *nt*, are the same in both languages: as *vice*, *prélude*, *age*, *famine*, *collation*, *opinion*, *stature*; *noble*, *animal*, *capital*, *artisan*, *prudent*, *resulant*.

Finally, in the great majority of cases, French words may be translated by those English words that resemble them; as *mésure*, measure; *folie*, folly; *peuple*, people. These rules include thousands of words.

4.—THE PRONOUNS.

Pronouns are of three kinds:—

1. Personal Pronouns, which immediately and simply supply the place of a noun; as *je, moi*, I; *tu, toi*, thou; *il, lui*, he, &c.

2. Relative Pronouns, which always refer to some subject previously mentioned; such as *qui*, who; *que*, whom or which; *lequel*, which.

3. Adjective Pronouns, which have the qualifications of both pronouns and adjectives; as *mon*, my; *son*, his, her; *chaque*, every; *ce, cette*, this, &c.

Personal Pronouns are of three persons:—

<i>Je, moi, me</i> , in the singular	}	1st Person.
<i>Nous</i> , in the plural		
<i>Tu, toi, te</i> , in the singular	}	2nd Person.
<i>Vous</i> , in the plural		
<i>Il, le</i> , masculine	}	Singular. }
<i>Elle, la</i> , feminine		
<i>Lui, se, soi, en, y</i> , of both genders		
<i>Ils, eux</i> , masculine	}	Plural. }
<i>Elles</i> , feminine		
<i>Les, leur, se, en, y</i> , of both genders		

Je, nous, tu, vous, il, ils, elle, elles, are used as nominatives to verbs.

Me, te, s', nous, vous, are used as objective cases between the nominative and the verb.

Le, la, les, are similarly used when the verb takes no preposition after it.

Lui, leur, y, are used for both genders between the nominative and the verb when the verb takes the preposition *à*, to, after it.

En is used when the verb requires *de* after it.

Moi, nous, toi, vous, lui, eux, elle, elles, are used either with or without prepositions apart from verbs. The following are examples:—

Je le dis, I say it.

Je le vois, I see him.

Il la frappe, He strikes her.

Nous vous montrerons le chemin, We will show you (to you) the way.

Nous le lui donnâmes, We gave it to him (or to her).

Il me parle, He speaks to me.

Elles nous prêtaient de l'argent, They (ladies) lent us (to us) some money.

Nous en parlerons, We will talk of it.

Vous y étiez sujets, You were subject to it (or to them).

Vous et moi nous irons à la campagne, You and I will go into the country.

Après de longues infortunes, on méconnaît le bonheur lorsqu'il se présente, et l'on s'en méfie, After long misfortunes, we fail to recognize happiness when it presents itself, and we distrust it. (Literally, One fails to recognize—when it itself presents—one himself of it mistrusts.)

Lui, seul, il l'a fait. He alone has done it.

Donnez-le-moi, Give it to me.

Parle-t-il à nous, ou à eux? Does he speak to us or to them?

RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

The following are the French Relative Pronouns:—

Qui, que, quoi, who, whom, which, what.

Dont, of whom, of which.

Lequel, laquelle } which.

Lesquels, lesquelles }

Duquel, delaquelle }

Desquels, desquelles }

of whom, of which.

Auquel, à laquelle }

Auxquels, auxquelles }

to whom, to which.

Où is used as a relative pronoun with verbs which do not directly govern a case: as,—*les places où nous aspirons*, the positions *to which* we aspire; *la position où vous vous trouvez*, the position *in which* you find yourself.

Qui is used in both numbers for the nominative, and for the objective after a preposition: as, *l'homme qui parle*, the man that speaks; *les leçons qui me plaisent*, the lessons which please me; *à qui parlez-vous?* to whom are you speaking? *de qui venez-vous?* from whom do you come? (But *d'où venez-vous?* whence come you?)

Que is the objective answering to *whom* when governed by a verb: as, *le bruit que j'ai entendu*, the noise which I have heard; *les hommes que j'ai vus*, the men whom I have seen.

In asking a question, *qui* is the objective case: as, *qui avez-vous battu?* whom have you beaten?

Quoi, what, is used in reference to objects without life, which are not mentioned, but only alluded to: as, *voilà sur quoi vous comptez*, that is what you reckon upon.

Dont is used as the possessive case of *qui*: as, *les imbéciles dont l'âme est sans action*, idiots, whose mind is without action; and also before a verb which requires *de*: as, *le roi dont vous lisez*, the king of whom you are reading.

But when the substantive which governs *whose* is itself governed by a preposition, *de qui* must be used instead of *dont*: as, the gentleman in whose house you are staying, *le monsieur dans la maison de qui vous demeurez*.

And in referring to *things*, we must, in such a case, use *duquel, de laquelle*, &c.: as, *la table dont vous avez rompu les pieds*, the table whose legs you have broken; *la table aux pieds de laquelle vous avez mis des roulettes*, the table to whose feet you have put castors.

ADJECTIVE PRONOUNS.

Adjective Pronouns are of three kinds:—1, the Possessive; 2, the Demonstrative; 3, the Indefinite.

1. The Possessive are—

Singular.		Plural.	
<i>mon</i>	<i>ma</i>	<i>mes</i>	my
<i>ton</i>	<i>ta</i>	<i>tes</i>	thy
<i>son</i>	<i>sa</i>	<i>ses</i>	his, her
<i>notre</i>		<i>nos</i>	our
<i>votre</i>		<i>vos</i>	your
<i>leur</i>		<i>leurs</i>	their

These are used *without an article*, and *with a substantive*; as, *mon père*, my father; *son frère*, his or her brother; *sa mère*, his or her mother; *mes amis*, my friends; *votre voisin*, our neighbour; *vos enfans*, your children; *leur patrie*, their country; *leurs jardins*, their gardens.

Son, sa, ses, agree with the noun to which they belong, and not with that to which they refer; so, her brother is *son frère*; his table, *sa table*; his house, *sa maison*; her relations, *ses parents*.

The masculine forms, *mon, ton, son*, are used before feminine nouns beginning with a vowel; as, *son âge*, his or her age; *mon âme*, my soul; *ton idée*, thy idea.

The separable possessive pronouns are—

Singular.		Plural.		
mien	miennne	miens	miennes	mine
tien	tiennne	tiens	tiennes	thine
sien	siennne	siens	siennes	his, hers
nôtre		nôtres		ours
vôtre		vôtres		yours
leur		leurs		theirs

These are used *with an article, and without a substantive*; as, *voici mes livres*, *mais voilà les vôtres*, here are my books, but there are yours; *sa maison et la mienne*, his house and mine; *je parle à vos enfants et aux nôtres*, I am speaking to your children and to ours.

2. The Demonstrative are—

(1) *Ce, cet, cette, ces*, this, that, these, those, placed before a noun; as, *prêtez-moi un de ces livres là*, lend me one of those books.

Ce is used before a masculine noun beginning with a consonant.

Cet is masculine before a vowel.

To distinguish the nearness or distance of an object, *ci*, here, or *là*, there, is affixed to the substantive; as, *ce garçon-ci*, this boy; *cet oiseau là*, that bird; *ces maisons là*, those houses; *ces fruits-ci*, these fruits; *cette dame-là*, that lady.

(2) *Celui, celle, ceux, celles*, this, that, these, those, refer to a substantive previously mentioned; as, *mon fusil et celui de mon frère*, my gun and my brother's (*that* of my brother); *cet enfant-ci et celui-là*, this little boy and that.

(3) *Ceci* and *cela*, this, that; which refer to something not named: as, *Que cela est bon! ah, goutez cela*, How good that is! ah, taste that.

3. The Indefinite are—

On, one, some, people, they.

Le même, the same.

Chaque, chacun, each, every.

Tout, every, all; *aucun*, none.

Autre, autrui, other, another.

Personne, nobody.

Nul, none, no one; *rien*, nothing.

Certain, quelqu'un, quelque, some one, some.

Plusieurs, several; *quel*, which? or what?

Tel, such; *quiconque*, whoever.

Of these, some are strictly pronouns, and cannot be joined to a substantive: such are *ou, chacun, autrui, personne, rien*; the others are used adjectively.

All the adjective pronouns are indeclinable: their terminations are varied only to distinguish the gender and the number.

On is masculine and singular; and after *et, où*, and *si*, and after *que* if the following word begins with *c* or *q*, takes *l'* before it for the sake of euphony; as, *on doit considérer les temps où l'on vit et les lieux où l'on est*, people ought

to consider the times in which they live and the places in which they are; on passe sur l'honnête et l'on songe à l'utile, people pass by what is creditable, and think of what is useful.

Même takes the plural *mêmes* when it means *same* or *self*; as, les *mêmes* vertus, the same virtues; nés pour *eux-mêmes*, born for themselves.

Tout makes *toute* in the feminine, and *tous* and *toutes* in the plural.

Tout is sometimes an adverb, answering to our *quite*; as, *tout* blanc, quite white; *tout* laine, all woollen; and in that case is always *tout*.

Besides these, *chacun* makes *chacune* in the feminine; *aucun*, *aucune*; *nul*, *nulle*. The two latter are used in the plural only when the substantive has no singular; as, on ne lui a rendu *aucuns* devoirs, they have not paid him any respect; il ne gagne *aucuns* gages, he does not get any wages; *nulles* troupes ne sont mieux exercées, no troops are better disciplined.

Autre makes *autres* in the plural, and is joined with *un* as follows: l'un ou l'autre, one or the other, either; l'un et l'autre, one and the other, both; l'un l'autre, one another; ni l'un ni l'autre, neither.

Quel makes *quelle* for the feminine singular, and *quels*, *quelles*, for the plural. *Tel* makes *telle*, *tels*, and *telles*.

To express *not* the French use two words, *ne pas*, or, more emphatically, *ne point*; which are separated by one or more words coming between them, as, je ne l'ai pas dit, I have not said it (or said so); il ne nous échappera pas, he will not escape us; ils ne le sont point, they are not at all so.

After the negative words, *rien*, *aucun*, *personne*, *nul*, &c., above mentioned, the *pas* or *point* is not to be used, but only *ne*: so, elle *ne* fait *rien*, she does nothing; je *ne* vois *aucun*, I see none (or I do not see any); *personne* *ne* m'a vu, nobody has seen me; l'empereur dans ses bienfaits *ne* connaît *nulle* borne, the emperor recognizes no limit in his acts of kindness; ils *ne* savent que faire, *ni l'un ni l'autre*, neither of them knows what to do (they know not what to do, neither of them).

Qui, *quel*, and *quelque*, are sometimes joined with *que* to express the same indefinite idea as *who* and *what*, followed by *soever*. Their use will be better learned from the examples given.

Soi of both genders is generally used as a reflexive pronoun of the third person singular, and rarely in the plural. It is chiefly used in relation to the indefinite pronouns, as *chacun pour soi*, each for himself; *aucun* n'est prophète chez soi, no one is a prophet at home; qui ne songe qu'à soi, he that thinks only of himself (*ne...que*, *only*).

The following phrases have been carefully selected from the best French classics, for the purpose of illustrating the use of the pronouns which have been mentioned and explained. Only a few of the more difficult are translated.

La colère est une folie; quand elle n'obéit pas, elle commande.

Moi et votre père nous avons été longtemps ennemis l'un de l'autre (*avons été*, have been).

Vous êtes un sot en trois lettres, mon fils;

C'est moi qui vous le dis qui suis votre grand'mère.

(*C'est moi*, &c. It is I who am your grandmother who tell you so.)

Quique ce soit qui le dise, il a tort (whoever it is that says so, he is wrong).

Le roi, l'âne, et moi, nous mourrons (*nous mourrons*, we shall die).

Il ne doit rien à personne (*il doit*, he owes).

Vous, votre mère, et votre sœur, vous êtes heureuses.

Mon père et moi nous serons heureux de vous voir (*nous serons*, we shall be; *de vous voir*, OF to see you—to see you).

S'ouvrir à son ami, c'est penser avec soi (*s'ouvrir*, to open oneself; *c'est*, it is; *penser*, to think).

C'est à être doux pour tout autre et rigoureux pour soi (to be gentle for [towards] every other [all others] and strict towards oneself).

L'officier auquel le roi renvoya l'examen de notre affaire avait l'âme aussi corrompue et aussi artificieuse que Sésostris était sincère et généreux (*renvoya*, referred).

Les bergers étaient aussi sauvages que *le pays même* (the country itself).

En quelque endroit que la fortune ennemie les jette (in whatever place persecuting fate casts them) ils portent toujours avec eux *de quoi s'entretenir* (of what to converse—subjects for conversation).

Nous commettons bien des fautes quelque sage que nous soyons (*nous commettons*, we commit; *bien de l'*, *bien du*, *bien de la*, much, a great deal of; *bien des*, many; *nous soyons*, we may be).

The following phrases should be carefully noticed and imitated.

[Il y a *means*, there is, there are.]

Ce que je vais dire, c'est que—(*lit.*, that which I go to say, it is that—), what I am going to say is that—

Quelque cas que fasse Quintilien des qualités de l'esprit, whatever account Quintilian makes of the talents of the mind.

Le grand avantage des écoles, c'est l'emulation.

Les pauvres enfants se trouvent vicieux avant que de savoir ce que c'est que le vice (what vice is).

Ce que l'on conçoit bien *s'énonce* clairement (expresses itself; that is, in English, is expressed).

Qu'est-ce donc? (what is it then?) what is the matter? Qu'avez-vous? (what have you?) what annoys, vexes, hurts you? Ce que j'ai? what is the matter, *do you ask?* Cela ne serait rien. Qu'est ce à dire? (what is that to say?) what does it mean?

Prenez-en tout ce qui vous plaira (take of it or of them all that which will please you) take what you please. Prenez en tout ce qu'il y a de bon. Qu'est ce donc que j'ai fait? what have I done then?

L'œil *appartient* à l'âme plus qu'aucun autre organe (belongs).

Qu'est ce que vous y avez? (what is it that you have there?) what have you there?

Qu'est ce que c'est que cela? what is that?

Il y a de biens grandes beautés dans ce tableau-là, there are very great beauties in that picture.

WAR.—We punish murders and massacres committed among private persons. What do we respecting the wars, and the glorious crime of murdering whole nations? Here avarice and cruelty know no bounds; barbarities are authorized by decrees of the senate and votes of the people; and enormities, forbidden in private persons, are ordered and sanctioned by legislators—things which, if a man had done in his private capacity, they would have paid for with their lives. The very same things we extol to the skies, when they do them with their regimentals on their backs.—*Seneca*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

Homer.—When I proposed the query respecting “the blind old man of Chios’ rocky isle,” as some term him, I omitted to ask, *Where* was Homer born? All have read the couplet—

“Seven cities claimed the mighty Homer dead,
Through which the living Homer begg’d
his bread.”

And the names of these cities we find in the lines:—

“Smyrna, Chios, Colophon, Salamis, Rhodos,
Argos, Athenae,
Orbis de patria certat, Homere, tua.”

Now, of all these, there seems more evidence in favour of the opinion that Smyrna was Homer’s birth-place. Homer’s progenitors are named from two rivers—the Maeon and the Meles—and both these are near Smyrna. But there seems far stronger evidence in favour of Crete. Either Homer was born there, or he spent a large portion of his life there—probably the years of his youthhood. There are many reasons for believing this; such as the Homeric superstition, respecting the sympathy of the horse with its master, lingers unbroken in Crete. In Crete alone is found the ibex—Homer’s *αἰξ ἀβριος*—and the horns of those of the present day equal in length those mentioned by Homer (*ἐκκαίδεκα δῶρα*) = thirty-two inches. Again, Homer often alludes to *tumblers*, and, in doing so, describes those of Crete; these performed in pairs, so the dual number is always used. Again, Homer speaks of the distance from which the voice can be heard; and in Crete a conversation can be carried on by two persons *two miles distant*. Once more, Homeric superstitions and mythology are for the most part identical with those of Crete. With these few remarks I leave the

question to the classical readers of the *Controversialist*, hoping to be favoured with the expression of their opinions upon this very interesting subject.—**THELKELD.**

37. Are there any arbitrary rules of metre in the composition of a “sonnet,” or any fixed order in the rhyming of the lines? If so, what are they?—**A. Z. N.**

38. Can any of your numerous correspondents inform me the best and cheapest way of making a photographic apparatus?—**W. J. C., Junior.**

39. What parts of arithmetic are *more particularly* in requisition for an intended candidate for a government situation as Custom’s Clerk.—**L. J. P.**

40. Could any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me how it is supposed that gold and other metals came in large masses in the earth? Do they and stones grow? Is there any work published on the above subject?—**G. D.**

41. Will any of your readers inform me how to keep a common-place book?—**R. S.**

42. A subscriber writes:—“For the last year I have held a situation of clerk in a mercantile establishment; and as it seems only very likely that such a profession is the only one now for me, I am anxious to be versed in the minutest details of business, mercantile and otherwise. I have made up my mind to a hard, dry study, and determined to follow it up with determination and perseverance. Can you give me a list of books most suitable and useful for this purpose? I wish to comprehend in my studies the nature of our laws as regards business, as well as the mercantile relations of other countries to ours.—**GUSTAVUS.**”

43. Would a few readers of the *British Controversialist*, secretaries of Mechanics' Institutions, Mutual Improvement Societies, and other kindred institutions, be so kind as to furnish answers to the following questions respecting the several societies of which they are members?—

1. What is the total number of members in your institution? Also, classify them into their several occupations.

2. Is this number *equal* to, *above*, or *below* that at any former period of the institution's history? Is it what you may reasonably expect from the amount of the surrounding population?

3. What are the means employed to promote the objects of the institution? State the number of volumes in the library; to what extent it is used; and also classify the character of the works read into theology, science, history, politics, fiction, &c. If there are in operation any classes, state their character, how attended, and what is the interest in the institution manifested by the members generally.

4. Does any (and what) obstacle appear to exist in the way of the increased usefulness of the institution, particularly among that class for which they were primarily intended, viz., working men? what seems to promise a remedy for this? have *any* means been tried, in addition to the usual literary inducements generally obtainable in such societies? if so, state their nature, &c., and the result, whether successful or otherwise.

5. Can you make any suggestion, in addition to what is included in the answers to the foregoing questions, relative to the best means calculated to secure the increased usefulness and prosperity of these institutions?—
CLEMENT.

44. A friend wrote me a note, containing the word "*connection*," and afterwards sent for it to alter the orthography into "*connexion*." I declined affirming that there was "no

mistake." Please say if I acted correctly.—W. J.

45. I find nothing is more common in the *Times* and other respectable newspapers than for the distributive adjective pronoun *either* to be used convertibly with *each*. I think the former signifies "one or the other of two things;" the latter "*all* of several things spoken of." Am I right?—
W. J.

46. Would one of your correspondents explain, through the medium of the *British Controversialist*, in what manner light acts, or is acted upon, so as to enable us to see objects through glass; and also the reason that some substances are transparent while others are not? I should also be glad if he could inform me whether it has lately been attempted to be proved that objects have *themselves* colour independent of the light which makes them visible. I should further like to know the nature of the fluid which is observed above gas-lights and over lime-kilns, and which has a gaseous appearance.—
C. S. W.

47. Sullivan says, *sion* and *tion* should be pronounced like *shun*; but others seem to prefer *shon* to *shun*, among whom are Fulton and Knight (see their "Pronouncing Dictionary," by Whittaker). I cannot tell which Smart prefers, as manifest from his "Walker Improved." Please to instruct me on this point.—J. T.

48. Would any of your readers inform me the derivation and signification of the word "Whig," as used to denote a member or adherent of the Secession Church which now forms part of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and oblige—A. G.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

21. *Ventriloquism*.—In reply to the questions of "A Subscriber," relative to ventriloquism, modern inquiries have proved that the ventriloquist does not

need any peculiarity in the construction of the organs of voice, so that practice only is necessary to carry the art of illusion to a high state of perfection. The art of the ventriloquist consists merely in this,—After drawing a long breath, he breathes it out slowly and gradually, dexterously dividing the air, and diminishing the sound of the voice by the muscles of the larynx and palate; besides this, he moves his lips as little as possible, and, by various contrivances, diverts the attention of his auditors. Unquestionably, the first professor of the art, after the celebrated Alexander, is Love, who nightly attracts large audiences in the metropolis. The ancients also had ventriloquists. The Greeks called them *engastrimanteis*, and considered their art as the work of demons. I am not aware of any work on the subject.—E. L. A., *Tonbridge*.

25. *Photography*.—Gutta percha is readily soluble in twice its weight of benzole, and without heat, provided the benzole be chemically pure. J. L. is referred to Hunt's "Photography," published by Bohn, in his "Scientific Library," third edition, price 6s., for information respecting the American process called "Hillotype," after the name of its inventor, where the process is fully explained, and the various manipulations necessary described in detail. The chief difference between it and the Daguerreotype is in the preparation of the sensitive plate before placing it in the camera, and subjecting it to the action of light.—E. L. A., *Tonbridge*.

35. "Alpha" desires information respecting the East India Civil Appointments, on the subjects for examination, class of candidates, testimonials required, and prospects.

The table below is a list of the subjects, and the figures opposite the highest number of marks that can be obtained in respect of each.

From this list the candidate chooses

in which he will be examined, and six weeks before the examination sends in a statement, naming his choice. It will be seen that the most importance is attached to our own language and literature, and to mathematics, or rather, that the examination in these subjects will be the most severe.

The candidate is not expected to be examined in every subject, but only in those in which he may have a competent knowledge; nor is it necessary that he should know the classics particularly. If, for instance, he were to take English mathematics and the moral sciences, it is quite probable that, with a profound knowledge of the subjects, he may stand at the head of the list, and another might be equally successful by taking Greek, Latin, French, German, and Italian.

The examiners will tolerate no superficial smattering in any branch of knowledge, and will give credit only where an accurate and profound intimacy with the subject is displayed. Hence the advantage of choosing, and knowing thoroughly a few, over exhibiting a superficial and imperfect knowledge of many; therefore, better to be able to give a paper which proves the writer so thoroughly understands the principles of the differential calculus, than to hand in bad themes and translations in half a dozen languages.

The subjects of the first examination are as follows:—

English Language and Literature—	
Composition	500
History	500
General Literature	500
	<hr/>
	1,500
	<hr/>
Language & Literature of Greece	750
" " Rome	750
" " France	375
" " Germany	375
" " Italy	375
Mathematics, pure and mixed .	1000
	<hr/>
Carried forward	5,125

Brought forward	5,125
Natural Science, i. e., Chemistry, Electricity, Magnetism, Natural History, Geology, and Mineralogy	500
Moral Science, i. e., Logic, Mental, Moral, and Political Philosophy	500
Sanscrit Language and Literature	375
Arabic	375
	—
	6,875
	—

No candidate will be allowed any marks in respect of any subject of examination, unless he shall obtain one-sixth of the number set against that particular subject. There will be about forty candidates selected yearly, or twenty at each examination.

From the above list, it is evident that the candidates must be men who have finished their collegiate studies; and also that only those who have attained to high academical distinction can hope to pass this examination. Therefore it is probable that the whole of the successful candidates will be men who have taken one of the two degrees in arts.

The necessary testimonials are—a certificate proving the age of the candidate to be above eighteen and under twenty-three; another from a physician or surgeon, certifying that he has no disease, constitutional affection, or bodily infirmity, unfitting him for the service of the Company; and another from the head of the school or college where last he received his education, testifying to his being of good moral character.

The prospects of a civil servant are, that he will be well paid for twenty-five years' service, and at the termination of that period, he will retire upon a good pension, and with a liver complaint to compensate.

The lowest salary is £400 a-year, and entirely upon the abilities of the man does it depend to what salary he

may attain by the time of his retirement. Warren Hastings rose from a writer to be Governor-General of India, and Clive commenced his brilliant career in the same capacity. I do not know what the pensions are, but I believe it is the last salary obtained which regulates the amount of pension.

When a man has passed the first examination, it is supposed that he has finished his general education, and finished it with honour. He is then a civil servant elect, and immediately enters upon probation, with a view to pass a second examination in subjects of use only to the Indian servant, and which shall specially fit him for his duties as collector, magistrate, judge, financier, or for whatever capacity he may fill.

So that if a man fails in passing the first examination, he will have studied nothing but what will be of service to him as a professional man in England. But, as a probationer, he is studying his profession, just as another, having finished his academical career, commences law as his, prior to being called to the bar. The studies for the further examination are as follows:—

Law, including the ordinary mode of taking evidence, and the mode of conducting civil and criminal trials	1000
The History of India	400
Political Economy	400
Any Language of India, in which the selected candidate shall have given notice of his desire to be examined	200

In this examination the candidate is to be prepared in all the subjects. After one year of probation he can be examined in the above studies, and if he fails, can again be examined in another twelvemonth, when, if he is still unsuccessful in obtaining at least one-sixth of the number of marks set against each subject, he will be struck off the list, and lose his appointment.

If "Alpha" desires further information, I shall be happy to answer any of his questions, if he will write me, stating the present state of his studies; and his means of preparation; and should he desire to prepare, I could point out to him an economical

method of doing so. He may know my address through the Editor.

Inquiries to the India Board are to be addressed,—“The Secretary, India Board, Westminster.—India Civil Service Examination.”

TELEMAQUE

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Bedford Row Theological Class, Limerick.—The members of this class held their quarterly tea meeting on the evening of Wednesday, the 9th April, in their usual meeting place, the room of the Primitive Methodist Preaching House. There were more than eighty persons present, all of whom were highly pleased with the manner in which the evening was passed. After tea, the half-yearly report was read, the substance of which was, that the class had been formed in September last by the Rev. Mr. Craig, and a few young men desirous of mental and spiritual improvement; that it was in the habit of meeting every Monday night, for conversation on subjects taken from the Bible; and that since its formation there were twenty-one such meetings, at which the following subjects, among others, had occupied the attentive and serious consideration of the members; viz.—“Man's Ruin and God's Remedy;” “The Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ;” “The Duties we owe to God and Man;” “Baptism;” “The Ministration of Angels;” “The Communion of Saints;” and “The Inspiration of the Scriptures.” After the report had been read, addresses of a practical and instructive character were delivered by Messrs. T. Hudson, F. Brew, J. Smallman, W. Nelson, and A. Ramsey. The class has about twenty names on the book; and those who attend it regu-

larly acknowledge the benefits which they have derived from it since its establishment, and what they yet hope to receive from its prolonged existence. May it be instrumental in effecting the object for which it was originated, and be the means of sending out into the world men qualified to act well their part in life and fulfil the high end of their being.—W. N.

Glasgow Natural History Society.—This society has been instituted for improvement in Natural History. The office-bearers are, *Patron*—William Couper, Esq., M.D., *Professor of Natural History in the University of Glasgow*; *President*—Thomas Kyle, Esq., M.A.; *Vice-President*—Thomas Drysdale Buchanan, Esq.; *Secretary and Treasurer*—Hunter Finlay; *Honorary Directors*—Messrs. David Yair, John R. Liddell, John Marshall, and John Russell; *Ordinary Directors*—Messrs. David Walker, M.A., John Finlay, Robert King, Thomas Steel, and John Clark. At the meeting on Thursday, the 8th of May last, Thomas Kyle, Esq., M.A., read a very excellent paper on “Animalcules,” for which he received the thanks of the society. Gentlemen desirous of becoming members are requested to send their name and address to the secretary of the society, at the Religious Institution Rooms, Glasgow.—HUNTER FINLAY, *Secretary*.

INDEX.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY..	PAGE 1, 49, 145, 193, 241
AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE:—	
Geography—Introduction	97
SELF-EDUCATOR:—	
Lessons in French	133, 176, 225, 270
RELIGION:—	
Have we Sufficient Evidence, apart from Scripture, to Believe in the Im- mortality of the Soul?	
Affirmative Articles	55, 57
Negative Articles.....	7, 104, 145
Does Geology Confirm the Mosaic Account of the Creation?	
Affirmative Article	247
PHILOSOPHY:—	
Is Man the Creature of Circum- stances?	
Affirmative Articles	29, 111, 199
Negative Articles	63, 155
HISTORY:—	
Is the Character of Queen Elizabeth Worthy of Admiration?	
Affirmative Articles	16, 70, 162
Negative Articles	21, 117, 253
POLITICS:—	
Would Parliament be Justified in Sanctioning the Opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays?	
Affirmative Articles	130, 170, 213, 261
Negative Articles.....	123, 208, 257
SOCIAL ECONOMY:—	
Is the Spendthrift more Injurious to Society than the Miser?	
Negative Article	266
THE ESSAYIST:—	
Self-Culture: Its Importance to Young Men.....	34
"Things New and Old"	79
Galileo	218

THE INQUIRER:—	
Questions.....	44, 90, 141, 188, 234, 278
Answers:—	
Spirit Rappers and Table Talkers..	44
Words and Language.....	44
Roman Coins	45
Works on Singing	46
French for Self-Educators	90
The English Language.....	90
Euclid, lib. iii. 31	92
Where was Homer Born, and where did he Die?	141
The Merry Monarch.....	142
The Profession of Reporter for the Public Press	142
Art of Wood Engraving	142
Foreign Languages	189
Defect in Pronouncing the Letter R	189
Course of Mathematics.....	189
Modern French Literature	189
"Machiavelli"	189
Cement for Fixing the Metallic Parts of Electric Apparatus to the Glass Work	190
Galvanic Batteries.....	190
Study of Botany.....	190
Civil Engineering	235
Burring.....	235
Ventriloquism.....	236
Logarithms	236
Ventriloquism.....	279
Photography	280
Civil Appointments in India	280
SOCIETIES' SECTION:—	
REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVE- MENT SOCIETIES:—	
Gordon Street U. P. Church United Young Men's Literary Society ..	46
Whitby Institute—Geological Class	46
Edinburgh Young Men's Association	47
Christchurch Mutual Improvement and Debating Society	47
Bath City Lectures.....	47
Bedford Literary and Scientific	47
Shaftesbury Institute.....	93
Caxton Mutual Improvement Society (Manchester)	93

INDEX.

	PAGE
SOCIETIES' SECTION:—(Continued.)	
Aberystwith Welsh Literary Society	93, 236
Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society, Centenary Chapel, Dublin	93
Madras Young Men's Literary Society	93
St. Bartholomew's Working Men's Literary Institute	94
St. James's Literary and Scientific Institution	94, 239
Cooper's Hall (Bristol)	94
East Parade	94
Monkwearmouth (Sunderland)	94
York Street (Walworth)	95
Seacombe Mutual Improvement Society	95, 237
Ebenezer Chapel, Neckinger Road, Bermondsey	142
Leicester Early Closing Association	142
Young Men's Mutual Improvement Association, Wesleyan Chapel, Lower Abbey Street, Dublin	143
Glasgow (Clydesdale)	190
Pimlico	191
Castle Hill Chapel (Northampton)	191
London Sacred Harmonic Society, Exeter Hall	191
Hullah's Concerts, St. Martin's Hall	191
Chapel Street Chapel (Salford)	237
Law Students' Corresponding Society (London Section)	237
Milngavie Mechanics' Institute	238

	PAGE
SOCIETIES' SECTION:—(Continued.)	
Woodbridge Young Men's Association	238
Petersfield Young Men's Association	238
St. James's Junior Mutual Improvement Society (Hull)	239
Glasgow Polytechnic Society	239
Bedford Row Theological Class (Limerick)	282
Glasgow Natural History Society	282

THE REVIEW:—

Macaulay's "England," Vols. III. and IV.	83
Longfellow's "Song of Hiawatha"	183

LITERARY NOTICES, &c.	48, 95, 144, 192, 240
----------------------------------	-----------------------

MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES:—

Constantinople	76
How to Make a Fortune	186
Imitation of Jesus Christ	217
Literary Longevity	231
Hume's Philosophy and Style	232

LACONICS	6, 15, 28, 33, 62, 69, 89, 89, 103, 110, 122, 140, 154, 161, 169, 175, 179, 185, 188, 198, 207, 212, 217, 224, 231, 234, 246, 252, 256, 265, 269, 277.
-----------------	--

THE BRITISH
CONTROVERSIALIST,
AND
SELF-EDUCATOR :

ESTABLISHED FOR THE IMPARTIAL AND DELIBERATE DISCUSSION
OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN
RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS,
SOCIAL ECONOMY, ETC.,
AND AS A MAGAZINE OF SELF-CULTURE.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT."

"Here is a thing wherein I would willingly have you agree, that is, to *dispute* and not to *quarrel* ; for friends *dispute* between themselves for their better instruction, and enemies *quarrel* to destroy one another."—*Plato*.

"Truth can never be confirmed too much,
Though doubts did ever sleep."—*Shakespeare*.

VOLUME II.—NEW SERIES.

LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY HOULSTON AND STONEMAN,
65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1856.

LONDON:
J. AND W. RIDER, PRINTERS,
14, Bartholomew Close.

PREFACE.

It has been the yearly habit of the Editors of *The British Controversialist* to address the glad gathering of bright spirits, which crowds around the "chairs of state" in which they sit, in words of retrospect and hope. It is the one proud moment of our lives to be so encircled, and we may surely be pardoned the emotion. Our readers and ourselves are friends unknown in body, but with the soul's eye seen. How often in the night-silences have we heard your kindly words, your loving salutations, and almost felt the pressure of your hands! How much comfort and help do we owe you! comfort and help frankly given and joyfully received. Take our thanks: we cannot give away the pleasure of the gratitude we feel, or adequately express the mountain mass of obligation under which we lie to you. Believe us, it is in these moments that we become most sensible of the demerits—ah! how many!—of even our best services. Yet we have labours manifold, which, did you know, would move you to cast a glance of charity upon our shortcomings, and prove to you that in no little measure are our days made anxious and our sleep hours brief, that we may furnish forth the supplies of thought which this serial contains.

Were the work now in the reader's hand in any large measure the product of the Editors' pens, it would ill become them so to speak its praise; but it is the conjoint labour of a numerous body of contributors who have supplied the flowers and fruit, of which we, as the Editors, have had the selection, the arrangement, and the exhibition; and hence it is not self-flattery when we call attention to the merits of the contents of the present volume. To these contributors our warmest, heartiest thanks are justly due, not only for their able papers, but for the promptitude, laborious zeal, and friendly assiduity with which they work as yoke-fellows with us. To *one*, in chief, whose pen for seven years has never been idle in the service of our magazine, what words can be used that will express that combination of esteem, love, and admiration which we feel! Our heart knows not the words in which to write it. *He* will comprehend and feel our meaning.

Of the year's success, we have pleasing proof: our publisher warrants us to say that the sales are on the increase. This is well. It is evidence of the healthy heart-core worth which the public give the magazine credit for

possessing. We promise that on our part no flagging shall be found, if our subscribers continue to us the same kindly countenance as heretofore. The arrangements we have made and are making to secure novelty, variety, and sterling merit in the contributions of the succeeding year, we are confident will give complete satisfaction. All that conscientious solicitude can effect, we shall accomplish; and we know that our friends,—readers and contributors combined,—will spare no effort to widen our circulation, and extend our usefulness.

It is true that this year has not been without its shades; but ever and anon—

The words of cheer and blessing fell
Like silence on our fears.

Far from resting contented with the past—though to that we can point with justifiable congratulation—we are determined to press on still with unwearied energy. There is work enough before us:

“For the structure that we raise,
Time is with materials filled;
Our to-days and yesterdays
Are the blocks with which we build.”

To the expression of free thought, impartially exhibited in debate but yet subordinated to the highest and holiest influences which can operate on life, we are pledged. This field we occupy alone. Since our first issues were, in fear and hope, committed to the public eye, many periodicals have had “their rise and their forgetting;” we have, though not without a struggle, been placed in the fore-van of periodical literature. The applauding smiles of our friends flash mystic hints of greater success; whether it comes or no, we shall at least endeavour to be worthy of it.

May we in conclusion once more call the attention of our readers to the important series of leading articles to be commenced with our new volume, by Mr. Samuel Neil, entitled “EPOCH MEN;” the very title is suggestive of those who by their lives have made their age famous,

“And dying left behind them
Footprints on the sands of time.”

We think from the plan exhibited by the author in our last number, that this series bids fair to be of great interest and permanent utility, especially with such an audience as the readers of the *British Controversialist*.

Dear friends, we must make our exit with the time-honoured, genial, and seasonable gratulation, “A MERRY CHRISTMAS, AND A HAPPY NEW YEAR.”

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL—IDEALISM— XENOPHANES.

FROM a few far-scattered and disjointed fragments,—each, taken by itself, crude and inexplicit,—to shape out even an approximation to the real form of any ancient theoretic system of thought, is no easy matter. "Here a little and there a little," in varied connections, we may have the opinions of one of the olden worthies of the world alluded to, or even the very expressions he employed cited; but the links of ordination are wanting, the logical sequence of the ideas is lost, the organic coherence of thought with thought has disappeared from among the traditions of men. In these circumstances, it is the duty of the historian of the progress of philosophic thought to take a full view of the thinker's era, to hold in remembrance all the philosophic influences which could, with any degree of probability, operate upon him, and then to give the individual whose doctrines are under consideration the credit of the fairest possible interpretation of which they are susceptible,—such an interpretation, namely, as shall "fit in" his system to those of his predecessors, his cotemporaries, and his successors. Truths do not arise fortuitously, as the clouds *seem* to form themselves out of the invisible mists, but by a fixed process of organic growth, of spontaneous yet inevitable evolution and development. The grand and glorious attribute of thought is its *continuousness*. It is never complete and final, and yet "it hath a springing and germinant accomplishment through many ages." It is a process of causative propagation.

“ Throw in the water now a stone;
 Well wot'st thou it will make anon
 A littel roundel, as a circle,
 Perventure broad as a covérle.
 And right anon thou shalt see well
 That circle cause another wheel;
 And that the third, and so forth, brother,
 Every circle causing other,
 Much wider than himselfen was.”

Even so philosophy constantly tends to move the multitudinous mass of inertitude on which it impinges, and strives to produce a wider range of thought; yet each circle is receptive of power from that which antecedes it, and emanant of causative energy to that which follows. Thoroughly to know one circle of thought necessitates some acquaintance with all others, and to expound, in any continuous, logically sequent order, the thought-system of any great thinker,—and especially one of whose opinions little else is known than a few fragmental, semi-oracular sentences, or some disconnected and somewhat ambiguous allusions,—requires that the whole shall be viewed in relation to the age in which he lived, and the state of thought at the time in which it was elaborated. These difficulties we have encountered in our course before, and have been, to a certain extent, enabled to overcome them. We shall endeavour, with similar aim, to present such an abstract of the Xenophanian tenets as shall show his true, relative place among those whom fame—

“ Is lavish to attest the lords of mind.”

If we fail, we shall do no more than others who have preceded us; if we succeed, we shall thank their failures for showing us the way we should avoid, and thus inciting us to essay “a new departure,”—which we do now,—

“ With watch as circumspect as seamen keep,
 When in the night the leeward breakers flash.”

EXPOSITION.—

“ Are there not * * *
 Two points in the adventure of the diver?
 One when, a beggar, he prepares to plunge,
 One when, a prince, he rises with the pearl?”

There are these two moments also in the life of each great thinker—the moment when the *method* of any course of speculative thought is suggested and determined on, and that in which the results are all converged to one central crystallinely clear thought, the pearl of price, for which all the labour had been undertaken. To know the object at which any thinker aimed, and the result obtained in the endeavour to accomplish it, is, therefore, the all needful condition of a correct appreciation

of his method and doctrine. Xenophanes existed in the midst of philosophic influences, vital and effective, and must have been strongly moved and excited by them. Their potency was everywhere operative on the minds of men of thoughtful mood; and though calculated to give a certain amount of quietness to the soul, full of thronging thoughts, yet, as they appeared to him fraught with much error, resistance became his duty. The deities of Homer and Hesiod were full of presentative grace; they gratified the imagination, and gave a dogmatic answer to the queries of the reason—a solution to the difficulties under which the mind “groaned and was weary.” The Ionic School, in its tendencies at least, at this time, divided the material, the atom-composed, the actual universe, from the formative, *i. e.*, the deific power. The Italic School endowed the primal *Monad* with perpetual emanence and endogeneity—the capability, the desire, and the active exercise of self-development. The theories in each case rise high up out of and beyond the phenomena in which they received their *occasions*, and each claims to satisfy some craving need which the intellect feels. Shall we not come nearer to *the* truth, if we interrogate the soul as to its real wants, those claimant desires, with whose excitements it continually throbs and palpitates, and for the satisfying of which it incessantly labours? If it is allotted to humanity to *know* truth, there must be in it some criterion of what constitutes truth, some ground on which it must believe that it has found truth, *i. e.*, repose of soul. The external varieties of things, ever changing and fluctuating, cannot be rested in as the whole truth of things; neither can the mathematic relations of ideas, be held as those alone which operate in thought and thought-endowed being. There must be that in the soul itself which, indicating its wants, shall shadow forth the satisfactory, which must be to man the true. Not the phenomenal, nor yet the mathematical, can be the trustworthy method of attaining knowledge; but the logical, *i. e.*, the principle that unfolds the conditions upon which any idea may be regarded as proven or certain. It is thus that the necessities of the reason—the logic of thought—become the prime elements of philosophy, and that their externalization takes the fore rank in every investigative process, *i. e.*, the *a priori* constructive capacities of the soul are recognized as the presagers, the prophets, and the interpreters of phenomenal truth. True science is the product of reason, not of sense. The reason, therefore, is not only the suggestor, the originator, and the revealer, but also the ultimate judge of the True. Logic is the lawgiver of philosophy.

The strict formalism of thought, by which Xenophanes guided his investigations, is not more remarkable than the deep religious earnestness of his nature. Hence we find him seeking in God the One grand fundamental idea of philosophy.

“ For whereso I my thoughts direct,
They always return to the One, the Changeless; *all* becomes,
On being examined, resolved into the self-same Nature.” *

This One, how much has it been misconceived and misinterpreted! By anthropomorphic and polytheistic errors, men have beguiled themselves, and, “even to their own hurt,” have changed the Theic idea “into a lie.”

“ There is one God, indeed, the greatest of gods and of mortals.
Having resemblance to man neither in form nor in thoughts.”

“ But men foolishly think that gods are born even as they are,
And have, too, a dress, and a form, and a voice like their own;
But, truly, if oxen and lions had hands like ours, and like fingers,
Then would horses to horses, and oxen to oxen, resembling,
Paint and fashion their god-forms, and give them bodies
Of like shape to that in which they themselves are forth formed.”

Even so have men conformed their ideas of the Deity to the foolish imaginations of their own hearts; and, in the vain attempt to anthropomorphize all thought,—

“ Such things of the gods are narrated by Hesiod and Homer,
As would be held as shame and abiding reproach among mankind—
Promises broken, and thefts and mutual deceivings.”

It is, indeed, true, that the impotence of human reason is such, that absolute truth is incognoscible by man. *Phenomism*, the belief in the apparent, imprisons him, and the finitude of his nature limits his power of beholding the infinite amplitude of truth. Incomplete knowledge is error, inasmuch as it does not encompass and contain the whole truth. In this limited sense, the saying of Sotion is right, that Xenophanes was the first to assert that all things are incomprehensible, *i. e.*, are unable to be contained in the finite thought of humanity; for,—

“ Certainly no mortal e’er knew, and ne’er shall there be one
Knowing well *both* the gods and the All, whose nature we speak of;
Because, though by chance he speaks out the true and the perfect,
Yet he knows it not, for opinion is wrought into *all*.”

In consequence of these defects, man is hindered from attaining true knowledge; nevertheless, as he widens his thoughts by patient study, he learns more and more, and the gods favour the diligent inquirer into the mystic marvels with which man’s life is environed, and of which he is a great part.

* See, for all those passages of Xenophanian doctrine, and extracts relative thereto, marked in the text by inverted commas, Karsten’s “*Philosophorum Græcorum Veterum Reliquiæ*,” Amsterdam, 1830; Brandis’ “*Commentationum Eleaticarum*,” Altona, 1813; Cousin’s “*Fragments Philosophiques*,” vol. i., Paris, 1847.

"Not from the first was *all* revealed by the gods to mankind;
Only in time and by long search can man discover the better."

Hitherto, men had been groping after some adequate conception of the Divine. The vulgar had contented themselves with the mythological inventions of the poets; and the learned had striven to construct, out of the ever-varying phenomena of nature, or the numerical harmonies which are perceptible in their relations, a thought which could fittingly be held as an approximation to the true idea of God. In both of these directions great errors have been developed. The *ONE* is superior to the *Many*. Hence the highest idea we can attach to the divine nature is that of Unity. This Unity is also the First. "It is impossible to apply to God the idea of birth, for everything which is born must of necessity be born either of something like or of something unlike. Now each of these cases is impossible; for the like has no action on the like, and can no more produce it than it can be produced by it. On the other hand, the unlike cannot be born of the unlike; for if the strongest is born of the weakest, or the greatest of the smallest, or the better of the worst, or, on the contrary, the worse of the better, being would proceed from non-being, or non-being from being, which is impossible." "Since God cannot be born, he cannot perish; but everything which is born must needs perish, while that which is not born, that is to say, that which does not become a thing by means of another, but which is a being in itself, is eternal." Besides, "it is an absurdity to suppose that anything could ever have come into existence, had there ever been a time when there was nothing." Being *One* and *Eternal*,—a perfect, everlasting unity,—he must be infinite and changeless—he can only be symbolized to the sense-captive minds of men as "an unmoving sphere"—as containing within himself at once the centre and circumference of *being*. Hence he says:—

"Wholly unmoved and unmoving, it ever retains its position;
Changeless in place, although, at times, it changes its seeming."

If, then, it is unchangeable, it must be immaterial; for matter is liable to constant change, not only in its constituent atoms, but also in the phenomena it presents to the senses. If he is the first and the one, he must also be the source of the *All*; and if we regard the harmonious variety of the *All*, we must admit that he is infinitely wise. "He is all sight, all ear, all mind." "In all his parts, intellect, and wisdom, and eternity." So that it may, with highest truth, be said,—

"Wholly exempt from toil, he rules all things by thought and will."

He is the all-pervading, all-producing, rational activity, of whom the material universe is the imperfect manifestation.

We have no clear evidence of the mode in which he explained the *genesis* of matter, and reconciled reason with sense. This may have arisen from several causes, and especially from the fragmentary knowledge which we have of his doctrines. We believe, however, that he had not acquired any solution of the mode in which the indivisible Divinity originated, or passed into the multiplex and changeful nature which showed itself to sense. The opposition between the deductions of the pure Reason, or Thought Proper, and the presentations made to the sense-faculties, seems to have been looked upon by him as insoluble. The double aspect in which all things appear to the mind—the everlasting dualism of thought, the phenomenal and the true, the rational and the sensible, the One and the All;—in the attempt to find one thought which would harmonize and unify these, he was lost. These eternal antithetics of nature and thought he could not embrace in one operation of reason; and hence there is a contradictoriness, a vagueness, and an inconsistency between his Physic and his Metaphysic, which we find it difficult to comprehend. He is reported to have taught that nature was the product of four prime elements—that the earth was a cone, that the sea was the source of humidity, and held in solution in itself the various elements of terrestrial being; that the stars are congregations of vapours; that the number of worlds is infinite; that heat, acting on the earth, occasions vegetable and animal life. All these, however, are appearances; the Deity alone is the true.

REMARKS.—In the Xenophanian philosophy we find the earliest assertion of the truth-discovering power of the reason—the first rude striving after the demonstrative in speculative science. The elimination of a new method in scientific thinking, in which the fundamental principle is, to use the language of Browning's "Paracelsus"—

" Truth is within ourselves; it takes no rise
From outward things; whate'er you may believe,
There is an inmost centre in us all,
Where truth abides in fullness, and around,
Wall within wall, the gross flesh hems it in.
* * * To know,
Rather consists in opening out a way
Whence the imprisoned splendour may dart forth,
Than in effecting entry for the light
Supposed to be without."

G. H. Lewes has so happily and so eloquently uttered his estimate of this mighty sage of the mystic olden time, that we cannot resist appropriating its exquisite expressions to indemnify the reader for our deficiencies of treatment. Xenophanes "looked around him, and saw mankind divided into two classes,

those who speculated on the nature of things, and endeavoured to raise themselves up to a recognition of the Divine, and those who yielded up an easy, unreflective assent to the easy superstitions which compose [every ancient?] religion. The first class speculated to themselves, and to a small class of disciples. If they sought truth, it was not to communicate it to all minds; they did not work for humanity, but for the few. Even Pythagoras, earnest thinker as he was, could not be made to believe in the fitness of the multitude for truth. He had two sorts of doctrine to teach; one for a few disciples, whom he chose with extreme caution, the other for such as pleased to listen. The former was what he believed the truth; the latter was what he thought the mass were fitted to receive. Not so Xenophanes. He recognized no such distinction. Truth was for all men, and to all men he endeavoured to present it; and for three-quarters of a century did he, the great rhapsodist of truth, emulate his great countryman Homer, the great rhapsodist of beauty, and wander into many lands, uttering the thought that was working within him. What a contrast is presented by these two Ionian singers!—contrast in purpose, in means, and in fate. The rhapsodies of the philosopher once so eagerly listened to, and affectionately preserved in traditionary fragments, are now only extant in briefest fragments, contained in ancient books, so ancient and so uninteresting, as to be visited only by some rare old scholar, and a few *dilettanti* spiders; while the rhapsodies of the blind old bard are living in the brain and heart of thousands and thousands, who go back to them as to the fountain sources of poetry, and as the crystal mirror of an ancient world. How is this? Because the world presented itself to Homer in pictures, to Xenophanes in problems. The one saw existence, enjoyed it, and painted it. The other also saw existence, but questioned it, and wrestled with it. Every trait in Homer is sunny, clear; in Xenophanes there is indecision, confusion. In Homer there is resonance of gladness, a sense of manifold life, activity, and enjoyment. In Xenophanes there is bitterness, activity, but of a spasmodic sort, infinite doubt, and infinite sadness. The one was a poet, singing as the bird sings, carolling for very exuberance of life; the other was a thinker, somewhat, also, of a fanatic." Yet which was right? He who lived merely in the sense-perceived and the beautiful, or he who sought for truth, howsoever obscured by sense or poesy? Surely the thinker cannot hesitate to decide! Sublime as has been the fate of Homer, the life-dedication of Xenophanes was not less noble than his. If we do not admit this, we must deny the brilliant maxim of Boileau—

"Il n'y a rien de beau que le vrai."

Can we? We aver, No!

Philosophy.

IS MAN THE CREATURE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THREE are many points connected with this subject on which all parties must harmonize. As, that we combat successfully, to a large extent, with countless difficulties, these oftentimes giving tone to our spirits, and, in effect, bowling us onward in our extending career. Thus, it is not expected of those who affirm the question discussed, that they shall direct their energies to prove that men are so weak, that any and all obstacles are strong enough to make them quail and die; nor are they even prevented (by the question or side they defend) from showing that man's full power to battle with difficulties may not be so developed, that the spectator of a conflict between man and circumstances shall not, by being a witness thereto, derive power to conquer in an arena where a brother, who was only an *actor*, had been foiled and vanquished. It is universally admitted that a modicum of power is held by every man. So that the inquiry really is this, How is power acquired, in all its diversity of degree, in all its variety of form? We seek to show man a little more distinctly *as he is*, and how he grows to be *what* he is. We will not confess to the possession of a desire for detraction, or to limit what we call freedom in our race; but we seek, as witnesses of the everlasting and soul-exciting and soul-depressing struggles going on, to test the might of the ten and the twenty thousand powers engaged. We wish to learn how the individuals of our species become saint or demon, governor or governed, painter or poet, grave or gay, and why, in any case, such an one is letter A, class 1; how far 'tis true that from *without* arises the amplitude of social and other differences; why each man, sprung from one common stock, exhibits such contrast to coin from one mint, and holds or exhibits a character and a power indisputably his own.

Were we better able to disclose the nature of the relationship between matter and mind, better able to show the absolute dependence of spirit in man on the condition or arrangement of his physical half, our labour would be much curtailed, and would go far to settle this controversy—such knowledge would be a *new circumstance*. We briefly remark, that some accident or physical defect is confessedly often the cause of marked blight in the life. But look at genius, if you like. The advocates of the controlling might of circumstances have no occasion to ignore one fact in the history of any of their kind, from him who sinks

to him who soars. The buoyant elasticity and tenacity of life in many is a tempting theme to enlarge on; there is sometimes centred in one a wide compass of knowledge, a strong consciousness of energy, a rich fertility of thought, a clear and happy, ever new combination of imagery, and a fullness of expression in glowing words, which seems to tell of inborn strength. Such an example might be chosen to show the fallacy of our views. It would be an ample field both for the special pleader and the honest denunciator of the abhorred doctrine of necessity. But such witnesses may, in this dispute, give evidence on both sides. We know, without pretending to much of phrenology beyond its name, that there is no outward, commonly known cause to be *sought* for to create the wide difference seen (in capability) between the busy bees of society. It is plainly true that there are many of the millions of men who are capable of *any human task*, but who are, like the flowers of the desert,—

“Born to blush unseen,
And waste their sweetness on the desert air.”

'Tis these unripened fruits and flowers which we subpoena to our affirmation. 'Tis quite true, that here and there is a golden nugget of humanity of priceless worth, to ask the stamp of currency at no earthly mint. There is often in the poor man a native, indestructible vitality, which pre-eminently distinguishes him from his fellows; and sometimes these examples stand forth, descended from no stock of like kind; they are evidences of an overruling hand, which holds a reserve of riches and might, where even genius looks for rubbish alone. God does at will make either the vessel of honour or dishonour; but when this is all confessed, we shall turn to the so-called “chapter of accidents” to see what events and their adjuncts *do*, to call out the philosopher, the general, the poet, the statesman, and divine, from the common mass to fill their proper post.

We have no occasion to enlarge on the virulence or on the virtue of circumstances to mark their *power*, but we may ask, if there is any affinity between them and man? and further, if of *necessity* man is warped by them a single “hair's breadth”? Are they the thorns or the down of his course? Are they the angels who invite, or the devils who ensnare him? or has he *prescience* sufficient to lead him, and lead him where? Did man come into being, or reach maturity (as it is commonly understood), just as a coin comes from the mint, another aspect had been given to our subject; or did he know, by intuition, a straight way to happiness, to life, and immortality, while possessed of power to look at possible ill through his imagination, then might he quietly walk life's course, and enter into rest dimly foreshadowed here; but when we *know*, and daily feel, our ignorance; when we have the honest admission of contract

vision in prophet and priest, saint and seer; when the common cry is, "We know not what a day may bring forth;" when we feel simultaneously the power of passing emotions, and the concurring allurements from without; when we are compelled to adapt or to endorse Paul's declaration, that there is a law in our members warring against the law of our minds; and when we learn, also, that conscience is *not* an all-sufficient guide, do we not feel the *necessity* of *experience* to gain the light we need? and that at the best "*it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps*"? We seek not to lower the character of man, or rob him of his honours. Power is given to him. On earth there is not *his* like. Here he is lord, and all creatures, in some way, are made to feel it. He is ever bringing some good out of evil; and whether we track him in polar snows or torrid sands, we see him wring subsistence from every zone, and reign a king in all. But why, we ask, does he not put forth his hand, and seize higher blessings than he has ever yet enjoyed on earth? Is it through lack of power (as it is commonly thought of)? Have the highest, tallest, and best of our race plucked the fruit from the topmost boughs of the tree of good? But, we ask again, why not? Alas! the *arm* is shortened, and the *adventurous* aid of science, religion, and true goodness stand *not yet* revealed; but the roll of events shall raise man, and an unseen hand is now on their outer wheel. Man is ever adapting himself to every new order of things. But he has not yet reached the excellence we deem possible for him. Is not the scattered light flung amongst the divided races of the human family incontestable evidence of the existence of appliances for man's use, beyond any native skill in any one individual? Is truth of all kinds, wherever seen, anything more than evidence of the harvest reaped from circumstances? Have not peculiar events been indispensable to enable man to discover what he knows? and is not truth, thus *accidentally* born, the cause of present advancement? and does it not as surely model *us* as light affects the material world? In all this we do not destroy in man either power, choice, or willinghood; but we maintain man's constant, invariable indebtedness to circumstance, to account for his progress, as surely as the wax must go to the seal, to tell why it owns a certain form. Truth, knowledge, and opinion mould us as the potter moulds the clay, and as the drill changes the loon into a smart soldier. And may we not note the *want* of power notorious in our mental constitution, so that the knowledge we have is neither perfect in *kind*, in *arrangement*, or at *command*—so that the singular and curiously interesting laws of association, of which we know too little, must be depended on often in the most grave moments of life? At some juncture we require the attendance of a vagrant thought absent without leave, and which returns "too late." Is this independence of circumstance?

If we confound man's limited power over somewhat ductile difficulties with masterhood, this inquiry would afford but little scope for thought. It is when we discern the positive impenetrability of the phalanx of difficulties that we demur to man's non-subjection; it is when we look at the variety and the density of the host that we see the *variety* of the *end* of life as a something to be *won*. Did circumstances *not* possess a chameleon-like character, and were man immortal on earth, his powers might rise, and he might subdue difficulties with ever growing might; but as things *are*, 'twere easier to challenge summer flies to a duel, than expect to make willing mercenaries of ever new evolving things. It is true that we defy some difficulties; it is more true that we are quickly foiled: and the order of things which arises *demands* that succeeding strugglers shall conform thereto; there is no recalling of events, no re-fighting the battle; time has counted the minutes, and ushered in another scene. We truly are lifting the blocks we have hewn from the quarry of time, but which of us can tell how events have located, moulded, aye, stereotyped us? Events shape us, without saying, "By your leave." This looks very much like *non-subjection*! We are often directed or diverted from our purpose, as surely as the huge cannon shot, which whistles its song of death on the trembling air, is turned aside by rock or mound, or, it may be, the opposing shot urged on its growling mission of murder by the fiends of war. All the untold resources of genius, plied with man's cautiously-measured or thunder-striking might, are made ever and anon to lie prostrate before tiny events, or to do homage to God as the great Wielder of all things. See Sennacherib's host; see Napoleon and Russian snows; or see, in 1854-56, the Czar of Russia bowing in death, while the "sick man" takes medicine, which enables him to feel again the warmth of life, and smile at the would-be master from the north. The frank admission of man's known or unknown might does not untie this Gordian knot, does not reveal the hidden spring of actions, great or small. Rapid changes in events are but the cogs of the wheel which man first obeys, and then tries his "prentice hand" upon; but as far as the production of any grand scheme to add to his happiness is concerned, his life is a failure. Nor is there any essential distinction to be supposed between men. The man of lofty purpose and stern patience and fortitude, standing on the very Alps of intellect, is but slightly less impotent than his brother, who takes the parish dole: the difference is as between the thick and thin end of the wedge.

In this country, the presence of much biblical and other light occasions the life of conscience, and the tale of right and wrong. In some, how terrific is the conflict between them and evil! There is a trial of strength. How is it that some partially con-

quer, and some fight and die? Who made him to differ, who triumphs in a weak degree? Why are the conquerors so sullied in the fight, that less than angelic eyes discern their stains? It is in nice mental oscillation, arising from the exchange of *pros* and *cons*, that we must look for the most difficult problems to test our subjection or our freedom. Now, if we are not discussing man's power,—that being admitted, just as a river rolls as strongly, it may be, one way as another,—it becomes of necessity a question of freedom, and this we think disproved by the alternate arguments of the pleaders man listens to in a case of casuistry; and to settle the matter, we must go to the cause of choice. Were man a perfect being, his goodness were also a fact. Were he good, he could not choose evil; but all he did would be good, as like begets like. Now we submit, whether man's history does not demonstrate the presence of evil at the highest sources of choice. If choice is partially blind, are we to look for good, save as it is distinguished from great evil? Is this freedom? In cases of mental disturbance, when the spirit upheaves the whole being, there is as little of non-subjection evidenced as the sea discloses in a storm; but who can forbid either the winds or the waves? Who can say to the surges of the mind, either, "You shall not rise," or, "Peace, be still?" and if one could, the inquiry still is, Whence the power? Thus it is seen that power is not the secret we wish to learn, but how the channels of thought are first formed, and the early or later bias takes place. Whence the love or hate of this or that, which is almost as strong at times as the love of life? Surely this engrossment of the soul looks like subjection, submission, or vassalage. This does not imply the indolence of death, but it tells of an element and cause of character, often forgotten in the consciousness of might in the hand. If there is not the subjection we note, why the complaint of "fickle fortune" spoiling schemes, wasting energies, and inducing, alas! despair? True, many men realize much of that which they have set their minds on; but is this owing to their strong arm? and must we forget that there is a "tide" in men's affairs? He who overlooks this is a strange thinker.

The ability to discern the towardness or frowardness of the signs of the times is not a common gift to the race, and much of our success in the pursuit of an object lies in the grasp of the mind, and the discernment of these adverse or favourable conditions, while not one person may be sure of any boon he seeks. The impediments in our way are like flakes in a snow-storm—a few only excite, many dim, the prospect, and too many bury both seeker and object too. See on what contingencies have hung the revelations of science. Had the apple not fallen at a certain juncture, to arouse the contemplative and reflective

mind of Newton, what a pebble might not have fixed the chariot of knowledge, as surely as a mountain, for an age further on in the world's chronicle?

From all that we know of mind or spirit, there is, we assume, no just reason to regard it as other than a simple substance or essence, alike in its nature in all mankind. We may scarcely venture to surmise that variety of quality or quantity pertain to it; and we are almost shut up to the conclusion, that physical organization is the original cause of difference in our race. What a circumstance is this! Who that has ever closely studied the character of that gentleman, who ought always to be at home and under his own eye, has not found him very averse to too critical notice, and giving him the slip, with the latch-key in his pocket, having started on a fancy mission of his own? Is the mind or the owner master herein? or has some soft allurements thrown master and servant off guard, to give both an unasked holiday? Is not our power fickle in the bud, and bloom, and decay of life? But why? To what, save contingencies, is it attributable, that the earth is so besprinkled with pigmies, and here and there a giant? Have men taken the compasses, and inscribed the circle they will fill, resolving at twenty or twenty-five to be what they are at fifty or sixty? No, no. Apart from high resolve and true, worthy ambition, it is the invisible Lilliputians who, with finest silken elastic myriad threads, restrain or expand our powers, and by these are we made to feel that bolts and rivets are but the coarser shackles we wear—the stern outer signs and representatives of a finely woven gauze-work which falls, not on earth alone, but all finite things, material, sensible, invisible, and pertaining to thought.

Look at the race of men. Nothing is now wanting but some change, which no man can either command or imagine, to revolutionize all the thoughts and feelings of society, from earth's swollen centre to the poles. Who shall say what event shall usher in a new era, and re-model all? Who can even dream of the full plenitude of wisdom and goodness, where meek-eyed Pity shall be unable to detect a trace of poverty, as it is, or the rougher demon, vice? We never sought Utopia, but surely it is not there alone must be absent the din of war and false ambition, which ever exhausts hell to make earth forget the idea of heaven.

It is circumstances which excite us to action, like busy campaigners; and according to their relative power and our fluctuating knowledge and skill, we lead the maze of life. If they do not largely create desire, stimulate the spirit, and expand or contract this or that property or quality within us; if the knowledge gained by the vicissitudes of that time and chance which happeneth to all is neither the boon nor the curse of existence;

if the perception of good is alike in all, and faith in some leading principles the common property of the race, we will own that man is indeed a demigod; but if the wisest and the best fall and miss their prize, blinded by the dust of events, we deem ourselves bound in honesty to maintain, not that man is not strong, but that a stronger rules him unseen. If this be not true, why does wealth so often inflate poor mortals? How are all our emotions kindled, as readily as the Æolian harp breathes its tale to the zephyr, which kisses it, and hurries on its music-haunted course? Is the mind so cold and stoical, that sunshine and storm speak but one voice in its ear?

Was Louis Philippe free from the control we speak of when he exchanged the "saddle" he sat in so securely for a London sofa, when the crown which vanished from his fingers seemed to lead on the rider (never unseated yet), who came on the "pale horse," to unseat him from earth?

"Man sails on a river which seemeth wide,
And coloured and stained is its rolling tide;
He cleaves its billows, and vain of force,
He hurries along on life's river course;
He knows not what the river to him may be,
When or where it shall join the broad, broad sea.
Kind Heaven! oh, shape him his destiny."

If the affirmation we make is true at all times, does it not stare one in the face, when men let slip the finest advantages ever thrown in their way for a paltry deceit? when they live needlessly from hand to mouth, or indulge in miserable abortions of a dream? when, with few exceptions, men ignore the simplest, clearest principle established, and act on "The ——— take-the-hindmost" principle. We verily believe that, while making all allowance for the known difference between man and lower worms, the escape from the bondage of which we speak is the farthest Utopia ever supposed; and if we cannot demonstrate its non-existence, may we be pardoned for the pains we take to show that at present we are mentally and physically in the very definable latitude and longitude imposed upon us by the irrevocable past, and we deem the elucidation preferable to abstract reasoning. Until we are infinitely wise, it were well to rejoice in the ductility of man. Just look at the pains we take to get present good, *i. e.*, present comfort, present illusion. We love our children, possibly our grandchildren, if any of us are so grand. If our name multiplies, what pains do we take for posterity? Our reply is, practically, "What has posterity done for us?" We know that the demon poverty will sting our not remote offspring; but herein our wisdom, skill, and strength is less than that of a straying sunbeam. We take less pains to make a couch for the coming lords of creation, than we do for

cattle; and shall we boast of power to turn aside events? Want, disease, and crime more than decimate the "sons of God." What do we? A few may weep blood tears; but is not our power to stem the evils we mourn little more than the drivellings of dotage? Where is the evidence of our power, our inborn power, to rise? Are we a step beyond our fallen chieftain to insure dry bread? Our very foresight and experience scarcely leave us as wise as ants; and circumstances do not acquire, in our architectural fingers, any sure mathematical form.

Mankind are ever more or less menaced by things from without, which block their pathway, and stint their so-called freedom, that is (truly), their range. We are always standing at bay with obstacles: over some we are lord. Possibly not one difficulty singly may challenge us. We move like a lion in his lair, and fixedly eye our danger, and at times, with a bound, overleap all impediments, to turn upon them the proud glance of scorn. Does the confession end the controversy? Has not our inquiry arisen after these truths have become "household words"? Does not the question spontaneously spring up, Whence had this leo, man, his spring, thus to bound over barriers? May we not ask modestly for an estimate of the effects of "the times which passed over him"? or was there no educating power in them? and do they not hold out the hand of friendship as truly as they sometimes throw down the gauntlet of challenge? To know what we are, not one petty link in the chain of causation can we honestly pass by between the dark profound, or the dazzling light, to which we trace the extreme links. To stop short in inquiry voluntarily argues either an acknowledgment of the patent rights of the "Circumlocution office," or a kind of mental suicide, smacking of the very spawn of laziness.

If we know that life is begun without a purpose, that the after purpose of life is rarely in harmony with the will of Heaven; if, when fixedness pertains to it, the blast of events sends our house of cards quivering around us, shall we still maintain the doctrine of non-subjection? Couple ordinary and extraordinary events together, and compare them with man's design! Rather than be doomed to find the harmony, give us the labour of Sisyphus. On the other hand, take the vulgar idea of fate, illuminate it with biblical light, see God working by events, and harmony takes the place of confusion, telling man to hide his face in the dust.

We contend that man's power implies not master power; that range does not constitute freedom; that choice is an effect as well as a cause; and that this analytical examination is essential to self-knowledge. It is thus we find that circumstances "lick us into shape," and develop choice, thought, light, reflection, power;—this brings no man within the category of machines, nor can it, until machines rise in rank, and become sentient and thoughtful. Let no man complain. The upward sigh is power;

it is the struggle of the plant in the cellar to gain heaven's glorious light. We want, and ever shall want, more light, more power. Meanwhile, time and chance, in God's hand, are doing for us what climate and sunlight are doing for the world we roam on.

N.

ONE OF THE USES OF HISTORY.—The villain who has imposed on mankind by his power or cunning, and whom experience could not unmask for a time, is unmasked at length; and the honest man who has been misunderstood or defamed, is justified before his story ends. Or if this does not happen—if the villain dies with his mask on, in the midst of applause, and honour, and wealth, and power, and if the honest man dies under the same load of calumny and disgrace under which he so undeservedly lived, driven, perhaps, into exile and exposed to want,—yet we see historical justice executed; the name of the one branded with infamy, and that of the other celebrated with panegyric to succeeding ages.—*Bolingbroke*.

MEMORY.—AN ANECDOTE.—A gentleman had so bad a memory, and so circumscribed, that he scarce knew what he read. A friend, knowing this, lent him the same book to read seven times over; and being asked afterwards how he liked it, replied, "I think it is an admirable production; but the author sometimes repeats the same things."—*Thiebault*.

NATURAL HISTORY OF MAN.—In the external conformation of man, we immediately remark his upright stature, that majestic attitude, which announces his superiority over all the other inhabitants of the globe. He is the only being adapted by his organization to go erect.

It may appear a sufficient proof of the upright attitude and biped progression being natural to our species, that such has been the invariable practice of all nations in all ages of the world; that no people, no tribe, nor even any individual in a healthy condition has been known to do otherwise.—*Lawrence's Lectures*.

THE LIMITS OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES DEFINED.—When a nation forms a government, it is not wisdom, but *power*, which they place in the hands of the magistrate; from whence it follows, his concern is only with those objects which *power* can operate upon. On this account the administration of justice, the protection of property, and the defence of every member of the community from violence and outrage, fall naturally within the province of the civil ruler, for these may be all accomplished by *power*; but an attempt to distinguish truth from error, and to countenance one set of opinions to the prejudice of another, is to apply power in a manner mischievous and absurd.—*Rev. Robert Hall*.

Politics.

IS EDUCATION THE DUTY OF THE STATE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“To you I am bound for LIFE and EDUCATION.”—*Desdemona to her Father.*

“How empty learning, and how vain is art,
But as it mends the life and guides the heart!”—*Young.*

EDUCATION is the development of man's whole nature—physical, intellectual, and moral. Satisfactorily to expand the physical powers, to cultivate the intellectual faculties, and to rectify the moral feelings, demands the most serious attention and liberal support of every member of the vast family of man. The parent who is sensible that his child is a rational, intelligent, moral agent, must necessarily feel deeply interested in the cultivation of the natural powers possessed by his offspring, and must equally feel that the future happiness of his child depends upon the means employed for the purposes of his education. He therefore gives much attention to the subject, and expends much time, labour, and expense in the improvement of those powers as a means to promote the future happiness of his child. Influenced by such motives, we find that parents, in all ages of the world, where civilization hath exerted its benign influence, have esteemed the education of youth as the most important of all social questions. At the present time, the place it occupies in the public mind gives it the chief point of interest in the progressive spirit of the nation.

However widely the ancients and moderns may differ as to the quantity, quality, or kind of education, and the means of obtaining or enforcing it, all are equally agreed as to its importance—all equally admit its necessity—the savage and the *savan*, the peasant and the prince, the artizan and the statesman—all are in unison on this vital question in social science—the necessity and importance of education.

In no country has education occupied so much attention, or received so much support, as in our own country. Our forefathers have lavished their wealth upon educational institutions, our princes and our statesmen have fostered and honoured these institutions, and we, their heirs, are proud of their works, while we enjoy the benefits their kindness, prudence, and forethought have conferred upon us.

The advantages education gives to the world can scarcely be conceived; the peasant and artizan of the nineteenth century is

hereby put in possession of comforts and luxuries unknown to the good and the great of the olden times—the Alfreds and the Charlemagnes of infant nations. The ills of life are mitigated, the joys of life are increased, multiplied, and perpetuated, time, space, and distance are annihilated, the infant days of our mother world are made familiar as household tales, and the great and good of every age and clime speak to the heart and thrill the soul of man perpetually. But to contemplate its true value, one moment's reflection on the sad picture this world would present by the negation of all education is alone sufficient. See two individuals—one well educated, the other entirely ignorant; while the former is pleasant, agreeable, and happy, a good citizen and a joyous companion, the other is stupid, unapproachable, miserable, dissatisfied, suspicious, and emotionless; the one has within him the means of ennobling himself to greatness; the other is senseless, dependent, slavish. It is, therefore, concluded by all sound thinkers that education must rank among the vital interests of society; its absence would produce a moral night of worse than Egyptian darkness, as its presence must ever produce and increase that light which shineth brighter and brighter unto the perfect day.

The importance of education to civil society is, therefore, freely admitted. In accordance with the terms of the present debate, it becomes our duty to determine, according to the principles of right, justice, and our constitution, who is responsible for the education of the youthful portion of the community—whether the *State*, or the individual parent? In other words, Is it the duty of the State to educate the rising generation? In pursuing our argument it will be necessary to ascertain who or what the State is, how far it is capable of undertaking the responsibility, and whether education is a matter validly within the limits of the power of the state to perform.

The term *State* is exceedingly vague and indeterminate as popularly used in connection with our present subject. Sometimes it is the legislative, at others the executive; now it is the central executive, anon it is the municipal; and occasionally it is made a mixture of the whole. For our present purpose we shall consider the *State* as “that system of delegated agencies, by which the obligations of society to the individual are fulfilled.” Civil society is an institution of God. Such are the instincts of our nature, that society seems a necessity. Conjugal affection effects the simplest form of society, and is, as it were, the first link of an interminable chain of social bonds, relations, duties, and obligations. Whatever may be the peculiar theory of the individual accounting for the present social constitution of our country, few will be found possessing sufficient temerity to deny that naturally all men are equal—have equal natural rights and privileges; that is, in a state of nature all men are equal. This

state of nature and equality has been relinquished for a social state, in which some rights are conceded by the individual to the community, and the community compensates this concession by the performance of duties equal in importance to the welfare and happiness of the individual; hence arises the duty of governor and governed—the duty of the State and the duty of the citizen; thus, virtually, the laws by which the individual is governed are made by himself; that is, they are the result of his concessions to the community, in whatever manner they may be practically developed. It must be apparent that the individual cannot concede to the community that which is inalienable by himself, nor can the community accept that as its duty which is contrary to its nature, and manifestly beyond the limits of its capacity. Legislation is the prescriptive voice of the community—the rule of action for every individual citizen. It is necessary that the legislature should “furnish a rule of action in regard to others—voluntary in the one case, and compulsory in the other—which shall so commend itself to the mind of the person subject to it as to assure the assent of his consciousness; and, consequently, in the case of its compulsory application, to preclude a sense of tyranny.” And “the interference of this law (or rule of action) is limited to such exercise of the rights of nature as disturbs their exercise by others.” Thus “law is [only] auxiliary to duty; its final purpose is, the prevention of wrong.”* Education or its absence not being a wrong, in the legal sense of the term, is not within the province of the State, and cannot become the subject of legislation; and as the parent’s neglect of the education of his child cannot be construed into such an “exercise of the rights of nature as disturbs their exercise by others,” such neglect cannot become a fit subject for law, nor for the interference of the legislature; and as the parent’s neglect is the exercise of a natural right, which admits of the same right of nature being exercised by others without any disturbance of those rights, a sense of tyranny must of necessity be produced by the compulsory application of any “rule of action in regard to others.” Besides, as it allows the free exercise of natural rights in others, a rule of action having regard to others cannot, from its nature, be at all applicable; the conduct of the parent not affecting the rights of the community, the community has no jurisdiction—the legislature has no authority. Hence we conclude that, from the nature of civil society, government, and the principle of legislation, education is not the duty of the State.

The question now arises, Upon whom does this duty devolve? Who is responsible for the education of the rising race? We unhesitatingly reply, the parent; and in proving this to be true, we must necessarily prove that it is not the duty of the State,

* Professor Foster.

for two contraries cannot be both true; to prove one contrary is the disproof of the other. The physical and moral laws of the universe are so perfectly adapted to the nature of man in his social capacity, so admirably suited to the full development of his happiness, that the slightest attention to the subject will observe a beautiful illustration in the relations of marriage and of parent and child. Instinct, affection, maturity, and pride of offspring all tend to identify the honour and *amour propre* of the parent with the well-being of the child in the estimation of those by whom he is surrounded in his passage through life, and the approval his conduct is calculated to receive when his earthly course is finished, and he is presented before the grand review of the Great Eternal. Thus, by instinct and love the parent is impelled to the moral, intellectual, and physical advancement of his child, and the child, by the same motives, is impelled to yield obedience; thus nature prompts to the act, and habit strengthens the force of nature, uniting to give a moral power to education by the parent, entirely wanting in all substituted agencies for the purpose of education. The State, being different in nature to the individual man, cannot be possessed of instinct and affection, therefore cannot rightly educate the youth of the nation. Moreover, these instincts and this love are shown to be a necessary part of the parental nature; the State does not possess a parental nature in the same sense as the individual, and, therefore, the instinct and love possessed by the parent are inalienable by the parent, and cannot possibly be received by the State as essential parts of its nature. Hence it is not in the nature of the State to undertake the responsibility of educating the children of the community.

The parent's duty is, then, generally to educate his child in such a manner as to promote his present and future happiness. The maintenance and development of his physical constitution and its powers must be a necessary and important part of education; this, we opine, is equally beyond the power of the State with any branch of his intellectual and moral culture. The utter ignorance and helplessness of the child when he enters this world require, of necessity, the care and kindness which instinct and love alone can give. The culture and discipline necessary during its early childhood are more efficaciously supplied by the parent than by any State or other substitute, because what is wanting in scholastic fitness, according to the pre-conceived theory of State educationalists, is more than compensated by the greater amount of care, thoughtfulness, anticipated wants, evils avoided and joys anticipated by love and instinct.

But it may be objected, that the parent delegates the power to educate his child to the hands of teachers, and why may he not delegate, by an act of the legislature, the education of his child to the State, or to the teachers appointed by the State?

In reply, we observe, that to the teacher he voluntarily employs he delegates only a *part* of the education of his child; he is not thereby himself discharged from his duty to educate; he is the principal, the teacher is the agent; and the responsibility of the teacher is to the parent, while his own responsibility remains the same—perfect and inviolable; but a legislative act of the State places the matter in a far different position. Here the teacher is not a matter of choice, but one of necessity—penalty becomes due on withholding the child from the State teacher's instructions; hence the relation of parent and teacher are widely altered; the teacher is constituted by the legislative act an independent, if not an authoritative, superior to the parent; the parent's rights and obligations are withdrawn along with the performance of his duties; and by the destruction of these rights and the removal of these obligations and duties, a large inroad is made upon the family circle, one of the strongest household bonds is severed, the parental authority is destroyed, and anarchy and disaffection are sown broadcast over the land—nay, are inwrought into the very nature of the rising generation, gaining strength from early impression and the force of early habit, so invincible in the formation of character, and determining the after position of the man in time and eternity. Peculiarly appropriate are the remarks on this subject of Professor Wayland:—"Several duties devolve upon the one which cannot rightfully devolve upon the other; for instance, he [the parent] is bound to inform himself of the peculiar habits and reflect upon the probable future situation of his child, and deliberately to consider what sort of education will most conduce to his future happiness and usefulness. He is bound to select such instructors as will best accomplish the results which he believes will be most beneficial. He is bound to devote such time and attention to the subject as will enable him to ascertain whether the instructor of his child discharges his duty with faithfulness; to encourage his child, by manifesting such interest in his studies, as shall give to diligence and assiduity all the assistance and benefit of parental authority and friendship. And if a parent be under obligation to do this, he is of course under obligation to take time to do it, and so to construct the arrangements of his family and business that it may be done. He has no right to say that he has no time for these duties. * * *

The eternal destiny of the child is placed, in a most important sense, in the hands of its parent. The parent is under obligation to instruct and cause his child to be instructed in those religious sentiments which he believes to be according to the will of God. With his duty in this respect, until the child becomes able to decide for himself, no one has a right to interfere." Locke, in his "Essay on Civil Government," p. 233, also observes, that "Adam and Eve, and, after them, all parents,

were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and *educate their children*; not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them." Blackstone, in vol. i., p. 451, of his "Commentaries," speaks very plainly on this point, for he says, "The last duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an education suitable to their station in life—a duty pointed out by reason, and of by far the greatest importance of any; for, as Puffendorf very well observes, it is not easy to imagine or allow that a parent has conferred any considerable benefit upon his child by bringing him into the world, if he entirely neglects his culture and education, and suffers him to grow up like a mere beast, to lead a life useless to others and shameful to himself." Dr. Paley writes on this subject, in his "Moral and Political Philosophy," p. 216, "This duty of parents has its limit, like other duties, and admits, if not of perfect precision, at least of rules definite enough for application. These rules may be explained under the several heads of maintenance, education, and a reasonable provision for the child's happiness in respect of outward condition. * * * Education, in the most extensive sense of the word, may comprehend every preparation that is made in youth for the sequel of our lives; and in this sense I use it. Some such preparation is necessary for children of all conditions, because without it they must be miserable, and, probably, will be vicious when they grow up, either from want of the means of subsistence, or from want of rational and inoffensive occupation." So we also read, in Dr. Taylor's treatise on "Civil Law," p. 180, that "Providence has assigned this care, which I call education, to those natural trustees, the secondary author of each respective being; and has entailed the duties of sustenance, tenderness, and preservation on the producer, and stipulated (in the human species at least) for the gracious returns of duty, homage, and respect on the part of the offspring—a covenant where nature herself, by the most tender feelings and the most lively touches of our constitution, by what is called parental affection on one hand and filial piety on the other, seems in great measure to stand bound for the performance."

Our limits now admonish us. We therefore conclude for the present, observing that as advocates of voluntary education, we do not lightly esteem the importance of education to the individual or to society; on the contrary, because we esteem it of such great importance do we the more earnestly contend for the rights of parents and the necessity of preserving its voluntary nature from violation by the rude hands of Goths and Vandals, who would be constantly reducing the nobility of man's nature and powers to the unity of serf-like subjection, stereotype the ideas and emotions of the immortal soul within the stern, iron

bonds of man's Jesuitical creeds and formalisms, or manacle his ethereal nature with the materialism of secularism, binding him with the galling fetters of emotionless utility. Parents, know your responsibilities, your duties, and your privileges, and remember the wisdom which dictated the precept, "Train up a child in the way he should go: and when he is old, he will not depart from it."

Birmingham.

L'OUVRIER.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

" Oh! for the coming of that glorious time
When, prizing knowledge as her noblest wealth
And best protection, this imperial realm,
While she exacts allegiance, shall admit
An obligation on her part to teach
Them who are born to serve her and obey!
Binding herself by statute to secure
For all the children, whom her soil maintains,
The rudiments of letters, and inform
The mind with moral and religious truth,
Both understood and practised; so that none,
However destitute, be left to droop,
By timely culture unsustained, or run
Into a wild disorder, or be forced
To drudge through weary life without the aid
Of intellectual implements and tools,
A savage horde among the civilized—
A servile band among the lordly free.
This sacred right the lisping babe proclaims
To be inherent in him by Heaven's will."—*Wordsworth.*

THE present subject of debate, though long settled in the affirmative in the leading civilized nations of the world, seems, in our land, to have been considered, from the first, as an admirable battle-field for the display of sectarian zeal and christian malignity. Having a perfect detestation for sectarianism (which is the blight of all improvement, national and social, and the cause of nearly all the heart-burnings and antipathies in the world, and of the present lamentable absence of education amongst the poor of our land), we wish to discuss this question in a christian spirit, apart from sectarian and party feeling.

We propose dividing our remarks under the following heads:—

1st. That education is essential to the social and religious well-being of the people.

2nd. That "voluntaryism" (or private charity) is insufficient to spread education amongst the bulk of the poor.

3rd. Therefore, that it is the duty of the State to provide and carry out a system of education for the benefit of the people at large.

1st. The condition of the lower classes at the present time is

degraded and repulsive in the extreme. There is a large residuum of our population sunk in vice and misery—practical barbarians in the midst of our civilization. Irreligion, intemperance, and ignorance prevail to an alarming extent. In every town there are localities crowded with filthy inhabitants; fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, strangers, the dead and the dying—are all huddled indiscriminately together, regardless of decency and morality, in cellars and hovels infinitely worse in respect to all sanitary conditions than the stables in which we keep our horses. “No one but persons who have visited such dens can form any idea of their horrible condition.”* In the year 1848, in the town of Liverpool, above *forty thousand* of our fellow-creatures were living in cellars. These haunts of degradation, hotbeds of pestilence and immorality, and threatening foci of disease and vice to all around, are often situated in close juxtaposition to the mansions of the wealthy and affluent of the land. Few of these “plague-spots and fever-stills” are known to any but those whose duties lead them into contact with the poor. “Few of the countless throngs who flood the paths in Grays’ Inn Lane have any knowledge of the hotbeds of disease and vice which exist within a dozen yards of them.”* If there be any who think we are making out the condition of the labouring classes to be worse than it really is, we can refer them in confirmation of our views to the work from which the above extract is taken, to the census statistics, to the City Missionary and Board of Health reports, and to the works of Henry Mayhew (no one can accuse *him*, the friend of the poor and oppressed, of exaggeration, or of drawing on his own imagination for the horrible scenes of vice, misery, and degradation which he describes in the “London Labour and London Poor”). Can the unsatisfactory condition of our labouring poor be attributable to our high state of civilization, as some affirm? Facts prove the contrary. From the condition of Holland, Switzerland, and Germany, it is evident that civilization can exist without the attendant evils of rags, filth, and dissipation. Those disgusting sights of civilized barbarism which continually meet our eyes in this country are there never seen. They *must* have their forlorn poor, for Moses tells us that “the poor shall never cease out of the land.” It stands to reason that the lowest in the social scale must always be poor. But then decent poverty and squalid, filthy wretchedness are very different. The inhabitants of the before-mentioned countries, however poor they may be, are invariably decently clad. They possess habits of temperance and frugality, making “both ends meet” by living *within* their means. Here parties of the same

* Mr. Rawlinson, C.E.

† “London Shadows; or, a Glance at the Homes of the Thousands,” by George Godwin, F.R.S., &c.

class] spend half their earnings in the public house, themselves and families being clothed in dirty rags, which even a savage would despise. What matters it that our country maintains the lead in commercial enterprise, mechanical skill, and scientific researches, if the base of our social pyramid is in such an unsatisfactory condition? We may prosper for a while, but the result cannot be satisfactory in the end. No one who has ever travelled on the continent can deny the fact, that the social condition of the labouring poor is much lower here than in other countries. Wherefore the difference? It is this,—abroad the lower classes, though infinitely more given to amusement and relaxation (which they know how to enjoy without abusing), they maintain frugal and temperate habits, whilst “universal England rageth drunk.” It is true, many of our labouring classes are free from the degrading vice of drunkenness; many, too, are saving and provident men, but by these very means they raise themselves eventually to a higher station in society; it is no less true that the *majority of our labouring population* spend a large proportion of their earnings in that which reduces themselves and families to degradation and want. The chaplain of Preston jail, in one of his reports, says, “The insane fondness for drink prevails among the *whole* working part of the people.” Having ascertained “the weekly expenditure in liquor of all the men—hard-working labourers and skilled artisans—employed by one master,” he found that, “taking any 100 or 150 well employed workmen, each of them, on the average, devotes to the pleasures of drink more than 25 per cent. of his earnings; that many married men thus squander 40 or 50 per cent.; and that some are so infatuated as to throw away weekly in drink *thirty-five shillings out of forty shillings wages*.” In Glasgow alone it is estimated that *ten thousand* men go to bed drunk on the Saturday night, continue drunk all Sunday, and remain in the same state part of Monday! In spite, then, of private benevolence, religious missions, and six millions spent annually under the Poor Laws—in spite of the fact that labour is better remunerated in this country than in any other—we find a vast proportion of our labouring classes far behind the nations of the continent in decency and comfort; indeed, many are in reality worse off, and more degraded and barbarous than their painted, half-naked ancestors—they still require to be brought into the fold of social life. The slenderness of the results proves that the appliances at present in existence for this purpose are insufficient. The social condition of the upper and middle classes is far in advance of what it was a hundred years since. Vice seems to have sunk to a lower level. Formerly intemperance was considered to be respectable. The expression, “drunk as a lord,” which meant any one in a beastly state of intoxication, is no longer applicable. And why? The tastes of the upper and middle classes have

changed. The poor clerk on fifty pounds a year maintains a decent appearance; his education and station prevent him from carousing at the bar of a public house, and going home in a state of intoxication; but the well-paid artisan, earning his thirty or forty shillings a week, ruins his health and morality in dens of infamy, and ends his days in a pauper's grave. The higher the wages, the greater the intemperance. The principal depositors in savings' banks are those whose earnings are the lowest. Our labouring population seldom think of the future; whether in work or out of work they claim the privilege of marrying; they refrain from no present pleasure, and almost invariably live from "hand to mouth," spending their wages as they receive it. We thus see that the great sin of the working classes is *improvidence*. It is this that fills our prisons; that crowds our back slums—"Bethnal-greens" and "Cowgates"—with a demoralized and filthy population; that sends out into our streets famishing, wretchedly clad children; that causes one in every ten to be a pauper. But *improvidence is the result of ignorance*. Does it not appear evident, then, that "education is the duty of the State"? We cannot blame the people; society should combat the direful effects of this wide-spread improvidence, which, like a festering sore, destroys the fair renown of this so-called christian land, by spreading throughout the length and breadth of our country moral and mechanical education.

Though ignorance and crime, to the general and unprejudiced observer, seem inseparable, yet there are individuals who contend that education does not prevent crime, and point to such men as Sir John Paul, John Sadleir, &c. Few consider that education would eradicate crime, but we maintain that it would tend greatly to its *prevention*. The example of Sir John Paul is very ill chosen; for, by using the very same line of argument, we might prove that religion itself is useless to prevent crime. Was he not one of the foremost amongst the Exeter Hall philanthropists, continually expatiating on the beauties of religion, and, to all outward appearances, a very religious man? yet all his knowledge of religious truths did not prevent him from becoming a criminal of the blackest dye! Exceptions such as these prove nothing; it is the effect on the *majority* of individuals we should observe. Samuel Warren, Esq., D.C.L., thus urges that intemperance and ignorance are the two mighty evils at the root of all other social evils:—"I can see more clearly than ever—terribly clearly—the connection between cause and effect in crime. I can see it in the very act of hideous growth from the twin stems of intemperance and ignorance, which themselves take quick and deep root in the soil of man's corrupt heart. While we ought to be laying the axe to the root of the infernal tree, we content ourselves with snipping off leisurely a few of the uppermost leaves and twigs! Is not this merely child's

work?—idiot's work? May we not be guilty of impious trifling with an awful task set us by God? Do we forget who told us that 'men do not gather figs from thistles, nor grapes from thorns'?"* This opinion is held and enforced by almost every Judge in the land. The number of persons committed to the Wakefield House of Correction for the year ending the 31st December, 1855, was 3,873; of this number, no fewer than 1,415 were neither able to read nor write, 942 could read only, 1,427 could read and write imperfectly, and 89 only were educated as every man ought to be. Can any one, after reading such facts as these, conscientiously believe that ignorance and crime bear no relation to each other?

That education is necessary to the religious well-being of the State is denied by the bigoted sectary, but the unprejudiced Christian thinks differently. A certain enlightenment of the intellect is necessary before the grand and sublime truths of Christianity can be comprehended; without this enlightenment, the seeds of religion find a soil capable only of nourishing them into superstition, which has aptly been termed the religion of the illiterate. In fact, knowledge is alike required for this world and the next; without it, we stand but a poor chance of pushing our way here, or of attaining to a happy future hereafter. If the opinion of one man more than another deserves consideration on this important point, that man is Luther, the father of Protestantism. He saw the necessity of promoting and extending the intellectual enlightenment on which his reformation was founded, so that the great work he commenced might extend and ramify through all nations. Indeed, the extension of sound education was one of the great aims of his life; his constant endeavour was to place instruction within the reach of all. "It will not do," he writes, "to say that the children of the poor have no time for attending school. My opinion is, that the boys should go to school for an hour or two every day, and bestow the rest of their time at home in working, or learning their future trade." And, therefore, he argues that it is the duty of the State to provide instruction for all; "for since these children, whether instructed or ignorant, must grow up amongst us—and the well-being of a state does not consist merely in riches and military strength, but in good and orderly citizens; yet, besides those whose parents are too careless, there are many whose parents, though willing, are unable or unfitted to instruct—it is no less the interest than the duty of the government to care for those who otherwise must grow up without any instruction whatever."

We do not wish it to be understood that no uneducated man can be a true Christian. Our opinion is, that the illiterate man *may* possess pure religion, but that he *more often* becomes the

* Charge to the Grand Jury of Hull, Michaelmas Sessions, 1855.

sport of religious fanatics, the dupe of Shakers, Jumpers, &c. Where do the Mormons principally obtain their proselytes? From amongst the superstitious and religiously inclined uneducated Welshmen. My poor, deluded fellow-countrymen, not having the education which every man ought to possess, fall a prey to sophistical arguments of the missionaries from the Salt Lake. They are utterly unable to carry out the scripture injunction, "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good." I cannot refrain from quoting the following extract in support of my views, and in illustration of this command:—"In the present day, many persons almost nauseate the very name of a sermon, because there are so many silly and ignorant men who babble out from the pulpit their own inventions; and also ungodly men and contemners of religion, who preach execrable blasphemies. Wherefore, because (by the faults of such teachers) prophecy [or, preaching] might be brought into dislike, or even be almost entirely rejected, Paul commands the Thessalonians, to '*prove all things.*' Some men, finding that themselves, or the bulk of men, have been imposed upon, reject in the mass all doctrines; others, with weak credulity, indiscriminately *embrace whatsoever is proposed to them in the name of God.* The former class, filled with proud prejudice, bar themselves out from the way of improvement; the others rashly expose themselves to every wind of error. From these two extremes Paul recalls the Thessalonians to the middle path, forbidding the condemnation of any sentiment till it be first duly examined, and admonishing that we should exercise a just judgment before we receive as certain that which is proposed to us."*

We have thus seen that the degraded condition of the working classes is not a necessary consequence of our high state of civilization, but that it proceeds from the state of ignorance in which they are permitted to remain; and also that Protestantism, to be fully effective in evangelizing the masses, requires the aid of a certain degree of enlightenment. We have, therefore, proved that education is essential to the social and religious well-being of the people.

2nd. That voluntarism has failed in improving the morals of the under-stratum of society, is incontrovertible. The war of sects is still going on; each wishes to obtain the upper hand, and, if we wait for the settlement of certain dogmas, which have been in dispute for ages past and will be for ages to come, before we attempt to obtain anything like a general system of education, the lower classes will have to remain in a state of ignorance for an indefinite period, to which even the most sanguine cannot attach limits. Something like ten millions are spent annually in England on religion, and yet one-fifth of the people are practical

* Calvin, in his "Comment. in Epistolas."

secularists, and another fifth go to church as they would to a place of public amusement. How vast the means, how slender the result! The present condition of the masses is thus described:—"In a religious aspect, society has changed for the worse. Our rural districts are no longer famous for their Bethel-like homes. There has sprung up a contempt for the 'wisdom which cometh from above,' and for the simple, truthful, heartfelt piety of our forefathers. Our churches are filled, but it is with the upper, the middle, and a sprinkling of the better class of artizans—all, indeed, with whom it is necessary to make an appearance; but the working classes, who disdain the hypocrisy of appearances, are not there, but are found loitering in their homes,"* or spending the sabbath in the public house. Each sect reviles the other, and waste their energies in a vain and useless system of proselyting, instead of working in common to spread that knowledge which would enable the poor man at least to comprehend what they are striving at, and thus enable him to judge according to the dictates of his enlightened intellect. According to the last census there are three and a half millions of children in England and Wales destitute of proper instruction; and yet voluntaryists can prate of the non-necessity of Government interference. If we consider that voluntaryism originated at the commencement of this century, and first started at zero, we find that it has been fifty years in getting one-eighth of the children in this country within its influence! At the present rate of increase, what prospect have we of ever seeing the masses properly educated? There are now two millions of children neither at school nor at work! Does not this prove the utter failure of voluntaryism? Even the increase of educational establishments within the last few years is not due to pure voluntary efforts. The State has had more to do with the matter than voluntaryists like to admit. Take, for example, the case of the town of Halifax, and we find that up to 1840 voluntaryism could only contribute two schools for the education of the working classes; now it boasts of ten—*eight* of which are attributable to the exertions of Government. To educate the bulk of the poor would require a sum far too heavy for pure voluntaryism to raise. In populous districts, where wealth abounds, it *may* be possible to find a sufficient number of charitable individuals willing to distribute a little of their surplus cash for the benefit of their less fortunate neighbours; but in less favoured districts, where the bulk of the middle classes are comparatively poor, and the gentry and landed proprietors non-residents, it ever will be morally impossible to raise anything like an adequate sum for

* "The Elevation of the Working Classes," by A. Guthrie, of the *Ardrossan and Saltcoats Herald*. This pamphlet is well worthy of the consideration of all who feel an interest in the future elevation of the working classes.

the maintenance of the necessary number of schools. I think I have said enough to prove that the voluntary principle of education is a fallacy, and entirely insufficient to cope with the present lamentable extent of ignorance.

3rd. From what we have already advanced, we deduce the logical inference, that "education is the duty of the State." In conclusion, we propose to analyze the various objections which have been urged from time to time against a State education, and intend showing that they are entirely fallacious. Education is naturally divided into three branches—mechanical, moral, and religious. *Mechanical* education comprises reading, writing, arithmetic, &c.; *moral* education has for its object to instil the perception of right and wrong, and to inspire love for the good, the just, and the honourable; and *religious* education teaches our accountability to and relation with a holy and merciful heavenly Father. A national system of education in our land, on account of the numerous religious doctrines which prevail, should comprise the first two branches only; the religious department, which belongs exclusively to the parent and the church, should be attended to separately by the clergymen of the various denominations. Nothing can be fairer. The rich are at present educated on this principle; but such a system of education being devised for the poor—for the non-attendant at any place of worship—the various sects take alarm, and raise the cry, that secular instruction is useless and prejudicial. The fact is, each sect wishes to have the power of inculcating its own peculiar views and dogmas; and thus, until it can be settled which dogma is to prevail, the mass of the people are to remain in ignorance, unless the unprejudiced friends of the people succeed in bringing about a State education free from any sectarian control.

Education is incomplete without religious instruction; muscular development and personal cleanliness are also necessary parts of education; and it is quite as absurd to make religion an *indispensable adjunct* to the schoolroom, as it would be to insist upon swimming and gymnastics being taught in the same building. For Government to interfere with the religious education of the people, would be to put an extinguisher on religious liberty. We must, then, have secular education, or none at all. We cannot see why the poor should not be allowed the same facilities for obtaining instruction, apart from religion, as the rich. Education, according to the sectarian belief, resolves itself simply into *religious instruction*. Teach the poor how to read the Bible, it is said, and they will become intelligent and happy citizens, good fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters, and crime will diminish. Millions are receiving this instruction—but has the result been so satisfactory? There are two millions of Sunday scholars in England and Wales receiving "the elements of a religious education; but no sooner do they mingle in the active

world of labour, than, subjected to the constant action of opposing influences, they soon become as utter strangers to religious ordinances as the people of a heathen country."* The knowledge of religious truth alone will never make any one better or happier; the *doing* what is right is as necessary as the *knowing* what ought to be done. Those who are opposed to the establishment of secular institutions prevent the sabbath schools from being as efficient as they undoubtedly would be under a different system of affairs. The Sunday teaching is rendered nugatory by the opposing influences of the other six days. How much better would it be for religion, if the children who attend the sabbath schools spent the week in storing their minds with secular knowledge, than, as now, in idleness and in constant intercourse with indecency and demoralization! Surely the *teaching* of the secular school would be better than the *training* of the back slums and alleys! Do our opponents consider science to be incompatible with religion?—education to be a greater temptation to crime than ignorance?—or the *morality* obtained by secular teaching to be more injurious than the *immorality* the result of total *ignorance*?

Another class of objectors maintain that Government has no right to interfere with "the liberty of the subject." They recognize the right of the State to interfere in social matters connected with sanitary observances; can they admit that it is not as necessary for the well-being of the State to remove ignorance from the minds of the people, as to remove filth from our streets?

Lastly, we have those who, treating State education as a "continental innovation," contend that it would lead to military despotism. A national system of education signifies, according to them, "universal espionage; and universal espionage is incompatible with the freedom of Englishmen." They continually refer to Prussia, Austria, &c., in confirmation of their views; but they never mention the fact that the United States acknowledge the benefits of a State education, and that those states in which the most money is spent on education possess the greatest number of places of worship, and the most intelligent and religious citizens.

Let our readers lay aside all party bias and sectarian prejudice, and we have no fear for the result; the inevitable conclusion must be, that "Education is the Duty of the State."

Bradford.

TALIESIN.

INGRATITUDE.—You seldom find people ungrateful so long as you are in a condition to serve them.—*Roche foucault.*

* Mr. Mann—Census Returns on Public Worship.

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THESE two unenviable and detestable characters hold a very singular position. They stand in the same relative position, in the social "spectrum," as do the two colours, violet and red, in the solar one. They are the extreme boundaries of a variety of phases—the one being the very antipodes of the other. That every virtue has its contrary vice, and every good an opposite evil, is well known and acknowledged; but we do not think there is any similar instance of two characters placed as these are. We have the good man, and, opposed to him, the bad one; there is the righteous man, and the infidel; the honest man, and the rogue; and we have the sabbath kept holy by one and desecrated by another. In all these instances, however, the one disposition is admired, while the other is detested; whereas, in those before us, though the one *is* opposed to the other, *both* are despicable and bad. Thus arises the necessity of finding an answer to the question heading this article.

Before undertaking this peculiar task, we beg to warn all who may consider the question, with a view to its solution, to guard themselves against falling into a very dangerous error; it is, of being prejudiced against the spendthrift, and in the miser's favour, owing to the former being in the majority—there being more members composing the first of these two classes, the injuries resulting to society burdened with them are likely to appear on a magnified scale. We must, therefore, take one of each class, and consider him alone, in all his bearings, and strive to overlook the existence of others of the same kind. Like Sterne took his captive, we must take our spendthrift (or miser), and, viewing him with care and attention, form our conclusion as to which of the two is most hurtful to that society in which they may be placed.

Let us now to the task; and the spendthrift and the miser being given to us to find which is the greatest bane to society, our answer is, the latter. As there are two sides to every question, and two methods of solving every problem, we must undertake the task of proving the correctness of our reply. What, then, is the nature of the evils suffered by society through the misconduct of the prodigal? We find a young man, it may be, possessing a large sum of money, squandering it in many

ways, until at last *all* is gone. While in possession of it, we may find him at all the theatres, and sometimes at more filthy and debasing resorts. He may be surrounded by the lowest of characters—even the very dregs of society—wasting his property upon them—the associate of the depraved, and friend of society's outcasts. While “enjoying” himself, he makes himself his own and worst enemy, and by aiding in the support of those whom society abhors, he injures it. At last, with money spent, respect lost, and health quite ruined, he is cast a burthen, in *some* instances, upon society; but, we think, in many cases, his relations are the chief sufferers.

We allow him to be, *partly*, the supporter of gambling houses, horse races, theatres, “gin palaces,” and other abodes of sin and vice; but, at the same time, we must declare him *not* to be the *sole* agent here. Are there none others patronizing, by their presence, these detestable places? “Curses” to the community though they be, yet a great portion of those comprising that community, though not worthy of the truly degrading title of spendthrifts, yet help to maintain these “curses.”

Sorry we are to say, but a love for truth compels us, that one or two of these places of resort are attended by persons who hold a higher and far more respectable position in society than the prodigal. Many who would run from such a being, as from a burning powder magazine, are *not* ashamed to be patronizers, with him, of these magazines of crime. Therefore the injuries occasioned by the prodigal to the society cursed with his presence are but of a partial and indirect character, and must have but little weight in the present debate, since a very large proportion of society itself must stand on the same level with him.

Turn we now to the miser, that most detestable of characters. We declare him to be the *direct* cause of much of the misery and misfortune which falls to the lot of a great part of the community. The miser, by hoarding up his money, necessarily keeps it from circulation.

We allow that he may be an industrious man—perhaps works *hard* for his bread. This is a quality we cannot grant the spendthrift, but this does not mitigate the miser's case, for what use is his industry? Who is benefited by it? He works but to earn—he earns to hoard. We dare not say, he hoards to ruin others, but we make bold to declare, that if this is not his object, it is, unfortunately, the unavoidable consequence of his niggardly qualities.

Money, though a great evil, is as great a necessity in the present shape of society. The physical, moral, mental, and (we say it not hastily) religious nature of man must depend, for improvement, upon its free circulation. Prevent this, and the progress of civilization is at a dead lock—a perfect stand still. Money may be termed “the fly wheel” of society; and without it society

stands in the same predicament as would an engine under the same circumstances. The more it is circulated, the more commerce and trade flourishes, the more is society the gainer; and because the stoppage of that beneficial circulation, in any way, injures it, more or less, we claim the miser as one of the many banes of society.

The sum hoarded up by such a man is seldom a small amount, as experience has often shown; we therefore think him to be the ignorant cause of much of the pecuniary misfortunes falling to the lot of the hard-working portion of society—a great part of them may be attributed to the existence of his niggardly propensities. We know he is not, neither do we assert him to be, the *sole* cause, but we declare him one of the links (and a very strong one) of that chain which holds back many from the opportunity of advancing. Who can sum up the amount of evils following the want of a full and free circulation of “the coin of the realm,” retarded by the parsimony of a few? Where does the evil begin, and where end? Part at the miser; but the *end* none can point out.

Here we may be answered, that these evils are not *all* caused by the miser, but that he, like the spendthrift, is the author but of a part. This we must grant; but we beg to say, that the prodigal is not so much the *cause* of fresh evils and misfortunes as the *supporter* of *previously existing* ones; whereas the evils we ascribe to the miser proceed *directly* from and are *created* by him. The former is not the source of the misfortunes, but merely a little brook, helping to swell the mighty stream. The evils springing from the miser’s keeping back his money are unavoidable; but those which the prodigal maintains, but does not create, society could shake off. To do this only require a strenuous effort on its part; but society is willing to let them remain.

We are told by T. U., that the man who wastes and misemploys his money becomes ultimately a burden to the nation—is thrown upon it for support, and helps in filling and keeping full those buildings which the generosity of the country has raised for the maintenance of the poor and needy.

Here the spendthrift becomes his own enemy; and we would suggest, that to the prodigal’s one the miser sends five to the same place. We think that while, in the case of the former, but one individual falls back upon the support of his country, the latter, by his conduct, is the cause of five times that number so doing.

We allow that after the miser’s decease his hoarded money *then* is circulated, but the evil *has happened*, and to distribute the money at that time is similar to shutting the stable door after the steed has been stolen.

T. U. tells us candidly that his article was written chiefly with the view of opening this debate; and we allow him credit for

having written in a quiet and impartial manner; but we trust that he will read this, and hope it may lead him to the forming of a decided opinion upon the subject.

We think we have now shown that the miser—"the wretch covetous to the extreme," brings more *direct* misfortune upon the community in which he dwells than does the prodigal. Before concluding this, however, there is one little circumstance we desire to allude to, viz., the miser's solitary habits. He is, "a solitary creature" (though we must deny that he brings *no* misfortunes upon any family circle); but this we regard as not favourable for him. Man was made for the society of man, and everyone who excludes himself from the society of his fellow-creatures is to be condemned. We all need one another's support, and every man who refuses *his* is most assuredly not only treating society disrespectfully, but also *injures* it; therefore we *blame* the miser for his "solitary habits."

It may, perhaps, be said of the man so acting, that his conduct is preferable to his who, by living in the community, sets a bad example unto the rest. Granted; but let it not be forgotten, that the latter has opportunities for amendment, from which the former debars himself. "Wise men learn by others' harm," is a good proverb; therefore let all who consider this question, whatever side they may take, turn it to good account, and take care that, while frugal, they may not be mean and covetous; and, on the other hand, guard against a wasteful expenditure while spending money. Let us be of the number of those whose every action may be guided "by love to God, and love to man."

Stepney.

J. R.

THE PASSIONS.—

Pleasures are ever in our hands or eyes,
And when in act they cease, in prospect rise;
All spread their charms, but charm not all alike;
On different senses different objects strike;
Hence different passions more or less inflame,
As strong or weak, the organs of the frame;
And hence one master passion in the breast,
Like Aaron's serpent, swallows all the rest.—

Pope's Essay on Man.

POWERS OF MEMORY.—The powers of memory are twofold. They consist in the actual reminiscence or recollection of past events, and in the power of retaining what we have learned, in such a manner, that it can be called into remembrance as occasions present themselves, or circumstances may require.—*Cogan.*

ANCIENT CUSTOMS.—Their origin is commonly unknown; for the practice often continues when the cause has ceased, and concerning superstitious ceremonies it is in vain to conjecture; for what reason did not dictate, reason cannot explain.—*Dr. Johnson.*

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 277.)

5.—THE VERB.

Most of the terms which we have to employ in speaking of the conjugation of the verb are already familiar by their use in English grammar; but some require special notice on account of their distinctive use in the French language.

In the Indicative Mood there are five simple tenses:—

1. The Present, as in English; as *Je tiens*, I hold, or I am holding.
2. The Imperfect, which is generally to be translated by one or other of our English Imperfects, as *Je parlais*, I spoke, I was speaking. Sometimes it may be better represented by our phrase, *I used to*; as, *Brutus PASSAIT une partie des nuits à s'instruire de l'art militaire*, Brutus *used to spend* a part of the nights in teaching himself the art of war.
3. The Preterite corresponds to the Historical Imperfect of the English verb. It is used for the principal and leading facts in a narrative, while the circumstances are expressed in the Imperfect: but the special distinction between these tenses cannot be taught by rules, and must be learnt from the practice of the best authors. Thus Barthélémy, in his *Voyage d'Anacharse*; "*Je remontai*⁽¹⁾ *sur le vaisseau, et je tressaillis*⁽¹⁾ *de joie en apprenant que notre voyage allait*⁽²⁾ *finir, que nous étions*⁽²⁾ *sur la mer Egée. Sur le soir nous aperçûmes*⁽¹⁾ *du côté de Lemnos que nous venions*⁽²⁾ *de reconnaître à l'ouest, des flammes qui s'élevaient*⁽²⁾ *par intervalles dans les airs,*" "I embarked on the vessel, and I leaped for joy on learning that our voyage was going to end, that we were in the Ægean Sea. In the evening we saw, in the direction of Lemnos, which we had just discovered in the west, flames which at times arose in the air." The tenses marked (1) are preterites, those marked (2) are imperfects.

4. The Future Tense corresponds to our First Future, but it has no distinction of *shall* and *will*, and merely predicts. *Il ira* means, he will go; *tu régneras un jour*, thou wilt reign some day; but to express he *shall* go, thou *shalt* write, a different phrase must be employed.

5. The fifth simple tense of the Indicative partially answers to our Imperfect Potential, as *je voudrais savoir*, I should like to know; l'oracle avait dit que la nation dont le roi *périrait*, *serait* victorieuse, the oracle had declared that the nation whose king *should perish would be* victorious.

Besides these there are commonly reckoned five compound tenses, which are formed by adding the past participle to the five simple tenses of the verb *avoir*, to have; as, *j'ai eu*, I have had; *tu avais été*, thou hadst been; *il eut trouvé*

he had found; *nous aurons mis*, we shall have put; *vous auriez répondu*, you would have answered.

There are also two other expressions which have not yet been called tenses, but which have as much right to the name as some that are given above. (1) The use of the present infinitive after the present and imperfect of the verb *aller*, to go; as, *je vais vous dire*, I am going to tell you; a sort of paulo-post future, meaning that the action will begin (or would begin), directly; *nous allions entrer*, we were going to enter, we were just entering. (2) The use of the present infinitive with *de* before it, after the present and imperfect of *venir*, to come; as, *la bataille que je viens d'écrire*, the battle which I have just described; *Lemnos, que nous venions de reconnaître*, Lemnos, which we had just discovered.

The part of the verb which answers to our present participle is called the *gerund*; *partant*, setting out, is the *gerund* of *partir*; *agissant*, acting, of *agir*.

In French, as in English, the two auxiliary verbs, which are principally employed in forming the compound tenses of the active voice, and the phrases which constitute the passive voice, are AVOIR, to have, and ÊTRE, to be.

1.—AVOIR.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
J'ai	<i>I have</i>	Nous avons	<i>we have</i>
Tu as	<i>thou hast</i>	Vous avez	<i>ye or you have</i>
Il or elle a	<i>he, it, or she has</i>	Ils or elles ont	<i>they have</i>

Imperfect Tense.

J'avais	<i>I had</i>	Nous avions	<i>we had</i>
Tu avais	<i>thou hadst</i>	Vous aviez	<i>ye or you had</i>
Il avait	<i>he had</i>	Ils avaient	<i>they had</i>

Preterite Tense.

J'eus	<i>I had</i>	Nous eûmes	<i>we had</i>
Tu eus	<i>thou hadst</i>	Vous eûtes	<i>ye or you had</i>
Il eut	<i>he had</i>	Ils eurent	<i>they had</i>

Future Tense.

J'aurai	<i>I shall have</i>	Nous aurons	<i>we shall have</i>
Tu auras	<i>thou wilt have</i>	Vous aurez	<i>you will have</i>
Il aura	<i>he will have</i>	Ils auront	<i>they will have</i>

Conditional Tense.

J'aurais	<i>I should have</i>	Nous aurions	<i>we should have</i>
Tu aurais	<i>thou wouldst have</i>	Vous auriez	<i>you would have</i>
Il aurait	<i>he would have</i>	Ils auraient	<i>they would have</i>

Compound of the Present Tense.

J'ai eu	<i>I have had</i>	Tu as eu	<i>thou hast had, &c.</i>
Compound of the Imperfect Tense		J'avais eu	<i>I had had, &c.</i>
Compound of the Preterite Tense		J'eus eu	<i>I had had, &c.</i>
Compound of the Future Tense		J'aurai eu	<i>I shall have had, &c.</i>
Compound of the Conditional Tense		J'aurais eu	<i>I should have had, &c.</i>
		J'eusse eu	

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Que j'aie	<i>that I may have</i>	Que nous ayons	<i>that we may have</i>
Que tu aies	<i>that thou mayst have</i>	Que vous ayez	<i>that ye may have</i>
Qu'il ait	<i>that he may have</i>	Qu'ils aient	<i>that they may have</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que j'eusse	<i>that I might have</i>	Que nous eussions	<i>that we might have</i>
Que tu eusses	<i>that thou mightst have</i>	Que vous eussiez	<i>that ye might have</i>
Qu'il eût	<i>that he might have</i>	Qu'ils eussent	<i>that they might have</i>
<i>Compound of the Present Tense</i>		Que j'aie eu	<i>that I may have had, &c.</i>
<i>Compound of the Preterite Tense</i>		Que j'eusse eu	<i>that I might have had, &c.</i>

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Aie	<i>have thou.</i>	Ayons	<i>let us have</i>
		Ayez	<i>have ye.</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

<i>Present Tense.</i>		<i>Compound Tense.</i>	
Avoir	<i>to have</i>	Avoir eu	<i>to have had</i>

PARTICIPLES.

<i>Gerund</i>	Ayant	<i>having</i>
<i>Past Participle</i>	Eu	<i>had</i>
<i>Compound Participle</i>	Ayant eu	<i>having had</i>

2.—ETRE.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je suis	<i>I am</i>	Nous sommes	<i>we are</i>
Tu es	<i>thou art</i>	Vous êtes	<i>ye or you are</i>
Il est	<i>he is</i>	Ils sont	<i>they are</i>

Imperfect Tense.

J'étais	<i>I was</i>	Nous étions	<i>we were</i>
Tu étais	<i>thou wast</i>	Vous étiez	<i>ye or you were</i>
Il était	<i>he was</i>	Ils étaient	<i>they were</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je fus	<i>I was</i>	Nous fûmes	<i>we were</i>
Tu fus	<i>thou wast</i>	Vous fûtes	<i>ye or you were</i>
Il fut	<i>he was</i>	Ils furent	<i>they were</i>

Future Tense

Je serai	<i>I shall be</i>	Nous serons	<i>we shall be</i>
Tu seras	<i>thou wilt be</i>	Vous serez	<i>you will be</i>
Il sera	<i>he will be</i>	Ils seront	<i>they will be</i>

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

Conditional Tense.

Je serais	<i>I should be</i>	Nous serions	<i>we should be</i>
Tu serais	<i>thou wouldst be</i>	Vous seriez	<i>ye would be</i>
Il serait	<i>he would be</i>	Ils seraient	<i>they would be</i>
Compound of the Present		J'ai été	<i>I have been, &c.</i>
Compound of the Imperfect		J'avais été	<i>I had been, &c.</i>
Compound of the Preterite		J'eus été	<i>I had been, &c.</i>
Compound of the Future		J'aurai été	<i>I shall have been, &c.</i>
Compound of the Conditional		J'aurais été J'eusse été	<i>I should have been, &c.</i>

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
Que je sois	<i>that I may be</i>	Que nous soyons	<i>that we may be</i>
Que tu sois	<i>that thou mayst be</i>	Que vous soyez	<i>that ye may be</i>
Qu'il soit	<i>that he may be</i>	Qu'ils soient	<i>that they may be</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que je fusse	<i>that I might be</i>	Que nous fussions	<i>that we might be</i>
Que tu fusses	<i>that thou mightst be</i>	Que vous fussiez	<i>that ye might be</i>
Qu'il fût	<i>that he might be</i>	Qu'ils fussent	<i>that they might be</i>
Compound of the Present	Que j'aie été	<i>that I may have been, &c.</i>	
Compound of the Preterite	Que j'eusse été	<i>that I might have been, &c.</i>	

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Singular.		Plural.	
Sois	<i>be thou</i>	Soyons	<i>let us be</i>
		Soyez	<i>be ye</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.		Compound Tense.	
Etre	<i>to be</i>	Avoir été	<i>to have been</i>

PARTICIPLES.

Gerund	Etant	<i>being</i>
Past Participle	Été	<i>been</i>
Compound Participle	Ayant été	<i>having been</i>

To express the English negative *not*, *ne* is to be used before the verb (or before the auxiliary if it be a compound tense), and *pas* or *point* immediately after; as, *je n'ai pas*, I have not; *je ne suis pas*, I am not; *il n'avait pas vu la neige*, he had not seen the snow.

Nothing but the pronouns *me, te, se, le, lu, nous, vous, les, lui, leur, y*, may come between the *ne* and the verb: thus, *il ne faut pas nuire a vos semblables de quelque manière que ce soit*, you must not hurt your fellow-creatures in any way whatever (where *vos* indicates that the necessity expressed by *il faut* rests upon you); *je ne me serais pas levé*, I should not have risen; *ne buvant pas*, not drinking.

With the infinitive of an auxiliary verb this order must also be followed; as, *n'avoir pas entendu*, not to have heard; *n'être pas aimé*, not to be loved. But in any other case, *ne pas* or *ne point* must precede the infinitive; as, *ne pas frapper*, not to strike; *ne pas avoir d'argent*, to have no money; *ne pas être roi*, not to be king; *ne pas le donner*, not to give it; *ne pas le lui envoyer*, not to send it to him (or to her).

The following are negative forms of all the tenses of the indicative mood:

nous ne vendons pas, we do not sell; *elle ne savait pas*, she did not know; *vous ne parliez pas*, you did not speak; *elles n'iront pas*, they will not go; *tu ne tiendrais pas*, thou wouldst not hold. In the compound tenses the participle follows *pas* or *point*.

In the conjugation of regular verbs there are five principal tenses, from which the others are formed; viz., 1. The present of the indicative; 2. The preterite; 3. The present of the infinitive; 4. The gerund, or present participle; and 5. The past participle.

From 1 comes the imperative.

From 2 comes the preterite subjunctive.

From 3 come the future and the conditional.

From 4 come the plural of the present indicative and subjunctive, and the imperfect of the indicative.

From 5 come all the compound tenses of the active, and the whole of the passive voice.

1. The imperative is the same as the corresponding persons of the present indicative without the pronouns, except that in the first conjugation the final *s* of the second person singular is dropped; as—

Indic. Tu parles, tu agis, tu reçois, tu viens, &c.

Imper. parle, agis, reçois, viens, &c.

2. The preterite of the indicative becomes the preterite subjunctive by adding *se* to the second person singular; as—

Indic. Tu parlas, agis, reçus, vins.

Subjunc. Que je parlasse, agisse, reçusse, vinsse.

3. From the present infinitive are formed—

(1) The future, by changing the final *r*, *oir*, or *re* into *rai*, and (2), the conditional, by changing them into *rais*; so

Pres. Inf. Aimer, recevoir, rendre.

Fut. Ind. Aimerais, recevrai, rendrai.

Conditional. Aimerais, recevrais, rendrais.

4. From the present participle are formed—

(1) The plural of the present indicative, by changing *ant* into *ons*, *ez*, and *ent*; as *aimant*, nous aimons, vous aimez, ils aiment; *agissant*, nous agissons, vous agissez, ils agissent; &c.

(2) The imperfect indicative, by changing *ant* into *aie*, &c., as *parlant*, je parlais; *finissant*, je finissais.

(3) The present subjunctive, by changing *ant* into *e*; as *aimant*, que j'aime; *partant*, que je parte.

5. To form the compound tenses the past participle is added to the corresponding tenses of *Avoir* or *Etre*; thus *estimé*, esteemed; *j'ai estimé*, I have esteemed; *vous auriez estimé*, you would have esteemed; *nous sommes estimés*, we are esteemed, &c.

There are commonly reckoned FOUR conjugations of regular verbs: but as these unite under one example verbs with peculiarities which are difficult to an English student, it is easier to arrange them as follows:—

1st Conjugation.—Infinitive ending in *ER*, distinguishing those which terminate in *ger*, *eler*, *eter*, *ier*, *yer*, and *éer*.

2nd Conjugation.—Infinitive ending in *IR*, distinguishing those that form their gerund in *issant* from those in *ant*, and dividing the latter class into those whose past participle ends in *i*, and *u* respectively.

3rd Conjugation.—Infinitive ending in *OIR*.

4th Conjugation.—Infinitive ending in *RE*, including *aire*, *crire*, *uire*, *aindre*, *valre*, and *autre*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

49. Would any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* be kind enough to inform me whose black ink is the best? and whose ink is used in the Houses of Parliament? and what is the form or receipt for making it?

50. Where can the mesmeric desks for mesmerizing be procured? and what is the price? Whose work on mesmerism is the best, the price, and publisher? If they know of any work or works on electro-biology, the price and publisher?

51. What kind of calf do you consider the strongest and best for binding books?—A CONSTANT SUBSCRIBER, *Otley*.

52. Can you furnish me the titles of any books bearing either on Calvin's life or doctrines, as I am extremely anxious to know his views on the doctrine of Election; or the works of any other author treating on the same subject, either *pro* or *con*?—EAGLE PEN.

53. Would any of your Scottish readers inform me if there are any books published on the present mode of measuring mason, brick, or other works connected with building, as practised in Glasgow and the West of Scotland? Also state date of publication, publishers' names, and prices. Any information on these heads will oblige.—J. K. L.

54. Will some one of your numerous correspondents kindly inform me how to procure a good and cheap telescope, of sufficient power to see Jupiter's moons, and Saturn's ring, and the double stars? If any should have tested those advertised by Messrs. Solomon, Albermarle-street, Piccadilly,

and others, will they kindly give me their opinion? I am told that one might be made at a trifling expense, and should be glad to know the process.—A CONSTANT READER.

55. C. H. Janus's knowledge of arithmetic is very limited indeed, and he (being a very old subscriber to the *British Controversialist*) would feel very thankful to the Editor, if he would kindly recommend him a work—a very clear one—on the subject, to which study C. H. J. will only have one hour every day at his command to devote to the same.

56. I shall feel obliged for any information respecting the German degree, "Ph.D.," its nature and value, as well as the means and cost of obtaining it.—FODERE.

57. May I ask whether any of your numerous readers can inform me anything of the profession of reporter for the public press, and also what it is that constitutes a city?—J. D. KENDALL, *Hull*.

58. Would you inform me where I could obtain a copy of a work by a Dr. Oswell Dewy, or some such name, an American author?—JOSEPHUS.

Messrs. Trubner, Paternoster-row, and Messrs. Low and Son, Ludgate-hill, supply all the American works.

59. Would one of your correspondents give me some information regarding the MS. magazines which are noticed on your wrappers, as to how they are conducted, and also if it would be possible to establish one on the subject of theology? I should be happy to assist in its promotion.—J. L.

60. Are you aware if any work is published on the "Geology of Lanarkshire"? or if the geology of this dis-

strict is fully treated of in any work on the subject? If so, state name and price of the work.—A. G.

61. Would any of your readers inform me how and where the government of our West India possessions is carried on?—A. G.

62. Can any of your readers furnish me with an account of the origin of civilization?—Yours truly, AMICUS.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

10. *Primary Incandescence of the Earth*.—I think W. W. L. will find that the theory of the materials of the earth being originally in an incandescent and fused state is in perfect harmony with that truly sublime declaration, "And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." I can see nothing in this language to negative the theory; though there is one expression which, from perverted use, apparently clashes with its consistency, and perhaps this is the discrepancy which W. W. L. has been unable to reconcile—I mean the expression, "*without form*."

Like many derivatives, the word "form" has acquired a loose meaning, differing almost entirely from its original acceptation. The true signification of the word, and, I think, the one intended to be conveyed by the passage under consideration, is not shape in its abstract, as it is now generally used to express, but shape in the concrete—not mere shape, but a degree of quality of shape—regularity, order, amounting to a symmetrical proportion, which is called *beauty*. In that passage in the "Metamorphoses" (lib. I., v. 488), where Daphne implores her father to allow her to enjoy perpetual virginity, he replies:—

"Sed te decor iste, quod optas
Esse retat: rotoque tuo forma repugnat."

Here, observe, the father wished to tell her that her *beauty* opposed and would frustrate her desire, and the word "forma" is used as synonymous with "decor."

- But when Ovid wished to express abstract forms, in his description of the chaos, he uses an entirely different word—"vultus":—

"Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe."

It is utterly impossible to conceive of a body "without form," in the general acceptation of the phrase. "A shapeless mass" is a contradiction in terms. But, admitting this strict and real meaning of the word, the passage tells us, in general terms, what the theory minutely describes, that the earth was without order or complete form. This is evident from the result which ensued when the "Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The chaos of elements was rectified; the firmament occupied the highest place; next came the air, then the earth, girded with the waters. Here we have what the passage tells us the earth was without before—"form."

"Tum durare solum et discludere Nereæ
Ponto,
Cœperat et rerum paulatim sumere formas.—Virgil, Ec. vi.

Again, the theory entertained by the ancients is precisely parallel to that of revelation, and its expression, in many instances, strikingly so. Apollonius says, almost in the language of Moses,—

"Παῖδεν ὡς γαῖα καὶ οὐρανὸς ἦδε θάλασσα,
Τὸ πρὶν ἀπ' ἀλλήλοισι μὴ συναρηροτα
μορφῇ,
Νεῖκευς ἐξ ἀλαοῖο διεκρίθεν ἀμφὶς ἐκαστα"

See also Hesiod in Theogonica.

There is a great deal in geology which seems, on a narrow-minded inspection, to clash with revelation. It is like peering into a beautiful painting: he who does so, sees nothing but irregular doubts; but he who views it, so as to take in all its parts, sees a

symmetrical blending of form, colour, and light. It may be safely taken as an axiom in science, that nothing can be found in God's works to militate with his word.—O'DELL H.

[Replies, also, by "Clement" and "Threlkeld" will be inserted in early numbers.]

15. The best family medicine is, in our opinion, old Buchan, of which a cheap edition may be obtained on order of almost any bookseller.

The best account of the Russian war is now publishing in shilling parts by the Messrs. Chambers, Edinburgh and London.—J. L., *Appleby*.

26. The studies requisite for a situation in the Custom House, London, are as follows:—Arithmetic, from Addition to Vulgar and Decimal Fractions; the applicant must write an expeditious hand, and correctly from dictation, with a slight knowledge of general history and geography. French, although not absolutely necessary, both that and Latin, are great recommendations.—J. J. G.

In answer to inquirer, No. 27, I can advise him (advising from experience) not to article his son. If he intends that his son should only take a surgeon's diploma, there is no absolute necessity that he should article him. I can assure J. N. S. that it is a waste of both time and money on what is worse than worthless. To apprentice any young man who is to study and practice the "healing art," let him be placed with a dispensing druggist and chemist for six months, and, with a little attention, he will learn all that can be learnt during an apprenticeship of three or four years. Afterwards send him to a school of medicine for a winter or a summer session, and then he would be fit for a situation as an assistant to some medical gentleman.

The cost of articling him would pay for his classes for the first session. The system of apprenticeship did very well in times gone by, when a certifi-

cate of apprenticeship was the only qualification necessary before entering on practice. For further information, see students' number of the "*Lancet*," September 15, 1855.—ZAKIA, *Surgeon*.

37. *The Sonnet*.—We believe the following note on page 42, vol. iii., of Hallam's "Introduction to the Literature of Europe," will furnish all the information required by A. Z. N.:—

"The legitimate sonnet consists of two quatrains and two tercets; as much skill, to say the least, is required for the management of the latter as of the former. The rhymes of the last six lines are capable of many arrangements; but by far the worst, and also the least common in Italy, is that we usually adopt, the fifth and sixth rhyming together, frequently after a full pause, so that the sonnet ends with the point of an epigram. The best form, as the Italians hold, is the rhyming together of the three uneven and the three even lines, but, as our language is less rich in consonant terminations, there can be no objection to what has abundant precedents, even in theirs, the rhyming of the 1st and 4th, 2nd and 5th, 3rd and 6th lines. This, with a break in the sense at the third line, will make a real sonnet, which Shakespeare, Milton, Bowles, and Wordsworth have often failed to give us, even when they have given us something good instead.

"The common form of the Italian sonnet is called *rima chiusa*, where the rhymes of the two quatrains are 1, 4, 5, 8; 2, 3, 6, 7; but the alternate rhyme sometimes, though less regularly, occurs. The tercets are either in *rima incatenata*, or *rima alternata*; and great variety is found in these, even among the early poets. Quadrio prefers the order, a, b, a, b, a, b, where there are only two rhyming terminations, but does not object to a, b, c, a, b, c, or even a, b, c, b, a, c. The

couplet termination he entirely condemns.—Quadrio, *Storia d'ogni Poesia*, iii., 25."—S. R. A.

A correspondent asks the price and publisher of Bailey's "*Festus*." It is published by Chapman and Hall, and its price is 8s. 6d. Used to be 3s. and 5s., now 8s. 6d.

38. We think W. J. C. will find by experience that the cheapest way to obtain a photographic apparatus is to purchase it. He will find a good description of a camera, and full directions for making the same, by a Mr. Mackinlay, in No. 2 of the "*Liverpool Photographic Journal*," price 3d.—J. L., *Appleby*.

41. *Common-Place Books*.—Has R. S. read what has been already written on this subject in the *British Controversialist*? I think all the information that can be required will be found there. The remarks to which I refer extend over two pages (small type), and are in the 3rd vol., pp. 234, 277, 313.—TALIESIN.

46. In reply to the questions of your correspondent, C. S. W., glass is transparent (for instance, a window-pane), because, being very thin, and its surface completely smooth, together with its two sides being perfectly parallel to each other, it is unable either to refract any rays or absorb any, and can reflect them but slightly. The molecules, of which glass is composed, afford a free passage to the rays of light, and consequently it is transparent and colourless. The reason why some bodies are opaque and others not is, that opaque bodies absorb or reflect more or less the rays of light. A black object absorbs all the rays which strike upon it, and does not reflect any; a white object, on the

contrary, retains none, and reflects them all; and a red object retains green, and reflects the complimentary colour, red. But transparent bodies (as I explained before) are unable to absorb any rays, and are only capable of reflecting them slightly; they consequently transmit all the rays they receive. I am not aware that it has been attempted to be proved that objects have colour independent of the light that makes them visible. This hypothesis I will show to be false and untenable; for colours, being only distinguishable by the eye, when it is destitute of light, no impression is made upon the retina, and the colour is alleged to be invisible. Now, if you fix your eye for a few minutes upon a red object, and then cast it upon any adjoining white object, the white object appears of a greenish hue. Here it is clear the eye produces the colour. And again, a circular card, painted with the colours of the spectrum, made to rotate, appears a greyish white. The fleeting colours of the rainbow, every drop of water composing it being exactly similar in every respect, is yet, so to speak, coated with colours entirely different; it likewise shows the effect the direct rays of the sun have in producing colour.

Having thus, as I think, satisfactorily shown that colours are dependent on the eye alone for discernment, and that if the colour is not visible, we have good reason to believe that there is none, I come to the last question, viz., the nature of the fluid above gas-lights and over lime kilns. The fluid is water formed from the union of the hydrogen of the combustible with the oxygen of the air.—S. E. L., *Micklehurst*.

HONESTY AND HONOUR.—The principal, if not the only, difference betwixt honesty and honour seems to lie in their different motives: the object of the latter being reputation, and of the former duty.—ANON.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Belfast Young Men's Intellectual Improvement Association.—This association held its first annual musical soirée on Tuesday evening, 27th May last, in the Corn Exchange News Room, when the members and their friends, to the number of about 300, sat down to an excellent tea; after which Mr. James Mathison, who was called to the chair, made a few introductory remarks on the state and objects of the society. Very clever and animated addresses were delivered during the evening by Mr. Sam. Young, on "Intellectual Improvement," and by Mr. William Lowry, on a "British Political Reform," the intervals being most agreeably filled up with vocal and instrumental music, which elicited warm and hearty plaudits from the audience. A unanimous vote of thanks was then passed to the chairman, the proceedings of the evening concluding with "Rule Britannia." Every one seemed delighted with the evening's entertainment, and the members were much gratified with their first annual meeting. This society has debates on different subjects once a fortnight, and papers are also read monthly, to which the public are admitted. It consists of three branches, viz., the "literary and scientific," the "religious," and the "music."—A. B. C.

Swansea (York Place) Christian Association.—A soirée, in connection with this society, was held in the schoolroom adjoining York Place Baptist Chapel, on Tuesday evening, May 27th, by way of closing the present session. After tea, the president of the association (Rev. J. H. Hill) commenced the proceedings by a speech, comprising a brief sketch of the society since its formation in January, 1856. A report was then read by one of the

secretaries (W. D. Hopkins). Several gentlemen addressed the meeting, and appropriate pieces of music were sung by friends who kindly rendered their services.—WILLIAM J. ROFF, *Hon. Secretary.*

The Leicester Young Men's Institution, Hotel Street.—A general meeting of the members was held at the Wycliffe Rooms, on Friday, 28th March, 1856, when the committee laid before them their report of the proceedings of a year, more important than any which has occurred since its establishment. They trust that the promise of extended and permanent usefulness, which has been given by the past year, may be abundantly fulfilled in coming years. Since the last annual meeting, lectures have been given by the Revs. G. P. Despard, R. W. McCall, J. W. K. Disney, J. D. Massingham, William Hill, and H. K. Richardson. During the summer and autumn of 1855, various proposals made to the committee, with the view of giving a wider field to the operations of the institution, were long and anxiously considered; but it was finally decided, at a special meeting of the members, held at the Wycliffe Rooms, on Tuesday, November 6th, that it was expedient not to make any change in the fundamental rules of the institution, but rather to give the greatest possible efficiency to all its operations on the basis of the existing rules. A select committee was appointed on that occasion to consider what steps should be taken to make the operations of the institution more extensively and permanently useful. Classes in Greek, Drawing, Elementary French, Latin, Christian Evidences, English Grammar and Composition, German, Arithmetic and Elementary Singing, have been

formed and been continued during the quarter which is just closed, and all of them, except those for Arithmetic and Christian Evidences, will be continued during the coming quarter. The total number of members is above 150, and the average weekly attendance considerably upwards of 100. All the lecturers bear strong testimony to the satisfactory progress made by those members whose attendance has been regular. The committee feel that the warmest thanks of all the members, and of all who care for the intellectual and moral improvement of the young men of Leicester, are due to those gentlemen who have given time and thought and personal labour to this unobtrusive but most valuable part of the operations of the institution. During the past year the library has been augmented by several gifts of books, by some purchases, and especially by a grant from the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, met with an equal amount by the liberality of Mr. Sarson. The most encouraging fact connected with the recent history of the institution is the very large accession of new members. Since the beginning of December, 1855, upwards of 100 new members have been enlisted, a very large proportion of whom have joined one or other of the evening classes.

Edinburgh Young Men's Association.—The half-yearly soirée in connection with this association was held on the evening of 8th April last, in the Side Room, Queen Street Hall, which was patronised by a highly

respectable company. Mr. Livingston, the president of the association, occupied the chair. After some very appropriate remarks by the chairman, addresses were delivered, by Mr. Finlay, on "The Pleasures of Study;" Mr. Dickson, on "Experience;" Mr. Lawson, on "Popular Inconsistencies;" and another member, on "The Art of Living." Mr. Usher also delivered a very humorous "Poetical Address." Throughout the evening the meeting was enlivened by the performances of a glee party, and by songs and recitations from several of the members and others; and the company separated, highly pleased with the proceedings and the very flourishing appearance exhibited by the association.—W. WARREN, *Secretary*.

Thornbank Scientific Institution.—The members of the above institution celebrated the termination of a very successful lecture session by a public dinner, on April 5th, 1856. The chair was ably occupied by Mr. Hutton Teucher, chairman of the institution, who, after the usual loyal and patriotic toasts, gave a very suitable address upon "Scientific Institutions." Animated addresses were then given upon the following subjects:—"Permanency of the Peace," "National Education;" "Science;" "Literature;" and "Art." The evening was spent in a most delightful manner—toasts and recitations, gemmed with poetic effusions, and intermingled with the soul-elevating strains of "Auld Scotia's" song. After a vote of thanks to our chairman, the meeting separated.—J. H.

LITERARY NOTICES.

The chair of Logic and Metaphysics, vacant by the death of the late lamented Sir William Hamilton (of whom we hope to be able to give a life and estimate in our next) is being keenly contested. The chief candidates are, Professor Ferrier, of St. Andrew's, author

of "The Institutes of Metaphysics," whom, for the most part, the press supports; Professor Fraser, editor of "The North British Review," and Professor of Logic in the Free Church College, Edinburgh, whom dissent in Scotland much blazons; Dr. MacVicar,

late of Ceylon, now minister of Moffat, author of "An Enquiry into Human Nature," one of the most original and deepest thinkers of our age, whom the *élite* of speculative men *wish* may succeed; and Principal Scott, of Manchester College, a man of much promise, whom the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh, we believe, patronize. There can be no doubt that the event is fraught with consequences of highest import to metaphysic studies in Britain, and it will be sad if we must, as seems to be more than suspected, through sectarian feeling miss "the right man" for this place.

M. Bavard, of Buenos Ayres, has forwarded to the Academy of Sciences an account of his investigations into the fossil bones of South America. His collection now comprises upwards of 6,000 fossils, among which are fifty entirely new species.

A Paris journal asserts that M. de Lamartine's long struggle to preserve his family mansion and estate from sale by auction by his creditors—a struggle which, of late years, has caused him incessant literary labour—has ended in failure, and that he, in consequence, a ruined and broken-hearted man, has resolved on emigrating to the United States of America.

A munificent friend of literature has forwarded to the French Society of Men of Letters a donation of 10,000 francs. Six thousand francs are to be assigned to four medals, to be awarded to the best essay on four stated subjects—the first of which is, "Criticism and the Critics of the Nineteenth Cen-

tury;" and the remaining 4,000 francs to the reward of papers of merit inferior to the best.

Over the slab which has hitherto covered the grave of William Cobbett, in the churchyard of Farnham, Surrey, a tomb has just been erected by Mr. Thomas Milnes, the sculptor, who executed the statue of Nelson recently put up in Norwich. The tomb is made of a durable stone, from the quarry at Roch Abbey, in Yorkshire. It stands near the porch of the church, is of solid workmanship, oblong in form, and in style following the plainest old English architecture. On one panel, the inscription, copied from the slab, is:—"William Cobbett, son of George and Anne Cobbett; born in the parish of Farnham, 9th of March, 1762. Enlisted into the 54th Regiment of Foot in 1784, of which Regiment he became Serjeant-Major in 1785, and obtained his discharge in 1791. In 1794 he became a political writer. In 1832 was returned to Parliament for the borough of Oldham, and represented it till his death, which took place at Normandy Farm, in the adjoining parish of Ash, on the 18th of June, 1835." On the panel opposite:—"Anne Cobbett, daughter of Thomas and Anne Reid, and wife of William Cobbet; born at Chatham, 28th of March, 1774. Married at Woolwich, 5th of February, 1792. Died in London, 19th of July, 1848." Farnham Church is within a mile of Waverley Abbey and of Moor Park (once the residence of Sir William Temple), and about two miles from Aldershot.

NEW BOOKS.

Alford's First Principles of the Oracles of God, fcp. 8vo. 3s. cloth.

Ark of the Covenant, by the Author of "Preces Paulinæ," 3s. 6d. cloth.

Attaché in Madrid, translated from the German, post 8vo. 7s. 6d.

Bard's Waikna, or Adventures on the Mosquito Shore, fcp. 8vo. 1s.

Bacon's Essays, with Annotations by Whately, 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth.

Baumarchais and his Times, trans. by Edwards, Vols. I. and II., 21s.

- Bohn's Classical Library: Quintilian's Oratory, Vol. II., 5s. cloth.
 Bohn's French Memoirs: Duke of Sully, Vol. I., 3s. 6d. cloth.
 Bohn's Standard Library: Guizot's Civilization, Vol. III., 3s. 6d. cloth.
 Boucher's Manna in the Heart; 79th to 150th Psalm, cr. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
 Bradbury on the Security and Manufacture of Bank Notes, 4to. 5s.
 Bremer's Hertha, translated by Mary Howitt, post 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth.
 Butler's Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, 8vo. 9s. cloth.
 Busbury's Summer in Northern Europe, 2 vols. post 8vo. 21s. cloth.
 Candlish's Christian Sacrifice, royal 18mo. 1s. 6d. cloth.
 Cassell's Lessons in Italian, by C. Tausenau, M.D., 12mo. 3s. sewed.
 Chalmers' Select Works, Vol. VIII.: Theology, Vol. II, cr. 8vo. 6s. cl.
 Chapman's History of Gustavus Adolphus and 30 Years' War, 12s. 6d.
 Cockburn (Lord), Memorials of his Time, 8vo. 14s. cloth.
 Cornford's Missionary Reminiscences, fcp. 8vo. 2s. cloth.
 Creative Week, fcp. 8vo. 6s. 6d. cloth.
 De Girardin's Stories of an Old Maid, 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth.
 De Vere's Stray Leaves from the Book of Nature, illustrated, 3s. 6d. cloth.
 Excelsior, Vol. V., cr. 8vo. 4s. cloth.
 Fergusson's America by River and Rail, 8vo. 14s. cloth.
 Flemish Interiors, by Author of "A Glance Behind the Grilles," 7s. 6d.
 Gretton's Scripture Witness to Jesus Christ as Son of God, 3s. 6d.
 Grierson's Heaven on Earth, fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d. cloth.
 Gurney's (Priscilla) Memoirs, edited by S. Corder, cr. 8vo. 5s. cloth.
 Hall's Sacrifice; or, Pardon and Purity through the Cross, 2s. 6d.
 Handbook of Court, Peerage, and House of Commons, May, 1856, 5s.
 Hardcastle's Genealogical Text-Book of British History, 18mo. 2s.
 Haxthausen's Russian Empire, translated by Farie, 2 vols. 28s. cloth.
 Hibberd's Epitome of the War, fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d. cloth.
 Hill's Travels in the Sandwich and Society Islands, 10s. 6d. cloth.
 Homeri Ilias, ex recognitione Gulielmi Dindorfii, 8vo. 5s. 6d. bds.
 How a Penny became a Thousand Pounds, 12mo. 1s. cloth.
 Hui's Modern Romanism, fcp. 8vo. 1s. 6d. cloth.
 Human Nature Considered in its Covenanted Relations to God, 5s.
 In Honorem—Songs of the Brave, cr. 8vo. 7s. 6d. cloth gilt.
 Isabelle's Surfaix Cavalier, 8vo. 10s. 6d. cloth.
 Jennings' Social Delusions Concerning Wealth and Want, 4s. cloth.
 Kidd's Treatises on Songbirds, Vols. I to V., 12mo. 1s. each, sewed.
 Lamp of Life, fcp. 8vo. 5s. cloth.
 Mackay's Songs for Music, fcp. 8vo. 1s. sewed.
 Martell's Principles of Form in Ornamental Art, 12mo. 1s. sewed.
 Monro's Sacred Allegories, fcp. 8vo. 9s. cl.
 Moulton's Bible Poems and Lyrics, 12mo. 3s. 6d. cloth.
 Muir's Discourses in Scottish Church, Crown Court, 7s. cloth.
 Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula, Part I., cr. 8vo. 5s.
 Neal's Moral Concordances of St. Anthony of Padua, cr. 8vo. 3s.
 Peacock's Headlong Hall, and Nightmare Abbey, fcp. 8vo. 1s. boards.
 Phillimore's Parochial Sermons, cr. 8vo. 6s. cloth.
 Place's Catechism of Music, fcp. 8vo. 1s. 6d. cloth.
 Prince's Glimpse of the Wonders of Creation, 12mo. 4s. cloth.
 There is no such Thing as a Trifle, square, 3s. cloth.
 Traveller's Library: Fuller's Life and Genius, by Rogers, 2s. sewed.
 Weeds from the Isis, by a Few Oxonians, fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d. cloth.
 Westwood's Foxglove Bells, 12mo. 2s. 6d. cloth.
 Wilkins's "Threescore-Years-and-Ten," fcp. 8vo. 3s. 6d. cloth.

The Logic of Study.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

"LEARNING is like a river, whose source, being far in the land, is, at its first rise, small and easily viewed; but still, as you proceed, it gapes with a wider bank,—not without pleasure and delightful windings, while it is, on both sides, set with trees and the beauties of several flowers,—but still, the further you follow it, the deeper and the broader it is; till, at last, it empties itself into the unfathomable ocean; *there* you see more water, but no shore—no end of that fluid expanse." So writeth Owen Feltham. And it is even as he says. Knowledge is the river-course along which we voyage out towards the Infinite. Can we construct a chart which may make the navigation thereof possible—be a guide through its turnings and windings—be a monitor regarding the shoals, quicksands, reefs, tide-currents, and whirlpools in its channel—be a directory to the various topics of interest on its banks, and lead the barque of thought in safety into "the vast ocean of Truth"? We dare not answer, Yea! to the query; and yet we would fain attempt some slight tracings which may, be it ever so little, aid the young adventurer in his progress along that river which "*labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*"

Study is mental labour—the voluntary exertion of the power of thought *in* the acquisition of knowledge and *for* the development of the intellect. Knowledge is a fruit culturable to perfection only by patient, continuous, persistent work—a treasure hidden by the All-wise under the surface of phenomena; Study is the "open Sesame," on the right use of which the *apparent* uncloses and reveals the *real*,—

"A solemn council held within,
Of man's best understanding faculties."

The economization of time and labour in study has been an object of solicitude among all earnest truth-seekers; and hence have resulted those various *methodologies* by which men have endeavoured to simplify and abbreviate the processes of thought that are requisite to "wring some bright truth from its prison."

These systems of investigation have, for the most part, been constructed more with reference to the attainment of *objective* knowledge than the government and direction of the *subjective* perceptivities which must be employed in the discovery, correlation, and expression of all those truths which can be differentiated

by any means whatever from the individual Ego. Something different from this—something whose chief and special aim shall be the education of the intellectual nature of the thinker—the placing of the mind itself in the true and proper relation which it ought to have while engaged in the attainment of objective truth—seems to us to be required. To show how the primordial appetency of the mind—the uneasiness of curiosity—the tendency of the intelligence to assimilate all things to and incorporate them with itself, may, instead of being permitted to exist as a vague, instinctive restlessness, become progressive and unitive, receptive, evolutive, and methodical—an ever-waking activity—appears to be a desideratum in the literature of self-culture. The materials, indeed, exist plenteously enough, but far and widely scattered; and nowhere (so far as our memory serves us) have they been collected, concatenated, or arranged into a system having for its express and determinate purpose the direction, guidance, development of the mind itself in the processes of personal education; that is to say, having as its all-paramount aim the *growth* of the soul rather than the acquirement of items of knowledge—the healthy activity of a thinking being rather than the accumulative agglomeration of mere learning. To the task of constructing such a system we now set ourselves. Success does not always smile on the endeavours of innovators, and she may not even deign to encourage our present effort. In making the attempt we shall, however, have done our duty, and *that*, with us, is *the* completely decisive consideration.

For brevity's sake we shall throw our present prelection into the dogmatic form, and somewhat sententiously enounce those principles which, we believe, constitute the prime elements in a useful "Logic of Study."

Study is the aim-governed exercise of vital thought.

The chief end of study is the growth of the intellect, through the acquirement of knowledge, science, truth.

The intellect *grows*, not by the accretion of knowledge to itself, but by a vital assimilation of phenomena, of any kind, with itself, and an absorption of these into the ideative functions of the Ego.

The Ego is personal, unitive, self-identitative.

These three qualities constitute an organization.

Every organization, material or immaterial, exerts certain powers, and effects, or labours to effect, some certain end or ends.

Whatever other purposes may be accomplished in the course of these exertions, the primary aim of each organization is the perfectionment, as far as possible, of its own peculiar nature.

The attainment of true wisdom is the chief element in the perfectionment of the human mind (the Ego).

True wisdom is the result of the exertion of the powers of thought in accordance with the laws which regulate their processes.

The laws which regulate the processes of the intellectual powers in the endeavour to attain true wisdom constitute natural logic.

These laws, when thought out as objects of consciousness by any one, and expressed in language, so that they may more readily become the objects of consciousness in or to others, constitute a system of logic.

A system of logic specially framed for the guidance of the mind in study would form a logic of study.

A cause is that which satisfactorily accounts for the existence of any phenomenon, *as it is*, in so far as the purpose of the mind in considering it is concerned.

A law is that which, so far as the purpose of the mind in considering it is concerned, satisfactorily accounts for the invariable order and the regular and determined relationships of phenomena with each other.

The nature of the human mind in itself (that is to say, the mode in which the mind is constituted to operate in thinking) gives the primordial elements of logic—laws of thought.

These laws come into operation only at the impulses of adequate causes, of whatever kind.

According to the kind of causes by which the mind is set thinking, so is the species of concepts to which the mind gives form.

The primitive causes of thought, viz., the kosmos and the consciousness, may be regarded as effective in producing—1st, Concepts of exterior, sense-given phenomena; or—2nd, Concepts of interior, self-possessed, and reason-given phenomena.

The former is chronologically the earlier; the latter is logically so.

So soon as phenomena have presented themselves with sufficient frequency or impressiveness, the *ideative* faculty of the mind becomes consciously active.

Conscious mental activity is thought.

The determination of the matter and aim of thought by the will is study.

Thought, consciously and voluntarily pursued, begins with the observation of facts, either external or interior.

Observation may be either *passive* or *active*. It is the former, when impressions are received from facts, as they circle round or in our life, without any conscious attempt on our parts to detain them for investigation, to influence the frequency of their return, or to alter the conditions, circumstances, or modes in which they occur. It is the latter, when we consciously retain, inspect, and think upon them—when we place ourselves in circumstances to secure their recurrence, or set in operation means or agencies by which we arrange, control, or vary them, in accordance with some *forethought* (*prudens questio*) in the investigation of which the intellect is employed.

In the earlier stages of mere being observation is passive.

The supreme laws relating to the right use of this primitive, spontaneous percipency are—

1st. Be careful in noting exactly (*a*), the fact itself; (*b*), the particulars of which it consists; (*c*), those facts antecedent, concomitant, or subsequent, with which it seems to be related.

2nd. Be careful to retain and record in the memory an exact and faithful notion of the fact, (*a*), as a whole, and (*b*), in its several parts; in other words, let the *thought* contain nothing that *is not*, and omit nothing that *is*, given in the *fact*.

3rd. Be careful to distinguish between the *matter* of fact and the *form* it assumes in the several processes of thought.

The *matter* of any fact is the whole aggregate of the various ideas which, when united, compose it; its *form* is the manner or mode in which the mind arranges, associates, or thinks of it. The former *denotes*; the latter *connotes*.

In the subsequent stages of being (*i. e.*, when the investigative processes of thought begin) observation is active and experimental.

Active, experimental observation does not supersede the spontaneous exercises of sense and consciousness, but is rather super-added thereunto for the attainment of higher ends, *viz.*, the actualization of reasoning thought.

The aim or purpose which presides over the processes of active observation is, in general, the acquirement of a knowledge of causative, concomitant, and illatively consequent facts; *i. e.*, the formation or development of science.

The object of search (*i. e.*, the study) being settled, the supreme canons of active observation are as under; *viz.*,—

1st. Separate and disentangle, *in thought*, each attribute of the given fact or facts from all the other attributes.

2nd. Distinguish between those attributes which pre-exist and are causative, co-exist and are concomitant, post-exist and are consequent, persist and are continuous, &c.

3rd. Determine *which* of the particular qualities, &c., contained in any idea, representative of a fact, is connected with the topic of study; in other words, realize in the mind what quality or qualities determine the character of the given fact or facts, in so far as regards the particular study in which you are engaged.

4th. When the intellect holds simultaneously before its perceptive faculties more than one fact of a similar, or supposedly similar kind, distinguish between those ideas which are co-inclusive (*i. e.*, identical, similar, or analogous) and co-exclusive (*i. e.*, diverse, unlike, or heterogeneous), as well as those which are precedent and sequent in time, space, or causative agency, and subsequent or insequent in the same states.

5th. These inclusions and exclusions should be made in simple and faithful agreement with the laws of the associative faculties, *viz.*, likeness, contrast, succession, and contiguity. (See "Art of Reasoning," chap. xx.)

6th. Classify together, *in thought*, such facts as, being included in the specific observations made, coincide in producing any one idea, or more ideas than one, that impress the associative faculties similarly.

7th. Multiply, repeat, and revise those observations which have been reduced to classification, that the chances of error may be lessened by the increase of the means of detecting error.

8th. Regulate every instance of classification by the presiding purpose of the given study.

Classification may be either (1) natural, *i. e.*, as the facts appear in the spontaneous operations of observation, (2) scientific, *i. e.*, as the facts appear in the aim-governed, invented, or arranged experience of active observation, or (3) artificial, *i. e.*, in accordance with some presiding but non-scientific purpose.

Classification is unitive in its main purpose, and governed in the logical sphere by the *forms* indicated by the words genus, species, difference, property, and accident. (See "Art of Reasoning," chap. xiii.)

Genus identifies several distinct facts (*i. e.*, phenomena) under one idea of form, quality, or law, by which they are unified, systematized, and marked by and in the intellect.

Species is the identification of classes of facts or phenomena into a sub-unity having similarity of constitution, organization, &c., as the cardinal idea which colligates them. The number of the points of identity diminish as the mind mounts from species to genera, and *vice versa*.

Difference contrasts and distinguishes species; it is *the* point in which identity ceases and specific characterization begins.

Property is any single quality implied in and springing from the difference.

Accidents are all other qualities by which individual facts are distinguished from each other. They are *separable* from the species, but *inseparable* from some particular individuals thereof.

When matters of fact have been subjected to the foregoing processes, they become amenable to a new series of mental operations, the consideration of which, together with their exemplification, we must defer till another time.

CHARACTER OF HOBBS.—He was frank, civil, and communicative of what he knew, a good friend, a good relation, charitable to the poor, a great observer of equity, and had no desire of gathering wealth. "This last quality," says Bayle, "is a favourable prejudice for the goodness of his life." For a man who had lived so long (till ninety-one), his reading was inconsiderable. He said himself, if he had bestowed so much time on reading as other men of letters, he should have been as ignorant as they!

Religion.

DOES GEOLOGY CONFIRM THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

“As to the particular form in which the descriptive narrative of creation is conveyed, we merely affirm that it *cannot be History*—it may be Poetry.”—*Rev. Baden Powell.*

THE book of Genesis, which contains the Mosaic account of the creation, we have every reason to believe, was compiled by Moses from other and older memorials, which he arranged and connected under the divine inspiration. To deny this inspiration of Moses is to throw discredit on the divine origin of the whole Bible; and to deny the teachings of geology is to close our ears to all reasoning and our eyes to all physical facts. The works and the words of God must necessarily partake of the same qualities; they cannot, therefore, be opposed to each other. But if the one should seemingly militate against the other, the fault must be our own; either our geological facts are erroneous, or our interpretation of the Bible is incorrect. Does the book of Nature, as unfolded to us by geological researches, contain anything inconsistent with the teachings of the Book of Revelation? We say, No! The Bible was given to man to teach him spiritual things, concerning his future state, and to point out to him the unchangeableness of God's love for his soul; it is “exclusively the history of the dealings of God towards men.” It was never intended to be the means of communicating to mankind the knowledge of physical truths; hence physical facts are therein spoken of in common phraseology, and in accordance with the ideas current amongst the Hebrews in respect to natural philosophy. The book of nature, and not the Bible, contains the revelation of physical causes; it was not the purpose of God to unfold at once to man the knowledge of the laws which regulate the universe, or of the physical construction of the globe he inhabits; these were left for him to discover from other sources. The book of God's works, which in our day has received the attention of men of science in all countries, who have succeeded in discovering its hidden mysteries, does not invalidate, in any one point, the book of His Word, viewed in a proper light, although it contains much that is directly contradictory to the Mosaic account of creation as generally interpreted and taught—the teaching of our Sunday schools being, that the

universe was brought into existence by the Almighty six thousand years ago, and within the period of six days. The catechism of the Church of Scotland defines the Mosaic account of creation to mean that "God made all things of nothing in six days," six thousand years ago. Adopting these definitions, we have no hesitation in saying that the Mosaic account of creation is directly opposed to the discoveries of geological science.

Geological researches have brought to light many facts, in respect to the early periods of the earth's history, which are plainly inconsistent with the notion that the first chapter of Genesis was ever meant to be a circumstantial account of the creation. Geology informs us that the earth has undergone innumerable changes, and that it has been the seat of organic life for millions of years. Every portion of its surface (with, perhaps, a few exceptions) has been many times in succession the bottom of the sea and the site of animal and vegetable life. The time occupied by these changes is far beyond the power of the human mind to compute, and to which the period of six thousand years is but as a grain of sand on the seashore. The various strata which form the crust of the earth are plentifully supplied with embedded fossils, the petrified remains of what was once organic life; these are incontestible evidences that the earth was *not* created within six days, since it has been estimated that the formation alone of the strata which lie nearest the surface must have taken millions of years. The great periods of change, during which the earth's surface underwent many important modifications, are distinctly marked and characterized by the imbedded fossils; they inform us that, during these changes, whole groups of animals were successively created and obliterated: in no case do we find any pre-existing species re-created, each form of animal life being adapted to the physical state of the earth's surface at the time they were produced. These operations were many times repeated before the existing animals were formed. Thousands of years must have elapsed between each modification of animal life; wherefore it is impossible that our earth has only existed six thousand years, or that it was created in six days; hence geology is totally at variance with the Mosaic account of creation as interpreted to our rising generations, who are taught to hold it fast in its literal sense as a historical truth—as an article of faith.

Turning to S. R. A.'s article, we find that he believes "that geology affords the fullest confirmation of the Mosaic record," yet is obliged to have recourse to a different interpretation of the record to that generally received. Does he succeed, even by thus "bending" the word of God, in establishing his views? We say not, and propose pointing out the most glaring inconsistencies, which are amply sufficient for our purpose, without descending to minute details.

1. According to S. R. A., the "days" in which Moses describes the creation to have been accomplished are to be understood as periods of indefinite extent. It is true, the word "day" is often used for an indefinite period, but always *metaphorically*: as, "the day of salvation." Millions of days would not be sufficient to satisfy geological requirements; but such a stretch of meaning is hardly allowable in figurative language, much less so in this case, where ordinary phraseology is used throughout. Besides, the concluding formula, "And evening was, and morning was, day one," and so throughout the series, necessitates our viewing the days referred to as being of ordinary length, otherwise what purpose does the formula serve in the narrative? Perhaps S. R. A. supposes the indefinite periods were divided into periods of light and darkness, and to produce which the earth took thousands of years to revolve on its axis instead of the usual space of twenty-four hours! Such an idea appears to us quite preposterous.

2. The succession of strata, with their corresponding organic remains, certainly bear some relation to the various operations of the divine power as laid down in Genesis; but, when carefully examined, we find many contradictory facts, the correspondence being only superficial.

3. "In the second and third days the waters were divided, and the dry land appeared." Geology informs us that there must have been several distinct creations; that the division of the earth's surface into land and water has been varied many times; that the earth was never entirely covered with water, and that the existing division of its surface into land and water took place immediately before the creation of the existing races of animals. "The earlier azoic strata bear evident marks of the action of water, being formed by crystallization in the primitive oceans." This is certainly true; but it also proves that dry land existed contemporaneously, for the materials composing them are evidently the washing down of the particles worn off the surface of the exposed land.

4. "On the third day also vegetation was introduced." Geology teaches us that animal and vegetable life were contemporaneous; in fact, the earliest forms of life are not plants but animals. We do not, however, desire to lay much stress on this, since the vegetable fibre of the early plants might have been more destructible than the osseous structure of the animals.

5. "Of the creation or appointment of the sun, moon, and stars on the fourth day, we cannot expect to find any confirmation in the rocks; but we know well from other sources that light is necessary for organic life, and that it would naturally precede the creation of animals and man." Very true, S. R. A.! but is not light as essential to vegetable life? Have you not placed yourself on the horns of a dilemma? Is it not well

known that light is even *more necessary* to vegetable than animal life? Is S. R. A. aware that horses are often born in coal mines, live there all their lives, and die at a good old age, without ever having seen any other light than that proceeding from a collier's lamp? Would an oak tree grow under like circumstances? How can S. R. A., believing that the existence of the sun was necessary for animal life, reconcile his views of the earth being clothed with trees and vegetable life before the presence and the operations of that luminary? He must have recourse to the supposition of innumerable miracles of an astounding magnitude to help himself out of the difficulty! To use his own words;—"Would, we ask, such a procedure be in accordance with the usual mode of God's dealings? Does he manifest his power and wisdom by sudden and wanton displays?" No! The Creator rules the universe according to a PLAN, and has never needlessly had resort to miracles.

6. "On the fifth day were produced the lower tribes of animals,"—"on the sixth day were created mammals and man,"—"and here we have a beautiful confirmation of the biblical account." You are rather too sanguine, S. R. A. We find traces of existing quadrupeds in those strata which first contain fossils of the reptiles and birds at present in existence, thus proving that the entire present races of animal life were created at the same great period of change.

7. "And what more fitted to occupy the divine mind during the period of rest than the plan of redemption?" So S. R. A. ascribes to the Almighty the attribute of resting! The verse of Genesis thus endorsed by him unequivocally implies fatigue to the Creator; but it is contrary to reason and revelation to ascribe to Him who "fainteth not, neither is weary" (Isa. xl. 28), anything like cessation from action, for our Saviour said, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," John v. 17.

8. "And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air, and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them." "And Adam gave names to *all* cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to *every* beast of the field," Gen. ii. 19, 20. The garden of Eden was situated in the temperate zone;—how could animals, then, formed and adapted to live in the coldest or the hottest portion of the earth's surface, have lived even for a short time in a climate totally at variance with their natural wants? After they had been named, how did they find their way to the climes suitable to their bodily structure? How did those animals which can exist alone in the regions of eternal cold succeed in getting to the arctic zone?

9. "And God said, Let the *waters* bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and *fowl* that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven," Gen. i. 20. How can this statement be reconciled with that contained in the 19th

verse of the second chapter before quoted? In the one case *water* is said to have brought forth the fowls of the air; in the other the *ground* is given as the source whence they sprung. How can S. R. A. explain the reason of those hostile statements? Which is the correct one?

10. It is said that Adam gave names to *all* cattle and fowls and *every* beast. Geology informs us that there had existed whole classes of animals which had become extinct before Adam was created; hence he could not have named *all* and *every* creature.

11. "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good." This signifies that the Lord was pleased with his workmanship—that he possessed the feelings of an artist, who, after executing his first great work, admires its beauties, and is gratified to find that he has succeeded in producing what he had desired. Such a preposterous idea as to suppose that the Creator was uncertain of his success is, to say the least of it, not consonant with our views in respect to the divine wisdom.

12. "Species after species were exterminated, but each was succeeded by another." Surely the Mosaic record cannot be considered as a literal account of the creation, since it gives us not the least intimation of these distinctive changes, which S. R. A. admits to have taken place. Why should the Mosaic narrative not only carefully conceal all reference to the vegetable ruin and animal death which preceded the existence of man, but also leave us to infer that death first entered the world after the fall of Adam?

Having shown that there are vast discrepancies between the teaching of geology and the Mosaic account of the creation, even as interpreted by S. R. A., it remains for us to explain what we consider to be the true meaning of the Mosaic record.

The theological odium directed against the Copernican system of astronomy in former times should teach us the folly of attempting to frame a system of philosophy out of the Bible. The fulminations which emanated from the Vatican were certainly not more foolish than many of the opinions at present promulgated in respect to science in connection with the Bible. The oppressors of Galileo were equally justified in supposing that the scriptures spoke of the earth as being fixed, with the sun revolving round it, as those who now contend for the literal interpretation of the book of Genesis. The Book of Revelation refers entirely to the moral government of man; it treats solely of religious subjects, and was never intended to be a handbook of geology or a compendium of astronomy. If this definition be denied, we must impute error to the divine inspiration, deny the authenticity of the Bible, or suppose to be physically correct the declarations therein made concerning the entire universe, however contrary to

all facts, all analogy, and all reasoning. In the book of Job we have an account of the creation of the world, equally deserving of being considered as a literal history as that in the book of Genesis. "The Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, . . . Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof; when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? Or who shut up the sea with doors, when it brake forth, as if it had issued out of the womb?" Job xxxviii. If we determine to adhere to the literal interpretation of the language of scripture, what frightful consequences must follow—we must attribute to God the mental passions and imperfections of man! Moses speaks of the Creator as walking and flying, having arms and feet, learning, seeking, improving in knowledge, doubting, expecting, deliberating and fearing. Can we believe to be literally true these degrading terms as applied to the Almighty? "And it repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart," Gen. vi. 6. "And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people," Exod. xxxii. 14. Here the Creator is not only represented as repenting and grieving for having made man, but as actually repenting for intending to do *evil*! That these attributes of the Almighty are false, scripture gives abundant evidence. "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent," Numb. xxiii. 19. "I am Jehovah: I change not," Mal. iii. 6. How can S. R. A. reconcile these expressions with the former ones? To do so, he must concede that Moses, though acting under the divine inspiration, spoke figuratively in thus attributing to the Almighty man's failings and organization. Then why so firmly believe the historical character of the book of Genesis, as explaining physical phenomena? What knowledge had Moses of the constitution of the earth, or the extent of the universe? What knew he of astronomy and geology, chemistry and physiology? We may safely conclude that he knew no more of these things than his contemporaries; it was not part of the divine commission for him to communicate physical truths. Nor could the Israelites, for whose especial benefit his writings were intended, have understood them had they been written in any other than the common phraseology. It seems quite ridiculous to suppose that Moses, if he intended to give a literal description of the creation of the universe, would so wrap up his meaning in doubtful expressions that the right sense could not be understood for three thousand years.

As we believe in the inspiration of Moses, we must allow that his narrative came indirectly from God. What did the Creator

intend us to understand by it? We know from the New Testament narratives, that God, through his inspired servants, adapted and turned into a medium for the conveyance of religious instruction, the opinions and prejudices current amongst the Jews at the time, though highly erroneous. The Saviour himself adopted this method of proceeding. As an example, I need only refer to Matt. xii. 27, "And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out? therefore they shall be your judges;" thus conceding, for the sake of argument, the truthfulness of the pretences of the Jewish exorcists. Are we to suppose that they really had the power of casting out devils? Certainly not! This is, we consider, the true light whereby to view the first portion of the book of Genesis. It is a most sublime piece of composition, embodying the opinions of the Jews in reference to the cosmogony of the earth, which Moses was inspired to dress up in the garb of history. It was well calculated to serve the ends of religious instruction, having been designed to establish amongst the Hebrews the belief in one majestic and all-powerful Creator, to prevent the worship of false gods and the various other wild and fanciful forms of idolatry which then prevailed; hence the wisdom of introducing in this manner the animals and other objects therein mentioned, to show that they were the work of God, since they were especially the objects which they had seen worshipped amongst the Egyptians, and into the idolatrous worship of which they were themselves so prone to fall. The concluding portion of the first chapter was intended to enforce the observance of a day of rest. The reason given for this rest, that God was fatigued and needed repose, was evidently a *condescension* on the part of the Almighty to the minds of the ignorant and sensual Israelites. In Deuteronomy they were told to keep the sabbath in remembrance of their deliverance from the Egyptian bondage. This is another proof that the scripture writings were adaptations to the prevailing ideas of the times in which they were produced.

The earliest narratives of antiquity, amongst all nations, have been written in a style highly figurative; they all incline to the character of *poetry* rather than to that of *history*. Why should we deny this character to the book of Genesis? Surely not because the literal sense is easily comprehended, otherwise we should not have S. R. A. labouring to explain to others what he cannot very well understand himself. Josephus, the Jewish historian, says, Moses "spoke some things wisely, but enigmatically and under a decent allegory;" and after the description of the seventh day "he began to talk philosophically."

We have only referred to the discrepancies between the Mosaic record and the teachings of geology. There are many other considerations which affect the literal interpretation of the

book of Genesis. Why was a mark set upon Cain, to prevent others from slaying him, when he was the only surviving descendant of Adam and Eve? Where did he get his wife? &c.

In conclusion, we maintain that geology *does not* confirm the Mosaic account of creation; that it is palpably inconsistent with, and entirely opposed to, the belief that "God made all things of nothing in six days;" that even S. R. A.'s method, of giving up the *literal sense* of a portion of the narrative, does not answer the requirements of the case, the only satisfactory way being to consider the whole as entirely figurative.

Bradford.

TALIESIN.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"By the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water: whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished."—2 *Peter* iii. 5, 6.

As the keynote of our argument, we have struck a Biblical chord. Strike now the harp of creation, and listen! Doth it not discourse sweet music to the foregone strain? It must. It does. Those mighty instruments must harmonize—those instruments whose every utterance breathes praise to the Contriver. The great Immutable cannot make one of his works oppose another. In each of the three great books—Creation, Providence, Revelation—can man read the superscription I AM.

A father, who is in a distant land, sends to his children a picture of himself and a letter. In the last he describes himself exactly, and tells his children whatever he would have them do. In the picture he is exactly portrayed; and if his children fail to catch the true expression, it is because they look through a bad light. And those inner qualities, the more secret excellencies, which the picture fails to show, are most closely and thoroughly delineated in the letter. As the picture is perfect, and the letter most true, the teaching of the one contradicts not that of the other; the letter speaks on topics concerning which the picture instructs not, and the picture gives its testimony to the truth of the letter.

We, the children of the mighty God, whom our eyes see not, have such a picture and such a letter—Nature and the Bible. Science is the description of that picture, and it must agree with the Bible.*

There is agreement between the science geology and scripture, though some philosophers (falsely so called) have endeavoured to jar the eternal harmony, and with presumptuous hands to strike forth chords harsh and discordant.

Both geology and scripture give us a glorious history of the

* See our article on the "Unity of the Human Race," in the *Christian Penny Magazine* for February.

birth and youthhood of our globe; and both agree. This is their combined testimony: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;" and then mighty agencies exerted themselves upon this globe; mighty changes took place, all calculated to prepare it for future occupancy by man. Forests grew into sombre magnificence, and then were overwhelmed, deeply buried, and by a superjacent mass compressed into tracts of coal. Subterranean fires melted the elements of the earth, and poured along its depth the veins of molten metal. Creatures such as the eye of man has never seen in their life and mightiness, whose sound was unheard by human ear, roamed the plain and peopled the waters. Through long ages successive creatures were created, successive revolutions took place, until at last the earth, unfurnished outwardly, and comparatively shapeless, was bathed in the waters of its baptism, covered with a liquid mantle which no eye could pierce—"the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep." How long this lasted we know not. At length it ended; "the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters," and, bidding them retire, the earth appeared, which He then clothed with verdure, surrounded with a transparent atmosphere, peopled with sentient beings, and prepared for the immediate habitation of man, filling it with all that could conduce to his comfort, delight his sense, and elevate his soul.

That such was the early history of the earth we believe, because—I. It is consistent with the words of Scripture. The words of Moses, in the first verse in Genesis, are indefinite, and, as we think, designedly so. He just mentions that which was necessary to disprove the two pet philosophies of scepticism—the eternity of matter and the agency of chance. He brings God before us as the contriver and creator of the universe, and that is all. Details of the primal construction he omits, and, according to his usual custom, relates only that which intimately relates to man. He also fails to make mention of the subsequent changes and revolutions which took place among the earth's components, and merely takes up the matter when it begins to touch upon the fair history of man. He tells man, as another proof of God's greatness as well as of his goodness, that shortly before he came into being the earth was in a comparatively chaotic state, but that He had repressed the waters, had made the earth appear, and had formed from chaos this delightful world, for the sake of man. The time which elapsed between the creation of the world and its befitful for man he leaves indefinite. The Bible was never meant for a philosophical class-book. But Moses yet allows for this intervening period. The original Hebrew gives us no reason to suppose that the events of the second verse were as closely connected with that of the first as our word "and" leads some to suppose. We are left per-

fectly free to imagine the intervention of such a period as sufficed for all those transformations and developments, of which geology informs us. And to this view of the matter we are almost forced by other passages of scripture, such as that at the head of this article and Proverbs viii. 25—29. But these refer to geological changes which must have taken place before the creation of man, but subsequent (of course) to the creation of the world. Some intermediate geological period is therefore required. But all will not agree with us in the statement just made concerning the words of Peter. Many divines consider the passage to refer to the Noachian deluge. We disagree with them, because—(1.) It can scarcely be said that at the time of the deluge part of the land which it should have covered was “out of the water.” (2.) The Noachian deluge cannot be said to have destroyed the then-existing world, for it could not have produced any great change, being so gradual and so gentle that it left an olive-leaf clinging to its parent tree. (3.) There is every reason to believe that the deluge of Revelation was only *partial*; in support of which supposition, as it bears upon our future argument, we may be allowed to adduce the following reasons. There was *no need* for a universal deluge. There is every reason to believe that no man had passed from the continent of Asia; therefore, if that continent were submerged, nothing more was requisite. And we know that the Father acts not where need is not plain. “Power hath ordained nothing which Economy saw not needful.” Again, Asia is cup-shaped, so as to be well calculated to be the receptacle of a sudden flood. And once more, “We know that the kangaroos and emus of New Holland, the llamas of Peru, the sloths, armadilloes, and ant-eaters of Paraguay, to mention no other instances, never could have accomplished the passage from the places of their location to any central part of the Old World, and back again, from the scene where the ark of Noah was set afloat, by natural means. Neither can the polar bear and the hippopotamus, the ostrich and the eider fowl, the reindeer and the giraffe, exist together in a state of nature, requiring a great diversity of climate; and supposing them aggregated by the Divine Power, and sustained in a common temperature, the difficulty of conceiving a building capable of accommodating a tenth of the single parent-species is prodigious. To supernatural agency, indeed, all things are possible; but when nothing is said of its action in the record—when the object, imagined to have been effected by it, must have been to a great extent useless—and when the congregation of the animals is represented as in the main the work of Noah, we may surmise that a transaction local in its nature and comparatively limited in its extent, is the subject of the relation. This opinion, which zoological considerations favour, is *not opposed to the narrative*, expounded in har-

mony with oriental forms of speech, and with the genius of scripture diction when treating of physical events."*

The Noachian flood, then, was only partial, and the passage in Peter is plainly inapplicable to it. It follows, then, that its reference is as we have stated. So much for this part of the argument.

II. It is consistent with God's usual procedure. The process was gradual, not hasty. So is it in natural things. He does not raise up a forest in a night. First the ground receives the acorn; then the green bud peeps from the sod; then the strippling tree bows to the wind; then swells the proud strength of the storm-defiant oak. So is it with nations. As with the Romans—first humble shepherds, then petty foragers, then mighty warriors, then conquerors of the world. And so, in the preparation of this world, God acted according to his usual plan. Gradually were the metals stored, gradually were formed oceans' beds, gradually was the atmosphere adapted.

Again, the process involved no unnecessary miraculous operation. God is very sparing of miracles; and why should He depart from His wont in a case like this?

III. It is consistent with the scriptural view of the dignity of man. The declaration of the Bible, that God hath crowned man with glory and honour, is emphatically seconded by geology, which tells us that for him, during lengthened ages, mighty agencies toiled, wondrous creatures existed, glorious schemes were organized by God himself.

IV. It is consistent with the teachings of geology. None will dispute that geology bears evidence of a God, and of His continual carefulness for the well-being of man. It thus agrees with the first verse of Genesis. That it agrees with the second is thus shown. The most recent geologic depositions are the Alluvial. These are referred to existing causes, and are supposed to have been formed subsequent to the creation of man. The next are the Diluvial, which geologists are agreed in referring to most potent aqueous agency—to the action of a vast swirling mass of waters—enveloping the earth. The deluge did not afford such. Must we not conclude that the mass of waters, whose action produced the diluvian rocks, was that "deep," upon the face of which, when it had finished the preparation of the earth for man, brooded the Spirit of God? And the statement of modern geology is this:—"The last geologic catastrophe, prior to man's creation, was a general one, and left the whole earth in what may be called a chaotic state, the land and water being commingled; and the very atmosphere seems to have been so far affected by the general disturbance, as that it

* Milner's "Gallery of Nature," p. 594.

was not capable of transmitting the light of the sun and heavenly bodies."*

V. It is consistent with the discovered Geology of other worlds. When arguing for a plurality of worlds, we declared it "probable that some worlds are in a brute, and inert, and chaotic state, as was our earth, when preparing for its occupation for man." The state of the moon, chaotic, volcanic, atmosphereless, verifies this, and many astronomers believe Jupiter to be surrounded by a "deep," similar to that which enwrapped the world six thousand years ago. Other worlds may exhibit various grades of geologic development.

But we must cease. We might show how remarkably this view agrees with those floating traditions prevalent among the Orientals concerning a pre-Adamic age. But we trust enough has been said to show that in the matter of the earth's creation, the teachings of science and Scripture are identical. And in all points does Geology agree with Scripture. Both proclaim God as the great Creator. Geology tells that His agents in His work were fire and water; and Revelation tells of the great "deep," and also announces the existence of central fires, which shall finally consume the earth; both tell of a wondrous submersion of the globe; both declare man's late advent and peculiar glory; both speak of partial floods; both proclaim this earth's future.

Christian, rejoice! sceptic, tremble! Science goes hand in hand with Revelation, as two such fair sisters, sprung from one sire, should. Like the earth and the moon, each gives light to each.

THEBELKELD.

VOLTAIRE'S CHARACTER OF CROMWELL.—Cromwell is described as a man who was an impostor all his life. I can scarcely believe it. I conceive that he was at first an enthusiast, and that he afterwards made his fanaticism instrumental to his greatness. An ardent novice at twenty often becomes an accomplished rogue at forty. In the great game of human life, men begin with being dupes, and end in becoming knaves. A statesman engages as his almoner a monk, entirely made up of the details of his convent—devout, credulous, awkward, perfectly new to the world: he acquires information, polish, finesse, and supplants his master.—*Philosophical Dictionary*.

SILENCE is one of the great arts of conversation, as allowed by Cicero himself, who says, "There is not only an art, but an eloquence in it;" and this opinion is confirmed by a great modern, Lord Bacon. For a well-bred woman may easily and effectually promote the most useful and elegant conversation, without speaking a word. The modes of speech are scarcely more variable than the modes of silence.—*Dr. Blair*.

* "Eclectic Review," November, 1854.

Politics.

IS EDUCATION THE DUTY OF THE STATE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

WE very unhesitatingly reply in the affirmative of the present question. We do so whether the education referred to be understood to include religious instruction, or be entirely of a secular kind, as we think the State is entitled in the general case to impart education of either description ; but as the duty of the Government may be resolved very much into a question of expediency, the number of sectarian differences, and that alone, may make it reasonable in the State to confine its support simply to secular instruction, leaving the field open as to religious knowledge. In making this remark, however, we must be allowed to except Scotland, where, from the unanimity of the people in religious doctrine, it does not seem impossible to establish a national system, combining religious with secular instruction, on a satisfactory basis.

Primarily it seems every man's individual duty to provide education for his children ; and parents being fully sensible of this obligation, there would be no need of the State's interference, and no duty on the State to interfere, unless it could be shown, which it would be difficult to do, that the State could do the duty better by taking it out of the hands of the people—of those willing to perform, and in the course of performing the duty here incumbent upon them. But it is evident from the census, and other returns to parliament, as well as from many other means of testing the amount of education the people possess, that large numbers of the parents themselves are very ignorant, and are inclined to evil habits, and have no idea of the value of education, and that their children are growing up in ignorance of what is useful, and, as the necessary consequence of that ignorance, in the knowledge and practice of what is criminal and vicious ; all this is fully brought out in the article by Taliesin. We think, then, that in these circumstances, so far as the question has yet been carried, the State has a clear right to interfere, so that the community at large may be educated ; and in necessarily dealing with one class, that is, the class neglectful of the education of their rising members, it seems more politic to deal with the education of the people in general by a national system ; but, at all events, there is an evident call on the State to provide education.

The question comes to be,—Is it the duty of the State to res-

pond to the call? and we may answer generally, that unless the good is to be accomplished in some other way, as, or more, effectually,—or unless it can be shown that the State will receive any positive injury, of whatever kind, fitted to overbalance the benefits a national system of education would confer,—it is its duty, as an intelligent organization, to do the good pressed upon it, as it is each man's duty to do all the good he can. We shall presently endeavour to show that the object sought cannot so adequately be promoted in another way; or, in other words, that the voluntary scheme, the antithesis of State education, is quite unable to provide education effectually; and we may here say, that it is purely chimerical to talk of any injury to Government by attempting to undertake the work of education, as the duties of the State may be so arranged or divided as to enable this to be done as effectually as by any other organization. We may add two things, which seem to us to simplify the question a good deal:—*First*, while the State lays down the plan, and provides the funds, it is not to be presumed that it is intended to take from the people the management of their educational matters, so far as they can be said to possess such control. The question is not a Government education *versus* one controlled by the people, the first accepted in preference to the second as the least objectionable on the whole; but in any Government scheme that would find favour in this country, the people themselves would have the general working of the system, as we find in the United States, in Canada, to a certain extent in Scotland, and as is projected in the various bills introduced into Parliament on the subject of education, regarding England, and in those for the amendment of the Scottish system. A national system for this country is not necessarily founded on the model of the Prussian scheme; but, even if it were, we apprehend that the evil of centralization objected to against that system is greatly exaggerated—intelligent observers considering that the gradual spread of knowledge, which is its result, is diffusing habits of reflection tending to undermine the evils of a despotic government; at all events, while such a system may be naturally adopted in connection with an illiberal constitution, it may be as naturally expected that our national system will be in harmony with our free institutions. *Secondly*, In any true system of education, the people themselves will not merely be employed in working it out, which in fact they could only effectually do by the energetic and uniform organization of a governmental system necessitating the concurrence of all parties; but their voluntary efforts will be encouraged, and an increased value be given in proportion to the desire of the parent to have his children educated; and in both of these ways sufficient attention is paid to the various elements of a system contributing efficiently to the education of the people.

While it may be the duty of the State to effect the good we

desiderate, in the general case, the question occurs, *Has it not a very deep interest in the matter—an interest which renders its duty absolutely imperative?* We think it has. The State is injured by the ignorance and consequent criminality of a portion of society. This surely cannot be denied. Why does a parent educate his child? Because it tends to keep him from a number of bad habits, which otherwise would take root, and to enable him to develop his powers so that he may fill an honourable place in the world: and this is not accomplished simply by sharpening the intellect, but, as every system professes to do, by inculcating moral principles, and, in every event, habits of attention, order, and diligence, so essential to civilized humanity, are promoted by education; and the same general grounds may be urged for the State imparting education, namely, that society is a loser in respect of increased criminality, and the small amount of intellectual and moral development on the part of any portion of its members. And we may observe that, seeing that it is *admittedly* a duty of the parent to provide education for his family; and seeing also that it is *admittedly* a right thing to diffuse education, if necessary, by voluntary effort, it can scarcely be successfully maintained that the community at large has no right to do so, if considered expedient, by means of its organization—the State. But, farther, the State is compelled, for its own protection, to punish crime: if crimes are committed, it feels bound to punish, however varying the causes which lead to their commission; and, if so, is it not entitled to prevent crime, so far as possible, by an education which will fit the child for doing well, and, so far as any education can do, give it the disposition to *do well*? Is it not entitled to prevent crime as well as to punish it, when it comes to the overt act? If entitled to seize a juvenile culprit, to whip him, to expose him to the hardships of a long imprisonment, is it not entitled, or bound rather, to adopt the generous method of dealing with him, namely, to educate him? Has it only a right in the way of rigour and punishment, and no right or duty whatever to prevent the necessity of such procedure, by training up the child by means of education? We think that to every generous mind the answer is obvious; and in fact the public conscience, and the consequent effect of punishment, are vitiated by the consideration that penalties are inflicted without any prior endeavour to educate the child. Again, even in punishment, although severity, so as to deter the criminal from pursuing the criminal course he has begun, as well as others from crime, be an essential element, yet there is no Christian code which has not professedly in view also, by that and other means, the restoration of the offender; and shall it be said such punishment may be inflicted after crime has been committed, and yet that no endeavour ought to be made by the State to prevent crime by education? In the one case, you have a child

falling into crime, punished for crime, and possibly deterred from committing crime afterwards; whereas, in the other, the child is so instructed that he has no disposition to disobey the laws, but has a desire to do well. But farther, it will be found by experience that the educational method is far more effectual than the other to attain the end in view; by the former, a positive good is done—the intellectual and moral life of a nation is largely developed; but, by adopting the latter, there is a strong probability of failure; and the very means taken to punish are often those which lead farther into crime: and surely it is the duty of the State not to rely solely on these means, when better can be put into practice. It is true that Government interference may be carried to excess in this and other matters; but this does not invalidate either the soundness or the value of the principle for which we contend; and the opposite theory, consistently carried out, would put a stop to the encouragement given by the Government to the arts and sciences, and an interference in many other ways favourable to the morality and intelligence of the people, and the office of the State be limited to the actual punishment of crime.

But the duty of the State is rendered still more obvious by the following considerations, which show the inefficiency of the opposite or voluntary principle: and it may be premised that every reason which tells in favour of a national system is necessarily an argument for a State system, which alone can carry out the general desire:—The voluntary principle engenders inequality in the amount and kind of education; schools will be established rather for the class who establish them, than for the poor of the masses who have no appreciation of the value of education; but even if a few philanthropic persons interest themselves in the common population, they do not choose to send their own children to the schools they erect or support: these are, to a large extent, charity schools, which, in promoting education, destroy at the same time the independence of the working man; the different classes grow up apart, a course fraught with great social evil. The voluntary notion, proceeding on no regular plan, and fluctuating in its operation, will necessarily fail to carry education into every part of the country, particularly into the districts which most require it; and the people themselves cannot be expected to entertain the same idea of the value of education where it is the affair of a few, and not a thing intended for the children of the country, and laid down as part of the statute law. Again, voluntary education is the most expensive. We do not assert that under a national system less money would be expended;—on the contrary, we hope there would be more. This would not be a burden; it would be well spent; it would come from the landowners and farmers; and in the towns the wealthy, and generally those living by trade, would be compelled to pay

intend us to understand by it? We know from the New Testament narratives, that God, through his inspired servants, adapted and turned into a medium for the conveyance of religious instruction, the opinions and prejudices current amongst the Jews at the time, though highly erroneous. The Saviour himself adopted this method of proceeding. As an example, I need only refer to Matt. xii. 27, "And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out? therefore they shall be your judges;" thus conceding, for the sake of argument, the truthfulness of the pretences of the Jewish exorcists. Are we to suppose that they really had the power of casting out devils? Certainly not! This is, we consider, the true light whereby to view the first portion of the book of Genesis. It is a most sublime piece of composition, embodying the opinions of the Jews in reference to the cosmogony of the earth, which Moses was inspired to dress up in the garb of history. It was well calculated to serve the ends of religious instruction, having been designed to establish amongst the Hebrews the belief in one majestic and all-powerful Creator, to prevent the worship of false gods and the various other wild and fanciful forms of idolatry which then prevailed; hence the wisdom of introducing in this manner the animals and other objects therein mentioned, to show that they were the work of God, since they were especially the objects which they had seen worshipped amongst the Egyptians, and into the idolatrous worship of which they were themselves so prone to fall. The concluding portion of the first chapter was intended to enforce the observance of a day of rest. The reason given for this rest, that God was fatigued and needed repose, was evidently a *condescension* on the part of the Almighty to the minds of the ignorant and sensual Israelites. In Deuteronomy they were told to keep the sabbath in remembrance of their deliverance from the Egyptian bondage. This is another proof that the scripture writings were adaptations to the prevailing ideas of the times in which they were produced.

The earliest narratives of antiquity, amongst all nations, have been written in a style highly figurative; they all incline to the character of *poetry* rather than to that of *history*. Why should we deny this character to the book of Genesis? Surely not because the literal sense is easily comprehended, otherwise we should not have S. R. A. labouring to explain to others what he cannot very well understand himself. Josephus, the Jewish historian, says, Moses "spoke some things wisely, but enigmatically and under a decent allegory;" and after the description of the seventh day "he began to talk philosophically."

We have only referred to the discrepancies between the Mosaic record and the teachings of geology. There are many other considerations which affect the literal interpretation of the

book of Genesis. Why was a mark set upon Cain, to prevent others from slaying him, when he was the only surviving descendant of Adam and Eve? Where did he get his wife? &c.

In conclusion, we maintain that geology *does not* confirm the Mosaic account of creation; that it is palpably inconsistent with, and entirely opposed to, the belief that "God made all things of nothing in six days;" that even S. R. A.'s method, of giving up the *literal sense* of a portion of the narrative, does not answer the requirements of the case, the only satisfactory way being to consider the whole as entirely figurative.

Bradford.

TALIESIN.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"By the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water: whereby the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished."—2 Peter iii. 5, 6.

As the keynote of our argument, we have struck a Biblical chord. Strike now the harp of creation, and listen! Doth it not discourse sweet music to the foregone strain? It must. It does. Those mighty instruments must harmonize—those instruments whose every utterance breathes praise to the Contriver. The great Immutable cannot make one of his works oppose another. In each of the three great books—Creation, Providence, Revelation—can man read the superscription I AM.

A father, who is in a distant land, sends to his children a picture of himself and a letter. In the last he describes himself exactly, and tells his children whatever he would have them do. In the picture he is exactly portrayed; and if his children fail to catch the true expression, it is because they look through a bad light. And those inner qualities, the more secret excellencies, which the picture fails to show, are most closely and thoroughly delineated in the letter. As the picture is perfect, and the letter most true, the teaching of the one contradicts not that of the other; the letter speaks on topics concerning which the picture instructs not, and the picture gives its testimony to the truth of the letter.

We, the children of the mighty God, whom our eyes see not, have such a picture and such a letter—Nature and the Bible. Science is the description of that picture, and it must agree with the Bible.*

There is agreement between the science geology and scripture, though some philosophers (falsely so called) have endeavoured to jar the eternal harmony, and with presumptuous hands to strike forth chords harsh and discordant.

Both geology and scripture give us a glorious history of the

* See our article on the "Unity of the Human Race," in the *Christian Penny Magazine* for February.

system, with that of the countries where such a system has been established, as regards education.

In conclusion, we would inquire, Are we bound to wait the tardy progress of mere voluntarism? Is there no possibility that ignorance may overwhelm voluntarism? Indeed, would it be reasonable to expect that voluntarism, good enough in the way of proselytism where religion is concerned, should be efficient when, in addition to that, it is called to diffuse secular education? Is there anything in the nature of Government to compel it to refuse its powerful assistance, and to commit the question of education, so vital to the State, to the hazards or the necessary inequalities of the voluntary scheme? We confidently ask an answer in conformity with our views. We submit that the facts and arguments we have adduced, in establishing the greater efficiency of a national system, would alone go far to show that that system ought generally to be adopted, and that there is no sound theory which prevents its adoption; and finally, that the opinion, that the State has no duty whatever in the case, is repelled by our reason and our conscience, as well as by the necessities of the empire.

Edinburgh.

T. U.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

PERHAPS of late years more intellectual force has been expended upon the question of education than on any other pertaining to man's moral and intellectual progress; but it must not be supposed that the result is in proportion to the effort put forth. On the contrary, we shall find the result is exactly in an inverse ratio to all this effort, and that a feeling of dissatisfaction prevails upon this question, which has no parallel in any other. One simple point alone has been conceded by the various parties engaged in the solution of this social problem, and that is the paramount importance of education itself to the welfare of the people. Every step beyond this is encompassed with dangers; every point beyond this has been the ground upon which many a battle has been fought by eager combatants, zealous for victory.

And yet we sincerely believe that much of this warfare might have been avoided, had truth been the sole object of investigation—no matter with what pre-conceived notions it might have clashed; something more tangible and definite would have resulted from the earnest discussion of a question of such grave importance to man's welfare. With this belief, and having no other motive than a simple desire for the truth, we shall proceed to notice a few of the points which, in our opinion, have been too often overlooked in the discussion of this question, but which, notwithstanding, deserve patient and careful investigation before a permanent and satisfactory conclusion will be possible.

By the term "education" is generally understood the proper culture or development of man's moral, intellectual, and spiritual faculties, and in this sense we use the word in the present debate. The great purpose of life is culture, in its widest meaning, and every man will illustrate this principle in some shape or other; his powers of perception will be quickened for good or for evil in his journey through life; and it becomes his duty, as a rational and responsible being, to determine in what manner he shall acquit himself; and his greatest help will be that "knowledge of good and evil," which will enable him to decide promptly and rightly in every emergency that may befall him. Hence the paramount importance of education to every man. Now we think it must be apparent, even on the surface, that if the definition we have given of education be correct, it is entirely beyond the province of the State to interfere with a question affecting, as this does, man in every relationship of life. And upon this ground would we make a firm stand. If it lies not within the power of the State to educate its children, then, by no species of reasoning whatever can it be said to be a duty devolving upon it; for that only can be said to be a duty which will admit of fulfilment.

In the first place, the education of the people is a duty which the State cannot directly fulfil. Education is of two kinds, mechanical, and moral. The first may be said to resemble the clay tenement which enshrines the soul of man, the latter is the soul itself; both are indispensable the one to the other. Now we admit that it is quite possible for the State to administer to the people the first or mechanical part of education; but the latter, were the attempt made to any extent, would soon be found to be without its pale. The question then arises, Would it be expedient to secure the first at the imminent risk of losing the latter? This we shall proceed to answer in the negative. The main purpose of education undoubtedly is to enable a man to discharge his manifold duties to society, from motives at once right in themselves, and of sufficient power to influence his conduct, when opposing agencies are at work to counteract the effect of right principle. And to this end nothing better could be adapted than the inculcation of sound moral and religious principles, upon which to base all the actions of life. Every other foundation will prove itself but shifting sand. Self-interest, expediency, present good, present gratification, all these at times will rule over the soul of man, when moral motives are abandoned, and nothing but disaster and ruin awaits him. Such being the case, no attempt should be made to weaken the influence of moral or religious teaching, without careful consideration. We are dealing with this question more as one of practice than any mere theory. The State education of the people must of necessity be a secular education; and, in the present state of

society, such a system could not be otherwise than pernicious. The moral influences at present at work amongst the mass of the people would, to a considerable extent, be withdrawn, on the interference of the State with the education of the people. Nothing can be clearer than this. Grant that it is the *duty* of the State to educate the children of the working classes—for this is the real point at issue—and in effect you disown the duty of the parent to do the same thing. One of the most obvious effects of a State interference in the education of the people will be the altered relations sustained by the parent to the child,—a change productive of the most serious evils. In further support of our views on this part of the subject, we would refer the reader to the admirable opening article in this debate, in which the mutual obligations of parent and child are pointed out with great clearness.

But we pass on to notice the remaining propositions, as these are of the most practical importance. In the second place, then, we observe that the education of the people may be materially promoted by the indirect effort of the State. The great retarding causes of all improvement, moral and physical, are intemperance, and improvidence; the latter, indeed, being the necessary adjunct of the former. Not until these evils have been materially abated, can we hope to place education on a sound basis. We look around and see people subject to a bondage more humiliating and degrading than that endured of old by the down-trodden Hebrews; and we ask ourselves the question, How can these things be?—How is it possible that in an age remarkable for mechanical and scientific improvements—for luxuries and comforts unknown in the past history of the world, that immense masses of the people can huddle and herd together like beasts of the field? And yet these things may be witnessed every day; and even stranger things than these. The executive power of a great nation may be seen making *a gain* of the wretchedness and degradation of a people great in spite of their faults and shortcomings! Again we ask,—How can these things be?

Before the education of the people is delegated to the State, we should surely inquire whether the State is willing to discharge the task we would impose upon it; whether it is sufficiently alive to the great interests at stake in such a step, to feel any interest whatever concerning it. We will apply a practical test:—During the past month, a slight reduction has been made in the malt tax. To the lovers of certain kinds of liquids, this may seem no great grievance; but how does it affect the question of education? To say nothing of the policy which dictated this step, in presence of the thick-spread evils resulting from intemperance, if we consider it only as a matter affecting, indirectly it may be, but still affecting, the education of the people, what

inference must we draw? Why, that our legislators are building with one hand, and pulling down with the other. Had some reduction been made in the taxes upon knowledge, we could have seen the operation of some fixed principle; but not so in the policy which dictated the partial repeal of the duty upon malt.

Again, the moral and physical destitution of the people is pleaded in support of the plan for State education; but, under present circumstances, State education would scarcely ameliorate their condition at all. Take, for instance, the widely prevalent vice of intoxication: how will State education affect this subject? Examine the statistics carefully which have appeared in a previous article in this magazine—an article, too, in support of the State education of the people—bringing to light a degree of suffering and wretchedness which is truly terrible, and say, in what manner will education remove these dire evils? If 10,000 men go to bed drunk every Saturday night in Glasgow, how will a system of education, intended for children, affect *their* condition? Doubtless we should be told that the children of to-day will be the parents of to-morrow, and that a good influence exerted upon them will be felt to the end of all time. But we are very sceptical as to the result. Of all the constituent elements which make a character, those which are *moral* are most abiding, and moral interests ever flourish best at home. If a home, then, be wretched, and the head of a family an improvident, dissipated man, we have no hesitation in asserting that *his influence* would more than counterbalance the effect of a sound education. It must be clear thus, that any attempt to educate the people, without in the first place removing the more apparent causes of vice and improvidence, would be eminently unsuccessful; and that before any good could result from the one, adequate steps must be taken to combat the other.

In the last place, we notice that in conjunction with this indirect help on the part of the State, the people will be found able and willing to educate themselves. It is a matter beyond dispute, that if the people would only educate themselves, it would be far better, and far more likely to prove beneficial than if the State were to interfere in a question so closely connected with their best interests. The only question of any practical importance which remains for our consideration is this, Can the people educate themselves? This, in conjunction with the terms already stated, we shall answer in the affirmative. As already intimated, the education for which we are contending must be wrought out by two agencies—the State, and the people. The duty of the first is clearly marked out by existing circumstances; wherever thick sown and deeply rooted temptations to evil abound, there must the work begin. Gambling houses have been suppressed by law, and other houses, exerting a far more baneful influence, and wielding a far more weighty spell, must be put down too. In other words, we see no hope for England until we have what

technically termed a Maine law, &c., in effect, the total suppression of the sale of intoxicating liquors. Then would the disgraceful and suicidal acts, which are daily recorded in the newspapers, be abated, and this nation no longer have to blush for her Christianity; and then, too, would every influence at work for the moral and social advancement of the people operate with unimpeded energies upon a soil prepared for its reception. Until this is done, education will remain the bright dream of some visionary enthusiast.

But the people have a work to perform, and we have to decide, upon paper at least, whether they are willing and able to perform it. We judge of the present by the past, especially in the matter of probabilities or possibilities; and we do so in consideration of the present question. As the people have worked nobly in the past, so will they, when rightly and wisely supported, work nobly in the future. State education was never dreamed about by our senators when the people were really as ignorant as barbarians; but now, when mechanics' institutions, mutual improvement societies, evening classes, debating societies, and a powerful periodical press, are at full work, the profound discovery is made, that the people *must be educated!* We would say to our senators that as we, the people of Britain, have begun a good work, so are we capable to carry it on to the end, and that our only wish in reference to the State is comprised in the word "non-interference."

One word, in conclusion, as to the expense involved in the education of the people. It was stated in a previous article of this magazine that the people could not afford to educate themselves, and the writer evidently thought he had put the extinguisher upon what he termed "poor voluntaryism." Now this really sounds absurd. If the people cannot pay for their own education, who is to pay for them? Not the State certainly, for the State obtains all its wealth from the people. Here is a fact which may throw a little light upon the subject. Mr. Charles Knight—a good authority—stated recently that the sum annually expended in this country upon literature, including newspapers, was only between £5,000,000 and £6,000,000; that is to say, for every penny spent upon food for the mind, *eleven pence at least* is spent upon liquid stimulants for the body! Let this state of things be reversed a little, and we shall hear no more of the property of the people, or the insufficiency of voluntaryism to grapple with this question.

It now remains for the reader to judge for himself. We have endeavoured to bring forward a few facts and principles which have been too often overlooked in the heat of this contest, and which we would fain hope go far to establish our case; nothing now remains, therefore, but to wish prosperity to the sound education of the people.

Wakefield.

J. E. B.

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE present is a question of degree only; and it would seem that there will not be required a great expenditure of logic or of example to prove that the man who, by reckless expenditure, becomes insolvent, and then sustains himself for a time by misrepresentative credit, is both a more unprincipled character in himself, and also inflicts more wrongs upon his neighbours, than the solitary miser, whose worst vice is that of close trading, and whose worst wrongs to society are those of a recluse capitalist; for the injuries of a spendthrift upon the community are positive, while those of a miser are merely negative. A miser may be honest, but a spendthrift never. The latter invariably ruins himself, and then robs his neighbours; but the former is nothing more than a stagnant nuisance and a miserable man. The errors of the one class thus affect the public generally, while those of the other are private and personal only. A spendthrift is a social upas tree; all who come within his delusive protection, all who have dealings with him, all who trust him,—all suffer, and all are injured.

But the classes of character before us have been unduly circumscribed by J. R., on the negative side. This writer appears to have singularly primitive ideas of what constitutes a spendthrift. He would seem to have sat down to pen his article after virtuously contemplating Hogarth's prints of the "Rake's Progress," and to have imagined that a "rake" and a "spendthrift" are necessarily, and under all circumstances, identical; though why, after this confession, he should so steadfastly denounce the "thriving 'prentice," who certainly bears some resemblance to a respectable miser, and impute all goodness to a rake, is a query which will have lost its wonder after J. R.'s other performances, in the way of incomprehensible inference and perverted ingenuity, are witnessed. A spendthrift is depicted by this intelligent observer as a gay young fop, whose relative has recently bequeathed him "a large sum of money," which he is represented as benevolently investing in the support of "gambling houses, horse races, theatres, gin palaces, and other abodes of sin and crime, until at last *all* is gone." There is pathos in this narration. The word *all*, in italics, is a true and delicate touch of nature. J. R. has certainly mistaken his vocation; he should

contribute tales of thrilling interest to those interesting periodicals which are so ardently devoured by sentimental milliners and bakers' daughters, who would doubtless betray a tender commiseration for the awful rake of the story, and probably fancy the portrait his own.

Now if a spendthrift were indeed the poor innocent victim that J. R. supposes, there can be no doubt that a more harmless creature never existed, and that J. R. is quite right in the side he has taken; for a miser by contrast must be a perfect demon of vice and ravaging devastation. But unhappily for this writer's argument, the class of men whom he espouses certainly admits of far greater extension than he indicates. A spendthrift is not simply a poor fop, who has been "brought to grief" by his tailor, or a misguided rake, who has been ruined by his doctor; but a spendthrift may be defined in broad terms as a man whose expenses exceed his income. It may be a gentleman, who maintains a larger establishment than he can afford; or a tradesman, who, on credit, speculatively continues in business after he is clearly insolvent. The case is thus not affected by the subject being a gentleman, and a spendthrift in his private capacity, or a merchant or banker, and a spendthrift in his public capacity; for in each case the expenditure is greater than the income, *i. e.*, the person subsists on a credit which he is not justified in obtaining, and the necessity for which we here suppose to have resulted from prior extravagance. The merchant or trader, therefore, who, on the strength of his good name, is buoyed up for a season by accommodation and credit, is as clearly a spendthrift as is the baronet or gentleman, who, on similar grounds, continues to incur liabilities, which he is incapable of meeting.

And how large is this class of pretenders? They pervade the whole kingdom. Where is there a town in which many do not lie to-day hid, to-morrow to be unveiled? Where a honest tradesman, who has not many times been seriously embarrassed by them? Their baneful influence extends, like the circles on a pool, far and wide. It is not simply themselves whom they injure, but every person who has dealings, or is associated with them, has reason to regret it. By compelling their tradesmen to give long credit, a false system of dealing is engendered, and fictitiously high prices are originated, both as a means of reimbursement for losses, and for interest on outlying capital; so that the honest community of every grade must suffer for the extravagance, and consequent insolvency of a particular class. Indeed, we cannot view the spendthrift in a single position not injurious to his fellow men. It is true that he may be a respectable member of society; but what is society?—Who cares for its laws, or rates himself by its standard? With it what was right yesterday, is wrong to-day. Some time ago, it was right and proper that a lord should get drunk; but what so ungentle-

manly as this vice to the poor effete young aristocrat of to-day? Of all things hollow and artificial, society maintains the superlative degree,—and this is no new utterance. Let it, however be noticed that to the spendthrift is due one or more false elements in the code of that spurious embodiment of respectability called *society*, or the *world*. To him is due the value which is set upon social grade, and he is accountable for the wrongs to the industrious, arising from the too ardent indulgence in the expensive ambition therein implied. If reckless adventurers never encouraged this petty craving after a social circle above their own legitimate one, we presume that the mania would cease generally, and that the result would be a great increase of happy families, contented parents, educated sons, and paid-up tradesmen.

But the world is thus largely composed of boastful pretenders who have no money, and of spendthrifts who would be better without it. From Strahan, Paul, and Co., or Sadleir, or any conceivable titled scapegrace, down to the meanest insolvent debtor, all are spendthrifts, and their name is legion. Who can calculate the injury they inflict? By the legal swindle of some spendthrift company, how many shareholders, with their families, are beggared! By the myriads of fire and life insurance companies, and other high-sounding jargon,—titled bubbles, whose lying prospectuses are showered like autumn leaves over the land, promising, out of nothing, to pay and to do everything; by the folly of the vainglorious in society's high places, and by the vanity of their servile imitators, the world is filled with false pretensions, our streets are filled with beggars, our workhouses with paupers, and labour has become lowered to a curse and a shame. A spendthrift is therefore a social pestilence, sweeping over the land—he is an unseen whirlpool, towards the vortex of which scores of duped creditors are unwittingly tending, and in which they will presently sink, to be heard of no more.

But what wrongs can the poor miser advance to compete with this host of injuries? J. R. has enumerated several:—First, “the miser works hard,” for which we are requested to blame him, because J. R. cannot see who, but the man himself, is benefited by it. We will inform him who is benefited by it,—*posterity*! Does this satisfy him?—if not, we proceed to observe that it is a common opinion amongst the unsophisticated, that if a man gains money by honest labour, he is not morally responsible to any person for the manner in which he spends it or keeps it—or at least for the latter. But, moreover, if the miser be blamed for *keeping* his money, how much more should the spendthrift be blamed for *spending* his in the profligate manner so vividly pictured by J. R.! It is certainly a less evil to do no good than to go about doing harm;—which is all we contend for.

The next blemish in the otherwise fair tablets of the miser's character is said to be his wicked propensity to *hoard*. On this

topic J. R. again argues with an unsuspecting simplicity and innocent ardour, which are quite refreshing—his vigour is astonishing; he turns the question over, he casts it from him, then returns to it again, and breaks it into fragments; but every time he elicits something good and favourable, which is received with a complaisant smile, as if all things were known to him from the beginning. There is nothing which he cannot prove; black, in his hands, would become white; the sun would become the moon, and the ocean a river, a pond, or lake. He informs us (which is doubtless equivalent to proving it) that our moral, mental, physical, and religious progress, depends upon money, and that a miser, by withholding it from circulation, places a dead lock upon the fly-wheel of society. This is probably fine language; but an unenlightened reader will probably consider it somewhat unintelligible. He then invites us triumphantly “to sum up the amount of evils following the want of the full and free circulation of the coin of the realm, retarded by the parsimony of the few.” We think that a far more difficult task even than this might be retorted upon the advocates of the negative side. Money, we may remark, is far from being the soul and necessity of business, &c., that it formerly was. Neither misers nor tradesmen do now hoard up their gold in strong boxes kept carefully in secret places; this method survives only in melodramas and J. R.’s imagination. Except in retail business, and among small ignorant mercenaries, hard cash is scarcely known. A merchant, with consignments in every clime, probably does not circulate directly ten sovereigns a week. And it is the same with misers. Paper and credit are now the circulating media. Misers, therefore, *do not* hoard up money; and in J. R.’s assumption that *they do*, lies all his gross misconceptions on the subject; but, like all other sensible money-loving people, they invest their gains in a secure and profitable manner, and are no more to be blamed for so doing than are the thousand other rich or retired persons who hold shares in the millions of various stocks extant. With the exception of a few ignorant and penurious old maids and bachelors, there are no misers in the sense implied by J. R.

To picture any human being, therefore, as a sordid wretch sitting gloaming in a cave or hovel, surrounded with bags of gold, and instructing his hard featured myrmidons to go forth and grind the poor and imprison the fatherless, in order to bring in more money, is simply nonsense, and a mere figment of imagination. A miser is really nothing more than a man who conducts his business on what the world considers to be the most approved principles; he purchases labour and stock in the cheapest markets, and sells the produce thereof in the dearest, and simply does not maintain a position in the social scale commensurate with his income. This is all the wrongs of which he

is guilty; and to say that, for this perfectly harmless conduct, he is equally blameable with the profligate, devastating spendthrift, is a perversion of judgment which we cannot understand.

E. S. J.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN relation to society and pecuniary affairs, this subject embraces extremes. As such, we are sorry that neither of the interested parties, whose character, influence, and objects will be mooted and canvassed, can be congratulated on the result of the discussion; for preponderate the evidence how it may, they are but entitled to a negative verdict—of injuring and jeopardising the welfare of the community to a less extent than the other. But to direct our attention to the question.

Our opponent T. U., who sides with the Miser, defines the subject correctly, as one pertaining exclusively to a realised society; and indeed we do not apprehend that any different construction can be placed upon the words, other than the effects of the respective parties on society.

In our opinion, to attempt to resolve or discuss the question as a problem of a society of misers or spendthrifts, would be singularly anomalous. To conceive or dream of a society constituted in this manner would, we believe, be ridiculous. The application and signification of the terms would immediately fall into desuetude, inasmuch as it is by the contrast of these eccentric members of society with the uniformity of the general body, that we derive our ideas of their conspicuous isolation. Divest them of this insularity by elevating the general body, or merging the lesser in the greater, and we lose such ideas in the consolidation of the whole.

It is material to a thorough appreciation of our subject that we properly understand and define the names embodied in our question. This we can scarcely expect to do efficiently from Walker, for to confine ourselves to a rigid dictionary definition, aiming frequently at aphoristical opinion, would be opposed to the scope and comprehensiveness of our subject, requiring a free and not literal interpretation of its terms.

The qualities of frugality and industry cannot be claimed as the characteristics of the miser, nor generosity and indolence as the characteristics of the spendthrift. It is when the former become intensified to avarice and slavery, and the latter degenerate into dissipation and recklessness, that we discover two banes of society. Each of these classes exercises an influence necessarily prejudicial, and frequently pernicious; but apart from the real question, but perhaps not entirely adventitious, as it may alleviate some of the more sinister features, is their apparent character. If we would prefer either example, we should pre-

nounce in favour and on behalf of the spendthrift, who is, we think, more allied to humanity by his congeniality of habit and disposition than the miser, who severs every link of affection and sociableness by a blighting frigidity. In the one character we recognise the traits of youth, to which a great portion of this class belongs, buoyancy of spirits, and love of novelty; but these are generally of an ephemeral kind, for after the first outburst of irritation and excitement, we shall find them subside and reform, and settlement generally ensue. On the other hand, however, we shall detect not an invariable misanthropy, but frequently a morbid distrust or detestation of his species, which becomes a confirmed and permanent disease, so seldom relieved by a sunny cloud of humanity, that we regard it as irremediable. Hence we conclude, that so far as mere personal influence may operate upon us, that the spendthrift has more of the poetry of human nature in his soul, and consequently enlists more of our sympathies than the miser, whose more dreary features repel us; and further, that in point of duration, the spendthrift is more of an occasional truant from the *golden mean* than the miser, whom we contemplate as a permanent absentee. After this casual glance at the influence of the respective characters, we have now to advert to the stern realities displayed in the effects. The foregoing remarks apply more strictly to the outline impressed on our minds by somewhat superficial views, heightened in the colouring, perhaps, by our own sympathies. But this sympathy or prejudice, and it is incontestably a popular one, is not, we repeat, altogether idle, but will be found to rest on a substratum of facts. In the definition furnished from Walker by T. U. motives or evil passions are not imputed to either class, and nothing more is implied than an inordinate desire to hoard and to lavish. Our opponent, not being very felicitous in these definitions, makes up the defect by assigning evil passions rather partially. To a dispassionate and fair discussion he purposes to employ the miser as essentially a lover of money; but the other, in addition to his peccadilloes in prodigality, he must needs be a malignant. If such were a fair estimate and statement of the different men, we should consider it an undebatable subject, and the conclusion inevitable and imperative. But it must be obvious that the miser, who subordinates every passion and emotion to a great leading idea, and that ignoble and sordid, is naturally carried to extremes to achieve his absorbing object—the acquisition of wealth. That in the attainment of this he should have to encounter and surmount formidable obstacles, necessitating the ignoring of all earthly ties and future spiritual prospects, is not remarkable; although at the same time we do not comprehend under this head all actuated to the commission of crime by a love of lucre; but it cannot be asserted that when a comparative avidity will incite to crime, a ravenous propensity will

preserve an immunity from immorality. T. U. paints the character, objects, and destiny of the miser in colours which will not adorn the dark (black) ground native to the mind of the miser. The following is very fair for a miser. "He feels very little discomfort," "is contented with his situation," "and looks forward to no change in it." Again, he represents him as relationless, and, as a consequence, distressing no family circle; or if he is not such a solitary thing, T. U. asserts that his origin and that of his family is humble, therefore they do not require or miss the luxuries of life. This we cannot allow. Contentedness is not the lot of a covetous man, either with reference to his means or situation; nor is avariciousness confined to any particular class, but, on the contrary, pervades every rank, rendering all alike susceptible to the distemper, irrespective of present indigence or affluence, past nobility or humbleness of origin or extraction. Such a man as detailed above is not likely, we avow, to break moral laws, "sanctioned by penalties." T. U. admits, however, that society is injured to a certain extent by the withholding of his money, but this he retracts, or rather contradicts, in subsequent passages, by assuring us that society is ultimately no loser by the hoarding system. This he brings about by reasoning not only anomalous but even disingenuous, when we reflect that it emanates from an opponent of the calibre and acumen of T. U.

"Say we have twenty misers in this city; their wealth at their decease is set free and circulated. Twenty misers will do the same for succeeding generations, and society in the end will be no loser." This is equivalent to affirming that the continuation or perpetuation of moral criminality will abate or consecrate its heinousness, from the fact that he constrainedly bequeaths his illicit hoards to posterity on account of his inability to transplant them to another world, which prescribes an inflexible law with regard to the transit of passengers' luggage! It may as well be asserted that as the miser has been perfunctory in the performance of the duties incumbent upon him in the social state, he redeems his errors of omission and commission by leaving his carcase—through the undertakers, his legatees—to his contemporaries! We must demur also to the advantages which are supposed to be the concomitants of a long accumulated wealth, suddenly transferred to next of kin. Such influxes are, we question not, often opportune and beneficent, yet we cannot be oblivious to the fact, which immediately suggests itself, that frail human nature, when elated at these "Godsends," is carried to great excesses, which frequently earn for the recipient the epithet of spendthrift: thus through the miser's instrumentality other classes are precipitated to the other extreme.

Afterwards follows a delineation of a supposed spendthrift, which in the catalogue of sins, ancient and modern, beggars description. Suffice it to say that all frailties are enumerated,

classified, and imputed, whether retrospective, present, or prospective, direct, indirect, or contingent! He insists on evil motives as influencing and actuating him! The maintenance of the great superstructures of the country, with all their abominations, is attributed to him! The theatres, wherein the spirit of the drama—the mighty, soul exploring, sympathy arousing, heart enthralling—treads majestically in his great asylum from oblivion, enwrapped in all its glorious inspiring associations. We are not credulous enough to accept the dictum of T. U. that this, and all places of amusement, can be sustained by the spendthrift. Races and such like are not dependent for support on him, for the greatest of our aristocrats and best country gentlemen will figure as their chiefs and promoters. But these undoubtedly have great drawbacks; but an immense part of our population participates on festive and holiday occasions in these sports, and it is to them that we look for the real supporters of amusement, to which, we are afraid, T. U. has an abhorrence. With regard to gin palaces, casinos, &c., it is undeniable that money finds its way into this vortex; but who will have hardihood to stigmatize as spendthrifts (in the acceptation of the word in our debate) the patronisers of these places? The vicious do congregate, heedless of the immoral epidemics, which chill and blast most of the flowers that are brought sufficiently near to be contaminated, is too true; but callousness has in many hearts given way to all tenderer feelings, and cold-blooded calculation presides over the scenes and pervades the chambers of misery, so that even avariciousness may act and indeed does act in enticing the unwary into its grand banqueting halls. The frequenters of these hells cannot be considered as essentially spendthrifts, or the working man who attends the public house. It is indubitable that a large portion of these people are led on by infirmity of will and instability of purpose to engage in pursuits and pleasures which are not censorious in a criminal point of view; and that competition in a class and faction substantially above their own necessitative or profuse expenditure in luxuries and superfluities will endanger and accelerate the declension of their fortunes. But these weaknesses of temperament and habit, entailing such extravagances, are remarkably advantageous to an inferior social class, whose subsistence is dependent on them; and it is from the dissipation of these that a good many of our middle classes are raised to comparative affluence, and indeed accumulate great fortunes, which ultimately open to the aspiration of their families all the channels of preferment and honourable ambition. To dwell on this fact would be futile, as it is apparent that every penny squandered to gratify a whim is circulated, and passes into the hands of a dependent and laborious class.

We shall not pursue this theme further at present. T. U. has, we think, utterly mistaken the miser whom he has portrayed,

and on a better description of the man it is not impossible that we may be convinced of the fallacious position we have assumed, as we are not fully determined in our own minds which is correct, and we hope this may serve to elicit facts to *war* on the side of *truth*.
CID.

INWARD BLINDNESS.—Talk to a blind man—he knows he wants the sense of sight, and willingly makes the proper allowances. But there are certain internal senses, which a man may want, and yet be wholly ignorant that he wants them. It is most unpleasant to converse with such persons on subjects of taste, philosophy, or religion. Of course there is no *reasoning* with them, for they do not possess the facts on which the reasoning must be grounded. Nothing is possible, but a naked dissent, which implies a sort of unsocial contempt; or, what a man of kind disposition is very likely to fall into, a heartless tacit acquiescence, which borders too nearly on duplicity.—*Coleridge*.

CONVERSATION.—If I were to choose the people with whom I would spend my hours of conversation, they should be certainly such as laboured no farther than to make themselves readily and clearly apprehended, and would have patience and curiosity to understand me. To have good sense, and ability to express it, are the most essential and necessary qualities in companions. When thoughts rise in us fit to utter among familiar friends, there needs but very little care in clothing them.—*Steele*.

GOOD BREEDING.—Perhaps the summary of good breeding may be reduced to this rule,—“Behave unto all men as you would they should behave unto you.” This will most certainly oblige us to treat all mankind with the utmost civility and respect, there being nothing that we desire more than to be treated so by them. The ambitious, the covetous, the proud, the vain, the angry, the debauchee, the glutton, are all lost in the character of the well-bred man; or if nature should now and then venture to peep forth, she withdraws in an instant, and doth not show enough of herself to become ridiculous.—*Fielding*.

SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE.—The profoundly wise do not declaim against superficial knowledge in others, so much as the profoundly ignorant; on the contrary, they would rather assist it with their advice than overwhelm it with their contempt; for they know that there was a period when even a Bacon or a Newton were superficial; and that he who has a little knowledge is far *more* likely to get more than he that has none.—*Colton*.

SNEERERS.—The most insignificant people are the most apt to sneer at others. They are safe from reprisals, and have no hope of rising in their own esteem but by lowering their neighbours. The severest critics are always those who have either never attempted, or who have failed in original composition.—*Hazlitt*.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 40.)

5.—THE VERB—continued.

FIRST CONJUGATION in ER.

AIMER, TO LOVE.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, AIME; 2, AIMAI; 3, AIMER, 4, AIMANT; 5, AIME'.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
J'aime	<i>I love</i>	Nous aimons	<i>we love</i>
Tu aimes	<i>thou lovest</i>	Vous aimez	<i>ye or you love</i>
Il or elle aime	<i>he, it, or she loveth</i> <i>or loves</i>	Ils or elles aiment	<i>they love</i>

Imperfect Tense.

J'aimais	<i>I loved or was loving</i>	Nous aimions	<i>we loved or were loving</i>
Tu aimais	<i>thou lovedst, &c.</i>	Vous aimiez	<i>ye loved, &c.</i>
Il or elle aimait	<i>he, it, or she loved, &c.</i>	Ils or elles aimaient	<i>they loved, &c.</i>

Preterite Tense.

J'aimai	<i>I loved</i>	Nous aimâmes	<i>we loved</i>
Tu aimas	<i>thou lovedst</i>	Vous aimâtes	<i>ye loved</i>
Il aima	<i>he loved</i>	Ils aimèrent	<i>they loved</i>

Future Tense.

J'aimerai	<i>I shall love</i>	Nous aimerons	<i>we shall love</i>
Tu aimeras	<i>thou wilt love</i>	Vous aimerez	<i>ye will love</i>
Il aimera	<i>he will love</i>	Ils aimeront	<i>they will love</i>

Conditional Tense.

J'aimerais	<i>I should love</i>	Nous aimerions	<i>we should love</i>
Tu aimerais	<i>thou wouldst love</i>	Vous aimeriez	<i>ye would love</i>
Il aimerait	<i>he would love</i>	Ils aimeraient	<i>they would love</i>

Compound of the Present

J'ai aimé *I have loved, &c.*

Compound of the Imperfect.

J'avais aimé *I had loved, &c.*

Compound of the Preterite

J'eus aimé *I had loved, &c.*

Compound of the Future

J'aurai aimé *I shall have loved, &c.*

Compound of the Conditional

{ J'aurais aimé }
{ J'eusse aimé } *I should have loved, &c.*

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
Que j'aime	<i>that I may love</i>	Que nous aimions	<i>that we may love</i>
Que tu aimes	<i>that thou mayst love</i>	Que vous aimiez	<i>that ye may love</i>
Qu'il or qu'elle aime	<i>that he, it, or she may love</i>	Qu'ils or qu'elles aiment	<i>that they may love</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que j'aimasse	<i>that I might love</i>	Que nous aimassions	<i>that we might love</i>
Que tu aimasses	<i>that thou mightst love</i>	Que vous aimassiez	<i>that ye might love</i>
Qu'il aimât	<i>that he might love</i>	Qu'ils aimassent	<i>that they might love</i>

Compound of the Present Que j'aie aimé *that I may have loved*
 Compound of the Preterite Que j'eusse aimé *that I might have loved*

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Singular.		Plural.	
Aime	<i>love thou</i>	Aimons	<i>let us love</i>
		Aimez	<i>love ye</i>
Compound Form (given in grammars, but very rarely found in authors).			
Aie aimé	<i>have thou loved</i>	Ayons aimé	<i>let us have loved</i>
		Ayez aimé	<i>have loved</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.		Compound Tense.	
Aimer	<i>to love</i>	Avoir aimé	<i>to have loved</i>

PARTICIPLES.

Gerund or Present Participle	Aimant	<i>loving</i>
Past Participle	Aimé	<i>loved</i>
Compound Participle	Ayant aimé	<i>having loved</i>

It is unnecessary to give the passive voice, as it is merely a repetition of the verb *Etre*, adding *aimé* after every person of every tense.

INFINITIVE ending in GER.

The difference in this case arises from the preservation of the soft sound of the *g* in positions in which it is generally hard.

JUGER, TO JUDGE.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, JUGER; 2, JUGEAI; 3, JUGER; 4, JUGEANT; 5, JUGE'.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
Je juge	<i>I judge</i>	Nous jugeons	<i>we judge</i>
Tu juges	<i>thou judgest</i>	Vous jugez	<i>you judge</i>
Il juge	<i>he judges</i>	Ils jugent	<i>they judge</i>

Imperfect Tense.

Je jugeais	<i>I judged</i>	Nous jugions	<i>we judged</i>
Tu jugeais	<i>thou judgedst</i>	Vous jugiez	<i>you judged</i>
Il jugeait	<i>he judged</i>	Ils jugeaient	<i>they judged</i>

Preterite Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je jugeai	<i>I judged</i>	Nous jugeâmes	<i>we judged</i>
Tu jugeas	<i>thou judgedst</i>	Vous jugeâtes	<i>ye judged</i>
Il jugea	<i>he judged</i>	Ils jugèrent	<i>they judged</i>

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Preterite Tense.

Que je jugeasse	<i>that I might judge</i>	Que nous jugeassions	<i>that we might judge</i>
Que tu jugeasses	<i>that thou mightst judge</i>	Que vous jugeassiez	<i>that ye might judge</i>
Qu'il jugeât	<i>that he might judge</i>	Qu'ils jugeassent	<i>that they might judge</i>

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Juge	<i>judge thou</i>	Jugeons	<i>let us judge</i>
		Jugez	<i>judge ye</i>

PARTICIPLE.

Present—Jugeant, judging.

In all other parts these verbs are like AIMER.

Verbs whose infinitive ends in CER take a cedilla under the c in the same cases that the g of ger takes an e; namely, before a and o: as, nous plaçons, we place; je plaçai, I placed.

INFINITIVE ending in ELER or ETTER.

These verbs double the l or the t before e mute in all the tenses.

CHANCELER, TO TOTTER.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, CHANCELLE; 2, CHANCELAI; 3, CHANCELER; 4, CHANCELANT; 5, CHANCELE'.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
Je chancelle	Nous chancelons
Tu chancelles	Vous chancelez
Il chancelle	Ils chancellent

Future Tense.

Je chancellerai	Nous chancellerons
Tu chancelleras	Vous chancellerez
Il chancellera	Ils chancelleront.

Conditional Tense.

Je chancellerais	Nous chancellerions
Tu chancellerais	Vous chancelleriez
Il chancellerait	Ils chancelleraient

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Que je chancelle	Que nous chancelions
Que tu chancelles	Que vous chanceliez
Qu'il chancelle	Qu'ils chancellent

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

*Singular.**Plural.*

Chancelle

Chancelons
ChancelezIn all other parts like *AIMER*.

If the *e* in the penultimate syllable has an acute accent, as *empiéter*, to encroach, *inquiéter*, to disturb, *révéler*, to disclose, neither the *l* nor the *t* is doubled, but when the termination commences with *e* mute, the *é* becomes *è*; as ils empte^è, they encroach; nous révèlerons, we shall disclose. All other verbs which have in the last syllable but one an *e* before a consonant take a grave accent whenever the termination commences with *e* mute; as

<i>enlever</i> , to carry off	<i>j'enlève, j'enlèverai</i>
<i>semer</i> , to sow	<i>je sèmerai, qu'ils sèment</i>
<i>espérer</i> , to hope	<i>il espère, nous espérerons</i>
<i>régner</i> , to reign	<i>qu'il règne, il régnera</i>

To these are to be joined *bourreler*, to torture; *geler*, to freeze; *harceler*, to tease; *peler*, to peel; *receler*, to secrete.

But verbs in *ger* preceded by *é* retain the acute accent; as *protéger*, to protect; *il protège*, he protects; *il protégea*, he protected.

INFINITIVE ending in *E'ER*, *IER*, or *YER*.

In the case of verbs whose infinitive ends in *ier* the *i* belongs to the stem or root of the verb and is consequently retained throughout. So in the verb *prier*, to pray, *PRI* is to take the place of *AIM*, of *Aimer*, even where we should have such forms as *priions, priez*. Similarly, in verbs whose infinitive ends in *E'ER* the *é* is preserved throughout the conjugation; as *nous agréions*, we allowed; *que vous agréiez*, that you may allow; *agréé*, past participle masculine; *agréée*, past participle feminine.

When the infinitive ends in *YER* the *y* becomes *i* wherever *e* mute follows; as *je paie*, I pay; *vous paierez*, you will pay, &c.

The following exercise contains such forms only as have been brought before the notice of the student. It is necessary to observe, that prepositions before the infinitive are rarely translated into English. So in the second sentence, *d'avoir* must be translated, *to have*; and in the fifth, *nous cessons de l'aimer*, *we cease to love him*.

EXERCISE II.

On est toujours trop loin de ceux qui sont en arrière. Dans les disgrâces, le comble de l'infortune est d'avoir été heureux. Les amitiés ne dureraient pas longtemps, si la pénétration de deux amis était parfaitement égale des deux côtés. Je m'étonne qu'étant ce que vous êtes, et qu'ayant été ce que vous fûtes, vous ne renonciez pas à jamais au monde. Nous méritons qu'un ami nous quittât si nous cessons de l'aimer après son refroidissement. Il est plus facile de jeter du ridicule sur une belle action que de l'imiter. Je n'avais pas pensé qu'il eût apporté si promptement tout ce que nous l'avions chargé d'acheter. Le mouvement de la terre sur son axe ayant partagé, en jours et en nuits, les espaces de la durée, tous les êtres vivants qui habitent le globe ont leur temps de lumière et leur temps de ténèbres. Nous nous montrâmes aussi audacieux que vous fûtes prudents.

pounds by three quarters of a pound, we should write $5\frac{3}{4}$ pounds : where the $\frac{3}{4}$ denotes the fractional part, that we call *three quarters*. We see, then, that to express *fractional values*, we commonly make use of two numbers placed one above the other with a line between them. The lower is called the DENOMINATOR, and shows into how many parts a *whole*, or one unit, is supposed to be divided ; and the upper is called the NUMERATOR, and shows how many such parts are to be understood by the fractional expression. Such expressions are called VULGAR FRACTIONS.

Another method of denoting fractional values we must defer, for want of space, till next month.

RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ANGER.—It is said concerning Julius Cæsar, that, upon any provocation, he would repeat the Roman alphabet before he suffered himself to speak, that he might be more just and calm in his resentments. The delay of a few moments has set many seeming affronts in a juster and kinder light ; it has often lessened, if not annihilated, the supposed injury, and prevented violence and revenge.—*Watt's Doctrine of the Passions*.

TRUTH.—He that opposes his own judgment against the consent of the times ought to be backed with unanswerable truths ; and he that has truth on his side is a fool, as well as a coward, if he is afraid to own it because of the currency or multitude of other men's opinions.—*De Foe*.

PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND.—The human mind considered as that of an individual, or collectively as that of an age, or a nation, is slow and gradual in its development. At times it meets with obstructions that seem to prevent its expansion and to retard its growth. But still it is, on the whole, found to be progressive in its march and continual in its increase. The augmentation of its ideas to-day becomes the preparation for a greater increase to-morrow. Every generation makes an intellectual advance beyond the preceding. Whatever doubts might exist on this subject before the invention of printing, there can be no doubt that that art has not only accelerated, but perpetuated the intellectual progression of man. It is the opening of a better day on the prospects of the human race—the dawn of a new era of mental improvement and intellectual activity.—*Fellows*.

FORGIVENESS.—The brave only know how to forgive ; it is the most refined and generous pitch of virtue human nature can arrive at. Cowards have done good and kind actions, cowards have even fought, nay, sometimes even conquered ; but a coward NEVER forgave : it is not in his nature ; the power of doing it flows only from a strength and greatness of soul conscious of its own force and security, and above the little temptations of resenting every fruitless attempt to interrupt its happiness.—*Sterne's Sermons*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

63. Will any of our kind correspondents inform me if there are any works published on the "Plan and Construction of the *Organ*?" if so, please state its *price* and the publisher's name.—*Musicien*.

64. Would any of your correspondents give answer to the following:—Which is the best general illustrative commentary of the Bible? What are the more prominent merits of Kitto's Pictorial Bible? and is it sufficient for the ordinary needs of a mechanic?—*F. A. M.*

65. Would any of your readers inform me the best method of acquiring short-hand; and whether it is possible to do so without the assistance of a master? also, the best work on the subject, and the publisher?—*J. W. P.*

66. I should feel obliged by being informed, through the pages of the *B. C.*, the best work on each of the undermentioned subjects, viz., political economy, ontology—that kind spoken of in *L. Watts's Logic*?—*W. J.*

67. Can any of your readers state the blood relations of the royal families of Europe, and their connection (if any) with Queen Victoria?—*D. Y. G.*

68. Being anxious to obtain a situation in the Civil Service, would you, or any of your numerous correspondents, kindly inform me whether there are now more facilities afforded of attaining that object than existed before the Civil Service Commissioners made their report? If so, how am I to proceed in order to get on to an examination for a junior clerkship in the Admiralty, Whitehall, and Somerset House, or the Treasury? what are the subjects of examination? and any further information that would be serviceable to me, in the absence of parliamentary or

other influential friends who would interest themselves in my behalf?—*J. G.*

69. Will any reader of the "*Controversialist*," who passed his examination before the Society of Arts in June, kindly oblige me with the following particulars, which perhaps may not be uninteresting to others of your subscribers in a similar situation?—Firstly, Can you be examined in Arithmetic and Bookkeeping, without its being necessary for you to be examined in Algebra, Euclid, &c., as these go under one heading—mathematics? Secondly, Similarly, is it also necessary to be examined in English literature, if you propose English composition and writing from dictation, as these are all mentioned together? Thirdly, Are the examinations very severe? and the probable amount of the cost, fees, &c.—*SPITZ.*

70. Would any of your readers inform me if there be any treatise extant containing an impartial account of the beliefs of the different sects of Protestantism, and also of the various divisions of Presbyterian church government? if so, please mention price, and publisher.—*R. A. W. L.*

71. The subscriber will feel greatly obliged to any of the numerous readers of the *British Controversialist* who may favour him, through its medium, with a clear definition of the word "*warranted*."—*R. A. W. L.*

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

52. I believe that a fair statement of the doctrine of Calvin is to be found in the following extracts from Calvin's Christian Institutes:—

"Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by which he hath determined in himself what he would

have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for others.

"In conformity, therefore, to the clear doctrine of Scripture, we assert, that by an eternal and immutable counsel, God hath once for all determined both whom he would admit to salvation, and whom he would condemn to destruction."

A similar doctrine is found in the "Confessions of Faith of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster," chapter iii., "3. By the decree of God for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death.

"4. These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished."

Now, Mr. Editor, I have never yet been able to see how these doctrines can possibly consist with the merciful character of God, or with the command to every man to love him. I am no Methodist, but I recommend the perusal of "The Universal Redemption of Mankind the Doctrine of the New Testament." by Richard Watson, published by Mason, City-road, 3s. 6d; also, of an article on "Dr. Chalmers and Modern Calvinism," in the "Wesleyan Methodist Magazine" for December, 1855.—Yours, R.

J. W. J. sends a similar extract to the above, and recommends "Dr. Gill's Cause of God and Truth," in an octavo volume, published by Tegg; "A Practical Discourse of God's Sovereignty," by Elisha Coles, 1772; and "Topland's Controversial Writings—Witsius on the Covenant between God and Man," published by Tegg, in two vols., 24s., as valuable works on the Calvinistic side.

62. From having been for so long a

time a participator in the great blessings of civilization, man has completely forgotten that there was a time when those of his race were but shortly removed from the present condition of savage life—I say, but shortly removed, because recent inquiries have proved that the original state of mankind was not that of the savage, completely. Professor Trench, speaking of the savage, says, "So far from being this living seed, he might more justly be considered as a dead, withered leaf, torn violently away from the great trunk of humanity." It must be admitted that our ancestors were in a much more debased condition than we are now; and the question which Amicus has proposed for us to solve, is, By what means has man been raised from a semi-barbarous condition to the grand social position he now occupies?—in other words, What is the origin of civilization?

I think it will be admitted, that a society of degraded beings could never have raised itself from its low and base condition without the intervention of a superiorly enlightened race of men; thus, the Romans civilized our rude forefathers. Again, Rome herself stood indebted to more primitive nations for her advancement in the moral and intellectual character. What I have then said implies the pre-existence of other nations before the Roman, and these again, perhaps, other, until we arrive at the oldest nation on record—the Jews. From whence did this nation derive its civilization? Not from other nations; not from itself—for man is unable to raise himself from a state of degradation; but from a *Superior Being*—from God. The following quotation from Archbishop Whately will support this opinion:—

"According to the present course of things, the first introducer of civilization among savages is, and must be, man, in a more improved state; in the *beginning*, therefore, of the human race; this, since there was no man to

effect it, must have been the work of *another Being*. There must have been, in short, something of a revelation made to the first, or to some subsequent generation of our species."

I would yet venture to urge, that this revelation could not have been contained in the book so called; for a portion of mankind was civilized ere it was given; nor could it have been given as an instinct of our first parents' nature, or after generations of men would, by means of that instinct, have

been able to civilize themselves. Thus far the negative. In the affirmative, I would speculate that it may have been given to Adam, through the medium of the angelic ministry, after he was expelled from Eden.

If Amicus wishes for more information upon this subject, he may obtain it from Dr. Whately's "Lecture on the Origin of Civilization," published with the others of the Exeter Hall Series, 1854-5, price 4s., or separately for 3d.—J. W. J.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

The Burlington Club and Literary Institution.—We invite the attention of our West End readers to the above club, about to be opened in the neighbourhood of Bond Street. The annual subscription is £1 11s. 6d., or half-yearly ditto, £1 1s.; ladies (annual), 10s. 6d. No member is liable beyond the amount of his subscription. Every member to have the privilege of introducing visitors. The rooms of the club and institution comprise dining, smoking, chess, and conversation rooms, a reading room, library, lecture, billiard, and class rooms. All members of the late St. James's Literary and Scientific Society, who have paid their subscriptions due at Christmas last, to be admitted members of the new club until Christmas next for half the annual subscription. Life members of the late St. James's Literary Society to be admitted at one guinea per annum. The sum of money necessary for furnishing the new club is to be raised by the issue of loan notes for £1 each, payable to bearer, and bearing interest at 5 per cent. until redeemed by the club. Further information may be obtained from the secretary, Mr. THOMAS CURTIS, at the temporary offices, No. 3, Boyle Street, Saville Row, between the hours of 2 and 4, and 8 and 9, p.m.

Newington Working Men's Association.—The annual soirée of this

association was held on Monday evening, June 30th, in the boys' national schoolroom, Queen's Head-row. The room, which had been most tastefully decorated, was filled with various objects of interest, both natural and scientific. Among many others, might be mentioned a beautiful working model of a steam engine, and attached thereto an orrery, the whole constructed by one of the members; models of Sebastopol and Rome, instruments of war from the Crimea and Otaheite, while numerous specimens of the choice and beautiful in nature interspersed the whole. In the course of the evening, G. A. Gilbert, Esq., for many years a resident magistrate in Australia, delivered a very interesting account of the discovery of the gold fields, illustrating his remarks by several specimens, which he had brought with him. The meeting was also addressed by the Rev. W. Buck, who pointed out the advantages to working men of such institutions, and the beneficial results which attended their connection with them. The proceedings were greatly enlivened by the performance of music, both vocal and instrumental; and the meeting, which was large, separated at about half-past ten, much pleased with the arrangements that had been made for their entertainment. The

society is now in the third year of its existence, and affords the advantages of a reading room, library, lectures, and instruction in English grammar, French, and mathematics, advantages which are shown by the steady increase in the number of members, to be appreciated by those for whose benefit the institution was founded. At the same time, as the subscription (1s. per quarter) brings it within the reach of almost all, it may be safely affirmed that the knowledge of its existence requires only to be more widely disseminated, to insure a still larger accession of members.—G. C.

St. Paul's Mutual Improvement Society, Preston.—On Monday evening, October 15th, 1855, the third anniversary of the above society was held in St. Paul's school. Upwards of 300 sat down to tea, after which the Rev. John Miller, who occupied the chair, delivered an address. The secretary, Mr. G. Burton, read a report of the proceedings of the society. Since the 10th of June, 1854, there have been delivered in connection with this society, about forty lectures, upon subjects theological, historical, and philosophical, the composition of various members of the society. Besides these lectures, on alternate Saturday evenings there are discussions on various topics, or readings from eminent prose writers or the poets. The number of

members on the books is twenty-four (since this report was read they have been increased to forty), for the use of whom are obtained three weekly papers, as well as the *British Controversialist*, the "Bulwark," "Leisure Hour," "Chambers's Journal," "Churchman's Penny Magazine," &c.; there is also connected with the society a valuable library, containing upwards of 200 volumes of works of the best authors. The secretary concluded with an appeal to others to join this or similar societies. The Rev. Canon Parr (Vicar) addressed the meeting upon the importance and influence of mutual improvement societies. A hymn having been sung, Mr. W. Robinson was called upon to address the assembly. After speaking on the early formation of the society, and of his own individual pleasure in being one of its members, he concluded by presenting to the Rev. T. B. Wrenford a neatly bound copy of the "Hammersmith Discussion," as a small mark of esteem for his very efficient services as president. The rev. gentleman briefly acknowledged the present, with a few words of exhortation to the members. After addresses from Mr. G. Donaldson, Rev. A. S. Page, and Mr. W. Sedgwick, the meeting was closed by singing the National Anthem, all seemingly highly pleased with the pleasant evening they had spent.—J. BERRY, *Secretary*.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Believing that the Bible, read, known, and understood, will prove more effectual than Acts of Parliament in making men religious, we gladly hail the first Number, price one penny, of the "Sabbath School Expositor, with notes, critical, explanatory, and practical," by Dr. Campbell, of Bolt-court, that "spring head" of cheap congregational literature; we consider it a marvel of cheapness, even in these days of printing press prodigies, and cordially recommend it to all our readers, and more especially to those who take an

interest in our religious discussions. "Lectures on the Bible," and "Scripture Doctrines," are two prettily bound, nicely got up, inviting-looking little books for children, by Samuel Green, but published by the Sunday School Union. We have presented them to a school library in our neighbourhood, and hope to report progress at some future interview with the Reverend author.

The Alliance liquor list (one of the peculiar, but horrible, features, of the "Alliance News," a penny weekly

paper, the origin of the teetotallers), is now made up for the year, and gives a grand total of 2,081 accidents and offences through drink, a third of which terminated in death. Every case is well authenticated. Surely this awful census should put every man on the alert to suppress such a woful, and, we fear, growing evil.

"The Self-Educator Lessons in French" are at last in the publishers' hands; they do credit to the author, and make ample amends for the delay. We believe that those who master this little book will need none other,—it in fact bears out its title,—*"The Essentials of the French Language."* After it, reading and conversation will do the rest. There are 80 pages of brevier, without even a line in the shape of a preface; the author leaves his work to speak for him.

Mr. Murray is preparing for publication, in his *"British Classics,"* a new edition, in four volumes, of Mr. Croker's *"Boswell,"* with Mr. Croker's last corrections and additions.

Professor Owen, F.R.S., who for nearly thirty years has been connected with the Royal College of Surgeons, as conservator of the Hunterian Museum, and Professor of Comparative Anatomy, has just resigned his appointments, and entered on a more extensive scene of usefulness at the British Museum, as superintendent of the natural history department.

The Lords of the Admiralty have awarded the £10,000 offered for the first discovery of traces of Franklin to Dr. Rae and his companions.

Mr. Thackeray has accepted an invitation from Edinburgh to deliver his lecture on the Four Georges, at the Philosophical Institution of that city, in November.

The *"Athenæum"* and the *"Illustrated News"* are having a somewhat warm discussion about a letter professedly by Bolingbroke to Pope, published recently in the columns of the latter.

The Council of King's College, London, have received a cheque for £500 as a small memorial to the late Right Hon. Sir Harry Inglis, from "One whose family loved him."

Apropos of King's College, now that there is the *"Oxford and Cambridge University Magazine,"* and the *"London University Magazine,"* why should not "King's" have its own Magazine too?

Professor Fraser, a metaphysical writer of some celebrity, has been selected by the Town Council of Edinburgh to fill the vacant chair of Sir William Hamilton.

BOOKS OF THE MONTH.

[Our limits will not allow us to do more than indicate a few notable or useful additions to our current literature.]

Mr. Bohn has published Sully's *Memoirs*; Guizot's *History of Civilization*; Vol. I. of Thierry's *Norman Conquest*; Quintillian's *Institutes of Oratory*; and the *Orations of Demosthenes*.

Messrs. Longman:—Diamond editions of Moore's *Lalla Rookh*, *Songs and Ballads*, and *Irish Melodies*.

Messrs. Chambers:—*Life and Works of Robert Burns*, Parts I. and II.; and new volume of *"Educational Course,"* *Modern History*.

By various publishers:—New vols. of Thiers' *Consulate and the Empire*; *Select Works of Dr. Chalmers*; Montgomery's *Life and Writings*; *Circle of the Sciences*; *"Popular" Histories*; Dr. Lindsay's *British Lichens*; Dickens' *Household Words*; *Illustrated London News*; and the *Family Economist*; *The Child's Educator*, by John Cassell; Professor Bunsen's *Signs of the Times*; Ansted's *History of Inanimate Creation*; *Chemistry of Food*; Crumpton's *Fall of Sebastopol*; Xenophon's *Cyropædia*, with English notes by Gorham; Franke's *German Letter Writer*; Barrow's *Summer Tour*, Part II.; *Northern Germany*; and the *Exeter Hall Lectures for 1855—56*.

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL—IDEALISM—PARMENIDES.

"THE development theory," when applied to the progress of ideas, gives the true law of the interpretation of doctrines. These pass through the thoughts of successive masters in somewhat the following form, viz.:—When a given idea has been posited as the basis of any scheme of thought, that scheme is wrought out into intensity and exclusiveness in proportion to the length of the series of thinkers who, through conviction or otherwise, adopt that idea as their own; the earlier being the less, the latter the more, logical. This has as yet been our experience in seeing the panorama of early Greek speculation pass before us; nor do we find the Eleatic school exceptional in this respect. The constituent tenets of this school being posited by Xenophanes, we find them more strictly defined and more explicitly worked out by each successive member, till the recoil of thought exhausts itself, by passing to the utmost limits to which logic can lead it, whereon it must begin to retrace the path, in order, if possible, to discover the faulty reckoning, and take a new departure over the untracked ocean of pure thought.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH.—Parmenides, the son of Pyres, was a native of Elea, on the western coast of Lower Italy, then called Magna Græcia, the city in which Xenophanes, in his old age, had settled. The era of Parmenides has been, like that of many of the ancient thinkers, the subject of much dispute. Aristotle (*Met.* i. 5) informs us that he *is said* to have been a pupil of Xenophanes; and this Diogenes Laertius asserts. Plato, in the "*Parmenides*, or an *Essay on Ideas*," says, that at the age of sixty-five, he, in company with his friend and philosophic successor, Zeno, then forty years old, visited Athens during the great Panathenæa, and dwelt in the house of Pythodorus. At this time Parmenides conversed with Socrates (born 468 B.C.), then but a youth (*πᾶν νέος*). Diogenes Laertius gives the sixty-ninth Olympiad—504—500 B.C.—as the date at which he flourished (*ἡκμαξε*). He is said besides to have had Empedocles (fl. 444 B.C.), of Agrigentum, first as a pupil, and then as an imitator and rival. These are the dates and circumstances which have, if possible, to be harmonized before the era of Parmenides can be regarded as chronologically fixed. We

doubt very much the possibility of their being capable of entire harmonization, and essay with diffidence the following observations on that point.

Parmenides was descended from a noble family, distinguished no less by station than by wealth. It is highly probable that Parmenides would be subjected to all those educational influences which could be supposed to induce him to maintain the honour of the family. Xenophanes was at this time old and honoured, a man of note, not only for what he had thought, but also for what he had seen and done. He had been admitted to citizenship in the lately formed city, and had there given utterance to those melodious sounds, in which the experience of his life had been embodied and enshrined. In his boyhood, therefore, Parmenides *may* have listened to those

“ High and passionate thoughts
To their own music chaunted,”

in which Xenophanes expressed his opinions regarding the *Eternal One*. Under influences such as these—

“ Trembling even to the life-depths of the frame,”

the mainspring of the “strange resistless impulses” of youth *may* have been touched, and Xenophanes *may* have become, in this way, the proximate instrumental and efficient cause of the devotion of “the vigorous mind of wise Parmenides” to philosophic pursuits. Direct pupilage we can scarcely suppose him to have undergone; yet, indirectly, what influences incalculable may have been the result of even the casual interview of the aged sage and the genius-gifted school boy! Perhaps during the lifetime of Xenophanes, but certainly after his decease, the doctrines which had been promulged by him found a continuator and expounder in Ameinias. To this person, Parmenides, moved thereto by how much regard for the wise man of Kolophon we know not, attached himself as a pupil, and that with the best results; for, from the remark of Diogenes Laertius, that he “*was induced*” by Ameinias “to embrace the tranquil life of a philosopher,” we may infer that the luxuries of society, the excitement of political life, and “the deceitfulness of riches,” had made an impression on his mind, which it was found difficult to erase. He did not learn to despise

“ True power,
Or aught that dignifies humanity;”

but he did learn to be a man of that scant order of mankind—

“ Who knew himself, and knew the ways before him,
And from amongst them chose considerately,
With a clear foresight, not a blindfold courage;
And, having chosen, with a stedfast mind
Pursued his purposes.”

Hence, in his manhood's prime, accepting the legislative functions with which his rank and wealth invested him, he framed a code of laws for his native city; and so wisely were the enactments it contained adapted to the circumstances and needs of the Phocæan colony, for whose behoof it had been undertaken, that succeeding magistracies regarded it as advisable to make the citizens of Elea annually take oath to abide thereafter by the laws of Parmenides. We may suppose that in this he was following, in some measure, the example of Pythagoras, whose fame, as the founder of the league of Crotona, he must have learned from Diochartes, a poor, but honourable and virtuous disciple of that great thinker, under whose tuition he had placed himself subsequently to the completion of those studies which he had pursued under Ameinias. His duty to his country as an honest patriot being fulfilled, when he had supplied it with those institutes of jurisprudence, on obedience to which the welfare of the state depended, he, desirous of becoming acquainted with the Ionic philosophy, set out, accompanied by Zeno, to Athens. At this time he was handsome and pleasing in person, middle-sized, and grey-headed. Here he may have met with Archelaus, a disciple of the Ionic Anaxagoras, and amid the crowd of pupils who pressed to listen to this expositor of the physical constitution of nature, may have entered into conversation with the quick-witted son of Sophroniscus; or, mingling with the hearers of Protagoras, Prodicus, or Gorgias, may have marked the flashing of the prominent eyes of the externally unpromising *protégé* of Crito, and with the sociable benignity of one who was able to despise the common usages of men, may have listened to the fresh-bursting thoughts of the precocious boy, Sokrates, on the topics which were then under debate. Here, too, he may have met—it may be, renewed acquaintance with—Empedocles, his future disciple and rival, and may have discussed with him, as well as with Melissus and Heraclitus, the new ideas on physics, which intercourse with the Ionic thinkers had suggested to his active mind. Of his after life we have no information; the date of his death we know not. It is not probable that he long survived this journey to Athens, if he even thereafter returned to his native country; for we find, about twenty years after this, a tyrant reigning in Elea, and his pupil, Zeno, conspiring against an usurper who had violated the laws of his master and friend, circumstances which are not likely to have arisen during the lifetime of the law-giver. Parmenides had lived devoted to thought and to duty. He had trained his disciples to love wisdom and liberty. They neither forgot his precepts nor his example. Had he not lived *well*?

EXPOSITION.—“The Greek philosophers, at a very early period, were impressed with the correct conviction that all science is the pursuit of the universal amid the particular, the

permanent amid the fluctuating, the necessary amid the contingent, the One in the All."* The Ionic school had questioned all the elements—all nature—regarding this unity. The Italic thinkers had eliminated it from numbers, and found therein the One, or *unit*, the base-thought as well as the measure of All. The Eleatic turned from the outer world, multiplex and changeful, to the inner world of thought, one, and though changeful, yet the same—found *in itself* what others had sought in the infinite *not-self*, and failed to find. In thought alone is the solution discoverable, *that* declares, "the One is, the Many *seems*." Thus far had Xenophanes led the speculations of men, and here it was that Parmenides, seizing the leadership, marshalled the hosts of thought to a new victory, that of self-knowledge.

In a beautiful allegory, with which his poem "On Nature" opens, Parmenides shadows forth the journey which the human soul takes in the search for wisdom's prize. Therein he represents the soul as drawn, by the coursers of the sun, led by virgins along a pathway, far away as thought can reach, and hitherto untouched by foot of man, upwards to the dwelling-place of Δίκη—Justice. On the soul's arrival, Dik e promises to reveal all that it desires to know. Rejoice, yea, deem it not a misfortune, O soul, that thou hast been led up hither. Here thou shalt learn—what it will be well for thee to know—the fearless certainties of conviction-causing truth, as well as the more conflicting and less certainly proven opinions of men. Keep steadily under the directing guidance of the former; use the latter sparingly, and—

"Let not the common usages of men
Persuade thy better-tutored judgment
To trust to men's unsafe, deceitful eyes,
Or traitorous ears, or random-speaking tongues.
Reason alone must prove the truth of facts."

Courageously follow wheresoever she leads, and success in finding truth is suré. The whole poem seems to have been composed in a similar spirit. Bringing into prominence the essential distinctness of sense and reason; placing in contrast "certainty, the thoughts of unerring truth," and "the deceptive pomp of human opinion," he not only developed the doctrines of Xenophanes, but most distinctly changed the course of philosophy, from a search after a solution of the mysteries of Being, to an investigation of the mysteries of Knowing, by asserting that *Being is being known*.

"Come, and to the words I utter listen, all attent,
That thou *the path of inquiry* may'st rightly know.
The *One* which holds—All is, and Non-being is not—

* Ferrier's "Institute of Metaphysic," p. 157.

Leads forthright to certainty; for truth attends it.
The *other*, that nought is, yet that non-being must be,
Is the pathway of error, ending in vain dreams.
For *what is not, is neither thinkable nor known,*
No one can utter it." *

Hence results the logical development of his system by Zeno; for if that alone is which may be known, *how to know* is the all-important question which, being answered, makes an acquaintance with the Existent possible.

In the Parmenidean criticism truth and opinion are formally placed in antithesis—the one is exalted, the other abased. Though men generally believe in the reality of the sense-known, such knowledge is false and deceitful, and the Reason alone gives certainty and truth. That which Reason thinks of as absolutely true, is—Being, Being *per se*, Being absolute and necessary;—with this alone science concerns herself. The soul is for ever adverse to plurality—the deceitful, transitory phantasies of the senses, upon which to trust is to be the dupe of day-dreams—for ever solicits a knowledge of the indivisible, the One. This alone is reasonably conceivable, and absolute “non-being is neither able to be thought of nor uttered.” What, then, are the characteristics of the One? It is—

“ Whole, self-begotten, changeless, yea, even limitless.
Never was it, nor yet shall it be. The All is already
One from eternity; for what would you seek as its origin?
Whence its increase? Not from nothing! Of the Non-Being
We can neither think nor speak, for 'tis not to be thought or said
That Non-Being is, else say ye what need caused it,
Sooner or later, to assume being, and rise from nought?
Most certain it is, then, that the All or the nought exists;
Even so does the force of certainty prove that nought but being
From being can issue.”

All movement is change; to change is to lose what is possessed, or to gain the unpossessed. The One can do neither; it is therefore immobile, and if so, indivisible. If motionless and undivided, then it must be unbounded in time or in space.

“ As present, what may seem absent retain thou in thought,
For being cannot be held from adherence to being,
Which is neither loosely strewn through the world,
Nor yet in one spot compacted.”

* We express the opinion in the text more emphatically than we are accustomed to do, because an opposite opinion has been peremptorily given by Professor Ferrier, in his “ Institutes of Metaphysic,” pp. 157—162, where the names of Anaxagoras and Parmenides seem to us to be used, by an unconscious mistake, instead of Anaximenes and Xenophanes. In this, one of the ablest metaphysical publications of the present century, it is a pity that such a misapprehension, we shall not say mistake, should have currency.

The greatest perfection possible is to be *One*. To this inevitable logic the Knowable—i. e., the *True*—is subject, for *Being* is *being known*.

All that relates to the sense-know, the plural, the changing, the contingent, the phenomenal, apparitions and phantasies, each and all, he relegates to the latter of those "two forms men have fixed and named in their minds," viz., Error, "which leadeth astray" from Truth and its criterion, Reason.

What, then, is Reason, the judge and the critic? how can we know that its verdicts are *true*?

"Thought resembles its cause, for whose sake it is;
For without that which is, thought, which predicates being,
Would be wholly impossible; for nought is, nor shall there be
Other than the Existent."

And thus thought is declared to be self-conscious being. It is this, not only in the whole, but in each of the apparent parts, so much so, that—

"Just as is in each the union of many-jointed limbs,
Even so does it always hold with the thoughts of men;
For it is in the nature of limbs to think in man
Alike in one and all; for thought is—perfection of being."

Hence, too, as thought is a result in men dependent on organization, and each organization differs from each, at least, in degree, those sensations which the organization yields are only opinion, a seeming (*δοξα*), while the thoughts that awake in the reason are trustworthy realities, a faith (*πιστις*). The one gives relative, the other absolute, knowledge. Sensations, the developments of the transient being in which we now appear, must not be trusted; but the divisions of the reason, the self-conscious verities of the limitless, the One—these are trustworthy. Nevertheless, seeing we have both sense and reason, there should be a doctrine of both, and science should possess, not a metaphysic alone, but also a physic—a doctrine of the seeming generation of things. For in so far as man lives in a seeming, while the real is only revealed in glimpses around him, sad as the fate of humanity is, thus shuttled along from light into darkness, it still would be sadder, could he not, in some measure, reduce the appearances into approximate universals, gather them together into unit-heaps, and thus bring them nearer in likeness to the reason-revealed One.

Of the details of the physical system of Parmenides, we have only a few notices, a mere scantling, and those which we have are in a great measure disjoined from any exposition of the principles by which his thoughts were guided. We must interpret them, therefore, according to the general system of

thought exhibited in the foregoing extracts. Even as each man must, with Faust, exclaim,—

“Two souls, alas! within my bosom dwell,
Whose hostile natures ceaseless strive together:”

so it is with nature, of which man is the created reflex. Two opposites, flame and darkness, the seen and the unseen, are held together and governed by necessity. Each striving to separate from the other, constitutes dissolution; each, when rejoined to necessity, is re-created. The heavens above are light, flame; the earth beneath is darkness. We live in a mid-region compounded of both, and hence the imperfections of sense. Out of this commingling of light and darkness the elements of being take their rise; like seeking like, they join, and animals are formed. As man is thus made up of light and darkness, his thought is continually confused by the perception of both; for thought is self-conscious being. As flame is the perfect, sphere-forming element, the degree of the being's perfection differs with the amount of warmth contained, and hence at death the flame portion, departing from the body, flies away from the phenomenal to the meta-phenomenal, and becomes wholly perfect in the light of being.

REMARKS.—The system of Parmenides is a bold and rigorous idealism. It is the merit of this system, that it pursues an inevitable, a strictly logical course from its first principle. Not explicitly, indeed, but implicitly it shifted the ground of speculation, and made it important that men should learn *how to know*. It is quite true that this logical sequence of thought is attained by shutting the mind's eye to one-half of the truth. If reason perceives by supra-sensitive means a knowledge of the changeless, infinite One, she no less distinctly, by sense, receives the notion of the phenomenal, the finite, the many. To deny one thought, because we cannot colligate it to another, is arbitrarily and illegitimately to maim truth. Facts, observed realities, are not the whole of science, but they are its occasioning cause. Abstract thought is never identical with concrete existence—fact, so that abstract thought, however simply its terms may unite in syllogisms, will never give results that hold in the region of experience. Real being, and the abstract idea thereof, cannot be equated. Was, then, the system of Parmenides, because false *per se*, useless? Far from it; it taught men to eliminate the ideal from the real, and threw off from the idea of the Divine the investiture of natural scenery with which the Ionic school had garmented it, as well as the numeric enwrapment in which the Italic school had clothed it. The bold, brave adherence to reason which he exhibited, did it not result in the dialectics of Zeno and Aristotle? the grand abstract idealism of which he was the originator, did it not pioneer the way for the

Platonic metaphysic? Thus, too, it ever is, the great of one time must always leave work for the coming time, and leave it to others to fill out their unfulfilled careers,—

“Unravelling the knots their baffled skill
Pronounced inextricable, but surely left
Far less obscure.”

To be one of the few who leave a task which “men o’ the after-time” will undertake—is not that itself “exceeding glory”? Way, there! place Parmenides among the immortals.

GOVERNMENT OF TEMPER.—Every human creature is sensible of the propensities to some infirmity of temper, which it should be his care to correct and subdue, particularly in the early period of life; else, when arrived at a state of maturity, he may relapse into those faults which were originally in his nature, and which will require to be diligently watched and kept under, through the whole course of life, since nothing leads more directly to the breach of charity, and to the injury and molestation of our fellow creatures, than the indulgence of an ill temper.—*Dr. Blair.*

THE Stoics taught that happiness was only to be found in the practice of virtue. They denied that health, reputation, and riches were, properly speaking, *good*; and they contended that poverty, ignominy, and pain were not *evils*. “Virtue alone,” said their founder, “is sufficient to happiness; and the wise man may enjoy it at all times, be his condition what it may.”

Zeno is said to have died at the age of ninety-eight years, having never experienced any sickness or indisposition whatever. Had Zeno been the victim of pain, reproach, and poverty, would he have taught that these things were not evils?—*The Savage.*

EDUCATION. Accustom a child, as soon as it can speak, to narrate his little experiences, his chapter of accidents, his griefs, his fears, his hopes; to communicate what he has noticed in the world without, and what he feels struggling in the world within. Anxious to have something to narrate, he will be induced to give attention to objects around him, and what is passing in the sphere of his instruction, and to observe and note events will become one of his first pleasures: and this is the ground-work of a thoughtful character.—*Educational Magazine.*

RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ANGER.—Let your desires and aversions to the common objects and occurrences in this life be but few and feeble. Make it your daily business to moderate your aversions and desires, and to govern them by reason. This will guard you against many a ruffle of spirit, both of anger and sorrow.—*Watts’s Doctrine of the Passions.*

Religion.

DOES GEOLOGY CONFIRM THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION ?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

“AND the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after his kind: and God saw that it was good. And the evening and the morning were the third day.”

Here it is plainly stated, that the third day of the six of creation was devoted to the production of vegetation. This relates only to a period of not yet six thousand years ago. Consequently, as Moses is supposed to have given a correct, because inspired, account of the creation of the world, we cannot imagine vegetable life as having existed before that period. Threlkeld says, however, that it has existed from an indefinite period:—“Forests grew into sombre magnificence; creatures such as the eye of man has never seen in their life and mightiness, whose sound was unheard by human ears, roamed the plain, and peopled the waters.” He says that, “through long ages successive creatures were created, successive revolutions took place, until at last the earth, unfurnished outwardly, and comparatively shapeless, was bathed in the waters of its baptism.” This is what geology teaches us; with regard to the statements in the Bible, it is purely imaginary.

We have it stated that, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth;” that the earth was “without form, and void;” and that “darkness covered it.” This is the indefinite period to which Threlkeld refers; and we would ask him, If it would not be absurd to suppose animal and vegetable life existing in such a state of things?

“And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light.” “And God divided the light from the darkness. The light he called Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day.” And Moses concludes his account of the creation by saying,—“Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them.”

In these statements we have no clue whatever to any pre-existing worlds. It is simply stated, that at the commencement of creation a chaotic mass of matter existed, which was made to form the groundwork of our globe, and that the work of creation was completed in six days. As Taliesin justly remarked, we must consider the days as being of ordinary length. The Lord,

when addressing Moses in Exod. xxxi. about the observance of the sabbath, says, in the seventeenth verse,—“It is a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever : for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed.” We should think that this declaration was made in order to furnish proof of the omnipotence of the Creator. This short period of a week was to be a sign that in that space of time the Almighty created this beautiful world of ours and all its adjuncts.

On the other hand, geology asserts, that this is not the first, but only one of a series of worlds extending through time indefinite. It also informs us, that these worlds were clothed with vegetation, and peopled with animal life. This does not agree with the Mosaic account, and only by conjecture, with regard to the latter, can it be made to do so.

Again :—“And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the field.”

“And unto Adam he said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it : cursed is the ground for thy sake ; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life ; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee ; In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground ; for out of it wast thou taken : for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.” St. Paul says, in Rom. v.—“Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin ; and so death passed upon all men, for that all had sinned ; nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression.”

Here we are led to suppose that death was the consequence of Adam’s fall. But geology tells us that death has been going on in the animal kingdom thousands and thousands of years before the existence of man. Now, taking into consideration the analogies of the human to the brute form—both having to undergo the wear and tear of life—both having the old generation as it passes away immediately succeeded by a new one—and man in these respects resembling animals, which are void of sin but are subject to death, geology would lead us to suppose that death is the necessary result of animal life.

Again, Threlkeld says that there is every reason to believe that the deluge was only a partial one, in fact, merely confined to a portion of Asia. I answer that in no part of the Bible is there stronger language used than there is in describing the universality of the deluge. “And the flood was forty days upon the earth ; and the waters increased and bare up the ark, and it was lift up above the earth. And the waters prevailed, and were in-

creased greatly upon the earth; and all the high hills that were under the whole heaven (observe this) were covered. And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, and every man; all in whose nostrils *was* the breath of life, of all that *was* in the dry land died. And every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face of the ground, both man and cattle, and the creeping things, and the fowl of the heaven; and they were destroyed from the earth."

The highest mountains were covered. Mount Ararat in Armenia rises to the height of more than 17,000 feet. It strikes me that Asia must have been *cup-shaped* indeed to have contained such a body of water as that! It is evident, then, that a flood that covered Ararat must have overspread all the continents.

On the other hand, geologists assert a universal deluge to have been physically impossible. They ask, Whence could the water have come, in order to cover the highest mountains? The surplus waters are represented as coming from the sea and clouds. "The same day were all the fountains of the great deep broken up, and the windows of heaven were opened." We should naturally consider that this vast accumulation of water was the result of a miracle; but Moses did not appear to have any idea of such a thing. He merely considered it as coming from the sea and heavens, and then being gradually drained back.

Threlkeld says, "There is agreement between the science geology and scripture, though some philosophers (falsely so called) have endeavoured to jar the eternal harmony, and with presumptive hand strike forth chords harsh and discordant." And such, in my opinion, will be the case, till there shall be more enlarged views of the Bible, more comprehensiveness of mind, more unity, more love, and, above all, more charity among the professors of Christianity.

In conclusion, I would say that I have endeavoured to point out some of the discrepancies between the Mosaic account and geology, and that I shall peruse with great interest any further remarks thereon. In order to account for these differences, I would coincide with Taliesin: "The book of revelation refers entirely to the moral government of man; it treats solely of religious subjects, and was never intended to be a handbook of geology, or a compendium of astronomy." I do not think it would interfere with the infallibility of the Bible if we were to consider this portion as "entirely figurative." Consequently I am compelled to say that geology does not confirm the Mosaic account.

GRIMWOOD.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

In commencing this subject, I will first mention that geology has experienced (within a few years past) several severe attacks of a peculiar character. Men of respectable ability, and firm

friends of revelation, having got deeply impressed with the belief that the views of geologists are antagonistic to the Bible, have set themselves to the questioning of their writings, not so much with a view of knowing, as of finding inconsistent and untenable positions. To afford the complete and orderly details of this study within the limits of one or two papers is almost impossible. It will, therefore, be my object,—*Firstly*, To glance at the confirmation which geology gives to the Mosaic account of the creation; and *Secondly*, How the interpretation may, consistently with scripture, coincide with geological facts.

We are taught, in the inspired history, that the Almighty Creator caused the waters under the heaven to be gathered together into one place, and made the dry land appear; and geology also teaches us that there was a time when the waters covered portions of the earth which are now dry, and that changes have been effected by the Spirit moving over the face of the waters. We are also taught that, at the Divine mandate, the earth brought forth grass, and herbs yielding seed, and fruit trees, yielding fruit after their kind. And that God saw that all these were good, and then set up the firmament of the heavens, with lights to rule the day and the night, and made the signs for the seasons, and for days and years; and that after the fourth period of time, he bid the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creatures that have life, and fowls to fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven. It is written that God then created whales and other living creatures, which the waters brought forth. The fifth grand epoch then closed; and the sixth commenced with the creation of cattle, and the creeping things and beasts of the earth, which were made after their kind, and were good in the sight of their Creator. After these, God created man in His own image, to whom He gave the dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and every creeping thing upon the earth. And he blessed male and female, and bid them be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over all things. These are the successive steps of creation, attested, not only by the word of Revelation, but by Nature's wide-spread record. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," is the simple but sublime sentence which commences the inspired volume. This language contains a statement complete in itself; and independent of the account which immediately follows, of the six days' creation, is not contradictory to this. It admits, indeed, of a translation which not only accords with, but expressly teaches the fact, that a period intervened between the first act of creation and the six days' work. And if such an interval be allowed, it is all that geology requires to reconcile its facts to revelation.

Geology furnishes important illustrations of revealed religion.

It confirms the statement that the present continents of our globe were once, and for an indefinite time, beneath the ocean, and that they were subsequently lifted above the waters by internal agencies.

It agrees in or with revelation, in making water and heat the two great agents of geological change upon and within the earth ; and that the work of creation, after the production of matter, was progressive.

It shows us, equally with revelation, that the existing races of animals and plants on the globe were created at a comparatively recent epoch ; and that man commenced his existence not more than six thousand years ago.

It shows us, also, that the earth contains within itself the volcanic agency, necessary for its future destruction by combustion, as described in the Bible.

But, perhaps, the most important illustration of revealed truth, which geology affords, is the light which it casts upon certain passages of the Bible relating to the creation.

As those texts which represent the earth as immoveable, and the heavenly bodies as moving diurnally around it, were not rightly understood until astronomy had discovered the true theory of the solar system, so those passages which relate to the period of the creation of the universe, the introduction of death into the world, and the extent and operation of the deluge, were misinterpreted till geology disclosed the true meaning. So far from revelation being in collision with geology, it is more fully illustrated by it. Who thinks, at this day, of any discrepancy between astronomy and revelation ? And yet, two hundred years ago, the evidence of such discrepancy was far more striking than any which can now be offered to show geology at variance with the scriptures. We ought, therefore, to look upon that science as illustrating, not opposing, the scriptures.

Many able writers and commentators, who lived long before geology existed, believed that the first verse of Genesis describes the creation of matter, distinct from and prior to the work of six days. The following persons are of this supposition,—Justin Martyr, Gregory Nazianzaen, Basil, Cæsarius, and Origen ; the three last were very explicit upon this subject. It would be easy to quote similar opinions from more modern writers, who also lived previous to the development of geology. But I will give a paragraph from Bishop Patrick only, who lived one hundred and fifty years ago. “How long,” says he, “all things continued in mere confusion after the chaos was created, before light was extracted from it, we are not told. The first question that arises, on reading the first five verses of Genesis, is, whether the creation here described was a creation out of nothing, or out of pre-existing materials. The latter opinion has been maintained by

some able commentators and theologians, as Doederlin, Dathe, Milton, Buck, and Smucker."

Without entering into the meaning of the word *create*,—the phrase "the heavens and the earth,"—I pass on to state briefly, that an indefinite period may be allowed between the beginning and the six days. It is a correct principle of interpreting language, that when a writer describes an event in more places than one, the briefer statement is to be explained by the more extended one. Thus, in the 2nd chapter of Genesis, we have this brief account of the creation, "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth when they were created, in the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens." Now, if this were the only description of the work of creation on record, the inference would be very fair that all was completed in a single day. Yet when we turn to the first chapter of Genesis, we find the work prolonged through six days. The two statements are not contradictory, but the briefer one would not be understood without the more detailed. In like manner, if we should find it distinctly stated, in the particular account of the creation of the universe in the first chapter of Genesis, that a long period actually intervened between the beginning and the six days, who would suppose the statement a contradiction to the fourth commandment? It is true, we do not find such a fact distinctly announced in the Mosaic account of creation. But suppose we first learn that it did exist from geology, why should we not be as ready to admit it as if stated in Genesis, provided it does not contradict anything recorded therein. For example, let us refer to Exod. ii. 12, with regard to the parents of Moses, and their family. Suppose, now, that no other account existed in the Bible of the family of this Levite; we could not, surely, have suspected that Moses had an elder brother and sister. But imagine the Bible silent on this subject, and that the fact was first brought to light in deciphering Egyptian hieroglyphics in the nineteenth century, who could hesitate to admit its truth, because omitted in the Pentateuch, or who would regard it in opposition to the sacred record? With equal propriety may we admit, on proper geological evidence, the intercalation of a long period between the beginning and the six days, if satisfied that it does not contradict the Mosaic account; but let us rather read both records, and see the slow steps by which our earth was prepared to be the scene of moral action; let us observe, too, that this advance was only seemingly retarded, but really accelerated, by the strange and wild convulsions which often broke up a previous order of things; and shall we not be brought to conclude, that if the preliminary stages were so vast in duration, we may expect some corresponding portion of time to be occupied in the working out of the grand scheme? It is a scheme, the very nature of which renders

it impossible that it should be instantaneously perfected. It requires time to unfold itself. The consummation can be reached only by progress—the working out of a mighty history.

With our present limited range of vision and brief span of existence, the plan seems to evolve itself too slowly: we cry, “How long, O Lord!” and are impatient for the conclusion. We forget that God’s eternity, and the eternity which is before us, is a duration in comparison with which “pyramids are but pillars of snow, and all that is past but a moment.” In short, nowhere in the whole world of science do we find regions where more of the Deity is seen in his works. To him whose heart is warmed by true piety, and whose mind has broken the narrow shell of prejudice, and can grasp noble thoughts, these are delightful fields in which to wander. More and more they must become the favourite haunts of such hearts and such minds. For there do views open upon the soul, respecting the character and plans of the Deity, as large and refreshing as those which astronomy presents. Nay, in their practical bearing these views are far more important. Mechanical philosophy introduces an unbending and unvarying law between the Creator and his works; but geology unveils His providential hand cutting asunder that law at intervals, and planting the seeds of a new economy upon a renovated world. We thus seem to be brought into near communion with infinite Mind. We are prepared to listen to His voice when it speaks in revelation. We recognise His guiding and sustaining agency at every step of our pilgrimage.

And we await in confident hope and joyful anticipation those sublime manifestations of his character and plans, and those higher enjoyments, which will greet the pure soul in the round of eternal ages.

Micklehurst.

A. L.

FAMILIARITY WITH INFERIORS.—I should commend a soul of several stories, that knows both how to bend and slacken itself, that finds itself at ease in all conditions of fortune, that can discourse with a neighbour of his building, hunting, or any little contention betwixt him and another; that can chat with a carpenter or gardener with pleasure. I envy them who can render themselves familiar with their own attendants; and dislike the advice of Plato, that men should always speak in a magisterial tone to their servants, whether men or women, without being sometimes facetious and familiar. For, besides my reason, ’tis inhuman and unjust to set so great a value upon this prerogative of fortune.—*Montaigne.*

GOVERNMENT. No government ought to own that it exists for the purpose of checking the prosperity of its people, or that there is such a principle involved in its policy.—*Burke.*

History.

IS MACAULAY'S ESTIMATE OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE CORRECT?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

Most of our readers will probably remember the celebrated speech of Lord John Russell, in which that statesman declared that *the* history of England yet remained to be written. The remark was made at a time when the first two volumes of Mr. Macaulay's history were before the public; and we therefore cannot doubt that the noble lord included those volumes in his general condemnation of our national histories. For our own part, we must confess a thorough and hearty sympathy in Lord John's opinion; but we extend it much further. "*The* history of England" we cannot help regarding as one of the glories of millennial perfection—one of those great achievements which each successive generation will aim at, with ever-varying, but always imperfect, success. The ideal historian must combine in one the minds of a Shakspeare and a Bacon, a Milton and a Newton. He must indeed be a "myriad-minded man." He must have the poet's power to "body forth" and "turn to shape," in life-like reality, events, characters, and circumstances, which have long since passed away, and become as unreal, to the present generation, as the airy nothings of a poet's dream. He must, too, have the true spirit of the Baconian philosophy—breadth and minuteness of observation and research, unwearied patience, and deep learning, all guided by a strong and single-minded passion for truth. He must possess vivid imagination to realize the past, deep sympathies and knowledge of man's nature to enter into the position, and to ascertain the motives, of those characters who stand out from the mass in the foreground of the ever-shifting groups of history. And with these he must unite the keenest sagacity and the profoundest judgment. A perfect historian must in fact be a perfect man. He must possess the most opposite of qualities, and yet give no undue prominence to any. And not only must the perfect historian be a perfect man, but he must have "a reading public" of more unanimity of taste and judgment than any which now exists. And even were all these conditions granted, what guarantee should we have that a given history would continue to hold the front rank of estimation in days to come? Unless society has become stationary, its views must alter more or less, while the *litera scripta manet* history must be cut down to mere

narration, or remain unwritten until the extreme point of social and human development has been reached, if it is to tower grandly and unchanged above the wrecks of time;—at least such must be the case with the history of yet living states.

The truth of the principle we have been endeavouring to illustrate has always been felt. Hence we find almost all historians aiming to excel in some particular and distinct class of historical writing—each one, in fact, sketching out, not so much history itself, as that aspect of history which most commends itself to his own mind. Hence, too, we also find that, in general, the greatest histories are those rather of a particular *epoch*, than of a particular *nation*. For example, who can forget the effect upon his own mind when he first read Carlyle's "History of the French Revolution"? The very words seemed to live and breathe with passion, and the pages to be tinged with hues of blood. The whole work seems melted into glowing fire, and the narrative flows along, like streams of lava, destroying, terrible, and yet fascinating. We seem almost to stand round the scaffold of Danton, and the death-bed of Mirabeau; our ears ring with the cries of the maddened populace, as they storm the Bastille; and we shudder convulsively over the dread picture of the massacres of September. The work in question is a marvellous combination of lyrical and dramatic poetry in the garb of seeming prose. Who can refuse to it the name of history? Who can doubt that it is one of the finest aspirations of *Clio*, first-born among the Muses? Yet, who can dream that Carlyle could write a *continuous* history, and describe the peaceful hours of a nation's life as fittingly as he has sketched those hours of frenzied madness? Again, who that has read Gibbon's "Decline and Fall," can forget the fascination of its pages, its calm majesty, and sombre glory? We feel, as we read, that we are watching Rome in her dying hours, gazing on the gold and purple glory of the sunset of her greatness. How strong the contrast to the irregular, wild strains of Carlyle! The one falls on our ear in sounds of terror—"the distress of nations, with perplexity; the sea and waves roaring; men's hearts failing them for fear." The other falls on the ear like the music of the dead march, and the measured tread of those who bear earth's greatness to the tomb—solemn, slow, and sad, yet grand and beautiful. The work of Gibbon, doubtless, has its faults. When he philosophizes, he often goes astray; when he reasons, his logic is often found to be of the flimsiest. But, as a whole, perhaps no history surpasses it in grandeur. It has the unity of a well-planned drama, the reality of history, and the fascination of romance. In execution and design it is a *prose epic*. A little consideration, however, will (we think) satisfy every mind that Gibbon's mind was peculiarly fitted to pen the history of the epoch of Rome's decline, and that, perhaps, it was fitted for that epoch alone.

We cannot fancy him attempting, with any success, a history of our own land; and the idea of his entering upon the *early* history of Rome excites an almost ludicrous feeling. We inevitably smile at the bare idea of finding Gibbon in company with Niebuhr, Arnold, and Cornwall Lewis, and engaged in "an inquiry into the credibility," &c. Again, who can imagine him (had he lived in later days) entering into competition with Carlyle?

We might continue this subject, and it is one of great interest, almost indefinitely; but enough has, perhaps, been said for our present purpose, that is, to show how history must take its tone from the adaptation of the writer's mind to the epoch which he selects. We may not ourselves concur in all Mr. Macaulay's views on the seventeenth century; but, before we condemn him on this ground, we must inquire into the relation which his mind bears to that age, and into the influence of his mental constitution upon the framework and execution of his history. Now, we think that few can doubt that if there is one period of English history more suited to Mr. Macaulay's powers than another, it is the era from the restoration of King Charles II. downwards to our own day, and more especially the first century (1660—1760) of that period. That century was the one era which seems almost to call for that essayistic style in which Macaulay shines with inimitable brilliancy—the *facile princeps*. It is the age which affords most scope for rhetorical and artistic illustration, and for literary portrait painting, points in which Macaulay excels. None are more fitting for Macaulay's pen than those whom Vandyke loved to paint. It was an age of genius, intellect, and courage, strangely mingled with scoundrelism, treachery, and corruption. Macaulay is pre-eminently at home in sketching the bloody, implacable Claverhouse, the revengeful Stair, Shrewsbury the contemptible, and Marlborough, one of the greatest and meanest of mankind, on the one hand; and on the other, he is almost as life-like and real in his description of the few higher and nobler characters of the time—Tillotson, Somers, Portland, and Montague. Character exhibited in action is the great forte of our author, and is the great feature of the age whose history he has undertaken to illustrate. The startlingly vivid manner in which he has presented the actions and men of those times is of itself a *prima facie* argument for the general truth of his portraits.

While we thus praise Macaulay, as having executed well his view of an era most congenial to his powers, we wish to avoid misconception. We have no faith in the lasting popularity of the brilliant essayist, and we estimate his history much below many others. It is almost the last we would recommend to the student. In our opinion, it is a work for the drawing room, and not for the study—a work to be quoted on the popular lecture

platform, and not in the argumentative treatise or the debate. It appears to us utterly wanting in all the true elements of historical proportion. Thus it abounds in pleasing, but utterly superfluous and highly-wrought descriptions of scenery. Processions and gatherings meet us at every turn—mere picture-scenes of history, appealing solely to the sight-seeing propensities of our nature, and the tastes of an age of special correspondents and illustrated newspapers. We certainly esteem Macaulay as infinitely more a master in his art, but we recognize the *same* art of history in Mr. Russell's letters from the seat of the war. Then, again, we often, in his pages, find ourselves wandering (pleasantly, no doubt, yet idly) amid pages of personal memoir and mere gossip; and, while reading, we feel our occupation bears about as close a relationship to the *study* of history, as the gossip of the tea-table to the philosophy of life, or a Chiswick flower show to the science of botany. His work is a sort of historical miscellany; and the space allowed to each topic is governed, not by its value, but the effect it may be made to produce. When we wish really to *study* history, we must still go back to our acquaintance, and reason with Hallam and Mackintosh, or study the pages of Hume, grand in the simplicity of their eloquence, and even philosophic, when not evidently warped by the author's contempt for the liberty of conscience and religion.

We read Macaulay's history as we read a novel, for its fascination. We look for the *telling*, even if there be doubts of the truth of what is told. There is but little of dignity in the historic muse of the writer. Hence we move on rapidly. We are never stopped to muse upon some profound principle of wisdom. We never feel, as we peruse page after page, how truly inspiring it is—

“ To stand upon some lofty mountain thought,
And feel the spirit stretch into the view;
To joy in what might be, if will and power
For good would work together for one hour.”

But we are hurried onward, catching mere glimpses of the scenery we pass, interesting, but fleeting. So to speak, we travel through history by an excursion train, and at the end of our journey feel that we have seen much, but learnt little; we are rather tired of our jaunt. We close his pages as we close a second-rate novel, with a sense of having enjoyed the perusal, and with but little thought of perusing it again.

Now, if we carefully consider the portrait of William of Orange, as drawn by Macaulay, we think it will soon appear that anything in it which may, at first sight, appear to indicate an incorrect estimate of that monarch, is nothing more than a necessary consequence of the historian's style and constitution

of mind. Whatever fault we may discover, it will almost invariably prove to be one of expression rather than of estimate. Macaulay must "*exaggerate*"—heap up more words of ornament than are consistent with the bare simplicity of truth. When he fails to do that, he necessarily ceases to be the consummate rhetorician that he is. Does he deny or ignore any material feature of William's character, or does he impute to that monarch any qualities which he did not possess? Neither of these things, we believe, can be justly charged upon Macaulay. He doubtless groups William's qualities in such a manner as to produce the most admirable effect, and the most striking impression; but is not this a mere subsidiary device, which alters not the reality of the portrait? Should we blame the artist who paints our relatives in *attitudes* calculated to bring out the most engaging of their charms, or deny the truthfulness of a daguerreotype because taken when a smile was passing over the face? To say that Macaulay's estimate of the Prince of Orange is incorrect, because the virtues are artistically grouped in front of the picture, while the faults are thrown in behind, as shades to fill up the picture, is to condemn *ourselves*, and to confess that *we* are utterly destitute of the power of exercising our judgments. The only question in such a case is, Are the faults distinctly enumerated and brought to light? If so, it is owing to our own mole-like vision, if we mistake the fore-group for the whole picture. In William, virtue predominated, in Marlborough, vice held chief sway. It was, therefore, natural that the sketch of each should strike at once, by displaying, at a glance, the essential features of these men. And in estimating the fidelity of William's portrait, we must judge of his failings (standing, as they do, in the back-ground) by the rules of perspective, and not by linear measurement. Sunlight, doubtless, blinds the owl, and renders him unable to recognize the objects he knows by twilight; but it assuredly does not alter the real features of the landscape; and the human spectator will scarcely be tricked into the belief that the river, as it winds along at sunset, is in very fact a stream of burnished gold, although the reflected light may make it almost seem so. Surely it would be strange indeed to condemn Macaulay because some readers, of owl-like mental vision, are utterly "dazed" by the brilliant rhetoric and gorgeous colouring in which he delights, and which he distributes lavishly on every topic.

We might here pause, and wait for our antagonists to single out the defects of resemblance, if any, existent in Macaulay's portraiture of William of Orange. It is our province to defend, and therefore the onset must first be made by our opponents. We have endeavoured to explain and to secure our position, so that they may save themselves from the delusion that, because we agree in sentiment with the Whig historian, we must necessarily

be bound by every epithet and expression which he has used. To attack Macaulay's pretensions as a first-rate historian does not detract from the character of William; and it is the hero, not the biographer, whom we defend. In our opinion, the history of crowned heads can present few, if any, greater and better sovereigns than William. Cæsar, or Alexander the Great, Charles of Sweden, Frederick of Prussia, Wellington, Napoleon, and, perhaps, even Marlborough, were greater captains and mightier men of battle than William; but blot out their victories, and what do they become then? On the other hand, William, great in war, is greater still in council. So we might take each feature of his character, and admit that he has been surpassed in each respect by many historical celebrities; but when we regard the *tout ensemble* of his *greatness* and *goodness*, and especially when we consider the men who were about him, and the atmosphere of treachery and corruption which spread around, who then will outweigh him in sterling worth? If greatness be best shown in adverse circumstances (and who can doubt it?), how great must have been the soul that dwelt within that thin, delicate frame, worn down by fatigue, and wounds, and danger, and torn by that terrible asthma which accompanied him from the cradle to the grave! Is he accused of ambition? The charge is negatived by a thousand incidents of his life. More than once he resolved to abandon this kingdom to its fate, stung by the ingratitude which was the result of his anxieties—resolved to abdicate a throne, which almost any other man would have clung to with desperate tenacity. He refused, it is true, to accept the anomalous position of regency, or even to hold the crown under his wife's title; but when we find that he made no attempts to seize the crown which dangled within his reach, we cannot justly impute this to anything but his statesman-like appreciation of the difficulties of his position. He saw that if he was to hold the reins of government, it must be with the possession of all the privileges and advantages of an established throne; and in a spirit of candour and simple honesty of purpose, he made his stand at the outset. He thus placed the decision in the hands of the people. The ambitious man, placed in his stead, would either have grasped the crown, and established his throne by open force, or would have accepted the compromise, and secretly have gained the end by craft and corruption. Again, his continental wars are held up as an evidence of his ambition; but he knew full well that even England must meet the plots of France and Rome by open force; and had *she* been safe, it would have been an indelible brand of shame, if he had deserted the interests of Holland. Dead to the land of his birth, what could he have become but the craven-hearted tyrant of the land of his adoption? No manly, honourable, or patriotic course was open, but that which he pursued. It might be

England's misfortune, but it was not William's fault, that her choice lay between a Dutch sovereign, with the entanglements and bloodshed of a continental alliance, and the tyranny of the bigoted and infatuated James.

William has often been charged with something like treachery in his dealings with the English nation during the reign of James. Some writers endeavour to make it appear as if he had neither excuse nor motive (saving lust of empire) in interfering with English politics. In reply to these views, we quote the opinion of Hallam, the most impartial of our historians. He remarks* :—

"It was the *clear right* and *bounden duty*, as well as interest, of the Prince of Orange to watch over English politics. From his marriage with the Princess Mary, he was the legitimate and natural ally of the Whig party. Totally differing from them in respect of liberty and religion, neither of his uncles had ever treated him with much regard. He would not have been without precedents, if he had employed his influence in exciting sedition; but he seems to have had *no* connection with the violence and faction of Shaftesbury and his party. He acted solely on the defensive, dexterously, yet fairly, never losing sight of the popular party, yet avoiding all reasonable pretext for rupture or offence."

In similar manner we find Hallam acquits the Prince of Orange of any participation in the rebellion of Monmouth. In 1687, the English nation were becoming convinced that a change must take place; they had begun to learn that James was fatally obstinate; that sooner or later the king must be deposed, or the nation must relapse into slavery, and endure the horrors of persecution. The chiefs, therefore, of *both* parties began to make direct overtures to William, and he quietly began his preparations for an event which he now saw must inevitably occur. Still we find no attempt to urge matters to a crisis, no overt act, until he received an actual invitation from this country. The birth of a Prince of Wales compelled the party of freedom to act. "This birth," remarks Hallam, "made the offences of James inextinguishable. He was growing old, and found too much resistance to make his ultimate success probable, while there was a guarantee of a Protestant heir." But the prospect of the regency of the Catholic queen of James, and the ultimate succession of a prince who would inevitably be nursed in Romish bigotry, left no room for hope, if the opportunity was allowed to slip by. The invitation was sent to William, and we are at a loss to conceive how he could have refused to accept it, without

* At the time of writing, we unfortunately have not access to Mr. Hallam's work, and are obliged to quote from memory, aided by a manuscript analysis of his work. We believe, however, that no material variation will be found.

being a traitor to the interests of that native land he loved so well, and to the still nobler and higher cause of Protestantism in the world at large. England had less direct claims upon him; but had he failed to respond to the cry for aid which she then raised, his hand would have sealed the death-warrant of her liberty, would have thrown to the winds the results of near a century of violence, bloodshed, and civil war, and have, perhaps, blotted out her existence for ages to come, except as a land of priestcraft and degrading bondage.

It is not for us to enlarge here on the benefits of the "glorious revolution," by which the dogma of divine right was rooted out, and the grand principle established, that the powers of the crown are the gift of, and emanate from, the people. The share of William in this grand event must cover all minor faults with a robe of glory, and lay every Englishman under obligations of gratitude, which would but ill assort with a spirit of carping criticism. Of the sincerity of William's religion, there can scarcely be a doubt; it was deep-seated and unobtrusive, but we find it ever manifesting itself in his private correspondence (where, above all, we look for sincerity on such a subject), influencing his conduct, and evidently sustaining him in that dread hour "when heart and flesh fail." Frigid he might seem to our forefathers; for, though their king, yet he was a stranger in the land, surrounded by those whom he dare not trust, and unable even to use our language with fluency. But the influence of his native country upon him, after he had gained a *crown*, shows a heart far above the selfish promptings of ambition—a heart susceptible of warm affections. The same fact is evidenced by his treatment of Auverquerque and Schomberg, Ginkell and Bentinck, the early friends who stood by his side in less prosperous times. And lastly, we find that amid the cares of state, the perils of war, and the anxieties of his position, he had the heart of the tender and affectionate husband. It could be no affectation which led him to wear a treasured lock of his lost wife's hair bound round his arm, and hidden from the sight of all till death revealed the touching circumstance.

Space forbids us to enlarge further. We must leave the development of the subject to our coadjutors, and reserve any further remarks of our own until our adversaries have brought forward their objections. As to the issue of the debate in the minds of the generality of our readers, we cannot for a moment doubt. The Prince of Orange had faults, but we imagine that no one can peruse the pages of Macaulay, without admitting that those faults are frankly stated; and while they may object to much of the manner, we believe they will heartily concur in the *substance* of the estimate formed by this brilliant author.

B. S.

Politics.

WOULD PARLIAMENT BE JUSTIFIED IN SANCTIONING THE OPENING OF THE CRYSTAL PALACE ON SUNDAY?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THE exact relations of the Testaments are not easily perceived. It is at least evident that since the Creation there has been a gradation of revelations. "The thoughts of men are widened by the process of the suns." Wherefore, each of God's revelations has appealed to a higher intelligence and spirituality. Nevertheless, since there has never been other than One Name *under* heaven whereby we might be saved, the centre fact of each dispensation has been the same. All, from the Adamic to the Christian, have been modally not essentially distinct. That it might be adapted to the amount of intellectual and spiritual power of the epoch, the Jewish was a prohibitory and "grievous" religion. The Christian yoke is "easy." Before, Truth was seen as in twilight; now, it shines glorious in midday radiance. Wherefore, barriers to keep men from straying from the path are no longer required. The way is plain. But however the restrictions and punishments conjoined with them have been "left behind," moral obligations, from their very nature, *must* remain the same among all nations and in every age. From its origin, position, nature, we see that the Fourth Commandment is a moral law; that there is still, and will be to the end of this dispensation, a moral obligation to observe the sabbath. But the regulations respecting it, once necessarily severe, are softened. Deeds of mercy, deeds of necessity—these, as our Saviour taught us, do not desecrate the sabbath. Nor should the artisan be debarred the sabbath air. But it is rather ridiculous to maintain that a visit to the Crystal Palace is a deed of necessity! Believing that such is unrequired, and is certain to lead to sin, we maintain that the duty of government is to keep such an avenue to evil closed. For this we are called Puritans and Sabbatarians, and we glory in these titles; there is honour in them, since they mean—upholders of God's institutions against Puseyites and Irreligionists.

We agree with "Wishwell" in believing that the Creator could neither actually have or desire repose; but we draw therefrom a conclusion widely different from his. God represents himself as acting; but as such repose was unrequired by himself, and could not affect angelic existences, it must have had some relation to man. What relation? Physiology shows that man

so constituted, that one-seventh portion of his time should be given to comparative rest; wherefore the Father, who in all his enactments seeks the good of man, set apart a weekly sabbath; and besides enforcing its observance by precept and incentive, allowed it by example. He knoweth the power of example upon men: Christ came not only as a sacrifice, but as an example also. The ordinance of the sabbath, then, was so important that God saw fit to enforce its observance by representing Himself as keeping it. And the doing this in Adam's time evidences that it was intended to affect the whole human race, as reason teaches it should, since all have bodies requiring rest, minds requiring relaxation from secular business by turning their attention to spiritual, souls yearning for communion with the Eternal. And that the sabbath was not a mere Jewish ceremonial, is evidenced by the facts (1), That it was instituted so early; (2), That it was observed by the patriarchs, for how else can we account for the division of time into weeks? (3), That it was observed during the prophetic age. This, be it remembered, was a time of development and transition. Ordinances became less regarded, as from afar shone the coming of the "bright and morning star." But yet there was no diminishment of the acknowledged sanctity of the sabbath; its desecration was still denounced, its holy observance blessed. This shows that the sabbath was not one of those cloudy types which were to melt away in the brightness of His coming; that in the new dispensation the fourth commandment was in no degree to lose caste. It was not, then, a mere Jewish ordinance. God saw that it was a great necessity; that it was a mockery to tell man to work out his own salvation if he had no time to do it in. Some prate that with the Christian every day should be a sabbath. Can it be so? Is it so easy to progress in the divine life? so easy, amid the cares, fatigues, heart-engrossings of business, to attend to the eternal welfare of the soul? Has there ever been a Christian who felt that he could progress spiritually as well without as with a sabbath? and worship as acceptably amid the turmoil of business as in the calm quietude of a restful sabbath? George Herbert says—

"Sundays the pillars are
On which heaven's palace arched lies;
The other days fill up the space
And hollow room with vanities."

And are we always to be engulfed in the swirling whirlpool of this world's occupations? Nay; sabbaths are the green oases in our wilderness-life. When delightful Eden became a desert plain, two of its chief glories the Father still bestowed upon man—marriage, and the sabbath. And to sweeten life, he gave marriage; as a badge of discipleship he gave baptism; to teach the way to heaven was the Bible given; to upraise our gross imagi-

nations, and feed our faith, the Lord's Supper was instituted; and, to crown all these, he gave the sabbath—the day for home's caress, and the training of children, for perusal of His word, and for holy ordinances.

To turn now to the articles of our opponents. We could wish that before making animadversions upon our expressions, they had read them twice. "Wishwell" would then have seen that we do not presume that "paintings demoralize and make thieves of the population;" and "Takesin" would find that we do not proclaim that the opponents of the sabbath must necessarily be infidels or Romanists, since we distinctly stated our expectation of finding among our opponents "the devout but misguided Christian." But certainly little of *christian* light has appeared in our opponents' articles.

A few words will suffice to answer Mr. "Wishwell," that foe to grammar, who, however well affected he may be towards the shareholders of the Crystal Palace, certainly does not wish well to Lindley Murray. If the logical rule of Whately, that the ungrammatical expression of an argument nullifies it, were allowed, we should find nothing to answer on page 132.

The first thing which strikes us is the immense agency for good ascribed to the Exhibition at Sydenham, by opening which "we open the gates of freedom and wisdom to the world!" Oh, ye American slaves, ye Russian serfs, ye priest-ridden myriads of fair Italia! haste to petition our government to open the Crystal Palace on Sunday. Then we are told that "the most important *objects ARE* to teach a great practical lesson in art." Well, what will art do? Think you, that the sot you desire to reclaim from the tavern cares for art; that he will "notice the growth of intelligence, and the vast superiority of modern conceptions"? And were the times, when art was at its meridian glory, pre-eminent epochs of morality and loftiness of spirit? Reader, ponder "Saxon's" excellent remarks on page 212, and listen to the following from the "British Quarterly Review:" "Rome—not in the days of her Scipios, not in the days of the Gracchi, but beneath the sway of her debased Cæsars did she stand forth the great patroness of art. And in the decline of Italian independence, and during the most crushing period of Bourbon despotism, did the arts flourish most in France and Italy. Art is good *in its place*. Not to become an instrument of deterioration, it must be underlaid with virtue, such virtue as art never gave, and which man must bring to it. Nations are great, not in the measure in which they live amidst flowers and fountains and statuary, but in the measure in which they will not lie, will not cheat, will not do homage to the selfish and the mean, but to the generous and the noble. But such virtues have their natural root in that highest form of the manly—in true religion. The arts come in the wake of national strength and greatness;

they never give existence to those qualities. And it is what has preceded art, and is distinct from it, that must secure to it its wholesome uses when it comes."

To return to "Wishwell." What is it that leads men to employ themselves in "works of usefulness" rather than in the "facture of gods"? Not art, but religion. We admit that the "*works* to be exhibited" in the Crystal Palace are not "in semblance to the *Chamber of Horrors*" (!) but can scarcely see how they are to produce the beneficial results predicted by "Wishwell," unless, as he would make out, the ignorant, besotted man goes with a "contemplative mind," knows the "lives and works" of "Homer and Newton," and is accustomed to spout forth poetical quotations! At last, "Wishwell" gets into a maze, and it is ludicrous to witness his perplexities with regard to thought and expression. "Something more than idle curiosity" is to "actuate" the workman's "motives" in directing his attention to the "displays" of intelligence, &c., "which are exhibited;" while "to a contemplative mind, the good which may be culled from a visit *may furnish it* with material for weeks of thought," and "to such persons an impression must be produced," &c. "Hold! enough." In "Wishwell's" second article, he animadverts on our remark that the sabbath—or rest-time—was hallowed by God more than any particular day. Our statement was founded upon the expressions in Exod. xx. and Deut. v., to which we refer him. He then wastes nearly a page on a false accusation, that we presume that paintings have a demoralizing tendency, and another on commonplaceisms, and ends with expressing a hope that he has "engendered a more reasonable and christian spirit."

To turn to a more respectable opponent, "Taliesin." He makes much of the fact that "our views are opposed to those of all the reformers." To which we reply, It is a known fact that converts and proselytes are always apt to be over zealous, to run to extremes. We have glimpses of this in the history of Paul. Brought up in all the strictness of ceremonialism, his Epistles show how far he recoiled from most observances after becoming a Christian. So our reformers, on leaving the Romish church, recoiled from all that seemed ceremonial. But are we to regard them as a second race of apostles? Were they not in fault in several cases? They approved of establishments; but yet half the people of England believe their views on this subject to be highly erroneous. "Taliesin" says that the founders of the Christian church were opposed to views like ours. How does he know? As early as A.D. 160 we find Irenæus declaring "On the Lord's day we Christians keep the sabbath;" and Ignatius, still earlier, speaks of the "Lord's day festival, namely, the resurrection day, the queen and empress of days." And from the apologists for Christianity we learn that it was observed from

the earliest times. The Church of Rome corrupted it; but those who saw most clearly after the Reformation—Usher, Andrews, and many others—found that Scripture required its holy observance. Hear also Wells: "Darkness and division there hath been enough in the Church, to quarrel with institutions and appointments of former times. But the perpetual silence of the church on this particular, infallibly shows the Divine right of the Lord's day. And the churches are so silent, because they dare not attempt such an enterprise as to rase the foundations of a divine institution."

"Taliesin" tells us that the decalogue is abolished; yet singularly enough informs us that nine precepts are iterated in the New Testament. It were strange, indeed, that Christ should declare that he came not to destroy—should lay so much stress upon the commandments—should show their spiritual nature in his Sermon on the Mount—if they were to be abrogated; and stranger still that he should, with careful argument, point out how superstitiously the sabbath had hitherto been regarded, and should demonstrate its real value and right observance, if it were no longer to be kept holy.

The falsity of the statement, that on one of the Sundays on which Christ met his disciples they were fishing, will be seen by referring to Jno. xx. 19, 26. It was on another occasion that Christ joined them when engaged in their usual occupation.

"Taliesin" believes that the opening of the Crystal Palace would restrain men from sensual gratifications. But is it likely, that those who now indulge in them would prefer the gratification of taste and intellect? Did the Derby Arboretum draw men from the public house? Government should close the avenues to evil, should shut up each public house on the Lord's day, and leave the Crystal Palace still unopened.

"Taliesin's" remaining arguments were answered by anticipation in our opening article. With regard to "Honestes'" remarks, we would observe, (1), The artisan can find pure air and relaxation sufficient in the parks, without a railway journey and the expenditure of his money. God forbid that we should debar him of a sabbath walk, which does not force others to labour or him to sin. Let him have his recreation, in such a way as shall be no stumblingblock to himself or to others. (2), Art, science, information, are not what the workman chiefly wants. It is true religion alone which can reform his evils, raise his intelligence, better his condition. (3), You say the workman must be taught by examples, deeds, facts. Where can you find sublimer ones than those in Holy Scripture? Is not our religion founded on facts, the grandest which can affect mankind? (4), We are told that there is no need to fear lest the sabbath, ceasing to be a day of religion, should cease to be one of rest. But there is fear of such a result. Government must be consistent. If altered at all,

the law must be consistently altered. The one step made, where will the foot of unbound pleasure rest? In the wake of the less harmful exhibitions must follow rotundas, theatres, casinos. And work must follow. It has in France. It has in Germany. It must in England. (5), Hence our remarks on the dependence of much of our religion, morality, and progress, upon the observance of the sabbath. We all know that in England, as compared with sabbath-breaking nations, the percentage of murders, thefts, illegitimate births, is comparatively small. And we also know that the foremost peoples in commerce and success are the three who best observe the sabbath—the English, Americans, and Jews.

We have now little fear that the Crystal Palace will be opened on Sunday, for directors know that should they do so, Christians will decide to forsake it in the week. The Christian will not attend it—the tavern-haunter will not. Only the middle, undecided class would support and be affected by it.

Herewith we cease. Let Dr. Hamilton's eloquent words consecrate this article: "O sabbath! Needed for a world of innocence, without thee what would be a world of sin! There would be no pause for consideration, no check to passion, no remission of care. We salute thee, as thou comest in the name of the Lord,—radiant in the dawn of that sunshine which broke over creation's achieved work—marching downward in the track of time, a pillar of refreshing cloud and of guiding flame—interweaving with all thy light new beams of discovery and promise, until thou standest forth more fair than when reflected in the dews of Eden, more awful than when the trumpet rang on Sinai! The Christian sabbath! Like its Lord, it but rises again in Christianity, and henceforth records the rising day. It has been the coronation day of martyrs, the feast day of saints! It has been from the first the sublime custom of the churches of God. It is a day of heaven upon earth! life's sweetest calm, poverty's best birthright, labour's only rest! Nothing has such a hoar of antiquity upon it! Nothing contains in it such a history! Nothing draws with it such a glory! The household's richest patrimony, the nation's noblest safeguard! The oracle of instruction, the ark of mercy! The patent of our manhood's spiritual greatness! The harbinger of our soul's sanctified perfection! The glory of religion, the watchtower of immortality!"

THEBELKELD.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WE have given the various opinions which have been expressed on this subject a careful consideration, but have not seen sufficient to warrant us in changing our former conviction. The question which every one ought to put to himself is, What ought, and what ought we not to do on the sabbath day? The answer is,

"It is well to do good on the sabbath day." Goodness is the essence of morality and religion, therefore any moral or religious measure would be justifiable. In the first place we will consider its good or evil influence on society. There is nothing in matter which is evil—neither animal, nor vegetable, nor mineral disseminate it. Mind is the creator of evil, not matter. Therefore all evil exists in ourselves, not in that which we see; though men can, however, propagate and spread wickedness by forms and moulds of matter. False systems and foul actors may quail. The opening of the Exhibition would be favourable to the progress of science and art—a diffusive knowledge of science elucidates facts of God and ourselves. Her progress has greatly conduced to civilise and christianise the world. The worshipping of a spiritual God has been substituted for the worshipping of a material god. As we have advanced a few thoughts on the inward contents of the Crystal Palace, we have next the outward, or works of nature. We do not affirm that the frequent sight of these would lead the untutored and depraved mind to an immediate and correct idea of an omnipotence, as savages see the most beautiful and romantic works of God, and still have the most imperfect knowledge of their Author. But we maintain that they are teeming with value to the tutored mind, and suggestive even to the uninitiated. When life is, therefore, created in all its varied and pleasing aspect, will any one affirm that, to the best of men, it is a profitless employment of time to trace in all these works the great Author of all? Effects are traced to a cause, and a God becomes manifest. We have, secondly, the social aspect. The hue and cry is, that fathers and sons will leave their domestic circle, and by their absence be a means of causing in thousands of homes desolation, misery, and "all the ills that flesh is heir to." We are not quite so apprehensive. Doubtless many would go, but would many such characters, who would produce that so-called misery, study to make home comfortable if they did not go? We think not; and if only a few could be improved, what a happy issue would be the result! It would react. Improve men, and you improve homes. It is in reality cause and effect.

Our opponents have, however, placed great stress on scriptural quotations, which induces us to adduce our own reasons from the same source. The Jews regarded the sabbath as a divine day, and considered that the least deviation from their mode of belief was a godless attack thereon. It was the sabbath day when Jesus made clay, and anointed the eyes of the blind man who sat and begged. The Pharisees, commenting even on this act of Jesus', said, "This man is not of God, because he keepeth not the sabbath day." Again, at the Bethesda pool at Jerusalem, lay a man who had had an infirmity thirty and eight years. "Jesus said unto him, Rise, take up thy bed, and walk.

And immediately the man was made whole. Therefore did the Jews persecute Jesus, and sought to slay him, because he had done these things on the sabbath day." According to this, the Jews discountenanced even works of mercy. We, however, will admit the rightfulness of such being performed. Still, Jesus did more than heal the man. He ordered him to take up his bed and walk. Jesus would not have ordered the man to do a wrongful act. Therefore he justified the travelling and the carrying of a burden on the sabbath. As the man might have remained for days, if Jesus had not made him whole, there was no necessity for the man to travel. His home might not be near. It might be miles distant, or several days' journey, as the pool was the only one in that part of which they entertained superstitious notions. We have the same Pharisaical spirit amongst us even now. It discountenances anything that is not of Mosaic foundation, detests newness, and consequently turneth away from much that is useful and progressive. Christ's spirit was liberal. It was respectful even to enemies. He sought not to injure those who would have slain him, but forgave, and tried to improve them, as they knew not what they were doing. He tried to improve them by persuasion, lovingkindness, and simplicity, not by force and dogmas.

We have now to make a review of our labours. Of "Threlkeld" we have but little to remark. "Taliesin" has overturned much. We have previously said a little. His essay, however, has the impress of ability, but, in some instances, an over sanguineness has led him to make unreasonable assertions. With "Saxon" we must dwell a short time. He asks if we "find that the memorable thirty years, in which flourished such demi-gods of art as Leonardo da Vinci, Angelo, Raphael, and others, left a marked moral impress on society in classic Italy?" We answer, Yes. They not only had a marked moral influence on society in classic Italy, but likewise influenced the "taste" of succeeding generations, down to our own day. The fact of our now considering them great, is of itself sufficient proof of this assertion. And, as Wieland beautifully remarked, "what are all the steps by which man advances himself by degrees towards perfection, but refinements—refinements in his wants, modes of living, his clothing, dwelling, furniture, refinements of his mind and his heart, of his sentiments and his passions, of his language, morals, customs, and pleasures? In the same degree that man adorns and improves his external condition, are his perceptions developed also for moral beauty."

Again, "Saxon" remarks on some of our words, "Surely he requires not to be told that green trees with proud spreading boughs, and 'tiny blooming dew-bent flowers,' are by no means peculiar to Sydenham on either Sunday or Monday?" We thank "Saxon" for such *valuable information*, and inform him

that we have a friend skilled in botany who will be about as glad to know this as ourselves. Are there not thousands who cannot visit the Palace on neither Monday nor Saturday, nor the other four working days of the week? Let "Saxon" walk up our metropolitan Oxford-street about seven o'clock on a Saturday night, and test the truth of our assertion. There he may notice hundreds measuring broad-cloth and tape; and if he would stay until they had finished, we believe nature would weight his eyelids. Sunday is their only leisure time. They need relaxation and renovation. Offer them something instructive and healthy, and you may draw them and do good. Instigate laws dictative of "church or nothing," and you can attain very little. They will not all attend church. The others most likely go to more injurious places than the Crystal Palace would be. "Saxon" has inferred from our remarks that "our contemplations can be directed to the displays of almighty intelligence and power only by a Sunday visit to the Crystal Palace." This may be his own conviction; it is not ours, neither have we intentionally used words to that effect; and his non-quotation of such important words leads us to believe that they have been spuriously fostered by himself, for to affirm such, would be the height of presumption. For "Saxon" to affirm that to be ours which was not, deserves that which we will refrain from christening. We believe congregations to be the greatest auxiliaries to virtue; and when all men are disposed to attend places of worship, we shall be alike glad with our opponents. Until then, let every one pursue that course which he considers right. For a time we may adopt different methods to arrive at the same result; but as different tinted colours harmonize, so may different systems, forming conjointly a beautiful whole.

J. E. P. "entirely repudiates the right of parliament to legislate on any matter affecting conscience, but more especially when they 'make the word of God of none effect.'" J. E. P. overlooks the fact, that parliament has already interfered in such matters. An existing law prohibits the Palace from being opened on the sabbath. In this instance J. E. P. takes the affirmative on the very essence of the question, which is, Would parliament be justified in sanctioning the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sunday? According to J. E. P., parliament has no *right* to interfere in this matter, as other sincere persons have "consciences," who think differently to what J. E. P. and his coadjutants do. Therefore parliament has no right to enact a prohibition. If she would not be justified in forming an act, would she be justified in retaining and enforcing it? Assuredly not any more than a thief, who would plunder his neighbour, would be justified, according to the law of God, in withholding that plunder from its rightful owner. If, then, parliament has no right to enact and enforce such laws, she would be *justifiable*

in sanctioning the opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays, **and** unjustifiable in not doing so. Many of J. E. P.'s remarks **are** utterly unintelligible to us. In some few others he wanders **from** the subject; and from his question, "Who are the Sunday League?" and his subsequent remarks, we are led to infer that **he** is not discussing the Crystal Palace question, but the character and abilities of those men forming the "Sunday League." **This** is foreign. It exhibits a shallowness of intellect. **Why** take the flimsy course of questioning the *intentions* of opponents, **instead** of advancing facts? There is another of his remarks, **which**, for his own sake, we refrain from quoting.

We now conclude. Let every one judge for himself, neither being persuaded by the remarks of our opponents, nor those of our own. But waver not between two opinions. Settle one way, not merely for your own sake, but for the cause of truth.

Manchester.

J. L. WISHWELL.

CHARLES II. AND MILTON.—Charles II. and his brother James went to see Milton to reproach him, and finished a profusion of insults with saying, "You villain, your blindness is the visitation of Providence for your sins." "If Providence," replied the venerable bard, "has punished my sins with *blindness*, what must have been the crimes of your father, which it punished with death?"

ADVICE ON MARRIAGE.—The best time for marriage will be towards thirty, for as the younger times are unfit, either to choose or to govern a wife and family, so, if thou stay long, thou shalt hardly see the education of thy children, who, being left to strangers, are in effect lost: and better were it to be unborn than ill-bred; for thereby thy posterity shall either perish, or remain a shame to thy name and family.—*Sir W. Raleigh, to his son.*

RESPECT PAID TO THE AGED BY THE LACEDEMONIANS.—There was a custom among the Lacedemonians, dictated by nature, and approved of by morality, which more polished nations have admired, but never imitated. I allude to the respect paid by the Spartans to age. Neither wealth nor titles were esteemed at Lacedemon; and therefore all the affections and propensities of men flowed in their natural channels. Age was venerated, and therefore youth was tractable. Experience was consulted, and therefore wisdom was practised. The aged and infirm were respected, and therefore the young and the middle-aged looked forward with satisfaction, and without fear, to the decline of years. To give one hour of comfort to the pale victim of adversity, and to cheer with one transient gleam of joy the evening of life, ought surely to be among the pleasures, as they are among the duties, of humanity.—*Sir W. Drummond.*

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WITHOUT cant or cynicism, it may be said that the love of money is the curse of the times. It stays the progress of truth, smothers religion, deadens all holy emotions. How few but make friends of the mammon of unrighteousness! How few, like Christian, can disregard the invitations of Demas, and pass the silver mine unheeded by! How few can say, like Peter, Silver and gold have I none, but what I have—faith, which is power—I give. Few are the non-worshippers of this modern Baal, and Jeroboam's golden calf is a fair type of universal man's idol.

The sin, danger, and evil consequences of covetousness are pointed out in Scripture, powerfully, and pointedly, and frequently. In all its gradations it has types—Achan, Gehazi, Judas, Ananias, Demas. And in startling and fearful distinctness is its spiritual aspect limned. Were we so disposed, we might draw an argument from this in favour of the position we have taken up. Were the spendthrift so great an enemy to society as the miser—were he an enemy at all in any great degree, prodigality would be denounced in Scripture; for it is an incontrovertible truth that whatever is hurtful to society must be hateful to God.

It is not necessary that the spendthrift should be vicious. It frequently happens that he is merely fond of articles of *vertu*, works of art, curiosity, and the like. In this he is a patron—though perhaps a somewhat undeserving one—of art. Naturally there is something of nobility in his character. Freeheartedness, generousness, most frequently go along with prodigality. There is nothing unmanly about the fault itself. Goldsmith could be one. Timon of Athens, a nobleman indeed, could be one. And so the general example of such a man is not harmful. But avarice is indeed unmanly, mean, and base. Hear Milton's masterly description of Mammon:—

“*The least erected spirit that fell
From heaven : for even in heaven his looks and thoughts
Were always downward bent ; admiring more
The riches of heaven's pavement, trodden gold,
Than aught divine or holy else.*”

T. U.'s supposition that misers seldom take upon themselves family ties, is scarcely borne out by the histories of noted misers. We believe it will be found that as many were married as unmarried. Then, being married, these results naturally follow, and have been known in many cases so to do. The children are ill fed and ill attended to, and are deprived in part of that bodily strength which, *cæteris paribus*, would probably have been employed for the good—direct or indirect—of society. They are debarred from means of education, and this must to no small degree operate detrimentally on society, since the more educated a man is, the less is he likely to become a burden to it by committing crime, or falling into poverty, and the more is he likely to avoid the extremes of which we now treat, to aid and favour the advancement of others, and to receive the truths of Revelation, which latter, if he do, he is sure to become a blessing to all around. Moreover, the father being continually occupied in the acquisition of wealth, the children miss parental training and teaching. No education can be as effective as that carried on by a parent, because of his natural authority, his children's affection, and the insight into their character he has every opportunity of gaining. Wherefore we are in the habit of referring observed defects of character to defective home influence. All this power for producing excellent results is unemployed by the miser. And as the mind which is unsupplied with proper pabulum will take up with that which is unfit, this negative part of the father's educational influence is productive of ill results.

Again: the children of the miser being debarred from pleasures which they know must, in the course of nature, be some day theirs, are led to desire the death of their father; thus the filial feeling dies away, and little of good can remain in a heart which owns no love for a parent. Or they fall into the snares of sharpers, sign post-obits, and the like, thus helping to foster a race of vampires who live upon the life-blood of society. Or they are tempted to crime, to theft from their father's store, or to the use of poison. These may be extreme cases, yet they follow but too easily. Once more: the father dying, large sums come into the free possession of uneducated and undisciplined minds, and terrible excess is the almost inevitable result.

It is a known truth that the heart of man is assimilated to the object he worships. Gold is the miser's idol, and it is curious to note how his heart approaches to its nature, becoming as cold, as easily lent to the basest schemes; as hard, though not as precious. So his ear is shut to the cry of the poor, and the homeless in vain seek shelter from him. The poor have an irreversible claim—a natural, just, and universal claim—upon the benevolence of the rich. And in so far that the miser withholds his charity, he inflicts a definite injury on society. Moreover his love of money, if it do not lead him to fraud, leads him to act up

to the very letter of the law, and God knows how much of oppression and cruel injury may be carried on by such an one! "To the young, the thoughtless, and the necessitous," says Dr. Dwight, "he lends money at exorbitant interest, and with tenfold security. The payment he discourages until the amount has become sufficient to enable him, with a suit, to inclose their whole possessions in his net. To the poor and suffering also he sells at unconscionable prices the necessities of life. Notes, bonds, and mortgages, given by persons of the same description, he buys at an enormous discount. His loans are almost instantaneously doubled, and property, mortgaged to him for a tenth part of its value, is swallowed up. The estates of widows and orphans melt away before his breath, as the snow beneath the April sun." By means like these many are reduced to poverty, and we all know that poverty is the most prolific parent of crime. Many are driven to despair; and a midnight plunge into the silent stream is the result of his oppression. Some burn with hate and longing for revenge, and cases are not unknown where the miser's soul has been sent unprepared to judgment, and the soul of his victim stained with the crime of murder.

And has his example no weight? Alas! yes. Crimes, like diseases, are infectious. The miser is the plague-spot of his neighbourhood. Verily, did we not know the Apocalyptic description to be spiritual, we had thought that gold were fitter for the pavement of hell than of heaven! With the miser's children his example must have fearful influence. If he do not openly school them in unmercifulness, cunning, and fraud, constant familiarity with such acts as his, constant hearing of his sentiments, must deaden their moral sense, and lead them to look with unaverted eye upon scenes of misery and deeds of crime, and at length without compunction to cause the one, and act the other. Thanking T. U. for his excellent exposition of the evils of prodigality, we believe that for the reasons above instanced, avarice is the more injurious to society. Be it ours to choose the mean of these extremes. Of all life-paths, the mid one is the safest.

THRELKELD.

CORPOREAL AND MENTAL GRATIFICATION.—It is well known how small is the value of all the merely corporeal pleasures, when taken nakedly by themselves and without the addition of anything mental. The man who relishes most the pleasures of eating and drinking, flies from a solitary meal, and confesses that his enjoyment in it is reduced to little. Of the pleasures of love, we see that the bodily part is little valued when stripped of the mental, and that it is only the lowest of our species who are found to be seriously under its influence.—*London Review*.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 89.)

5.—THE VERB—continued.

SECOND CONJUGATION.

INFINITIVE ending in IR.

1. GERUND ending in ISSANT.

FINIR, TO FINISH.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, FINIS; 2, FINIS; 3, FINIR; 4, FINISSANT; 5, FINI.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
Je finis	<i>I finish</i>	Nous finissons	<i>we finish</i>
Tu finis	<i>thou finishest</i>	Vous finissez	<i>you finish</i>
Il finit	<i>he finishes</i>	Ils finissent	<i>they finish</i>

Imperfect Tense.

Je finissais	<i>I was finishing</i>	Nous finissions	<i>we were finishing</i>
Tu finissais	<i>thou wast finishing</i>	Vous finissiez	<i>ye were finishing</i>
Il finissait	<i>he was finishing</i>	Ils finissaient	<i>they were finishing</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je finis	<i>I finished</i>	Nous finîmes	<i>we finished</i>
Tu finis	<i>thou finishedst</i>	Vous finîtes	<i>ye finished</i>
Il finit	<i>he finished</i>	Ils finirent	<i>they finished</i>

Future Tense.

Je finirai	<i>I shall finish</i>	Nous finirons	<i>we shall finish</i>
Tu finiras	<i>thou wilt finish</i>	Vous finirez	<i>you will finish</i>
Il finira	<i>he will finish</i>	Ils finiront	<i>they will finish</i>

Conditional Tense.

Je finirais	<i>I should finish</i>	Nous finirions	<i>we should finish</i>
Tu finirais	<i>thou wouldst finish</i>	Vous finiriez	<i>you would finish</i>
Il finirait	<i>he would finish</i>	Ils finiraient	<i>they would finish</i>

Compound of the Present	J'ai fini	<i>I have finished, &c.</i>
Compound of the Imperfect	J'avais fini	<i>I had finished, &c.</i>
Compound of the Preterite	J'eus fini	<i>I had finished, &c.</i>
Compound of the Future	J'aurai fini	<i>I shall have finished, &c.</i>
Compound of the Conditional	J'aurais fini J'eusse fini	<i>I should have finished, &c.</i>

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

*Present Tense.**Singular.**Plural.*

Que je finisse	<i>that I may finish</i>	Que nous finissions	<i>that we may finish</i>
Que tu finisses	<i>that thou mayst finish</i>	Que vous finissiez	<i>that ye may finish</i>
Qu'il finisse	<i>that he may finish</i>	Qu'ils finissent	<i>that they may finish</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que je finisse	<i>that I might finish</i>	Que nous finissions	<i>that we might finish</i>
Que tu finisses	<i>that thou mightst finish</i>	Que vous finissiez	<i>that ye might finish</i>
Qu'il finit	<i>that he might finish</i>	Qu'ils finissent	<i>that they might finish</i>

<i>Compound of the Present</i>	Que j'aie fini	<i>that I may have finished, &c.</i>
<i>Compound of the Preterite</i>	Que j'eusse fini	<i>that I might have finished, &c.</i>

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

*Singular.**Plural.*

Finis	<i>finish thou</i>	Finissons	<i>let us finish</i>
		Finissez	<i>finish ye</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

<i>Present</i>	Finir	<i>to finish</i>	<i>Compound</i>	Avoir fini	<i>having finished</i>
----------------	-------	------------------	-----------------	------------	------------------------

PARTICIPLES.

<i>Gerund or Present Participle</i>	Finissant	<i>finishing</i>
<i>Past Participle</i>	Fini	<i>finished</i>
<i>Compound Participle</i>	Ayant fini	<i>having finished</i>

Note.—*Hâir*, to hate, retains the diæresis (usually called in French *tréma*), throughout the conjugation, except the three persons singular of the present Indicative, and the second person singular of the Imperative.

The verb *fleurir*, to bloom, beside the regular form *fleurissait*, has also *florissait*, when used figuratively, and applied to great men, empires, arts and sciences, and the like; as, *Athènes florissait sous Périclès*, *Athens was prosperous under Pericles*; *Virgile et Horace florissaient au temps d'Auguste*, *Virgil and Horace flourished in the time of Augustus*. In the same sense the present participle is *florissant*; as, *alors les sciences florissant en Égypte*, *the sciences at that time flourishing in Egypt*.

EXERCISE III.

Les revers ralentissent mais n'amortissent pas l'ambition. Le premier moyen de diminuer l'indigence du peuple est d'affaiblir l'opulence extrême des riches. Quelqu' habiles artistes qu'ils soient aucun de leurs ouvrages n'égale les chefs-d'œuvre de Phidias et de Praxitèle. Quand on est Chrétien de quelque sexe qu'on soit, il n'est pas permis d'être lâche. Ce qui importe à tout homme c'est de remplir ses devoirs sur la terre. Le vrai moyen d'être trompé, c'est de se croire plus fin que les autres. Si la vie et la mort de Socrate sont d'un sage, la vie et la mort de Jésus sont d'un Dieu.—(J. J. Rousseau.) Les cheveux blancs d'un vieillard sans reproches sont les lauriers dont le temps le couronne. Les Egyptiens qui avaient appelé à leur secours des étrangers, après avoir favorisé leur descente, attaquèrent les autres Egyptiens qui avaient le roi à leur tête.

SECOND CONJUGATION.

2. GERUND ending in ANT.

SENTIR, TO FEEL.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, SENS; 2, SENTIS; 3, SENTIR; 4, SENTANT; 5, SENTI

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>			<i>Plural.</i>	
Je sens	<i>I feel</i>		Nous sentons	<i>we feel</i>
Tu sens	<i>thou feelest</i>		Vous sentez	<i>ye feel</i>
Il sent	<i>he feels</i>		Ils sentent	<i>they feel</i>

Imperfect Tense.

Je sentais	<i>I felt</i>		Nous sentions	<i>we felt</i>
Tu sentais	<i>thou feltest</i>		Vous sentiez	<i>ye felt</i>
Il sentait	<i>he felt</i>		Ils sentaient	<i>they felt</i>

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Que je sente	<i>that I may feel</i>		Que nous sentions	<i>that we may feel.</i>
Que tu sentes	<i>that thou mayst feel</i>		Que vous sentiez	<i>that ye may feel</i>
Qu'il sente	<i>that he may feel</i>		Qu'ils sentent	<i>that they may feel</i>

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Sens	<i>feel thou</i>		Sentons	<i>let us feel</i>
			Sentez	<i>feel ye</i>

PARTICIPLE.

Present—Sentant, feeling.

All the rest like FINIR.

Only seven verbs with their derivatives are conjugated like SENTIR; viz.—

Dormir, <i>to sleep</i>		Sentir, <i>to feel, perceive</i>
Mentir, <i>to tell lies</i>		Servir, <i>to serve</i>
Partir, <i>to depart</i>		Sortir, <i>to go out</i>
Se repentir, <i>to repent</i>		

Of *dormir* and *servir* the present tense of the Indicative Mood is—*Dors, dors, dort; dormons, dormez, dorment;**Sers, sers, sert; servons, servez, servent;*the Imperative, *dors, dormons, dormez; sers, servons, servez;* and the rest like SENTIR.

Two verbs, *tenir*, to hold, and *venir*, to come, which are conjugated alike, though properly speaking they are irregular verbs, are given here because of their numerous compounds and frequent occurrence.

TENIR, TO HOLD.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, TIENS; 2, TINS; 3, TENIR; 4, TENANT; 5, TENU.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je tiens	<i>I hold</i>	Nous tenons	<i>we hold</i>
Tu tiens	<i>thou holdest</i>	Vous tenez	<i>ye hold</i>
Il tient	<i>he holds</i>	Ils tiennent	<i>they hold</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je tins	<i>I held</i>	Nous tîmes	<i>we held</i>
Tu tins	<i>thou heldest</i>	Vous tîntes	<i>you held</i>
Il tint	<i>he held</i>	Ils tinrent	<i>they held</i>

Future Tense.

Je tiendrai	<i>I shall hold</i>	Nous tiendrons	<i>we shall hold</i>
Tu tiendras	<i>thou wilt hold</i>	Vous tiendrez	<i>ye will hold</i>
Il tiendra	<i>he will hold</i>	Ils tiendront	<i>they will hold</i>

Conditional Tense.

Je tiendrais	<i>I should hold,</i> &c.	Nous tiendrions	<i>we should hold,</i> &c.
--------------	------------------------------	-----------------	-------------------------------

Compound Tenses, J'ai, j'avais, &c., tenu.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Que je tienne	<i>that I may hold</i>	Que nous tenions	<i>that we may hold</i>
Que tu tiennes	<i>that thou mayst hold</i>	Que vous teniez	<i>that ye may hold</i>
Qu'il tienne	<i>that he may hold</i>	Qu'ils tiennent	<i>that they may hold</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que je tinssse	<i>that I might hold</i>	Que nous tinssions	<i>that we might hold</i>
Que tu tinsses	<i>that thou mightest hold</i>	Que vous tinssiez	<i>that ye might hold</i>
Qu'il tint	<i>that he might hold</i>	Qu'ils tinssent	<i>that they might hold</i>

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Tiens	<i>hold thou</i>	Tenons	<i>let us hold</i>
		Tenez	<i>hold ye</i>

And the rest like SENTIR.

THIRD CONJUGATION.

INFINITIVE ending in OIR.

RECEVOIR, TO RECEIVE.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, REÇOIS; 2, REÇUS; 3, RECEVOIR; 4, RECEVANT; 5, REÇU.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je reçois	<i>I receive</i>	Nous recevons	<i>we receive</i>
Tu reçois	<i>thou receivest</i>	Vous recevez	<i>you receive</i>
Il reçoit	<i>he receives</i>	Ils reçoivent	<i>they receive</i>

*Imperfect Tense.**Singular.*

Je recevais	<i>I received</i>
Tu recevais	<i>thou receivedst</i>
Il recevait	<i>he received</i>

Plural.

Nous recevions	<i>we received</i>
Vous receviez	<i>you received</i>
Ils recevaient	<i>they received</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je reçus	<i>I received</i>
Tu reçus	<i>thou receivedst</i>
Il reçut	<i>he received</i>

Nous reçûmes	<i>we received</i>
Vous reçûtes	<i>ye received</i>
Ils reçurent	<i>they received</i>

Future Tense.

Je recevrai	<i>I shall receive</i>
Tu recevras	<i>thou wilt receive</i>
Il recevra	<i>he will receive</i>

Nous recevrons	<i>we shall receive</i>
Vous recevrez	<i>you will receive</i>
Ils recevront	<i>they will receive</i>

Conditional Tense.

Je recevrais	<i>I should receive</i>
Tu recevrais	<i>thou wouldst receive</i>
Il recevrait	<i>he would receive</i>

Nous recevriions	<i>we should receive</i>
Vous recevriez	<i>ye would receive</i>
Ils recevraient	<i>they would receive</i>

Compound Tenses—J'ai, j'avais, j'aurai, &c., reçu.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

*Present Tense.**Singular.*

Que je reçoive	<i>that I may receive</i>
Que tu reçoives	<i>that thou mayst receive</i>
Qu'il reçoive	<i>that we may receive</i>

Plural.

Que nous recevions	<i>that we may receive</i>
Que vous receviez	<i>that you may receive</i>
Qu'ils reçoivent	<i>that they may receive</i>

Preterite Tense

Que je reçusse	<i>that I might receive</i>
Que tu reçusses	<i>that thou mightst receive</i>
Qu'il reçût	<i>that he might receive</i>

Que nous reçussions	<i>that we might receive</i>
Que vous reçussiez	<i>that ye might receive</i>
Qu'ils reçussent	<i>that they might receive</i>

Compound of the Present—Que j'aie reçu that I may have received, &c.

Compound of the Preterite—Que j'eusse reçu that I might have received.

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Singular.

Reçois *receive thou*

Plural.

Recevons *let us receive*
Recevez *receive ye*

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Present—Recevoir to receive
Compound—Avoir reçu to have received

PARTICIPLES.

Present—Recevant receiving *Past—Reçu received*
Compound—Ayant reçu having received.

The only verbs belonging to this conjugation are those whose infinitive ends in **VOIR**, and of these there are nine: seven end in *cevoir*, and the other two are *devoir* and *redevoir*. All other verbs in **OIR** are irregular—too irregular to form into classes; and they must be learned separately.

EXERCISE IV.

Il y a des gens qui demandent froidement ce qui ne leur est pas dû, et qui refusent nettement ce qu'ils doivent (*there are of the people, there are persons*). Nous aperçûmes à l'horizon un point noir qui présageait une épouvantable tempête. Nous devrions être toujours prêts à nous protéger et à nous secourir les uns les autres. Celui qu'on aime n'a point de défauts; si l'on vient à le haïr, il n'a pas de vertus. *Ce qu'il y a de certain*, c'est que les plus savants des hommes, les Socrate, les Platon, les Newton ont été aussi les plus religieux (*that which there is of certain, it is—what is certain, is—*) (*the Platos*: singular in French where we commonly use the plural.) *Il est des esprits* crédules et bornés, faciles à recevoir l'impression des préjugés, et incapables de revenir quand une fois ils l'ont reçue (*there are some*). Plus ils se sentaient pressés du joug des Gentils plus ils conçurent pour eux de mépris et de dédain (*the more they*). Vous ne concevriez pas qu'on fût d'une autre opinion que vous. Hommes puissants, recevez avec bonté les malheureux qui ont recours à vous.

LESSONS IN MATHEMATICS.

In the scale of notation of whole numbers we have seen that the removal of a digit one place to the left *increases* its value tenfold, and consequently, removing it one place to the right *diminishes* its value in the same proportion, till, when it occupies the units' place, it has no local value, but merely represents the number for which it stands when placed alone. Now, if we adopt some mark to distinguish the units' place, we shall be able to express fractional values by continuing the same mode of notation. Let the mark of distinction for the units' place be a point, placed at the right hand near the top of the figure; then the figures on the right of the point will denote, not integral numbers, but a fraction or a series of fractions. For instance,—in 3584·17296 the first four figures on the left express the ordinary integral numbers, just the same as if none stood on their right, but the 1 on the right of the point stands for $\frac{1}{10}$, the 7 for $\frac{7}{100}$, the 2 for $\frac{2}{1000}$, &c., and the whole expression denotes $3000 + 500 + 80 + 4 + \frac{1}{10} + \frac{7}{100} + \frac{2}{1000} + \frac{9}{10000} + \frac{6}{100000}$. And thus any part or parts of a unit may be denoted to any degree of accuracy that may be required short of perfect exactness.* This mode of expressing fractional quantities is called DECIMALS, or DECIMAL FRACTIONS.

In Algebra the symbols are the letters of various alphabets, and represent indifferently, according to circumstances, either whole numbers or fractions. Here, too, we find expressions answering to vulgar fractions (see pp. 90, 91), which may or may not be fractional quantities, when arithmetical values are substituted for their algebraical representatives. So, if a be taken to represent 504 and b to represent 72, $\frac{a}{b}$ will be equal to 7; but if b represent 79, $\frac{a}{b}$ will be no longer integral, but equal to $6\frac{25}{79}$. But since Algebra has no numeral scale, it cannot present anything resembling decimal fractions.

Besides these symbols of value there are also *symbols of operations*, which

* The explanation of the last phrase must be deferred till DECIMAL FRACTIONS come under more lengthened consideration.

serve to indicate more briefly, and at the same time more forcibly and clearly, than words can, the processes of mathematical calculation.

The sign $+$, which we have already used, denotes that the quantities between which it stands are to be added together; so, $5 + 3$ make 8. This sign (which is most probably a modification of the character $\&$) is read PLUS. It is called the *positive sign*, and the quantities before which it stands are called *positive quantities*.

The sign $-$ signifies that the quantity before which it stands is to be subtracted. So, $5 - 3$ make 2. It is read MINUS, and is called the *negative sign*, and the quantities before which it stands are called *negative quantities*.

Multiplication is denoted either by \times (which is read TIMES between integral numbers, and OF between fractions), or by writing the numbers that are to be multiplied together in a line, with a dot between them near the bottom. So, 3×4 and 3.4 both mean "three multiplied by four," or "3 times 4." The dot is used to distinguish 3.4 from 34, and consequently where the quantities are represented by letters it is not required. $3ax$ means "3 times a multiplied by x ."

Division is indicated by the sign \div or $:$ placed before the divisor, as $36 \div 4$ (thirty-six *divided by* four), or $72 : 8$ (seventy-two *divided by* eight); or else by writing the number that is to be divided over the divisor, like a vulgar fraction, as $\frac{466\frac{1}{2}}{218}$.

The sign $=$ means that the quantities or expressions between which it stands are of the same algebraical value; or, as it is commonly said, are *equal* to each other.

Some few symbols are left to be explained when it shall be necessary to use them.

There are two common abbreviations to be noticed. 1. Instead of writing $a + a + a$, we write $3a$; instead of $x + x + x + x$, $4x$; instead of $ab + ab + ab + ab$, $4ab$, &c.; putting down the quantity that is thus repeated, with the number of times which it is repeated expressed by a figure (or by figures if necessary) before it.

2. Instead of writing $aaaaa$, we write a^5 . That is, when any quantity is to be multiplied by itself, we write down the quantity with a number at its top to the right, to say how often it occurs as a multiplier.

Examples:—

If $a = 12$, $b = 10$, $c = 9$, $d = 4$, and $e = 0$;

$ab = 120$, $2bc = 180$, $5abd = 2400$;

$ac + de = 108$; $a^2 = 144$; $d^3 = 64$; $c^4 = 6561$;

$5a + 4b - 6c + 9d - e = 60 + 40 - 54 + 36 - 0 = 82$;

$2ab - cd + 3bd = 240 - 36 + 120 = 324$.

Let the following assertions be verified:—

$a^4 - 4a^3b + 6a^2b^2 - 4ab^3 + b^4 = 16$.

$a^3 - 3a^2c + 3ac^2 - c^3 = ac \div d$.

$2abc - 3bcd + bc^2 - cd^4 + 4b^2 + 2c - d = e$.

$a^2b^2 - c^2d^2$

$\frac{ab + cd}{ab + cd} = ab - cd$.

What is the result of the following expressions, supposing a , b , c , d , and e have the values given above?

1. $ac^2 - 2ad + 3bc + 4ad + 9ac - bcd$.

2. $3a^2bc - 4b^2c^3 + 3ab^3d - 5ab + 6abc$.

3. $4a^4 - 3ac^2 + 2a^2c^4 - ac^5$.

4. $3abc - 4acd + 7a^2d - 4cde + 7bce$.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

72. Referring to "Telemaque's" reply to "Alpha's" inquiry respecting "East India Civil Appointments," would "Telemaque" kindly answer the following questions:—If a candidate chose English language and literature, French ditto, and mathematics, would he be examined at all in the other subjects? How many candidates are there at each examination? do the twenty, who get the greatest number of marks, pass? Should one be under twenty-three when sent out, or under that age only before the first examination? Are the successful candidates sent out immediately after passing second examination? and do they get any salary the twelve months after first examination? Does it matter whether one is married or single?—F. E.

73. Will any of your able correspondents inform me as to which is the best grammar to use without the aid of a tutor? and also whether there are any exercises published on the plan of the model exercises in the *B. C.*?—T. S.

74. Will you kindly inform me of the publisher's name, date of publication, and price of the "Quarterly Review of Pure and Applied Mathematics," announced in the *British Controversialist*, vol. vi. p. 239, under the head of "Literary Intelligence"?—J. B.

75. Will you oblige me with the address of any foreign bookseller in London?—J. T. S.

76. I am much obliged to S. E. L., *Micklehurst*, for his answers to my questions. Perhaps he will be so good as to answer the following:—1. What is meant by a ray of light? 2. Does

the ray really pass through the glass? 3. How, supposing that the black colour is caused by the absorption of all the rays which strike upon the object, does it happen that, when the black letters of a book are seen through a prism, the black colour is invisible, and in its stead are seen the prismatic colours, whilst the white ground is almost unchanged in appearance? 4. Have not some blind people been able to distinguish colours by the touch? and how can this fact be explained consistently with S. E. L.'s theory?—C. S. W.

77. Will any of your numerous correspondents have the kindness to inform me what is the age, qualification required, and the means to be used, in order to obtain a situation in the "Excise"?—F. L. O.

78. Would you inform me the course of study in Mathematics at the Andersonian University, Glasgow? By answering the above, you will greatly oblige—MAR.

79. On turning up Walker's Dictionary I find under the word "Controvertist," that "instead of this word, 'Controversialist' is often *erroneously* used." Would the editor or a reader of the "*British Controversialist*" explain the discrepancy?—C. G.

80. A subscriber will feel obliged by a solution of the following query:—On the principle that fifteen degrees difference of longitude makes an hour's difference of time, sooner towards the east, later towards the west, the following anomaly offers itself,—suppose it to be twelve o'clock noon in London, on Wednesday, then, in a place 180 degrees east, it would be twelve o'clock on Wednesday night; while in a place 180 degrees west of London, it would,

on the principle we have above stated, be twelve o'clock on Tuesday night. But these places are identical. Which of these two calculations is the correct one?—GULIELMUS.

81. Can any of your readers inform me the price and publisher of a work entitled "Ghost Belief of Shakspeare," by Alfred Roffe?—JESSIE.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

29. *The Three Estates*.—The term, let me venture to inform "Ardrossan," means nothing more than the government of the country, *pro tem.*, comprehending the King or Queen, House of Lords, and House of Commons. By the term *fourth estate*, sometimes used, we understand *the press*.—W. O.

50. The best philosophical work on Mesmerism, that I am aware of, is "Facts in Mesmerism, with Reasons for a Dispassionate Inquiry into it," by Rev. C. H. Townshend, 2nd edition, 1844, 9s. Mr. Townshend's last work, entitled "Mesmerism Proved True," may be viewed in the light of a supplement to "Facts in Mesmerism," as it contains a refutation of the article which appeared in the "Quarterly Review;" it sells at 3s. 6d. Mr. Townshend's works may be obtained of Hippolyte Bailliere, 219, Regent-street, London. For instruction in Curative and Scientific Mesmerism I would recommend Davey's "Illustrated Practical Mesmerist," which can be obtained post free for 2s. from the author, William Davey, 37, North Castle-street, Edinburgh. Stone's "Philosophy of Electro-Biology," 3s. 6d., Bailliere, gives a view of Biology.

The mesmeric desks I have never seen used; the human hand can produce all the states of mesmeric sleep without the assistance of any wooden contrivance.—JESSIE.

51. The strongest calf for binding is the veined, or marble; next to that the purple and the darker colours;

the first-named, however, is but rarely used for any but whole binding.

54. A refracting telescope can be constructed at a very trifling expense, by which you will be enabled to see the satellites of Jupiter, the solar spots, and the unevenness of the moon's surface. Procure a convex glass, whose focus is 3 feet; this may be known by holding the glass in the sun's rays, and measuring the distance between it and where the sun's rays are brought to a small spot. Place this glass at the end of a tube 3 feet 2 inches long, in which let there be a small sliding tube for fixing the eye-glass in, and adjusting the focus for distinct vision. At the distance of 3 feet 1 inch, place a convex glass, 1 inch focal distance. The object glass (or first one mentioned) will form a picture in its focus of all the things that are directly opposite to it, and this picture will be seen magnified on looking through the eye-glass. The magnifying will be in this case as 36 inches is to one. With this telescope all terrestrial objects will appear inverted. The aperture at the object glass should not exceed 1 inch in diameter. A piece of stout pasteboard will do to construct both tubes with, and all come to five or six shillings.—DON.

63. There is, I believe, a first class publication which will suit "Musicien," entitled, "The Organ, its history and construction," by E. J. Hopkins and Dr. Rimbault: it contains, among other matter, specifications and suggestive details for instruments of all sizes, and is an extremely useful work to the organist or amateur. Published by Robert Cocks and Co., 6, New Burlington-street, royal 8vo., 400 pp., price £1 11s. 6d.—J. J. G.

64. *Answer to F. A. M.*—The best commentary on the Bible, in my opinion, is Matthew Henry's. There is a good edition published by David Keay, Bolt-court, Fleet-street. I am not

acquainted with Kitto's Pictorial Bible.
—A DIVINITY STUDENT.

65. The best system of short-hand yet published is that by Mr. Isaac Pitman, of Bath, under the title of Phonography. It can be learnt without the assistance of a master, and one hour's daily practice in writing and reading, continued for about a month, is generally sufficient to ensure tolerable facility in using it. The best first work is the "Instructor," price 6d., published by Fred Pitman, 20, Paternoster-row.—T. D., Hull.

70. There is a very useful little

hand-book published by Cradock and Co., 48, Paternoster-row, No. 10 of their "Library of Useful Knowledge," entitled "The Christian Religion, an account of every Sect, its Origin, Progress, Tenets, Rites, and Ceremonies." The price, 6d. only. This R. A. W. L. will find valuable for the former part of his question; but the price will allow of a further purchase for an answer to the latter, for which I cannot recommend a work.—J. J. G.

75. D. Nutt, Strand; Dulau, Soho-square; Williams and Norgate, Henrietta-street, Covent Garden.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Discussion Class, "People's Hall," Beck Lane, Nottingham, established by Mr. J. C. Street, the esteemed and indefatigable secretary to the "People's Hall," Nottingham, held its first annual musical soirée on Tuesday evening, July 1st.; the evening was spent in the most delightful manner—dancing, music, and recitations, agreeably diversified the entertainments of the evening. During the past year, papers have been read and discussion elicited upon various interesting subjects, by several of the members; and the spirit in which the class was commenced, has been, and is, sustained with unabated ardour and unflagging interest. A complete set of the *British Controversialist* has been purchased for the use of the members, and the current number is regularly taken in. Altogether, this discussion class promises to become not the least valuable adjunct of that noble institution, which is in fact what it is in name—*"The People's Hall," Nottingham*, as founded by the late George Gill, Esq.—F. M., Secretary.

St. James's Junior Mutual Improvement Society, Hull.—The fourth

quarter of this society commenced on the 1st of July, 1856. We have great pleasure in stating that the society is in a flourishing condition; notwithstanding that during the summer months the average attendance of the members is in general small, when compared with that of the winter. The secretary's report showed the membership to number upwards of 50, and the attendance of the members to average from 18 to 34. Four papers have, during the past quarter, been read, viz., "Newspapers," by Mr. T. D. Kendall; "The Age, its Tendencies and Exigencies," by Mr. G. Wilson; "The Character of Queen Elizabeth," by Mr. T. D. Duncan; and "Ancient History," by Mr. T. Jenkinson. The questions for discussion were, respectively,—*"Does the newspaper, as a moral agent, act badly?"* and, *"Are newspapers upon the whole beneficial?"*—the discussion upon which lasted two evenings; *"Is the character of Queen Elizabeth worthy of admiration?"* and *"Was she justified in putting to death Mary Queen of Scots?"*—the discussion occupying five evenings; and the subject of *"Is there a plurality of worlds?"* intro-

duced by Mr. T. N. Pool, which occupied two evenings. A library has been formed in connexion with this society, which already consists of about 80 books. It has been collected chiefly through the liberality of the members. Although the library has only been open for the use of the members the past five weeks, above 100 vols. have been circulated, July, 1.—A WELL-WISHER to the Society.

Proposed Northern Counties' Literary Association.—A proposal has emanated from some literary gentlemen in Bury, Lancashire, for the establishment of an association, to be called the "Northern Counties' Literary Brotherhood;" the objects are thus set forth:—"To promote those means which will tend to a more complete development of the literary talents and tastes of this populous district; and to afford pecuniary relief to authors—members of the society—whom life's casualties might place in embarrassed circumstances. Amongst a variety of means that might be used for effecting the objects in view, are suggested the following:—1st, An annual gathering of the members at some convenient town; the first to take place at Manchester. 2nd, The publication of a quarterly magazine, to serve as a channel of communication, and a constant test of the intellectual wealth of the members. 3rd, The occasional issuing of such works (written by members of limited means) as might be deemed worthy of publication, the society guaranteeing the authors against loss. 4th, The occasional offering of prizes for essays, poems, and other literary productions.

Wednesbury Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The members of this society held their first soir  e in St. John's Schoolroom, Russel-street, on Monday, the 2nd inst., when upwards of 120 members and friends partook of the ample provisions provided. After tea, and the usual preliminaries, the Rev. John Winter, incum-

bent of St. John's, took the chair, and delivered an eloquent and impressive address. From the report presented to the meeting by Mr. Samuel Horton, the Honorary Secretary, it appears that the society meets twice every week—on Wednesday evening for mutual instruction in writing, arithmetic, grammar, &c., &c., and Thursday for the discussion of religious, political, and scientific subjects, the reading of essays, and delivery of lectures. The society began with 12 members, but has already increased to 34, and it is now in a flourishing condition. Suitable addresses were delivered by Messrs. Miles, Proverbs, Chumbley, Hackett, Perry, and others, and also delightfully entertained at intervals by the band in connection with the works of Thomas Charles Russell, Esq., of Church-hill, and most ably conducted by Mr. Wm. Kendrick, with a selection from Haydn, Handel, &c. After the French and English National Anthems, the meeting separated about ten o'clock. The room was tastefully decorated with evergreens and appropriate mottos.—SAMUEL HORTON, *Secretary*.

New Independent Chapel at Islington.—The foundation-stone of the new chapel now erecting in the Offord-road, Islington, for the church and congregation who, in 1855, withdrew from Caledonian-road Chapel, and have since then assembled for worship in Twyford Hall, was laid on Tuesday by Apsley Pellatt, Esq., M.P. Appropriate speeches were delivered by the honourable member, by the chairman of the committee, and by the Rev. B. S. Hollis, of Islington Chapel. The Rev. C. Gilbert, Secretary to the Congregational Chapel Building Society, and several other ministers, also took part in the proceedings. The attendance of ministerial and lay friends was very numerous.*

* Some one has dropped the above into the editor's box, and we gladly give it a place, though rather out of our usual track.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Mrs. H. B. Stowe is in England, and intends publishing her new work, "The Influence of Slavery upon the White Population," during her sojourn.

A committee, including the Duke of Argyle, the Earls of Burlington and Chichester, and the Bishops of St. David's, Chichester, and Oxford, has charged itself with the task of raising a Hare prize for historical composition—to the merits of the Venerable Archdeacon of Lewes.

M. Thiers has undertaken a journey into Germany to examine the fields of battle of Lutzen, Bautzen, Dresden, and Leipsic, an account of which he will have to give in the next volume of the "Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire," which he is now writing.

M. Louis Fould, brother to the French Minister of State, has offered a prize of £800 (20,000 francs) for the best History of Art and the Industrial Arts before Pericles. This prize is to remain open for three years, and is to be awarded by the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres.

The "*Leamington Courier*" says:—"We have the pleasure of informing our Stratford readers that the long-talked-of gift of £500 by Mr. John Shakspeare, Langley Priory, near Ashby-de-la-Zouch, has been made over to trustees, for the purpose of purchasing certain property on each side of Shakspeare's House, and restoring that portion of the premises, known as the Swan and Maidenhead, to its original state."

The British Association for the Advancement of Science has just closed its annual meeting, held this year at Cheltenham; the next is announced for Dublin, Dr. Lloyd to be president. Mr. Jellinger Symons brought forward his views, but found no favour with the

astronomers, who were all against him.

A valued contributor has nearly ready for the press (and will probably appear with our next number) a little work of great importance to all who study correctness of composition and elocution. We refer our readers to the announcement on our wrapper.

NEW BOOKS.

Ahn's Method of Learning Latin; Aytoun's Bothwell; Galt's The Camp and the Cutter; Dr. Giles's Heathen Records to Jewish Scripture History; Thomas à Kempis, with Essay by Chalmers; Hardy's Remarks on Properties of Light; Lethbridge's Woman the Glory of Man; Litton's Mosaic Dispensation Introductory to Christianity; Orsini's Austrian Dungeons; Salad for the Solitary; Winslow's Life in Jesus; Hughes's Map of Geology of London and its Environs; Dr. Giles's Key to the Classics—"Caesar's Commentaries, Book I." and "Virgil's Aeneid, Books I. to III.;" Marcet on Composition of Food; Todd's Questions on Lives of the Patriarchs; Von Gumpach on the Moon's Rotation (a defender of Mr. Symons); Wright's Seven Kings of Rome; Rev. H. Beech's Good Soldier; Footsteps of Jesus; Letters to the Working Classes; Ingleby's Outlines of Theoretical Logic; Metcalf's Oxonian in Norway; Napier's Memoirs of the Marquis of Montrose. New vols. of—Alford's Greek Testament; Chalmers's Select Works; Bibliotheca Classica, "Cicero's Orations," by Long; Bell's Poets, "Early Ballads," &c.; Brougham's Works; Lardner's Handbook of Philosophy; Library of Biblical Literature; Gosse's Marine Zoology for British Isles.

The Logic of Study.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

“THE progress of the soul is something *unique*. It is not like the progress of planets—they run in circles, their course is an eternal careering through the same scenes and circumstances; having once swept their spheric pathways, though they move for ever, their age of novelty is over; henceforth, on them the same air will breathe, and the same suns will shine. But the soul, in every stage of growth, rises into a new sphere of conscious being. In each original thought it soars to a new orbit, and rolls through a new and brighter firmament; in every fresh resolve it feels an outbirth into another and a higher world. Nor is the progress of the soul exactly like that of the tree. The tree exhausts itself in growing; its growth is but a progress to decay and destruction. . . . But the soul contains inexhaustible germs,”* from which, by judicious culture, there may be continuously produced the fruitage of true thought, the “bright consummate flower” of a virtuous and holy life.

Of the all-paramount *object* of study we have not now, however, to speak;† we have rather to describe, with accurate brevity, the *mode* in which studies in general may be most advantageously, nay, we are inclined to say, must necessarily be pursued.

On this special topic we have, in our former paper, given such directions as seemed necessary for the guidance and control of the observative faculties; and we purpose in this present prelection to continue our exposition of the processes of mind through which *facts* pass, in order that they may be transformed into *truths*. When facts have been *observed* and *classified*, *i. e.*, when, in accordance with the regulations laid down in our previous article, we have been made sure *that* they are, the mind

* “The Progress of Being,” by the Rev. D. Thomas, an invaluable book for thinking young men, for a knowledge of which the writer is indebted to an estimable young friend, whose contributions have frequently enriched this serial—D. M. West.

† On the subject of Study, considered in various lights, by the writer of this paper, see “Hints on Study,” *B. C.*, 1850; “Aids to Self-Culture,” *B. C.*, 1854; as well as the chapters on “Method,” in the “Art of Reasoning,” and the “Elements of Rhetoric.” The “Essay on Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies” also contains much matter of special interest to the earnest student.

naturally and instinctively desires to become possessed of some explanation of their nature, properties, attributes, purpose, &c., *i. e.*, *what* and *why* they are: This explanation, when arrived at in accordance with the logical *possibilities* of the given thought, as these possibilities seem to be implied in the ideas which result from observation and classification, is called an Hypothesis.

An hypothesis, in other words, is a forethoughtful supposition or guess, made either on insufficient evidence, or else without actual and trustworthy experience, employed to account for or explain the facts of phenomena, *i. e.*, to give the reason for, or state the cause of, these facts being or seeming as they are.

Causes which lie hidden under the surface aspect of phenomena, and are hence not patent and obvious, can only be discovered by a judicious use of this suppositional explanation.

The chief use and advantage of hypotheses are, that they teach us, so long as they are held in the mind as possibilities, what to look for, and in what direction it is likely to be found.

There are no decisive circumscriptions or limits to the formation of hypotheses, except those of the Imagination; but as the Reason must judge of the plausibility of each hypothesis, each must be formed with due regard to the analogies of nature, *i. e.*, the possibilities of the peculiar phenomena about which it is framed.

The supreme canon upon which the validity of hypotheses may be said to rest is this, *viz.*, if the conclusions logically resulting from any hypothesis are themselves known and proven truths, or coincide with the other known and proven truths regarding the same or similar facts, or agree with the given or similar facts, the hypothesis is either true, or, at least, highly probable; and this probability is enhanced still more if the conclusions do not contradict any other known and proven truths or facts.

Causation is threefoldly conditioned, *viz.*—1st. It must operate between at least two objects, agent and patient. 2nd. It must be, in most cases, the combined result of three changes—(*a*), in the agent—the reason of the effect; (*b*), in the patient—the effect of the impulse, force, action, &c.; (*c*), the reactive influence of the patient on the agent. 3rd. It must act, *i. e.*, be influenceive in, at least three different moments—(i.) precedent to the action; (ii.) during the period of activization; (iii.) subsequent to the action.

There are two ways in which hypotheses may be usefully employed to aid in the determination of the true causative agency by which any fact, or series of facts, *is*, or *seems* to be, as we perceive it, *viz.*—1, that in which we accept as true some or any thought which, exactly and completely, both as to mode and number, explains the phenomenal results which we are engaged in investigating; 2, that in which we assume some or any fact as

the efficient cause of another, in consequence of observing a given definite relation in nature and extent between the occurrence of one fact and the occurrence of the other.

In the former case, the reason accepts that as true which wholly and satisfactorily explains all the phenomena, and contradicts none, when all other conceivable hypotheses fail to explain all, and contradict some; in the latter case it receives it as a suggestion, by the investigation of which real proof may be obtained—verification is proof.

The need for the employment of hypotheses arises from the uncertainty of our knowledge—we only *suppose* when we do not *know*: hence an hypothesis is a provisional argument; one, that is, which admits the existence of a cause for doubt, but at the same time indicates a desire to exchange that doubt for a truth on which the reason can rely.

Hypotheses are either *general* or *special*.

A general hypothesis is one which has no reference to time, but is equally applicable to the past, the present, or the future.

Special hypotheses are of three kinds, viz.—1, those which relate to past time and concern themselves with determining, or at least, with guessing, what particular consequents might or would have followed from certain different antecedents; 2, those which refer to present time, and inquire either what are the causes of certain special effects, or what are the existent effects which may be regarded as truly referable to certain special causes; 3, those relative to future time, and which employ themselves in determining the probable results of certain special causes, or what special causes would or might result in certain special effects.

General hypotheses are most frequent in science, art, and philosophy; special, in history, politics, economy, &c.

In all cases, and whatever be the nature of the question at issue, it is to be remembered that hypotheses are, in themselves, arbitrary creations of the mind, variable at pleasure, within the limits of the possibilities of the subject, and capable of being opposed by other hypotheses.

When any person consciously or unconsciously exchanges one hypothesis for another during the progress of any debate or process of thought, he is said, in logical phrase, “to shift his ground” (*ignoratio elenchi*).

The foundation principle of every hypothesis is *analogy*. The canon of analogy is, whatever coincides in many qualities, &c., of any species is likely to coincide in the rest.

The closer the analogy of the known causes or facts to supposed causes or facts, the more probable is the hypothesis constructed regarding them. In analogy, however, the identity of the qualities, not of the substance, is assumed.

The employment of analogy for the formation of hypotheses is called *anticipation*.

Syllogisms of anticipation do not yield necessary, but only probable truths; they are logical presumptions, made for the purpose of enlarging our experimental cognitions.

The following qualities must be possessed by every hypothesis, viz.—1. It must be possible *in thought*. 2. The consequents must flow or proceed directly from the antecedents, or the antecedents must be clearly and distinctly implied or contained in the consequents. 3. It must be *one*, *i. e.*, it must stand in need of no assistance from any other hypothesis; every subsidiary supposition or uncertainty lessens the likelihood of the accuracy of that which depends upon it. 4. It must approximate more nearly in verisimilitude to a true cause than any other concept possible—at the time and in the circumstances—to the mind.

All hypotheses are ultimately founded on the idea of probability.

Probability is expectation based on insufficient knowledge.

Of the doctrine of probability, the following is the supreme canon, viz., the likelihood of an hypothesis is in the precise *ratio* of the whole number of facts favourable to that assumption to the whole number of equally possible facts, both favourable or unfavourable.

A knowledge of the relative frequency of the occurrence of the special class of facts is therefore necessary to the formation of an accurate hypothesis.

This knowledge gives *data* to the thoughts.

These *data* may either be casually given in ordinary observation, or intelligently obtained by the registration of experience.

The more accurately the data have been collected, the more trust may be reposed in the hypothesis constructed for the purpose of explaining why they are as they seem.

This anticipation precedes, and is the handmaiden of, Induction, to an explanation of the *modus operandi* of which our succeeding paper will be devoted.

In reference, however, to the topic which has at present been occupying our attention, we cannot refrain from quoting the following passage from the Rev. W. Thomson's able treatise on "The Laws of Thought," in which the opinions which we ourselves entertain on this matter are so correctly expressed, that we should despair of competing with such a master in pure thought:—"A mistaken notion prevails that this rapid anticipation does not belong to the philosophic cast of mind—that it is precisely what Bacon condemns, as the method which hurries on rapidly from the particulars supplied by the senses to the most general axioms, and from them as principles, and their supposed indisputable truth, derives and discovers the intermediate axioms." It is thought that caution and deliberate examination of every par-

icular we can find, before we allow ourselves to form any conclusions whatever, are the conditions of all sound physical inquiry. There is here a confusion of two distinct things. Scrupulous caution should be exercised before an hypothesis is considered to be *proved*; and the law that we believe to be true should be applied to every fact where it can be supposed to operate, and to every other law with which it might interfere, in order to verify exactly what was at first only a happy conjecture. Bacon meant to complain that this sober process did not always follow the bright thought and brilliant suggestion, and, perhaps, that the bright thought itself was not suggested in the region of facts, but in that of words. . . . Philosophy proceeds upon a system of credit; if she never advanced beyond her tangible capital, her wealth would not be so enormous as it is. She works with a principle as true before she knows it to be so, because in watching how it operates upon facts consists the best means of establishing its truth; but she must be prepared at the same time to abandon and dismiss it whenever it is found to be in direct and irreconcilable conflict with established facts."

TITLES AND NOBILITY.—There are a set of men in all the states of Europe who assume, from their infancy, a pre-eminence independent of their moral character. The attention paid them, from the moment of their birth, gives them the idea that they are formed for command; they soon learn to distinguish themselves as a distinct species, and being secure of a certain rank and station, take no pains to make themselves worthy of it. To this institution we owe so many indifferent ministers, ignorant magistrates, and bad generals.—*Abbé Raynal*.

COMPLIMENTS.—Though all compliments are lies, yet because they are known to be such, nobody depends on them: so there is no hurt in them, you return them in the same manner you receive them, yet it is best to make as few as one can.—*Lady Gethin*.

WHAT PLEASURE IT IS TO PAY ONE'S DEBTS!—I remember to have heard Sir T. Lyttleton make the same observation. It seems to flow from a combination of circumstances, each of which is productive of pleasure. In the first place it removes that uneasiness which a true spirit feels from dependence and obligation. It affords pleasure to the creditor, and therefore gratifies our social affection. It promotes that future confidence, which is so very interesting to an honest mind; it opens a prospect of being readily supplied with what we want on future occasions; it leaves a consciousness of our own virtue, and it is a measure we know to be right, both in point of justice and of sound economy. Finally, it is the main support of simple reputation.—*Shenstone*.

Religion.

DOES GEOLOGY CONFIRM THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

“Not in vain the distance beckons,
Forward, forward let us range;
Let the great world spin for ever
Down the ringing groves of change.”

It is incontestable, that the Bible is a revelation of God's moral attributes, and not of his physical acts; that it is a plan of salvation for a fallen race, and not a scheme of scientific truth. Hence, when in such a revelation we find references to natural facts, we must suppose them introduced for a special purpose, and must take that purpose into consideration in interpreting them, just as an upright magistrate deals out justice according to the spirit of the law rather than according to the letter.

We next premise, that God, being eternal and omniscient, has no after thoughts—is never compelled to resort to special acts to meet unforeseen events; and it is in agreement with this attribute that (so far as finite man can understand the infinite), he invariably works by uniform laws, through which he never breaks. Hence all his acts are predetermined from eternity, and are brought about by a long chain of events slowly and regularly evolving their results—never by sudden interference.

The object of introducing into a revelation of religious truth an account of the creation, was evidently to teach the Jews his omnipotence; to impress upon their stubborn and idolatrous minds that not only were they his children, but that the countless hosts of heaven—the earth on which they stood—the elements of nature—the very plants and animals on which they depended for food and clothing, had each and all sprung into existence at his fiat, and were the pliant ministers of his will.

Suppose, now, you are teaching a little child; do you begin to explain to him that the earth is a ball, the sun a huge globe, and stars still larger suns? or do you teach him to sing, “Twinkle, twinkle, little star,” and allow him to consider the sky an arched vault, approachable by a ladder, whose zenith is crossed by the fiery sun daily, waiting patiently till curiosity, “the philosophy of childhood,” have disciplined his mind so far that you may explain to him how conclusions have been arrived at, and thus lead him to the glorious facts of science? Does not

cramming a child's memory with facts, before his intellect can understand them, always tend to sciolism? Now the case of the Jew was strictly analagous to that of the child, and hence the Mosaic account is far from circumstantial or complete. The sun, moon, and stars, are spoken of as lights, not as worlds vaster than our own. No mention is made of the countless ages during which this world had been in preparation; for such references would be unintelligible to those whose knowledge of numbers extended to a few thousands and of time to a few generations.

But while, on the one hand, the absence of scientific information is necessary and explainable, the incorrectness of direct statements is altogether incomprehensible. And accordingly we find, that whilst God has seen fit to simplify by omission, and even by adopting common phraseology, he has also taken care that there shall be no contradictions, to be stumbling-blocks to men of science or handles for infidels. Underlying the whole scheme of Providence, and evinced by numerous little textlets, are deeper truths and a profounder philosophy than its first readers ever imagined. The subject is too extensive to enter upon here; the following passages, which occur to us amongst others, will perhaps sufficiently explain our meaning.

"He hangeth the earth upon nothing." "The earth poureth forth bread; below it windeth a fiery region," Job xxviii. 5 (Boothroyd's version). Compare these passages with the generally received opinions of the heathen nations by which the Jews were surrounded.

"The Lord answered Job out of the whirlwind and said, . . . The waters are hid as with a stone, and the face of the deep is frozen."

Thus far, then, our examination shows that, *à priori*, a circumstantial history of the creation could not have been given to the Jews, but that an *account* being revealed, it must agree, *so far as it goes*, with the geologic record. Let us see how far this is the case.

The earliest period to which geological investigations conduct us back, is that when our earth existed as a huge fiery, molten, liquid globe, formless, confused, chaotic; curtained around with a dark dense atmosphere of vapour; the rule of a guiding hand proved only by its revolution round the sun. Such a state is almost beyond conception, and it is only after patient observation of upheaved mountain and contorted strata, of fault and dislocation, that we begin to comprehend the enormous character of the forces which have been at work on our globe, and, finding no other solution, are compelled to come to the conclusion that we are indeed standing on a thin shell, at most some 600 miles thick, with a fiery billowing ocean beneath.

Here, gentle reader, in consideration of the value of space in

the *British Controversialist*, have we reluctantly struck out some pages of manuscript, in which we had most conclusively, to our own mind, proved the existence of internal heat. But as neither of our geological opponents appear to be acquainted with the non-developmental theory, we wait till our opinion is challenged.

The subject is an important one, for we believe it is only on the other hypothesis that a serious attack can be made on the truth of the Mosaic record. If we admit the Huttonian hypothesis, so ably and perseveringly maintained by Sir C. Lyell, viz., that our earth has always existed in its present solid condition, and that the same classes of animals have always ranged over its surface,—in fine, that the established order is the only one, we offer a strong, if not incontrovertible, argument for the eternity of matter. We believe that the succession of animal life on the surface of the globe cannot be explained on Sir C. Lyell's theory, and he himself candidly admits this in regard to the recent introduction of man.

We believe that Sir C. Lyell's theory is at variance with the little we know of the way in which God works. He always proceeds by slow and regular progression, and that our world, created perfect, should revolve through countless ages, a prepared and habitable, but empty home,—ready for man, but in his absence waste and useless, is contrary to reason and revelation. The arguments for a plurality of worlds apply with additional force *against* such a theory.*

We assert, then, that geology at once gives the lie to that monstrous dictum, "that there are no traces of a beginning—no symptoms of an end." That it teaches that our earth existed ages ago in a fluid condition, and that since then it has been gradually preparing to receive its reasoning inhabitants. How impressive then the description by the Hebrew Lawgiver of its fluid and chaotic state, when it was "without form and void,"—in that beginning when the mineral dynasties had not as yet begun their reigns, and when inorganic life had not evinced its birth by the play of elective affinity, or by the accretion of a crystal. Thus far, then, the two records entirely agree.

The account of the six days follows: we have already adduced the rules for its interpretation. The great truth which it seems to convey is, that God created the earth, and by slow and measured steps fitted and prepared it for man's habitation, introducing, from time to time, those races of organized beings which it was able to support.

* Why our opponents have made no reference to Lyell's non-developmental views, we are utterly at a loss to conceive. Surely they are not unacquainted with the "Principles" (now in the eighth edition), by that eminent geologist, whose opinions would have made their attacks sound.

The question arises, How can the idea of *regular* progression, continued during countless millions of years,—a time so vast that we of the nineteenth century can form no computation of its length,—be conveyed to the minds of the Jews? Would you have it shortened to thousands, or would you not rather select some term of vague meaning, whose ordinary application was manifestly absurd? This, then, is the reason of the employment of the term “day.” We believe that this interpretation reconciles all difficulties, and if it does, every Christian is bound to accept it. Hear patiently, gentle reader, and decide for yourself, remembering, however, that we do not imply that the time from the creation was divided into six equal periods, but that the term day has been introduced as a *type*, so to speak, of order in time, and, having fulfilled that office, has little relevancy to the work done.

With regard to the first day's work, the only evidence given by geology is, that as our earth revolved when in a liquid state, the sun (and therefore night and day) was coeval with it. The work of the second day seems to indicate that period of time when the earth's crust had so far cooled as to allow the first deposition of water upon its tempest torn and earthquake riven granitic surface. During the third day, these waters are collected into seas, and definite boundaries are set between land and water. Meanwhile, the action of air and rain has decomposed the surface of the granite, and a rich and fertile soil is formed. The earth is now prepared for plants, and accordingly, the creative fiat goes forth, and the vegetable ascends the throne vacated by the mineral. Light is, however, now required, and is provided. Possibly at this point the dispersion of the last portions of the dense and watery atmosphere permitted the first genial rays to penetrate to the surface of the ground. But the creation of plants has prepared the way for animals; these living entirely upon organic matter, the former must have been created first. But the Mosaic account draws a line of distinction between the classes of animals. Oviparous animals* are created before mammals—man last of all. Such, we believe, is the correct interpretation of the Mosaic account; let us see how it tallies with the geologic.

Many geologists consider that the earliest traces of organic life have been destroyed by metamorphic action. If it be so, we should look to the higher metamorphic rocks for the formation in which vegetables preceded animals. This is for further research to determine.

The earliest traces of organization yet discovered are the fossils of the lower silurian beds. These being deep sea forma-

* The exact translation of the word rendered in our version “moving thing.”

tions, there are no land plants. Fucoids in the vegetable kingdom are found with molluscs, crustaceans, and fish in the animal. Thus far geologic evidence shows the two kingdoms to have been at least co-eval. The first trace of a land plant yet discovered is the conifer, found by Hugh Miller in the Lower Old Red Sandstone. A profusion of land plants are found in the carboniferous strata, where, also, occur the first reptilean remains (*archegosaurus* and *apateon*). Footprints of birds are found in new red strata (America). The little insectivorous, marsupial quadrupeds of the Stonesfield slate (*oolite*) are the first indications of mammalia. No traces of man occur, except in recent formations.

Now let any unbiassed reader set before him a chart of the earth's strata, and compare the geologic with the Mosaic record, and say if there is not the most entire and perfect agreement. Let our opponents, if they can, bring forward an account of the creation which shall as perfectly fulfil the purposes for which the record was given, and at the same time be as little open to objection, and harmonise as well with natural phenomena.

To clench this argument, compare the sublime simplicity—the accurate truthfulness—of the Mosaic account with the absurd theories which men have originated;—with the ancient theories that the heavens were a solid vault, the earth flat, and supported by elephants; but, as no resting place was found for them, the theory has fallen to the ground for want of a proper foundation. Recollect that such theories as these were part of the Egyptian learning, in which Moses was skilled; and yet there is not a line in his history to favour them.

With regard to the seventh day, space only allows me to point to the solution. "The first creature of God in the works of the days was the light of the sense; the last was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since is the illumination of his spirit."* What a beautiful thought! God's sabbath still lasts. Geology teaches that, in regard to our earth, he has rested from the work of creation from the time that he introduced man. The Bible shows that since then he has been redeeming the fallen race of men. The former work was of a week-day character; the latter is of the divine character of the sabbath. Why should his sabbaths be like those of puny man? And again, if his sabbath be an indefinite period, so must be his week-days.

We might show how admirably the geologic pieces on to the revealed record—how geology affords presumptive evidence of a future state; but we must refer the reader to the last chapter of Hugh Miller's "Foot-prints of the Creator,"—perhaps the finest, most enchanting effusion of his matchless pen.

In conclusion, then, we state, it appears to us that the record

* Bacon.

graved on stone, and the history on parchment, of which we have been speaking, are entirely accordant, and that the study of geology has cast no feeble light upon the Mosaic account. The confirmation is, we conceive, the more conclusive, inasmuch as the coincidences are entirely undesigned.

Here we finish the legitimate subject of dispute; but our opponents, finding in it scanty materials enough, have dragged in far other and different matters; and we feel compelled to break a lance with them even on some of these.

First, the entrance of death into the world. With regard to this, we state, as an incontrovertible fact, that modern research indicates that the lives of the mineral, the plant, and the animal, are but different manifestations of the same force. Now Moses clearly did not include minerals in his idea of life; and the term cannot with propriety be applied to such products. But if you do not apply it to minerals, says science, you must not apply it to animals. What, then, possesses life? We affirm, that man is the only earthly creature that lives, and that Moses used the term death in its strictest sense—the death of a reasoning, immortal being; and in this sense truly did death enter by sin. Hence this passage, instead of being contradicted, receives a marked confirmation from scientific research.

With regard to the deluge, we will only say that it is not from science, but from the reason with which God has endowed us—from the knowledge of his mode of action which he has permitted to us—that the idea of its universality receives its most marked contradiction. Few words throughout the Bible are used with more laxness than “all the world.” In Luke it positively means only the land of Syria. Why, then, in this place should you fix on the passage the extreme meaning? The word translated in our version “Ararat” is the name of the whole chain, not of that mountain. We do not see the drift of “Grimwood’s” argument on this point. He first concludes, “It is evident, then, that a flood that covered Ararat must have covered all the continent;” and then goes on (though he does not adduce, by any means, the most conclusive facts) showing that such a state of things was physically impossible.

Before closing, we cannot help remarking what appears to us the deep irreverence of the first negative article. Whither the arguments of the second tend we are not yet clear. Surely, if scholars can ransack heaven and earth to find the grain of truth underlying the bulky imagery of pagan allegories, the oldest record of the oldest book in the world deserves somewhat better treatment than to be thrown aside, almost without examination, for apparent discrepancies. More especially when considered as God’s word, it should be approached in the humble spirit of an inquirer, not with the rude jostlings of the debating club.

Manchester.

VON HAMMER.

History.

IS MACAULAY'S ESTIMATE OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE CORRECT?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

OUR opponent, approaching his subject with a tone so cautious and wary, as if fearing to venture beyond his depth, and deprecating all pre-conceived opinions on the question, tells us what a perfect historian should be, and then takes the needless trouble to show the reader that Macaulay is not such an one, when the fact is patent to the world. Has he not libelled Penn? has he not written down the Scotch Highlanders, whose wrongs, whose valour, and whose fame, are celebrated in song and story, and shall live long as hill, and loch, and gorse remain, or one of Scotia's sons has a soul beyond the *braw siller*?

Our opponent talks of Macaulay's "startlingly vivid style," as if that, forsooth, were a tribute to his trustworthiness. Is not the painter false to nature and false to art (which is truer art, the nearer its approach to nature), who makes everything, even truth, subordinate to effect; and none the less false, that the painter is a master-hand, and can, with judicious touch, shade into darkness or kindle into light each point, as suits his purpose;—none the less false, that for the while the spectator loses sight of objects half concealed behind copse and brushwood, and takes as the whole that which is but the full foreground? And though we do not quarrel with "the artist who paints our relatives in the attitudes calculated to bring out their charms," or "with the daguerreotype taken when a smile was passing over the face," still it is not truth to suppress or alter any feature which mars the whole, and in a full length we expect to find the stooping form or halting gait which individualize the man. To us the fault seems not merely one of "expression," but one of expression qualifying the estimate, and biassing the judgment which otherwise would be passed. Without denying the general excellencies of William's character, and the fact that he was the instrument by which England was freed from the contemptible tyranny of James II., at the same time we think that it was a good move from the Hague to London, and are rather dubious about the self-denying virtues of a man who, like a popular preacher, never had a *call*. but in an upward direction. From the time of his marriage with Mary, there can be little doubt he saw how matters were working, and that he looked to find his own advantage in the dissatisfaction which arose between James

and the people. His always holding out the idea of his own goodness is of itself an argument against its possession. And though the English people were justified in taking measures to free themselves from the yoke of a king who respected neither promises or oaths, who trampled upon their rights and liberties, and who was withheld more by fear than conscience from proceeding to even greater lengths than those which drove him and his dynasty from the throne, yet it was another thing between the father and his children. Was the prince right in conspiring against the authority and dominion of his father-in-law? And though the folly, bigotry, and imbecility of the king would inevitably bring their results, would it not have been more seemly had the prince, remembering that the king was his father, have hesitated to put forth his hand to touch the crown and sceptre of him who, whatever he had deserved at his nation's hand, at his hand had deserved nought but filial duty? And surely no question of state policy can justify the double treachery of the prince who, though in league with many of the principal men of England, assured the king that "he entertained no hostile intention,"* but who shortly after, finding the affair had got wind, was tortured with anxiety and uncertainty, and piously said he had more need than ever of divine guidance,† clearly proving that his religion and morality were not of that kind as to prevent him from getting on in the world. We do not like the piety which shows itself in *correspondence*, and fails to be exemplified in the life and conduct. The piety which is not strong enough or sincere enough to overrule ambition, or crush the pride of power, is not the piety our consciences approve or the word of God allows.

Whether he had any participation in Monmouth's rebellion we cannot say; but Monmouth was his friend. Had the rebellion been successful, we might have heard another tale; but one thing is certain, the crown of England was a prize upon which his eye, and heart, and hopes were fixed; he needed only the word, the will was good enough; and when the ever memorable invitation came,—of which he had had due previous notice by some of his titled spies, and for which he had already paid pretty considerably,—signed only by seven men, of neither great heart nor lofty patriotism, and whose cold, hesitating, irresolute address would have made any one cautious how he trusted himself to their courage or consistency (but the prize would pay all risk, the prince was pleased to consider it as the voice of the people), he dared not refuse, and after one or two abortive attempts, he landed in the kingdom, and advanced upon the

* MS. mem. of King James, quoted in his life, *ubi supra*.

† "J'ai plus que jamais besoin de la direction divine; n'étant pas assez éclairé quel parti prendre."—*Guil. III. au Comte de Portland*, 29 Août, 1668.

capital of his father-in-law, and the king was compelled to send suppliant ambassadors to stay his nearer approach; and his answer to the king's commissioners may be cited as an instance of his filial respect. He modestly demands, "that if his Majesty shall please to be at London during the sitting of parliament, that we may be there also, with an equal number of our guards; or if his Majesty shall please to be in any place from London, at whatever distance he thinks fit, that we may be at a place of the same distance, and that the respective armies do remove from London thirty miles, and that no more foreign forces be brought into the kingdom;" and as if this were not enough, the precious document concludes thus:—"That some sufficient part of the public revenue be assigned us for the maintaining of our forces, until the meeting of a free parliament." And this is the language of a son to his father! Say rather, the language of an unscrupulous invader, one who felt that might was the test of right.

We have dwelt upon this period of William's history as exhibiting the *morale* of the man, and showing, however great and good he might have been, that we are indebted more to the overruling hand of that Providence he so often pretended to invoke, than from *his* exemption from the foibles and frailties of human nature, for his moderate use of the power he had thus usurped; and to prove that Macaulay, in his anxiety to make a perfect picture, has forgotten that the picture was *a portrait* intended for posterity, and that to be perfect, it should be true to the original.

B. S. speaks of Shrewsbury the contemptible—yet *his* was the first and principal signature to the invitation which formed the warrant for William's usurpation: of the revengeful Stair—yet William did not scruple to use *his* revenge as the instrument of his own purpose; and though Macaulay says William was in all probability ignorant of the crimes which cast a dark shade over his glory,* the reader can judge of the amount of his ignorance, from the fact, that these crimes were perpetrated under cover of an order signed by the prince;—if Burnet is to be trusted, signed without reading. And lest Burnet should not be trusted, Macaulay proceeds to show its probability by analogy. He says:—"Whoever has seen anything of public business, knows that princes and ministers daily sign, and must sign, documents which they have never read."* After this, we need not be surprised at any mishap in public affairs, if this is the way they are managed; and as such was the practice in former times as well as present, we rather wonder that Charles's signature was not obtained to his own death warrant, to make the deed more legal. But in the case before us, we think, if William could sign such an order without either reading it or having some know-

* Macaulay, vol. iv., p. 217.

† *Ibid.*, p. 205.

ledge of its contents, he was quite unworthy of the post he occupied, and the blood shed is fairly to be charged to him. His hand gave the stamp and force of authority to what otherwise would have been of no avail.

Taking the question as given by B. S., page 116, we answer, Macaulay's estimate is unworthy of credit. He takes note of faults and failings only to cover and conceal, to gloss over, account for, or explain away, not to bring to light. There is nought in the foreground but graciousness and kingly majesty, and nobility of heart; and to serve the painter's purpose, he gladly hearkens to gossip and chit-chat from all quarters, and from all sorts of characters.

Burnet, the most notorious of parasites, whose wit is not always sufficient to tell him what to say, and where to stop, is used with great skill, quoted from where it tells *for*, and left as worthless where it tells *against*, the prince; and anything the painter must put in is given with such a dexterous turn, the beholder can scarce see (perhaps on account, as B. S. pleasantly remarks, "*of owl-like mental vision*") whether it is a virtue or a vice, or, if there can be no mistake, whether it properly belongs to the portrait; and all authorities, where they do not praise the prince, are quietly ignored; and facts, such as the well known despotic manner in which he used the marital rights towards Mary, so that Mackintosh says, "she not only had no will of her own, but did not dare to murmur when she was outraged,"* are warped and turned, until the original cannot be recognized in the so-called counterpart. We are not contending against William's claims, but against Macaulay's florid and partial treatment of them; and we think that enough has been said to show that the portrait, however good as to colouring and effect, is anything but a correct likeness. But why need we say anything in answer to B. S., when he himself allows, "Macaulay must exaggerate; heap up more words of ornament than are consistent with the bare simplicity of truth"?† Here for the present we leave the question to our coadjutors. B. J.

* Mackintosh, p. 369, quarto edition, Longmans.

† B. C., Sept., p. 116.

PUNISHMENT OF SIN.—Punishment has in it the notion of a remedy, and has the place of a mean not of an end. Now, as no more of a mean is to be designed than what is necessary to the end, and a mean is considerable only as it has a relation to the end; therefore, if the sinner repents, there can be no necessity for punishment, for the end is obtained without it; and there is nothing in punishment (save as a mean) in which goodness can take content.—*Whickcote*.

IGNORANCE.—It is as great a point of wisdom to hide ignorance, as to discover knowledge.

Politics.

IS EDUCATION THE DUTY OF THE STATE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THAT “physical, intellectual, and moral” education is a duty which is owed to children, few, we think, will be inclined to deny; each side asserts it. The question at issue is, by whom ought this duty to be performed?—by the parent, or the State? “L'Ouvrier” answers, by the parent; we answer, by the parent. “L'Ouvrier” says, “In proving this answer to be true, we must necessarily prove that it is not the duty of the State; for two contraries cannot be both true; to prove one contrary is the disproof of the other.” Upon this rock his argument founders.

Suppose the parent to be an ignorant, illiterate, perfectly uneducated man; suppose him to be irreligious, immoral, criminal, in the sight of God and man; suppose him to be sunk in the depths of vice and crime; suppose him to forget, nay, to be unacquainted with, the duty which nature has imposed upon him; suppose, in short, that he fail to educate his offspring, is the duty to remain unperformed? Is the poor neglected child to be allowed to grow up into manhood with no other education than that which he has received from the habits of his unnatural and brutish parent? ignorant of the distinction between right and wrong; ignorant of virtue, of morality, of religion, of God? unacquainted alike with the duty he owes society, and that which society owes him? possessing only, as he compares his lot of squalid misery with the wealth, the luxury, the refinement of his aristocratic neighbour, a vague sense of injury and wrong, and a desire, a craving for revenge? But, oh! how well acquainted with vice and crime! what an adept in theft, in lying, swearing, drunkenness! How familiar with dirt and rags, with hunger and thirst, with the pitiless storm and the biting cold, with the taunt, the defiance, the blow, the prison, the hulks, and, alas! but too often, the gallows! Is this to be the fate of the child of the parent who, from the want either of the will or the means, fails to educate him? Is the duty to remain unfulfilled altogether? Is the State to stay its saving hand from a false regard to the “rights of parents,” forgetting the while the wrongs of the child, and of Society? We trow not. Education is the right of the child: it is the duty of the parent in the first place to give it that right; but when the parent fails to do this, then must the State step in and perform it for him. In proving, then, that the parent “is responsible for the education of the rising race,” does

not "necessarily prove that it is not the duty of the State." Indeed! we are not going beyond what truth warrants, when we say that he has entirely avoided the real question under debate. He admits the necessity—the duty—of educating the rising generation, but contends that it is the parent's *right* to perform it; forgetting and ignoring the fact that the parent too often neglects this right and this duty. He argues as though these were universally acted upon. "By instinct and love," he writes, "the parent is *impelled* to the moral, intellectual, and physical advancement of his child." * * * "These instincts and this love are shown to be a *necessary part of the parental nature*." Is, then, the degraded condition of vast masses of our population, so vividly portrayed by "Taliesin," a myth? Is it false to suppose that in the back slums of our large towns there are "hotbeds of pestilence and immorality," "threatening foci of disease and vice?" Is it false to suppose that there are hundreds of thousands sunk in complete moral and religious darkness? Is it false to imagine that our agricultural districts produce thousands lost in complete intellectual deadness? Are our census and prison statistics, the reports of the City Mission, the Board of Health, &c., all false? Or, may it be, that these are all too true, and that the "instinct and love"—"the necessary part of the parental nature"—does sometimes fail to "*impel*" the parent to educate his child? May it be that the parental instinct is sometimes lost and drowned in the gin-bottle and the beer-pot, and that the parental love exhibits itself in a bestial selfishness, a savage ferocity, to be found nowhere throughout the universe, but in degraded manhood?

"Instinct, affection, maturity, and pride of offspring, all tend," says L'Ouvrier, "to identify the honour and amour propre of the parent with the well-being of the child in the estimation of those by whom he is surrounded in his passage through life." Affection! pride of offspring! honour! amour propre! *these* in the breasts of the burglars, the thieves, the bullies, the prostitutes, the drunkards of our cities! *These* are myths, if you will. "Pride and love of offspring!"—Yes; such pride and such love as will cause the parent, if he know his own child, to make him the most skilful of pickpockets, the most adept of thieves, the hardest of drinkers, the most foul-mouthed of swearers. *Thus* will the parent identify his own honour and amour propre with the *well-being* of the child. *Thus* may he receive applause from "those by whom he is surrounded, in his passage through this life."

Not such, however, is the education which L'Ouvrier says it is the duty of the parent to give his child. But whilst this is all that many of the rising race receive, others, and this more particularly in rural districts, are left to pick up such scraps of education as they can extract from the lanes, the fields, and the woods; such as the

intellectual occupation of frightening rooks, tending and driving cattle, will afford. Others, again, in the manufacturing and mining districts are at tender age sent into the workshop and the mine-pit, and employed at some mechanical, monotonous, body-and-soul-destroying labour, and receive there such notions of morality and religion as their elder associates impart to them. These classes, thanks to the efforts of philanthropists, are all vastly less numerous than they were wont to be. But still much remains to be done; and the real question at issue is, Whether the education of these poor children is to be left to their parents and the inefficacious efforts of the voluntary system, when it is such as we have described, or whether it is the duty of the State to step in and rescue them from their dangerous condition, by taking their education into its own hands?—whether, in fact, the State ought to perform that duty which the parent neglects, and which voluntarism fails to accomplish? This question “*L’Ouvrier*” has carefully avoided. Our answer is an unhesitating affirmative. 1st, Because education is a right belonging to every child; and 2ndly, Because society suffers from its absence.

1st, Education is a right belonging to every child.

This is a proposition few we think will be inclined to deny. It is a result of the very nature of civil society. The foundation of this is an implied contract between the individual and the community, namely, “that the community should guarantee to each individual member the enjoyment of certain liberties and advantages, or (as they are generally termed) *rights*, and that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit to the laws of the community; without which submission of all it” [is] “impossible that protection could be certainly extended to any.”*

Each individual has then to perform certain duties towards the community. But how can he do this, without having obtained a knowledge of these duties? and what is the obtainment of this knowledge but education? The State, for the protection of society, is bound to demand the submission of all to its laws, is bound to compel the performance of the implied contract. With what justice can the State inflict punishment upon the nonperformance of the contract, in cases where the individual has no means of learning his duties—where he is totally ignorant of the covenant which the State pronounces him to have entered into? Nay! it must be evident to every one, that he who receives no education to enable him to understand his duties, and to have some comprehension of the foundation of society, cannot justly be considered a party to the contract. He is without the pale of, an outcast, in every sense of the word, from society; an outcast in religion, in morals, in manners, in learning. Indebted to its

* Stephen’s Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. i., p. 29.

laws for no good, he is subject to its laws for no evil. This would be but common justice.

To say it is the *duty* of the parent to educate his child, is a virtual admission of the right of the child to education. "In these divisions of *rights*," says Stephen in his Blackstone's Commentaries [viz., personal rights, rights of property, rights in private relations, and public rights], "it is to be observed that we everywhere mean to include the converse or reciprocal consideration of *duties*. For what is due to one man, or set of men, is necessarily due *from* another, *et vice versâ*. The withholding of what is due to one man is the violation of a right, which constitutes the correlative idea of a *wrong*. Therefore, the absence of education is a wrong." "Thus law is only auxiliary to duty; its final purpose is the prevention of wrong." The absence of education *being* a wrong, in the legal sense of the term, teaching is "within the province of the State," and *can* become the subject of legislation; and as the parent's neglect of the education of his child *can* "be construed into such an exercise of the rights of nature as disturbs their exercise by others, such neglect" *can* "become a fit subject for law," and "for the interference of the legislature" (Vide L'Ouvrier's Article, p. 19).

"The parent's neglect is the exercise of a natural right." We assert, on the contrary, that the child has a natural right to education. Who can doubt that it is the will of God that every man should receive education? The Creator has implanted in the heart of every child a spirit of inquiry, and in the breast of every natural parent a feeling of pleasure in satisfying such spirit. Nay! the very beasts of the field teach us that it is natural for the parent to impart and the child to receive education. In asserting the natural, the divine right of the child to education, we are again asserting its legal right; for, "upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws" (Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 41).

2ndly, Society suffers from the absence of education.

It is the duty of the State to legislate for the happiness and welfare of the community. If, therefore, society suffers from the absence of education, it necessarily devolves on the State to supply the want. That ignorance is productive of vice and crime, is a well established fact. We have already referred any scruples on this point to those sources whence its truth may be shown. Need we prove that society suffers from the prevalence of vice and crime? It will be sufficient to call attention to the fact, that its presence keeps alive suspicion and distrust; that it endangers the safety of our property, our limbs, and our lives; that it causes the imposition of heavy rates and taxes for its prevention and punishment; that it gives a shock to our feelings by its revolting exhibitions; and, generally, it exercises a baneful and demoralising influence upon society.

From the truth of the above two propositions results a third, viz., that education is the duty of the State.

If education be a right belonging to every child, and if the education of every child be a right belonging to society, because it suffers from its absence, the State, "that system of delegated agencies by which the obligations of society to the individual are fulfilled," ought to take care that education is received by every member of the community. The question now arises, How is this to be done? Theoretically, there are two means,—1st, by making the parent, who neglects the education of his child, amenable to punishment; 2ndly, by undertaking the education of such child itself. Practically, the latter will be found to be the only efficacious means. Where would be the use of imposing fine or imprisonment upon the inhabitants of the back slums and alleys of our cities, whose whole lives are passed in the evasion and fraction of the law? It could not reach them. And yet it is into these haunts of vice, these sinks of iniquity and crime, that it is most important that the refining influences of education, the moralizing tendency of the Christian religion, should be carried. These are the places where crime can be met face to face, and, consequently, these are the places in which it can be most effectually grappled with. Into these places, then, should the law send her officers, not for the vain purpose of carrying punishment to the offending parent, but for the more legitimate, the more humane, the more politic, and the more fruitful purpose of rescuing the young from their hellward course, and placing within their reach that which should enable them to become respectable members of society—that which should lead to their well-being here, and their salvation hereafter. Prepare the feast of education—*invite* the guests. But if those which are bidden come not, then send out servants "into the highways and hedges, and *compel* them to come in, that the Lord's house may be full."

Here it is that the voluntary principle fails. It cannot reach the "foci" of the evil. It is armed with no powers to lay hold of the children of the selfish parent, who prefers sending them into the manufactory or the mine, rather than into the schoolroom. It has no authority to enter the back courts and lanes—the cellars and garrets of our Londons and Glasgows, our Liverpools and Manchesters, and carry off their youthful inhabitants and occupants to the purer atmosphere of the schoolroom. It may succeed better, and, thank God! *has* succeeded to a very large extent, in our small towns and villages. In these the poor man, for the most part, obtains his livelihood in some legitimate and honest way, and is dependent upon his wealthy neighbour for it. To such the parish priest, the philanthropist, and the minister of religion, can speak with some authority and some chance of success, concerning the necessity of the education of

his child; but in our large towns it is otherwise. There the machinery of the law is that which can alone work successfully.

Not only, however, does the voluntary system fail to accomplish the work set before it, but we object to its principle. We have shown that education is the right of every child. Not to *charity*, then, should the child be indebted for the right. It *claims* education as an act of *justice*, not *begs* for it as an act of *charity*. It is the duty of the State to see that justice is done, that the right is obtained.

We have more than once quoted Blackstone's Commentaries as an authority. L'Ouvrier has had the temerity to do the same in support of his views of the duty of the parent (in opposition to that of the State) to educate his child. As we cannot allow it to be supposed that that great man was an opponent of State education, we take this opportunity of calling attention to the words immediately following the passage quoted by L'Ouvrier, on p. 22 of B. C.; they are these, "Yet the municipal laws of most countries seem to be defective in this point, by not constraining the parent to bestow a proper education upon his children." We trust L'Ouvrier will have the grace to be ashamed of the disingenuous use he has made of the great lawyer's name.

Let us not, however, in the views we have expressed, be misunderstood. In advocating the duty of education by the State, we have no desire to be classed amongst those "Goths and Vandals" spoken of with such supreme contempt by "L'Ouvrier." We contend quite as earnestly as he can do for the preservation of the rights of parents. Under a proper system of State education, the parent should of course retain the right of educating his child himself, or delegating it to any particular individual;—nay! he should be encouraged to do so. But, where he refuses or neglects to do this, then we contend that it is the duty of the State to step in and to do it for him. The principle upon which we found our notion is this:—The child has no natural parent to give it its rights; the State must become—it is its duty to become—such parent. In the case of those poor children who have the misfortune to spring from the loins of parents in whom the parental instinct is entirely lost and sunk in vice and degradation, and who perform none of the duties of parents, we believe that it is the legitimate place, the bounden duty, of the State, to take the whole of them upon itself—to feed, to clothe, to lodge, to educate, and to put in the way of employment, these poor destitutes. Oh! if by the side of prisons and penitentiaries—those gloomy palaces for punishment, the dark abodes of vice and crime—we could but see national homes and national schoolrooms for the nation's poor, benighted children, then would the day surely come when some, at least, of the former might be safely rased to the ground, and England

would find an escape from her great curse—the prevalence of crime—and would be relieved from her great difficulty—what to do with her criminals. In the hands of the potter, the soft clay may be moulded into any shape ; but the form of the china vase is fixed for aye, until it is dashed into ruins on the ground. The direction of the sapling may be guided ; but the old tree yields only to the axe. When will England learn that it is better to *prevent* crime than to *punish* it !

Thus much in favour of a State education. We should have much liked to say somewhat with regard to the *nature* of this education, but space forbids us. We will simply remark, in conclusion, that it is our firm belief that no education which did not embrace all the three branches mentioned by “*Taliesin*,” viz., mechanical, moral, and religious, would be effectual and satisfactory.

PHILALETHES.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

“All constraint,
Except what wisdom lays on evil men,
Is evil, *hurts the faculties*, impedes
Their progress in the road of science, blinds
The eyesight of discovery, and begets,
In those that suffer it, a sordid mind—
Bestial—a meagre intellect.”—*Cowper*.

“Thought [that of slavery] villainous, absurd, detestable,
Unworthy to be harboured in a fiend !
And only *over-reached in wickedness*
By that—birth, too, of earthly liberty—
Which aimed to make a reasonable man
By LEGISLATION THINK, and by the sword
Believe.”—*Pollok*.

“It will be found an unjust and unwise jealousy, to deprive a man of his natural liberty, upon the supposition that he may abuse it.”—*Cromwell*.

THE time was, and not long since, when it was a matter of controversy whether the education of the nation—the mass of the people—was desirable, nay, even safe. Some there were—and such were neither few nor uninfluential—who were vehement in their denunciations of popular education, as dangerous to the structure of society ; and as the public mind gradually and surely, in spite of their earnest opposition, began to drink of the stream of knowledge, they were loud in their imprecations on the folly and impiety, as they considered, of the age then dawning. Their prejudices and determined opposition proved, for a time, a powerful hindrance to the spread of instruction ; but it was only for a time ; truth ever will prevail, and it did then ; the swelling torrent of enlightenment swept on, burst the barriers which their narrow-mindedness had prescribed, and rushed past them as they clung to the banks

with the earnestness of despair, washing away their false opinions, which had so long obscured the stream. The few of them that have survived their mistaken notions bewail the state things are coming to, and, with grief at the world's neglect of their counsel, predict the speedy ruin of society, and the end of all order, if not the world itself. Such persons are now, happily, nearly extinct, and the few remaining exert no influence on mankind; "they lurk only in the deserted and decaying corners of society—as patches of snow, fantastic as tenacious, may sometimes be seen clinging to crumbling walls, or hiding in a hill-side cranny, long after the fields have become green, and the streams free and sparkling." Light now springs up in the place of darkness; the benefits of knowledge are appreciated, instead of their existence being doubted. Man now sees the result of education, the advantages of knowledge, and no longer questions the right of all to instruction. The necessity of educating man, in order to raise him from that degradation, that equality with the brute creation which, alas! abounds around us to such an extent, is now unhesitatingly admitted. The evils of ignorance are now seen in their real character, their fearful malignity. The right of man, whatever his station in society, to cultivate that intellect, and develop those mental powers which are entrusted to him for improvement by an impartial Benefactor, is now conceded by all parties without demur.

But though man's liberty of thought and mental action is not now questioned, and though the advantages of the exercise and development of his intellect are clearly seen, yet there still remains among us a very extensive portion of our population enchained in the slavish fetters of ignorance. That thus ignorance still holds a powerful sway over numerous and willing votaries—slaves, without being aware that they are such—is a fact undeniable. Such being the case, it becomes our duty, who have experienced the benefits of education, to inquire into the cause of its absence from so many members of the community, and, as far as possible, remove those causes, and extend, by all lawful means, the field of information. To accomplish this, even to a limited extent, it is evident that great effort, and persevering, unflinching energy is required. The task is an Herculean one. Arrayed in opposition against us are those for whose children's welfare we exert ourselves; some whose limited means prevent them from obtaining that education for their offspring which they otherwise might; others, who know not what education is, are totally devoid of knowledge themselves, and conceive not of its existence in others; and those who consider learning a waste of time and money, having done without it themselves, think that their children need it not, or else are totally indifferent on the subject, unmindful of parental responsibilities. Seeing that such obstacles to the progress of enlightenment present them-

selves, is it to be wondered at that some waver in discharging these duties to mankind, and that others give up all exertion, excusing themselves on the ground of impossibility of success? Yet still numbers there are who, appalled and discouraged at the difficulties in the way, cannot shake off the sense of duty. The claims of the ignorant on them for instruction cannot be denied. They see their responsibilities, but also the difficulties to be overcome; and between the two are almost driven to despair; when, lo! a light appears, a way by which those duties may be taken from their shoulders, and ignorance, at the same time, be dispelled. Legislative education is the grand idea which has dawned upon their thus relieved minds. And what would seem more reasonable, at first thought, than that the governing power, to whom all members of the State owe allegiance, should have, as one of its chief concerns, and even as a duty, the education of those members, thus rendering them fit subjects, and, as such, better calculated to discharge their duties to themselves and the State? This certainly *appears* a most proper subject of legislation; for has not Government a right to direct its efforts against ignorance, the cause of so much evil? This seemingly so plausible scheme is caught at with avidity by those who are fully conscious of their duty to the youth among them, but have not the courage to breast all the dangers and difficulties which the discharge of that duty entails. Now that these duties may be discharged for them by the State, thus relieving them of their responsibility, as they imagine, what wonder that they rally round this idea, determined to give it their utmost support? They imagine that they now possess the charm by which ignorance will be dispelled, and at which the claims of society on them for education will vanish; and, anticipating the benefits which they think will undoubtedly follow a system of State instruction, stop not to consider the justice or practicability of such an undertaking.

“To follow foolish precedents, and wink
With both their eyes, is easier than to think.”

And thus while, but recently, the right of all to education was denied, it now becomes a question of dispute whether any have the right to remain ignorant, and in what manner and by whom each is at liberty to be educated? We by no means wish to insinuate that all those who are so earnest in their endeavours to obtain a State education do so from wrong motives, for many are actuated by philanthropic desires to benefit their fellows; yet they think not so much of the justice of the way by which they intend to accomplish their object, as the desirableness of that object; they forget that good may be the result of evil, and that the end does not always justify the means.

We consider that education is *not* the duty of the State, and

on these grounds:—Legislative education is wrong in principle; is unnecessary in the present state of society; is impracticable, except at the risk of greater interests than those its object is to secure.

1. Legislative education is *wrong in principle*. The duty of educating a child primarily devolves on the parent. This is indisputable. "He who decreed that the species should spring constantly from itself, has ordained the parental authority as primary and invariable."* "Parental love, as distinguished from instructive impulse, begins where that of the animal terminates. Nature seems to have provided for its gradual formation and development, as a moral principle, by protracting the infancy of man to a longer period than that of other animals, and, consequently, extending the time during which the instinctive impulse acts. To animals the instinct is valuable merely for the preservation of the species; to man it is still more valuable—the most binding principle of sociality—the rational affection between parent and child; that is, an affection for which both can assign a cause."† Now, legislative education would violate the duty, "that God and nature seem with one voice to delegate" to the parent. But, reply our opponents, it is practically impossible for parents always to attend personally to the education of their children. Do they not entrust them to the care of others, who make the instruction and guidance of youth their peculiar sphere? And, doing so, could they not, with equal consistency, delegate to Government, the parent of society, that duty which devolves on them individually, as parents, but which circumstances prevent them from personally discharging? Such a reply rests on two erroneous assumptions. One, that the office of a private teacher is identical with that of a State teacher; the other, that the parental qualities of the individual are similar to those (if such at all exist) of Government. When a parent delegates to another the duty of educating his child, he still superintends the instruction given, directs what is to be taught, and how; and, if the teacher does not act in accordance with the wishes of the parent, the child is removed to another instructor; and thus the parent, though not nominally, is virtually the educator of his child. Now the case is completely altered when the State undertakes the education of the child; the parent has then no longer any control over the instruction given; it may be in direct opposition to the dictates of that parental instinct implanted in him, yet he cannot help it; he is obliged to yield to the infallible (?) wisdom of Government, instead of to his own convictions. In reference to the second misconception, we cannot better convey our own opinions than by

* Dr. R. W. Hamilton.

† Dr. W. Cooke Taylor's "Natural History of Society."

again quoting from Dr. Taylor's valuable work:—"The confusion between a family and State has been the source of much evil. There is a natural tendency in the human mind to infer a similitude between their relations; and when once the first step in error has been made, the discovery of the fallacy becomes a matter of considerable difficulty. A monarch is frequently represented as the father of his subjects; and there is sufficient similarity in the mutual relations to justify the metaphor: but assuredly there is not such an identity in their conditions as to justify monarchs in treating their subjects like children who had not reached the years of discretion. * * * This fallacy of paternal government has not been less mischievous in its love than in its cruelty and caprice; it generates a mischievous spirit of meddling, which would not allow people to be happy or become prosperous in their own way. Bounties, protecting duties, and monopolies, were devised with the best intentions; regulations were issued, directing what processes should be used and what avoided, until merchants and manufacturers combined in the common request, 'Let us alone!' Nor has the fallacy, on the other hand, failed to influence subjects and citizens; they very commonly expect from ministers and parliaments what neither ministers nor parliaments can bestow. * * * If the fallacy has occasionally made rulers appear as injudicious parents on the one hand, it has exhibited the subjects as pettish children on the other. Thus it is evident that the paternal character of Government is a fallacious idea. Indeed, the reverse would seem to be the case; for the monarch is dependent on the people for support, and from them he receives the laws by which he governs." On what ground, then, has the State the right to educate? What are its legitimate duties? Are they not purely and solely civil? And, consequently, do not all moral duties lie beyond its province of action? "Breaking a window is a legal offence; but breaking a heart escapes the cognizance of the legislator." If the Government were to punish ignorance, then would it be bound to provide instruction. But ignorance not being a crime, it does not come within the limits of legislation to remove ignorance. But there are some who maintain, that though ignorance is not a crime, yet it is the cause of crime, and, therefore, legislative measures should be enacted against it. The same, however, might be said of poverty, which is not a crime, yet often the cause of crime; but most certainly charity is not one of the objects for which Government is constituted. If subjects have a right to demand of the legislative power food for the mind, what could reasonably restrict their demands to that only? Might they not consistently demand food for the body? For are not provisions as necessary, and their absence as detrimental, to the welfare of society as the presence or absence of instruction? If we have a right to free

trade, or liberty of the products of industry, have any a right to restrict our mental action, to dictate how and what we are to be taught? Most certainly not; the privilege alone belongs to the parent; he has no right to transfer it. State education, by violating the natural duty of parents, would soon render them careless about their parental responsibility, and, consequently, negligent of their children's welfare. It requires no prophetic powers to see what this would lead to. Family relationship is the basis on which rests the structure of society. "It is one of the clearest results established by experience, that the parental and filial relations are the most powerful of the conservative bonds that hold together the moral condition of society." And can those natural ties be violated, without material detriment to civilized society? By neglecting individual moral responsibilities, we should speedily relapse into a state of barbarism. Can that system be a just one, which would seek to wrest from a parent the ability to discharge those duties only capable of a right discharge by the parent? Can that principle be a right one which would thus tend to paralyze those most sacred instincts which prompt the parent to the special care of his offspring?

The principle of legislating on matters, which have to do with the action of the mind, is most decidedly opposed to liberty. Liberty of trade is "not merely the economical, material right of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market. It is that, and something higher. It is the application to one particular department of human action—that of industry—of a principle which is equally applicable wherever man's actions and interests are concerned. And the principle is, that no individuals, or classes, or ruling powers, have any right, natural or acquired, to restrict the freest development of the faculties and energies of the individual, so long as these do not infringe the like claims of freedom of every other individual; and, further, that in no conceivable circumstances can an individual be restricted in his industry, or deprived of his property, for the sake of conferring some supposed benefit on other individuals or classes. So that free trade simply means, leaving every man to his own resources, and employing the physical force of Government merely to protect him from the injustice and oppression of those who might attempt to curtail or destroy this freedom." *

2. Legislative education is *unnecessary*, in the present state of society.

The vast amount of ignorance which still prevails has, we presume, induced the advocacy by so many of a fresh system of education. Because ignorance still exists, many imagine that the present system is incapable of grappling with ignorance, forgetting that ignorance for centuries has been deeply rooted in

* Charles Robertson, Esq., of Liverpool.

this country, and that time is required, as well as strenuous effort, to demolish the defying monster. They do not trouble themselves to reflect, or they would perceive that a nation cannot be enlightened in a day; they see that it is not, but ascribe it to the inadequacy of the means at present employed, and looking around for other means, can find none but legislative enactments, which they at once clamour for, heeding not the justice of such measures. Were we fast gliding into a state of barbarism; were generations growing up untaught; were knowledge expiring; were our public institutions becoming extinct; were our trade and commerce fast decaying; then would we welcome any measures of our Government that would revive the languid pulse of the nation, or quicken and invigorate our drooping country. But is such the case? We are proud and happy to say it is not. Britain stands foremost among the nations in civilization, power, commerce, and education; yes, education. Schoolhouses are scattered in profusion throughout the length and breadth of this land; the accommodation exceeds the demand. Day after day from the press of this country is poured one continuous, voluminous stream of works teeming with information. Night after night are our lecture-rooms, reading-rooms, and mechanics' institutes crowded with those eager in the pursuit of knowledge. How, in the face of all this, can any venture to say that we are making little progress against ignorance? Long have we, as a nation, been characterized by intellectual attainment and general intelligence; and the time, we believe, is not far distant, when we shall be an example to the nations around of a country from which ignorance is banished, annihilated by the ever onward march of intelligence. Yet, in spite of all this progressive tendency of the age to vanquish ignorance, there are some who maintain that we are at a standstill; that, so far from advancing in knowledge, we are becoming more and more indifferent on the subject, and are allowing, without opposition, ignorance to gain ground. In support of this assertion, they point around to the deplorable prevalence of ignorance, not taking into consideration that the number of uneducated at the present time, as compared with the number at a previous period, is no criterion; for the population is constantly increasing, and consequently the proportion at a previous period will yield the correct estimate; the result of such a comparison shows the groundlessness of our opponents' assertions on this point. In 1818, the proportion of children attending school to the whole population was 1 in 17·25; in 1833, the proportion was 1 in 11·27, a decided improvement; and in 1851, the proportion was 1 in 8·36, being more than double what it was but 33 years before, a fact which shows what the present system is capable of and is doing, and that much progress is being made. At the present rate, we hope before long to see knowledge, that food of the mind, so

plentiful, and even more so, than food for the body. "Liberty will presently destroy ignorance, but slavery will sooner extinguish knowledge." We confidently anticipate the future, when Britain's sons, unrestricted in mental action by unnecessary and pernicious restraints, shall all, from the boy that whistles at the plough, or the artisan who toils at his work, to the nobleman in his mansion or the monarch on the throne, labour in the field of knowledge, and reap a rich harvest as the necessary result.

3. Legislative education is *impracticable*, except at the risk of greater interests than those its object is to secure.

The advocates of State instruction have, as the chief object of their efforts, the more speedy universality of knowledge than the voluntary system is capable of producing. Now, the voluntary system will, at the rate knowledge is at present advancing, in a very short time spread instruction to the remotest corners of our isle. But our opponents consider this pace tardy in comparison with that at which their system will, according to their statements, enlighten the people. We consider, and we believe that we have ground for our opinion, that were the scheme of legislative education carried into effect, knowledge would not be more rapidly and surely diffused than it would by the continued operation of the present system. In Prussia, where the State education plan has been for some time working, and attendance at school is more strenuously enforced than anywhere else, the proportion of school children to the whole population is one in seven; in England in 1851, five years ago, the proportion was one in eight and a fraction, which, by this time, must have reached, and we should think, considering the rapid progress in knowledge being now made, have exceeded, the Prussian proportion. We are at a loss to see what advantage it would be for Government (so notorious for being the "worst cultivator, trader, manufacturer," but why the best educator we cannot tell) to interfere in that which would be better executed without its aid. Some urge that the voluntary system is "impulsive, unequal, irregular, and uncertain in its operation," and on that ground legislation should supply a fixed system of education. To this we reply, that these disadvantages are not necessary attendants on the voluntary principle, but only incidental to it, and may be avoided. What are the advantages of this proposed system of State education which is urged upon us as necessary to our national progress and welfare? We see none. Possibly we may be dull of comprehension, yet we cannot perceive the value of a system which, to work to any extent, must be so rigorous, that no Englishman would tolerate it. But even admitting that advantage did result from the operation of legislative education, would such advantage counterbalance the disadvantages attendant on the working of the system? We unhesitatingly reply, No. When the advantage of State educa-

tion is referred to, it must be borne in mind that the superiority of such a system of education over ignorance is not meant, but the superiority of that system over another system of education. Among the evils which are entailed by legislative instruction, is one to which we have already referred, that of deadening the natural feelings of the parent towards his child. That such would be the case, must be evident, on a little consideration. For when the State educates his child, he at once loses that control which naturally belongs to him; and though the instruction given may be in accordance with his views, there is an equal probability that it may be directly opposed to them. And whether agreeable to or at variance with his convictions, he has no remedy. He has to quietly submit to have, what may appear to him, fallacious doctrines instilled in his child's mind, and if approved of by Government (we congratulate our opponents on having such a test for truth), his resistance to them will be futile. When thus all efforts of the parent to instruct his child according to his own idea, however correct those ideas may be, are frustrated, what wonder that the parent becomes indifferent to his offspring! His parental affections would be soon deadened. Would the advantages of a little more speedy diffusion of information justify Government in thus tearing from a parent the child which nature intended and best fitted him to instruct?

Again: a State education must of necessity exclude religious instruction, on account of the variety of religious opinions. "To enforce religious teaching, and yet to provide every sect with the means of propagating its own tenets, is at once to proclaim the supreme importance of religion, and to declare that all forms of it are equal in authority. The disastrous influence of such a system it is impossible to exaggerate. It must simultaneously foster indifferentism and sectarianism; justify the sceptic in withholding attention from any creed, and enable the sectarian to push his own; subject the child to the impress of any set of doctrines, perhaps to several in turn, and incite the man to despise them all."* Thus it is evident that religion could not be taught in State schools; yet how disastrous would be its exclusion! Our people would grow up uninstructed in that most important to them. Would any advantage in the system of State education justify the neglect of religious training? We think that this difficulty cannot be got over by the most earnest advocate of State education.

We conclude with the following appropriate words of Mr. Charles Robertson:—"And because ignorance, the effect, rather than the cause, of existing social and legitimate evils, still prevails among us, still meets our eye on every side, are we to

* "The Monthly Christian Spectator," vol. i., p. 479.

maintain that there is really no remedy for it, no power of suasion, no influence of example, no sense of duty, no stimulus of competition, that can be appealed to or relied on, and that the imperative duty of every well-wisher of his country is henceforth to give up his efforts in this direction, and to substitute for the operation of principles and feelings, which God has implanted in the human breast, a patent mechanism, to be worked unerringly and uniformly by the motive power of taxation? Is it to be henceforth the unmistakable sign of the patriot, that he withdrew his shoulder from the wheel of popular improvement, and devoted his time and energies to calling lustily on the State Hercules to drag the foundered carriage out of the rut of ignorance in which it is irremediably imbedded?" E. M., Jun.

INGENIOUS SPECULATION. We are accustomed to take it for granted that all creatures are living at one and the same rate, or that they are *going by our clock*; whereas, in fact, if we duly consider the analogies of the system of nature, we shall see reason to conjecture that while, perhaps, some species of animals are living much slower than ourselves, others may be living inconceivably faster. It is by no means unphilosophical to imagine that the ephemera of a summer's noon, which we are apt to pity as short lived, may, in the compass of their few sunny hours, be running through a century of joyous sensations; and if the microscope, which exposes to our view the vivacious tenants of a drop of water, had the power also of laying open the whirl of the sentient faculty of these tribes, it might appear, to our amazement, that the busy history of a thousand years is compacted into their life of a day or an hour, so that the diminutiveness of their visible organs is even less astonishing than the compression of their consciousness.—*Physical Theory of another Life.*

CANT.—In these days the grand *primum mobile* of England is CANT,—*cant political, cant religious, cant moral*, but always CANT,—a thing of words, without the smallest influence upon one's actions: the English being no wiser, no better, and much poorer, and divided amongst themselves, as well as far less moral than they were before the prevalence of the verbal decorum.—*Lord Byron.*

SUPERSTITION ABLY REPROVED.—Diagoras, surnamed the Atheist, being on shipboard, and in danger of wreck, the sailors were disposed to attribute the storm to the presence of so impious a person, on which he pointed to other vessels in the same danger, and asked if he were aboard all of them?—*Anon.*

DEATH.—When Socrates was told by a friend that his judges had sentenced him to death, "And has not nature," said he, "passed the same sentence upon them?"

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE present subject is extremely difficult to settle satisfactorily ; originally we were like T. U., “not very confident on the question, either the one way or the other ;” but, on mature consideration, we have become convinced of the fallacy of his proposition, “that the miser is his own worst enemy—that the spendthrift more fatally injures both himself and society.” T. U.’s article, which is written with great fairness and impartiality, has been replied to in the same quiet manner by J. R. and Cid,—whose productions will, we think, have the effect of considerably modifying his views. Every point brought forward by T. U. having been so ably met, there would have been no occasion for the present article, had it not have been for the one-sided, dogmatical contribution of E. S. J. He rushes madly into the controversy, without paying the least attention to the definitions laid down by his ally ; he alters the question to suit his own views, and then, to his great delight, proves what nobody would ever think of denying. “There is nothing which he cannot prove” to his own satisfaction. In his hands, the miser becomes a very virtuous individual, one who has been most shamefully ill-used and libelled by J. R. ; the spendthrift, poor fellow, obtains no mercy ; he is the very incarnation of evil and vice. Accept his views, and the general detestation in which the miser is held necessarily becomes most unjust and unfounded. We appeal to our readers, whether such assertions as the following are not gross perversions ; they are so perfectly ridiculous, that we are certain T. U. will never endorse them. We can hardly fancy that any one but a *miser* could write such stuff.—Listen ! “The solitary miser, whose *worst vice* is that of close trading, and whose *worst wrongs* to society are those of a recluse capitalist ; for the injuries of a spendthrift upon the community are positive, whilst those of a miser are *merely negative*. A miser may be honest ; but a spendthrift *never*. The latter invariably ruins himself, and then *robs* his neighbour ; but the former is nothing more than a *stagnant nuisance*, and a *miserable man!!!* A miser is really *nothing more* than a man who conducts his business on the most *approved principles* ; he purchases labour and stock in the cheapest market, and sells the produce in the

dearest, and simply does not maintain a position in the social scale commensurate with his income. This is *all* the wrongs of which he is guilty; and to say that, for this *perfectly harmless conduct*, &c.!!!” “The wretch covetous to extremity,” the abhorred and detested of the generality of mankind, has at length obtained a champion in E. S. J. The misers throughout the land should immediately reward him with an appropriate testimonial—suppose we say a copy of his own article bound in *calfs*. He accuses J. R. of having “singularly primitive ideas of what constitutes a spendthrift;” his readers will most decidedly consider that he has singularly advanced ideas as to what constitutes both misers and spendthrifts; *we* never expect to see the day when his definitions will find a place in the dictionary of the English language. Voltaire decides that before arguing we should define and understand certain terms in certain senses. The very nature of the present subject evidently implies that we are to understand the terms miser and spendthrift in their *ordinary application*—as generally understood and acknowledged. The question evidently being, whether an individual called by the public a spendthrift is more injurious to society than another equally well known as a miser, in the spirit of fair play and justice we should also select for comparison *average characters*, and not compare a moderate miser with a reckless, pre-eminently vicious spendthrift. How has E. S. J. acted?—With great unfairness; he adopts unheard-of definitions to express what he chooses to understand by the terms miser and spendthrift. We ask T. U., or any of our opponents, if the following definitions, furnished by E. S. J., are in accordance with the spirit of the question.

Miser—One who is “nothing more than a man who conducts his business on what the world considers to be the most approved principles.”

Spendthrift—“A tradesman who, on credit, speculatively continues in business after he is clearly insolvent.”

According to E. S. J., the question resolves itself into whether the dishonest tradesman is more injurious to society than the honest one? Of course, there can be no two opinions on the subject; we all admit the injury done to society by the dishonest man. Limiting ourselves to the *generally received* opinion of what constitutes a miser and a spendthrift, we will, in a few words, disprove the assertion that the injuries of the miser upon the community are “merely negative.”

Virtues in excess become vices. Avarice is the excess of carefulness and frugality; lavishness and prodigality, the excess of generosity. Carefulness is a virtue beneficial principally to the individual; society gains nothing by it directly, though much indirectly; when in excess, instead of being beneficial, it becomes injurious, since it withdraws from circulation the main prop of

all commercial activity. Generosity affects others more than the individual who possesses it; in excess, it still must benefit society, until the possessor has nothing more with which to be generous. He then injures society by depending on it for support—though in the generality of cases his friends have to bear the burden of his reckless expenditure; but, if we strike a balance, we find that society is still the gainer. While his means lasted, he was the support of many; eventually, society has to support him: we have the *many* against the *one*. Now, he may have been the support of many for a number of years; he himself is thrown on society only for a short time, “for,” says T. U., “he dies a premature death.” In a £ s. d. view, we find, then, that the miser injures society—the spendthrift benefits it. We will now consider the moral effects of the examples which they give to society at large.

Let us examine “the perfectly harmless conduct!” of the miser. Does he set a good example to others? Are his actions in accordance with his professions? The miser’s god is mammon—for this he sacrifices health and all social ties; his heart is steeled to the tears of the orphan and widow; he may never *transgress* the laws of the land, though his actions are far more heinous than the open pilfering of the professed burglar. We know that the love of money is the root of all evil; why, then, exonerate the miser from the consequences which must result from his inordinate itching after riches? “The wretch covetous to extremity” is always a hypocrite—he fawns on the rich and oppresses the poor. He dons the “cloak of religion,” and, under its protecting influence, practically acts in direct opposition to the laws of God which he professes to obey. He does far more injury to religion than the individual who, *professing* to fear neither God nor man, conducts himself in defiance of all law and all *morality*. The working man declares Christianity to be a worthless thing, because he finds many of those who profess to belong to the religion of truth, of goodwill, and charity, are grasping and oppressive. He points to the miser who conforms to its ordinances, and asks what effect it has on him? It does not prevent him from grinding his employed, or exacting to the uttermost every farthing the law allows, from those who are so unfortunate as to fall into his clutches. Does he not, then, injure society in its most vital point? His inconsistent conduct, so directly opposed to the principles of the religion he professes to obey, tends to strengthen the unbelief of the sceptic. Religion is absolutely necessary to the wellbeing of the state; the miser, by his hypocritical conduct, materially damages the cause of religion, and hence decidedly injures, in a positive manner, the society in which he exists. Viewing the miser in this light, his conduct cannot be so “perfectly harmless” as E. S. J. wishes us to believe; neither can we agree with T. U., that “he is his own

worst enemy." The injury he does to himself is comparatively slight; being the slave of mammon, his whole energies being devoted to the pursuit of wealth, he is not conscious of the social enjoyment he denies himself. The injury he does to himself he feels not; the injury he does to others is felt keenly: ask all who have had business dealings with him; ask the widow and the orphan, whom (by taking advantage of some legal quibble) he has defrauded of their bread and thrown on society for support.

The spendthrift certainly injures society by his example, but not to such an extent as the miser. He does not injure the cause of religion, since he does not profess to be "a guide, a buckler, an example" unto the world at large; he is no hypocrite, but is open, straightforward in his conduct; he grinds not his employed, but distributes his wealth around with an unsparing hand; he spends money on luxuries, but this does good to trade. Many spendthrifts go no further than this—their only fault being a reckless expenditure; they deny themselves no present gratification, regardless of future consequences. There are others who, in addition, lavish their wealth in gambling houses, casinos, &c. But here the spendthrift is not alone to blame. This has been satisfactorily proved by J. R. and "Cid." Without the support of the spendthrift, these places would still exist and flourish; so that, we believe, in a moral view, the injuries done to society by the spendthrift have been greatly exaggerated. The only thing we can directly attribute to him is the bad example he gives to others of living beyond one's means; but even this carries its own remedy with it—for though some may be tempted to do as he does, others are strengthened in their good resolves of living within their means, when they find the inevitable consequence of the spendthrift's mode of life to be utter ruin in the end. The spendthrift may be considered to bear the same relation to society as the Spartan slaves, who were made drunk by their masters, to exhibit the debasing effects of drunkenness. When the spendthrift's means are exhausted, what must be his feelings! To find himself thus plunged from affluence to want and misery, must be harrowing in the extreme. When he awakes to the full consciousness of his position, what pangs of remorse does he not suffer? Occasionally, perhaps seldom, he reforms, and by leading a better life, in some measure nullifies his former evil influences. But, granting that he invariably becomes an effete member of society, we still have advanced sufficient to justify us in reversing T. U.'s dictum, and saying, that the spendthrift "is his own worst enemy—that the" miser "more obviously and more fatally injures both himself and society."

Bradford.

TALIESIN.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 138.)

5.—THE VERB—continued.

FOURTH CONJUGATION.

INFINITIVE ending in RE.

The verbs belonging to this conjugation may be conveniently divided into four classes, whose Infinitives end respectively in DRE, INDRE, UIRE, and IRE.

The first of these classes is the only one considered regular by the best French grammarians.

1. INFINITIVE ending in DRE.

VENDRE, TO SELL.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, VENDS; 2, VENDIS; 3, VENDRE; 4, VENDANT; 5, VENDU.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.		Plural.	
Je vends	<i>I sell</i>	Nous vendons	<i>we sell</i>
Tu vends	<i>thou sellest</i>	Vous vendez	<i>ye sell</i>
Il vend	<i>he sells</i>	Ils vendent	<i>they sell</i>

Imperfect Tense.

Je vendais	<i>I was selling</i>	Nous vendions	<i>we were selling</i>
Tu vendais	<i>thou wast selling</i>	Vous vendiez	<i>ye were selling</i>
Il vendait	<i>he was selling</i>	Ils vendaient	<i>they were selling</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je vendis	<i>I sold</i>	Nous vendîmes	<i>we sold</i>
Tu vendis	<i>thou soldest</i>	Vous vendîtes	<i>ye sold</i>
Il vendit	<i>he sold</i>	Ils vendirent	<i>they sold</i>

Future Tense.

Je vendrai	<i>I shall sell</i>	Nous vendrons	<i>we shall sell</i>
Tu vendras	<i>thou wilt sell</i>	Vous vendrez	<i>ye will sell</i>
Il vendra	<i>he will sell</i>	Ils vendront	<i>they will sell</i>

Conditional Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je vendrais	<i>I should sell</i>	Nous vendrions	<i>we should sell</i>
Tu vendrais	<i>thou wouldst sell</i>	Vous vendriez	<i>ye would sell</i>
Il vendrait	<i>he would sell</i>	Ils vendraient	<i>they would sell</i>

Compound Tenses—J'ai, j'avais, j'aurai, &c., vendu.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.*Present Tense.*

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Que je vende	<i>that I may sell</i>	Que nous vendions	<i>that we may sell</i>
Que tu vendes	<i>that thou mayst sell</i>	Que vous vendiez	<i>that ye may sell</i>
Qu'il vende	<i>that he may sell</i>	Qu'ils vendent	<i>that they may sell</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que je vendisse	<i>that I might sell</i>	Que nous vendissions	<i>that we might sell</i>
Que tu vendisses	<i>that thou mightst sell</i>	Que vous vendissiez	<i>that ye might sell</i>
Qu'il vendît	<i>that he might sell</i>	Qu'ils vendissent	<i>that they might sell</i>

Compound Tenses—Que j'aie, j'eusse, vendu.

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Vends	<i>sell thou</i>	Vendons	<i>let us sell</i>
		Vendez	<i>sell ye</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Present—Vendre *to sell*

Compound—Avoir vendu *to have sold*

PARTICIPLES.

Present—Vendant *selling* *Past*—Vendu *sold*
Compound—Ayant vendu *having sold*

In the same manner are conjugated FONDRE, to melt; MORDRE, to bite; PERDRE, to lose; REPANDRE, to pour; and about forty others.

2. INFINITIVE ending in INDRE.

This class includes verbs in AINDRE, as *craindre*, to fear; in EINDRE, as *ceindre*, to gird; and in OINDRE, as *joindre*, to join. It includes about nineteen verbs.

CRAINdre, TO FEAR.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, CRAINS; 2, CRAIGNIS; 3, CRAINdre; 4, CRAIGNANT; 5, CRAINT.

INDICATIVE MOOD.*Present Tense.*

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je crains	<i>I fear</i>	Nous craignons	<i>we fear</i>
Tu crains	<i>thou fearest</i>	Vous craignez	<i>ye fear</i>
Il craint	<i>he fears</i>	Ils craignent	<i>they fear</i>

Imperfect Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je craignais	<i>I feared</i>	Nous craignons	<i>we feared</i>
Tu craignais	<i>thou fearedst</i>	Vous craigniez	<i>ye feared</i>
Il craignait	<i>he feared</i>	Ils craignaient	<i>they feared</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je craignis	<i>I feared</i>	Nous craignîmes	<i>we feared</i>
Tu craignis	<i>thou fearedst</i>	Vous craignîtes	<i>ye feared</i>
Il craignit	<i>he feared</i>	Ils craignirent	<i>they feared</i>

Future Tense.

Je craindrai	<i>I shall fear</i>	Nous craindrons	<i>we shall fear</i>
Tu craindras	<i>thou wilt fear</i>	Vous craindrez	<i>ye will fear</i>
Il craindra	<i>he will fear</i>	Ils craindront	<i>they will fear</i>

Conditional Tense.

Je craindrais	<i>I should fear</i>	Nous craindrions	<i>we should fear</i>
Tu craindrais	<i>thou wouldst fear</i>	Vous craindriez	<i>ye would fear</i>
Il craindrait	<i>he would fear</i>	Ils craindraient	<i>they would fear</i>

Compound Tenses—J'ai, j'avais, &c., craint.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Que je craigne	<i>that I may fear</i>	Que nous craignons	<i>that we may fear</i>
Que tu craignes	<i>that thou mayst fear</i>	Que vous craigniez	<i>that ye may fear</i>
Qu'il craigne	<i>that he may fear</i>	Qu'ils craignent	<i>that they may fear</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que je craignisse	<i>that I might fear</i>	Que nous craignissions	<i>that we might fear</i>
Que tu craignisses	<i>that thou mightst fear</i>	Que vous craignissiez	<i>that ye might fear</i>
Qu'il craignît	<i>that he might fear</i>	Qu'ils craignissent	<i>that they might fear</i>

Compound Tenses—Que j'aie, que j'eusse, craint.

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Crains	<i>fear thou</i>	Craignons	<i>let us fear</i>
		Craignez	<i>fear ye</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

<i>Present</i> —Craindre	<i>to fear</i>
<i>Compound</i> —Avoir craint	<i>to have feared</i>

PARTICIPLES.

<i>Present</i> —Craignant	<i>fearing</i>	<i>Past</i> —Craint	<i>feared</i>
<i>Compound</i> —Ayant craint	<i>having feared</i>		

3. INFINITIVE ending in UIRE.

NUIRE, TO HURT.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, NUIS; 2, NUISIS; 3, NUIRE; 4, NUISANT; 5, NUI.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je nuis	<i>I hurt</i>	Nous nuisons	<i>we hurt</i>
Tu nuis	<i>thou hurtest</i>	Vous nuisez	<i>ye hurt</i>
Il nuit	<i>he hurts</i>	Ils nuisent	<i>they hurt</i>

Imperfect Tense.

Je nuisais	<i>I was hurting</i>	Nous nuisions	<i>we were hurting</i>
Tu nuisais	<i>thou wast hurting</i>	Vous nuisiez	<i>ye were hurting</i>
Il nuisait	<i>he was hurting</i>	Ils nuisaient	<i>they were hurting</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je nuisis	<i>I hurt</i>	Nous nuisîmes	<i>we hurt</i>
Tu nuisis	<i>thou hurtest</i>	Vous nuisîtes	<i>ye hurt</i>
Il nuisit	<i>he hurt</i>	Ils nuisirent	<i>they hurt</i>

Future Tense.

Je nuirai	<i>I shall hurt</i>	Nous nuirons	<i>we shall hurt</i>
Tu nuiras	<i>thou wilt hurt</i>	Vous nuirez	<i>ye will hurt</i>
Il nuira	<i>he will hurt</i>	Ils nuiront	<i>they will hurt</i>

Conditional Tense.

Je nuirais	<i>I should hurt</i>	Nous nuirions	<i>we should hurt</i>
Tu nuirais	<i>thou wouldst hurt</i>	Vous nuiriez	<i>ye would hurt</i>
Il nuirait	<i>he would hurt</i>	Ils nuiraient	<i>they would hurt</i>

Compound Tenses—J'ai, j'avais, &c., nui.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Que je nuise	<i>that I may hurt</i>	Que nous nuisions	<i>that we may hurt</i>
Que tu nuises	<i>that thou mayst hurt</i>	Que vous nuisiez	<i>that ye may hurt</i>
Qu'il nuise	<i>that he may hurt</i>	Qu'ils nuisent	<i>that they may hurt</i>

Preterite Tense.

Que je nuisisse	<i>that I might hurt</i>	Que nous nuisissions	<i>that we might hurt</i>
Que tu nuisisses	<i>that thou mightst hurt</i>	Que vous nuisissiez	<i>that ye might hurt</i>
Qu'il nuisit	<i>that he might hurt</i>	Qu'ils nuisissent	<i>that they might hurt</i>

Compound Tenses—Que j'aie, que j'eusse, nui.

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

<i>Singular.</i>			<i>Plural.</i>	
Nuis	<i>hurt thou</i>		Nuison	<i>let us hurt</i>
			Nuisez	<i>hurt ye</i>

INFINITIVE MOOD.

<i>Present</i> —Nuire	<i>to hurt</i>
<i>Compound</i> —Avoir nui	<i>to have hurt</i>

PARTICIPLES.

<i>Present</i> —Nuisant	<i>hurting</i>	<i>Past</i> —Nui	<i>hurt</i>
<i>Compound</i> —Ayant nui	<i>having hurt.</i>		

There are eighteen verbs which are conjugated like NUIRE: of these, NUIRE and LUIRE, *to shine*, make the past participles NUI and LUI; the others end in T: as CUIRE, *to cook*, CUIT, *cooked*; INSTRUIRE, *to instruct*, INSTRUCT, *instructed*.

LESSONS IN MATHEMATICS.

THE difference between Arithmetic and Algebra consists in two points. Algebra is arithmetic firstly generalised, and secondly extended. In arithmetic the reasonings and operations are limited to definite and particular *numbers*, and the results are solitary and isolated truths. The addition of two numbers, for instance, gives a result which is not true if one of the numbers be changed and not the other: and similarly in respect to their product. But in *algebra* the reasonings and operations rest upon the properties which belong to all abstract quantities, and the results are general truths. Hence the form in which the simpler results of *algebraical* processes appear, merely *indicate* what is to be done *arithmetically* when specific values are given to the symbols of quantity.

Secondly, algebra is arithmetic extended. Arithmetic is concerned with numbers that lie on only one side of a certain limit. Algebra, in its most confined view, embraces quantities which numerically increase in two opposite senses; one being called positive, the other negative: or, if concrete numbers are used, the one set is in character precisely the reverse of the other, which may perhaps be best illustrated as follows.

All quantities, of whatever kind, may be represented by lines. In drawing or mapping, for instance, we say, let a certain length which is marked down represent a foot, or a yard, or a mile, or a degree, according to occasion, and multiples of this unit length are given in the *scale*.

In the same manner, if we select 1st, a point to measure from, and 2nd, a length to represent a unit, it is evident that any number may be represented by a line whose direction is the same as that of the unit employed, and which contains as many unit lengths (and parts of the unit length if necessary) as there are units in the given number. Nor does it matter whether this number is abstract or concrete. The length which represents 1, or 2, or 10, will represent 1, or 2, or 10 cwts., or shillings, or years, or degrees of heat, &c.

The point from which we measure represents 0; and when we have diminished a number as far as this we are in arithmetic compelled to stop. So 3—7 is arithmetically impossible: we can take away 3 and can then get

no further either in idea or expression, -4 being beyond the limits of arithmetic.

But if we conceive the line extended on the opposite side of the zero point, this division will very aptly and reasonably represent quantity of the opposite or negative character. Now this is not so much an addition as an extension, which arises in this way:—

Suppose the thermometer to stand at 0, and to have risen 12° and then fallen 5° . To represent this in the manner indicated above, we ought to move over 12 units in one direction (say to the right) and then retrograde 5 units, which would leave us 7 units on the right of the zero point. This is intelligible in both arithmetic and algebra. Let us now suppose that the thermometer falls 10° . To represent this we move to the left over 10 units, which leaves us 3 units on the left of zero. Now, whether we interpret this result according to our definition, or inquire what it ought to represent from the nature of the case, we come to the same result, viz., 3° below zero, or the sum of the changes, is -3° ; or the temperature is 3° of cold (if 3° on the other side of zero would be called heat).

Or take the following question. An insect is placed on a certain mark on a pole, and it moves 12 feet downward the first night, 10 feet upward the following day, 7 feet downward the second night, and 13 feet upward the second day; at the end of these movements how much is it below its first position?

Now the first ascent may be subtracted from the first descent, and we have an arithmetical answer to the question: but at the commencement of the second day, its place is only nine feet below its first position; and so, after ascending 13 feet, the arithmetical answer to the question, How much is it below its first position? is "Nothing at all," which is true as far as it goes; but, unless we alter the mode of expression, we cannot give an exact reply. Algebra, by the introduction of negative quantities, enables us to do this; its answer is -4 .

The extension, as distinguished from addition, will perhaps appear more clearly if we consider the motions in the instances adduced. The thermometer standing at 7° begins to fall. It passes through 6° , 5° , 4° , &c., in succession, and reaches 0° . Here if it was limited by arithmetic it would stop; but it continues to fall (that is, the direction of the motion is the same), and reaches its negative position by overpassing the imaginary limit which had been assigned it; that is, by extending the limits within which it had been previously supposed always to remain.

These remarks apply also to the second case, that of the insect; except that I have purposely reversed the direction of the motions, in order that the nature of the negative quantity may be more forcibly represented.

There are, we shall see, extensions of the meaning of many common terms, when they are applied to arithmetic. One of the further extensions of arithmetical terms employed in algebra must here be noticed; viz., that of GREATER and LESS.

All quantities with which we are concerned (and the reason of this limitation will be given hereafter) may be represented on a line thus:—

. -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

in which we observe that they increase *numerically* from 0 in both directions. But, looking at the arithmetical side only, we see that the numbers increase toward the right and diminish toward the left, so that every number is greater than that on its left, and less than that on the right. This holds true as low

as 1; for of 0, speaking arithmetically, we can only say that it is less than 1. But just as we say of 2, that it is greater than 1 and less than 3, we are in the habit of saying that 0 is greater than -1 and less than 1. So -1 is less than 0 and greater than -2 ; and in this sense, and this only, is it true that there are quantities less than nothing.

From this we shall easily infer what is to be understood by the negative values that are sometimes found for unknown quantities in algebraical problems.

Thus: two trains travel at the same rate and in the same direction; one is 70 miles on its way and the other 90: how far have they to go before the latter is twice as far on its way as the other? The answer, obtained on the supposition that they have to continue travelling *on*, is -50 , and the considerations above teach us that this means they must travel *back* 50 miles, when one will be 20 and the other 40 miles from their original starting place; which answers the conditions of the problem.

Again, let it be asked, How many yards of silk did a man *sell*, when the number of shillings *received* for each yard was 4 more than the number of yards, and the price of the whole was £51? This produces a quadratic equation, and gives for the number of yards 30 and -34 . In the former case the price of each yard is 34s., but what is it when -34 yards are sold? According to the above it ought to be -30 s., but how are we to interpret this? The $-$ sign before the number of yards *sold* changes the selling into buying, and the $-$ sign before the money *received* alters receiving into paying; and the negative answer is equivalent to saying a man may buy 34 yards at 30s. for £51, in which case the number of yards *sold by him* is, algebraically speaking, 4 less than the number of shillings *received by him* for each yard.

CALUMNY MADE USEFUL.—I am beholden to calumny, that she hath so endeavoured and taken pains to belie me. It shall make me set a surer guard on myself, and keep a better watch upon my actions.—*Ben Jonson*.

CAPACITY FOR FRIENDSHIP.—We may often exercise a choice as to who shall be our companions; but we have little control over the circumstances out of which friendship grows; and, therefore, instances of its successful formation, though delightful to hear of, can seldom be held forth for imitation. Yet the experienced may do well to warn the warm-hearted and confiding not to rely implicitly on any man, however kind and generous may be his present conduct, if he do not possess, besides a naturally amiable disposition, a conscience regulated by principle, and an understanding clear of discernment, and too strong to be swayed by the opinions of a multitude, or,—what is not less influential on the weak-minded,—the vicissitudes of fortune.—*F. F.*

DEPRAVITY.—Nothing can give us so just a notion of the depravity of mankind in general, as an exact knowledge of our own corruption in particular.

VICES.—When our vices leave us we flatter ourselves that we leave them.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

82. (L.) Can you recommend me a book in which the scanning of Latin verse is so *fully, clearly, and simply* explained, that with it a student may teach himself the scanning of any of the Latin poets thoroughly? (II.) The best guide to the government situations which are open to competition?—**VIRGIL.**

83. I should feel much obliged if any of your correspondents would inform me whether the book called the "Thirty Letters on Various Subjects," by Wm. Jackson, is published now; and if it is, please to name the publisher.—**W. R.**

84. Would any of the *scientific* readers of the *British Controversialist* oblige me by informing me the *best and cheapest* way to make or buy a *camera* for photography; the best house to buy a good and cheap compound lens at, with rack and pinion movement; and the *best practical* work on photography, containing all the different processes, and the best way to colour photographic pictures, the price and publisher?—**CHEMICUS.**

85. Could you inform your correspondent, through the pages of your monthly periodical devoted to "Inquiries and answers," the prospects a young man has who possesses a good knowledge of the French and German languages, and a tolerable knowledge of Italian, in connection with book-keeping?—**NIL DESPERANDUM.**

86. Will you have the kindness to inform me, through the medium of your valuable serial, how to ascertain the circumference of a circle, a segment being given? An answer to the above in your next, if possible, will very much oblige.—**J. R.**

87. Could any of the readers of the

British Controversialist inform me of the qualifications required for entering a college, and the lowest amount of college expenses for twelve months?—**J. A. S.**

88. What is the price of Mantell's "Wonders of Geology" (1848)? Also another work by the same author, entitled "Organic Remains of the British Museum;" the "Quarterly Journal published by the authority of the Geological Society of London"? I cannot find any stated sum to the above, affixed at the end of them, and therefore an answer I should receive with pleasure. I should like, also, if any of your readers could inform me, what books to peruse to learn fully the practical part of geology.—**A. L.**

89. Will any of your numerous subscribers inform me of the best manner of studying the "Evidences of Christianity" in all its bearings, and also name some of the best works treating thereon? I should feel obliged if they would apprise me of the best works bearing on "Infidelity" and its branches, so as to be able to grapple with the various classes of such opponents to the truth of Christianity. By inserting the above you will greatly aid, yours, &c.—**A STUDENT.**

90. I am desirous of studying the history, as well as the social and political institutions, of the principal nations of Europe; to obtain such a knowledge of them that I may be enabled to enter with interest into the various agitations and movements which ever and anon are taking place in those countries; to be able to go back to the sources of these movements; to understand the remote as well as immediate causes which have produced them, &c., &c. Now, this is a large field, and that is my reason for writing to ask some of

your able correspondents to indicate to me the best books on each particular power, and the most advisable method of pursuing my inquiries.—SEPTIMUS.

91. Can any one of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me how to get a good copy of a translation of Dante, with Flaxman's Illustrations, and the probable cost?—T. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

10. I am much obliged to "O'Dell H." for his answer to my question; but I referred more particularly to the *water*—"And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the *waters*;" and in the ninth verse, "Let the *waters* under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the *dry land* appear." Land is not mentioned before; the words seem to imply that this was the first appearance of dry land. According to the Plutonic theory, dry land would be formed before water by the cooling of the outside of the molten mass. The Neptunian theory—that matter, after its first creation, was in a state of aqueous solution—seems to me to be more in accordance with the whole narrative.—W. W. L.

72. In answer to F. E., a candidate is examined only in those subjects which he chooses from the given list; therefore, if he chose English, French, and Mathematics, he would be examined in no other, although a candidate taking these three subjects only would stand but a poor chance of becoming one of the twenty. The number of candidates is not limited. There were about 150 at each of the two last examinations. The twenty who obtain the greatest number of marks pass (i. e., the first examination), and have then to prepare for the probation examination, examination in law, &c. A candidate must be under twenty-three at the first examination, and under twenty-five at the second. The candidates are sent out as soon as

possible after the law examination. They receive no salary until they are appointed servants, and such they do not become until they have passed the second examination; therefore they will receive no salary for the twelve months mentioned. I have looked through all the papers relating to this business, and can find nothing excluding married men from the service. It will be seen that the first examination is competitive, but the second is not. I may also say, that this is considered now the most severe examination in England.—TELEMAQUE.

76. In answer to C. S. W.'s further inquiries, I beg to inform him, firstly, that a ray of light may be defined as composed of one or more particles of matter, of indefinite extent, proceeding from a luminous body; but that the nature of the light is so little known, that Sir David Brewster defined it to be "an emanation, or *something* which proceeds from bodies, and by means of which we are enabled to see them by the eye." C. S. W. then asks if the ray really passes through glass. Undoubtedly, though a portion of it is lost; no body being so perfectly diaphanous that all the light passes through. Transparency is due to molecular condition; charcoal, in its ordinary state absorbing light, in the state of the diamond it forms the brilliant. Then he asks why, when the black letters of a book are seen through a prism, the last colour is invisible, and, in its stead, are seen the prismatic colours; whilst the white ground is almost unchanged in appearance. Let C. S. W. take a narrow slip of white paper, paste it on a black ground, and behold it with a prism whose edges shall be parallel to it, and this *white* slip will appear coloured with all the hues of the spectrum, the violet tint having deviated towards the summit of the prism. If the slip of white paper, instead of being very narrow, is of considerable width, all the middle part,

and its *borders*, parallel to the edges of the prism, are alone coloured—those nearest to the summit with violet, mingled with blue and indigo; those nearest the base with red, mingled with orange and yellow. In order to explain this phenomenon, we must conceive this white paper to be divided into very narrow, parallel slips. Each of these gives, as in the first case, a complete spectrum. Now, the second spectrum being a little lower than the first, and the third a little lower than the second, and so on, there results a successive superposition of all the simple colours, which produces white, except towards the borders, where the superposition is not complete, or where the violet on one side and the red on the other remain isolated.

Having demonstrated that the superposition is complete only in the middle, and, therefore, *there* only is white, it is easily explained that it is the border of the white, and not the black, that is prismatically coloured. If a convex lens be interposed between the prism and the paper, the black of the print, which C. S. W. alludes to, may be plainly discerned, and the prismatic colours surrounding it may be seen far more brilliant.

C. S. W. seems still to cling to the hypothesis of latent colour, for he asks

whether some blind people have been able to distinguish colours by the touch. This is seldom alluded to, still less seldom credited. It is impossible that any man can really feel a shadowy and imaginary substance. And as to the theory of colour inherent in bodies, it is very easily disproved by the fact that a film of the solution of nitrate of silver on paper speedily becomes black. This would not be the case were the colour inherent, for then it would be uninfluenced by the action of light.—S. E. L., *Micklehurst*.

77. A candidate must, on entering the Excise, be not less than nineteen, nor more than twenty-five years of age. He must be unmarried. He must be able to work out sums in the rules of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, both in common arithmetic, and in vulgar and decimal fractions, reduction, proportion, practice, and interest; to write a good hand, and correctly and fluently from dictation; and have a competent knowledge of book-keeping by double entry. He will undergo an examination in the above-named subjects, and, if approved, will be placed under instruction. Excise patronage is in the hands of the Treasury and the Commissioners of Inland Revenue. F. L. O. must apply either to one or the other.—T. J.

The 'Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Aberdeen Speculative Association.

—This society has been in existence for upwards of three years. Its aims are, the moral and intellectual improvement of its members. The meetings are held weekly, two nights in the month being allotted for debate, the remaining two for the delivery of an essay and lecture. A *soirée* in connection with the association was lately held in the usual hall of meeting, at which about forty persons, members

and friends, were present. The proceedings were of an interesting character, and the arrangements of the committee gave general satisfaction. The nucleus of a library has also been formed for the use of the members, which is not, however, so sufficiently patronized as its claims might lead us to hope.—A. T., *Sec.*

. We do not like the title of this society, and from the list of subjects enclosed, we see no reason for its

being thus named, and think that perhaps the title is the reason for its not being so successful as the projectors could wish.

Glasgow Polytechnic Society.—If this society is yet formed, would "Hugh Cunningham" give me some information regarding its *modus operandi*, the duties required of members, the fees, night of meeting, &c.—DOUGLAS.

St. Bartholomew's Working Men's Literary Institute.—In our February number we gave a report of the half-yearly meeting of the discussion class connected with the above institute. We now insert an account of the last general or half-yearly meeting, held at the lecture-hall in the Gray's Inn-road, on Saturday, the 28th of June. Mr. W. Wilde Salmon was voted to the chair, and the secretary (Mr. Beard) read the report of the class for the past half-year, during which twenty-six meetings had been held, the attendance averaging nearly thirty each evening. The following questions, among others, have been discussed:—"Would it be desirable to re-establish Poland?" "Is the Maine Liquor Law just in Principle?" "Was England Justified in taking up Arms against Russia?" "Was the Execution of Charles I. Justifiable?" "What shall we do with Smithfield?" "Was Mahomet an Impostor?" "Is the Character of Napoleon III. Worthy of Admiration?" "Is it Practicable and Incumbent upon us always to Speak the Truth?" "What are the Best Means of Paying Off the National Debt?" "The Fall of Kars: who's to Blame?" "Is a Property Qualification the Best Standard of Fitness for a Member of Parliament?" "Did the Character and Conduct of Mary Queen of Scots Justify the Treatment she received from Elizabeth Queen of England?" After a revision of the rules, thanks to retiring members, and the appointment of a fresh committee of management, a vote of thanks

having been passed to the chairman and secretary, those gentlemen returned thanks, and the meeting separated.

The Swansea Christian Literary and Scientific Association.—On the 14th of Jan. it held its first annual soiree, presided over by the Rev. W. Spencer. It had long been thought that a change of presidency would act beneficially upon the future welfare of the association. It was deemed that a gentleman of the clerical profession, holding the presidency of the association, gave it a sectarian aspect, which was injurious to its success and prosperity. A change was moved, seconded by the rev. gentleman in the chair, and the association unanimously elected as president T. Williams, Esq., M.D. The Rev. W. Spencer was also unanimously elected vice-president. The doctor delivered an eloquent inaugural address, which was followed by a large increase of members, several of whom were dissenting ministers; and subsequently there has been a continuous accession of members, who now number 120, an increase of about fifty since my last communication. The breaking up of the session took place the last week in May, on which occasion the president kindly provided tea for the members at his own expense, and after tea, gave a lecture on "Summer Studies for Young Men;" and it was then determined to have two or three excursions in the summer months, to examine the various objects of natural science, and to prepare papers on the same for discussion during the winter months. The first of these took place on the 5th of July, to Langdon Bay, to examine the geological strata of that locality. It was crowned with complete success, and to the satisfaction of all parties. The library is on the increase, and there has been a valuable acquisition made to it in the addition of all the bound volumes of the *Controversialist*. The association bids fair for permanent and lasting prosperity.—T. T.

The Blackstone Debating Society, Crosby Hall, London.—The designation of this society points out at once its object and the class to which it looks for support; and it need hardly be observed that, to law students, there can be nothing more desirable than the ability to argue and to give utterance to their thoughts with fluency and ease in public. We invite the attention of our law readers. The secretary, Mr. Thos. Rogers, 70, Fenchurch-street, City, will supply information and enrol members.

Buckingham Literary and Scientific Institution.—The third annual soirée of the above institution was held in the Town Hall of this place, on Tuesday, the 3rd of June. There was a smaller attendance than in former years. The chair was occupied by the Rev. H. Roundell, who delivered an address, congratulating the members on the condition of the society, and remarked, that during the past season, there had been taken out of the library 533 books, 16 lectures delivered, with an average attendance of 130 persons. Several books had been presented to the institute, among which were 4 vols. of

"Half-Hours with the Best Authors;" 1 vol. of Smith's "Sermons;" 1 vol. of "Basket of Fragments;" and Mr. Rowland had kindly sent them his work "On the Hair," and this last announcement caused some merriment among the audience. After the address, songs and glees were sung by vocalists from London. During the intervals, the prizes were awarded to the successful competitors, as follows:—Messrs. H. Pointer and J. Jeffs, the first class, subject, "The Emigrant." The second class prize was given to Mr. Ife. Only one essay was considered worthy of a prize, which was awarded to Mr. J. H. Cross. A prize was also given to E. Eeles for the best poem, entitled, "The Soldier's Return." By the kind permission of His Grace the Duke of Buckingham, the band of the Royal Bucks Yeomanry was in attendance, and played during the evening. After a vote of thanks to the chairman, the meeting broke up, highly pleased with the evening's entertainment. To end the day's proceedings, a balloon was sent up in the market-place, which threw out red, white, and blue lights.—R. H.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Mr. Bentley, the publisher, has obtained the whole of Horace Walpole's *unpublished* correspondence with his friend and deputy in the Exchequer, Mr. Grosvenor Bedford. Old Mr. Bedford (the uncle of Southey's correspondent) was the channel of many of Walpole's unknown communications with the public papers, and at times of his many unostentatious charities. "Horry," as Lady Mary Wortley delighted to call him, will be found to have had a heart after all. His charitable sympathies were chiefly with poor prisoners for debt. This accession will give additional interest to the forthcoming

edition of "Walpole's Letters."—*Critic.*

Mrs. Stowe's "Dred" is out, and from a cursory reading appears to be a bald edition of "Uncle Tom." That was genuine heart-writing; hence its wondrous popularity. This is laboured and artificial: there are touches of Mrs. Stowe's peculiar talent for describing Methodist niggers, but nothing that makes the soul thrill, like Eva's death. "Uncle Tom" was all artlessness; "Dred" is all art. It will have a large sale, from its author's fame, but not from its intrinsic merits. Altogether it has quite disappointed us.

Emerson's "English Traits" is very cheap, very readable, and likely to be very popular. His statements, not always correct, are always good-humoured and natural; and, for an American, it is a pretty impartial critique on England and the English.

Our readers will perceive, from an announcement on another page, that a second edition of the "Art of Writing" (which originally appeared in our pages) has been called for, and the author invites all persons who commence before the 1st of December next the course of lessons there given, to send him specimens of their handwriting as they proceed, and to the one who evidently makes the greatest progress *he offers a complete set of the first series of the British Controversialist*. All letters to be addressed to the author of the "Art of Writing," 65, Paternoster-row, London.

Those interested in the sabbath question would do well to read the Rev. Mr. Hill's (of Birmingham) "Primeval Sabbath," a reply to lectures by Mr. George Dawson. We think the answer is unanswerable. Those who have read Mr. Hill's Prize Essays will not be disappointed in this little pamphlet; it goes at once to the root of the matter, and though only a reply, is interesting, even to those who are not in possession of Mr. Dawson's lectures.

Foremost in the literary obituary of the month is Gilbert A'Becket, author of the "Comic Blackstone," "Comic Histories of England and Rome," &c., and for many years one of the principal contributors to "Punch," and lately one of our best metropolitan magistrates. His son and he died within a few days of each other, while on a visit to Boulogne.

NEW BOOKS.

Addey's Library:—St. John's Legends of the Christian East, 2s. Bowstead's Practical Sermons, 21s. Bray's Novels:—De Foix, 1s. 6d. Charm of Entertaining Knowledge, 7s. 6d.; Da-

nielism, or the Development of the Son of Man, 1s.; Emerson's English Traits, 1s.; Experiences of a Barrister, 1s. 6d.; Ferrier's Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New, 1s. 6d.; Golovin's Stars and Stripes, 3s.; Hibberd's Book of the Water Cabinet, 1s.; Life of Maxwell, by Hook, 2s.; Pinney's Duration of Life, and its Three Eras, 7s. 6d.: Rev T. H. Stewart's Memoirs of his Son, 9s.; *Mrs. Stowe's Dred*, 12s. and 2s. 6d.; Christian Family Life, by Thiersch, 5s.; Yorke's Original Researches into the Word of God, 5s.; Wallace's Descriptive Geography, 1s.; Jameson's Communion of Labour, 3s.; Lapse's Calisthenics, or Elements of Bodily Culture, 2s.; Lays of Memory, by a Mother and Son, 10s. 6d.; Collis's Praxis Latina, Parts 1 and 2, 2s. 6d. and 3s.; Fergusson's Northmen in Cumberland and Westmoreland, 5s.; Forbes's Râs Mâlâ, or Hindoo Annals of Goozerat, 40s.; McLeod's Class Atlas of Physical Geography, 2s. 6d. Parlour Library:—Dumas' Cardinal Mazarin, Miss Porter's Hungarian Brothers, and James' Margaret Graham. Rail. Library:—Maxwell's Luck is Everything. Wither's Hymns and Songs of the Church, 5s.; Lynch's Wonders of the West Indies, 5s.; Reid's Streams from Lebanon, 4s.; Roberts' Southern Counties of England, 18s.; Porter's Ecclesiastical System of Independents, 6s.; Chambers' Russian War, 13s.; Tarnley's Language of the Eye Illustrated, 1s.; Russian Chit Chat, 4s.; Tupper's Out and Home, 5s.; Vestiga, 5s. Bohn's Library:—Pliny's Natural History, 5s. Albert Durer's Humiliation of the Redeemer, 32 Prints, 1s.; Facts about Boys for Boys, 1s. 6d.; New Vols. of Knight's English Cyclo., Vol. II., Biography, 10s.; Sully's Memoirs, 3s. 6d.; Knight's Popular History of England, Vol. I., 9s.; Annual Register for 1855, 18s.; Beaumarchais and His Times, Vols. III. and IV., 21s.; Science of Mind, Pneumatology, Vol. I., 8s. 6d.; Shakspeare's Works, by Singer and Lloyd, Vol. XI., 6s.

The Logic of Study.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

FAITH is no less necessary in science than in life. In both it "the evidence of things not seen." Indeed, fact and faith are the constituents of science. The phenomena or facts of nature excite ideas in the mind, and faith gives vitality and potentiality to them. The scientific intellect is not sceptical, but wise. It accepts the suggestions of Faith, tries and tests their accuracy at every step, surrounds itself with precautions, and looks upon the whole, or the greatest available number, of the facts, with the view of discovering whether its suggestions are consistent with the qualities of the system of facts of which it is thinking, and with the principles which control and govern other facts. When they are so, and when they move clearly and distinctly—

"Into the eye and prospect of the soul,"

they become the actuating principles of thought, and lead the mind onwards to the development of newer and higher truths than it could otherwise attain. Faith gives the intellect a purpose and an end; teaches it to use the best available means of compassing its pre-desired object. It graves the word "Examine" on its shield, and bears it emblazoned on its arms. Credence is the impulse to progress, the guide to investigation, and the criterion of the accuracy of human thought. It gives a God to the universe, acknowledges the existence and persistence of law therein, and by this idea of law, colligates and knits together into science the disjunct phenomena which play in ever-changing innumerable around the human mind. On this belief in law the validity of all inductive processes depends; and it is to explain to the student earnestly intent on lifting up his struggling soul to the height of the great arguments by which—

'Nature and nature's laws appear in light,'—

how the inductive process is performed, that these present papers are written.

The assumption (*faith*) which gives validity *in thought* to the generalizations and inferences, *i. e.*, hypotheses, which result from the operation of the mental activities, subsequent to their excitement by the phenomena of nature, is, that the sequences and consequences of each and every event are connected together

and controlled by some supreme law of order, established for the effectuation or fulfilment of some *end* or *purpose* accordant with and dependent upon the respective natures of phenomenal objects.

The idea of Order has this peculiar and especial property, viz., it arrogates to itself the *right* of being recognized by the Reason as the originator, as well as the preliminary *test*, of each hypothesis.

The explicit statement or utterance of what is implicitly contained in our idea of Order would be somewhat to the following effect; viz., that throughout the whole realm of nature, cause and effect are correlative, *i. e.*, that certain uniformities of operation prevail in nature, and these uniformities act in direct and constant obedience to Law.

Law is here recognized as a necessary element not only in *thought*, but also in *fact* and actuality—a necessity without which harmony, stability, and progress—in one word, system—are unthinkable.*

The *pertinacity*, if we may not say the intuitive invariability, with which men hold this idea, and the success which attends all experiments made in proof of hypotheses which have accepted the idea of Order as their centre principle, are the surest evidences we can have of the perfect safety, if not of the essential accuracy, of making this assumption, or, as we feel rather inclined to say, of acting upon the irresistible impulse to which it subjects us.

Logic is essentially a formal, *i. e.*, schematic, systematizing, co-ordinating science.

The object of logically conducted study is to discover the co-existences and the correlative successions which, together, determine the modes of the continuousness, so far as we can judge, of the phenomena of nature.

Phenomena impress the senses with a confused interminglement of qualities, and *these* the soul must disentangle and arrange, before it can thoroughly know, or beneficially employ, the objects from which those impressions proceed.

To effect this, the mind seeks to make the laws of the *thinking* Ego the exponents, the symbols, the suggestors of the laws of the objective non-Ego, and by the investiturement of the objective universe with the *forms* of the *subject*, obtain mastery and domination over it.

The process by which this is accomplished is called Induction.

Induction is a *bringing into one thought*, by some proof of their correspondence or agreement, the *form* (logical) and the *matter* (physical) on which the intellect may have been exercising

* See an opposite view advocated in G. H. Lewis's "Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences," pp. 51—57.

itself—the union of thought and evidence to produce knowledge—the colligation of the subjective *in man* with the objective *in nature*.*

The following three processes are implied in Induction, viz.—

* This definition differs pretty considerably from that commonly received as explanatory of this puzzling word. It may therefore be advisable—and it will doubtlessly be useful—to lay before the reader some of the significations which it assumed in the writings of scientific men.

I. The gathering into one *form* of a multitude of scattered particulars (Plato's "Phædrus").

II. Socrates used it as a name for the accumulation, or *bringing together*, of instances, *i. e.*, of particular known facts, as a ground or basis of belief in, *i. e.*, as proofs of, particular unknown facts, or the establishment of some formerly unacknowledged truth (Xenoph., "Œconomici," xvii. 15).

III. The Sophists define it as a persuasive argument, by which a person may be *induced* to admit some proposition as true, *i. e.*, believable (Cicero, "De Inven.," i. 31; Quinctillian, "Instit.," v. 11).

IV. The proving of the *major* term of the middle by the *minor* (Aristotle's "Pr. Analytics," ii. 23), a progress from particulars to universals (Aristotle's "Topica," i. 12).

V. The eliciting or creating of axioms from experiments (observations?), and the deducing or deriving of new experiments from *these* axioms (Bacon's "Nov. Org.," i. 19, ii. 10, &c.)

VI. Inferring correct general principles or laws from the instances or facts before the mind while thinking (Whately's "Logic," iv. 1).

VII. A formal illation of the universal from the individual, as legitimated solely in the laws of thought and abstract from the conditions of this or that particular matter (Sir W. Hamilton's "Discussions," p. 156).

VIII. The operation of discovering and proving general propositions (J. S. Mill's "System of Logic," ii.)

IX. The investigation of generals, in the particulars of perceptible unities, by the power of the reflective reason (Humboldt's "Cosmos," vol. iii., Introd.)

X. That commonly received and incorporated in common speech, viz., the mode of acquiring general truths by the collation of the facts of experience, is described in the following lines from Akenside:—

For each *wide family* some *single birth*
He sets in view, the important *type of all*
Its brethren : suffering it to claim, beyond
Their common heritage, no private gift,
No proper fortune. Then, *whate'er his eye*
In this discerns, his bold, *unerring tongue*
Pronounceth of the kindred, without bound,
Without condition.

Pleasures of Imagination, b. ii., pp. 124—131.

XI. The systematic observation of any series of phenomena, by which we are enabled, after careful verification, to deduce general inferences from the facts of experience (Neil's "Art of Reasoning," ch. viii., p. 73). Those who are curious in tracing the progress of the writer's thoughts on the essential elements of this topic, may compare the chapter in which this definition occurs with the present paper.

1st. The reception and perception of certain facts ; *i. e.*, observational activity.

2nd. The formation of a premise, *i. e.*, an hypothesis, which will include and comprehend, *i. e.*, explain, the facts observed, and all *like* facts ; *i. e.*, suppositional activity.

3rd. The resumption of the observative process (the repetition of the first act of the mental energy), or the planning or performing of some experiment, *i. e.*, testing act, which shall *prove* that the given hypothesis explains the given, *i. e.*, the perceived, and all *like* facts ; *i. e.*, verification.

Hence we perceive that—

$$\text{Observation} + \text{Hypothesis} + \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Re-observation} \\ \text{or} \\ \text{Experiment} \end{array} \right\} = \text{Induction.}$$

The objects to be aimed at in Induction are—

1st. The attainment of precise and reliable knowledge, which is effected—(a) By the separation and distinct disjunction of the object or objects on which thought is engaged from those which bear a seeming resemblance to it or them ; (b) by collecting and examining every instance of the phenomenon or phenomena possessing a sameness or a similarity to the object or objects of thought that comes, or can be brought, within reach either of observation or experiment, to decide whether they *are* identical ; (c) by collecting and examining every instance of phenomena which is, or seems to be, possessed of contrary or opposite qualities, to decide whether they are in reality distinct.

2nd. The discovery of the laws to which the objects of our knowledge are subject, effected by—(a) the formation of an hypothesis ; (b) the testing of that hypothesis ; (c) the comparison of that hypothesis with the ascertained truths relating to the same or similar objects or phenomena.

The problem of Induction is—given certain facts or phenomena, to find a thought which shall co-ordinate or systematize them, and prove that this thought is in exact correspondence with the order of nature, and hence that this law is an expression of the necessities of sequence and consequence under which the facts or phenomena exist, persist, or desist.

This problem is worked out more specially by—

I. Ascertaining the *reliability* of the *data*. (a) By personal observation ; (b) testimony, due regard being had to the character, mode of transmission, &c., thereof ; (c) experiment.

II. Generalizing the *data*, depending on—(a) the constancy and invariability of the occurrence of the facts or phenomena ; (b) the nature of the relation supposed to subsist between the facts and the explanation, viz.—1st, co-existence ; 2nd, dependence=1 cause=altering,
2 effect=altered.

III. Applying the generalization and interpretation to the *data*=experimental verification.

Explanation depends upon the following items, viz.—

I. A correct observation of all the particulars constituting, or naturally connected with, the facts.

II. An accurate and faithful account or estimate of facts, either in writing or thought, and the honest recognition of each and all of the elements of these facts.

III. A new conception, which may or can bind the facts “into one unison.”

IV. A combining of the facts and this conception into one in thought, and testing their co-adaptation in reality.

Explanation generally refers to such terms as follow, viz.—
Motive, act, result; origin, progress, end; agency, operation; source, product; force, movement, &c.

The following precautions must be carefully observed in all Inductive operations, viz.:—

1. Beware of insufficient observation.
2. Beware of making experiments unguided by a well chosen hypothesis.
3. Beware of bending facts, or falsifying observations, to suit your hypotheses.
4. Beware of mistaking coincidence for sequence, or mere sequence for consequence.
5. Beware of mistaking the statement of a general *fact* for a *law*—the *way* of Nature for the *law* thereof.
6. Beware of disjoining observation or evidence, and thought or reflection.
7. Beware of haste, rashness, and want of care or honesty.

The *modus operandi* of Induction has already been fully explained, “Art of Reasoning,” chap. viii., and need not be here enlarged upon; our purpose in this series of papers will be fully accomplished, if we have shown the place which the Logic of Induction holds in the processes of thought in which the intellect of the self-culturist must take part. This we shall have done, if we have succeeded in informing and convincing the student that in the acquisition of knowledge, Induction is not a final, but an instrumental act or process—not an *end*, but a *means*—the pathway to, not the temple of, Truth. In the light of the Reason the soul apprehends the law of order under which the facts *seem* to it to exist; it *projects* from its own sources some conception which implies this order, draws out the pure thought in due syllogistic form, gains the conclusion natural to the premises employed, then tests the facts as to whether they accord in their real activities and states with the deductions of the reason. If they do so, the thought is no longer an hypothesis, but a truth.

When truth has been discovered, the work of Induction accomplished, new powers of thought come into exercise.

new form must be impressed on the treasures of the intellect. This subsequent process is called Theorizing.

A theory is a regular and systematic arrangement of all the principles or laws operating upon or among the special facts, whatever these may be, on which observation, hypothesis, and induction have been expended—truths woven together into a legitimately developed unity; and hence it is, so far as it goes, the expression of the results of *completed* acts of thought.

Theorizing is placing the various principles of facts together, *in thought*, in the relations of their dependence on each other.

Theory, in its highest development, is identical with truth, *i. e.*, with the absolute and necessary realities of things.

Actual objective being is the external vesture of truth.

Actual subjective being is the essential vesture of truth. The former is the subject-matter of Physics—the knowledge of Nature; the latter is the subject-matter of Psychics—the knowledge of the Soul. Our belief in either is resolvable in its ultimate analysis to a reliance on consciousness, and hence they both receive their validity.

Theory unites *in one* essential and external truth, arranges them for ease and readiness of study and reference, and registers them for future guidance.

The principles of the theoretic exposition of knowledge have been already expounded and expressed in the chapters on Method in the “Art of Reasoning” and “Rhetoric,” and it were a “vain repetition” to extend this paper by reproducing the same or similar rules here. We trust that our students will turn to these, or some similar books, for more extended information.

At our earliest convenient leisure we intend to present to our readers some “Exemplifications of the Logic of Study,” when we hope to make it appear that the guidance offered in this and the preceding papers on this topic is based on the soundest appreciation of the *modus operandi* of the greatest minds of our own or other times.

But some may say, If this is so, what need is there to reproduce here that which was known and practised “in the days of other years”? These objectors may not have heard the wise words of an eminent poet—words in which we honestly believe, *viz.* :—

“Philosophy itself

Smacks of the age it lives in, nor is true
Save by the apposition of the present;
And truths of olden time, though truths they be,
And living through all time eternal truths,
Yet want the seasoning and applying hand
Which nature sends successive. Else the need
Of wisdom would wear out, and wisdom cease,
Since needless wisdom were not to be wise.”

Religion.

DOES GEOLOGY CONFIRM THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF CREATION?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

INSPIRATION is thus scripturally defined:—"Holy men of old spake (and wrote) as they were moved by the Holy Spirit." God, by his Spirit, communicated with man, giving him, in most cases, the power to apprehend this revelation; moving him by speech, or writing, or both, to give utterance to it, and in this infallibly guiding him. In some cases, the sacred writers were inspired accurately to describe past events, or those which came under their own observation. But when they compiled from existing materials (as in the case, probably, of Judges, Kings, and Chronicles), they were inspired as to the choice and arrangement of the matter. It was in no degree left to themselves. Sometimes these holy men had to give utterance to truths which transcended their intelligence, and sometimes to prefigure the remote future. And they were allowed, in some degree, to express the matter revealed to them in their own words, and with their own images: thus the herdsman Amos uses similes connected with agriculture and pastoral life. But all these men, moved and guided by the Spirit of truth, could *in no case promulgate error*.

But as the Bible was intended for all men, literate and illiterate, it was written (God's wisdom and his goodness combining to cause this) in a style intelligible by all. To assist the Israelites in their genesis of intellect, events are represented as they appear to the senses, and the Deity is mentioned after an anthropomorphic manner—as possessing many of the attributes of humanity. Wherefore, as was remarked by our able coadjutor "Von Hammer," Moses omits all scientific details, both because the Bible was never intended to be a compendium of natural philosophy, and because, had such details been given, the Israelites could not have understood them. But though the sacred writers omitted truths foreign to their purpose, they never promulgated errors. And so believing, we affirm that the narrative in Genesis is neither a mythologue, nor a compilation of legends, but a true description, to be understood literally, being, of course, interpreted in accordance with the genius of scriptural allusion and diction.

As to the mode of interpretation, we are sorry to be obli-

to dissent from that chiefly favoured by our coadjutors, especially by our dear friend S. R. A. The hypothesis that the word "*day*" in the Mosaic narrative stands for an indefinite period seems to us destitute of probability and reason. The term is certainly used in such a sense in some parts of scripture, but it cannot be so interpreted here. The hypothesis is opposed to geology, as to the order of the creation of the various grades of being. It is opposed to the character of the record, which is mainly a plain and consecutive one. It is opposed to other portions of scripture, some of which have been already adduced. And it destroys the chief argument for the sacredness of the sabbath. If a literal sabbath were not instituted in the beginning, the greatest argument for its bindingness upon us is destroyed.

Our own theory is briefly this (we must be pardoned for partially re-stating it): We may suppose—nay, we may conclude—that a lengthened period elapsed between the act of creation, commemorated in the first verse of Genesis, and the events of the following verses. The first verse merely states that originally God created the heavens and the earth—the material universe; that at some period in the past eternity he "laid the foundations of the earth, laid the measures thereof, and stretched the line upon it;" and that at the same time "the morning stars sang together."* This supposition, or conclusion, is warranted by the analogy of scripture; for frequently between some two verses there is passed over without notice a lengthy interval (compare Exod. ii. 1, 2, both with vii. 7, and ii. 4; also, Deut. v. 6; also, Ezra, chaps. v., vi.) It is rendered still more reasonable by the fact that the Hebrew particle translated "*and*," is often used adversatively,† signifying *but* or *yet*. Thus scripture leaves indefinite the absolute age of the world.

Now Moses, having omitted the intermediate history of the earth, takes it up at that period immediately preceding its adaptation and preparation for man's occupancy, stating its condition after the last great geologic catastrophe—that it, or part of it, was bathed in swelling floods, its form indistinguishable, and itself void of inhabitants. It was in a disturbed and confused state. Order there might have been before, but not now. Besides this, the light of the heavenly bodies could not penetrate the dense and perturbed atmosphere by which the earth seems to have been surrounded. "Cloud was the garment thereof, and thick darkness a swaddlingband for it."‡ After a fitting dura-

* Job xxxviii.

† "Genesis and Geology," by Denis Crofton.

‡ Job xxxviii. An argument might be based upon such passages as these. Though the opening verses of Genesis contain no more than is necessary, and geological details are omitted, we see from his other writings that Moses, as

tion of this state of things, the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters, and the preparation of the earth commenced for its inhabitation by its last and best inhabitant, the immortal heir of earth and heaven. The process of this preparation is detailed in the succeeding verses. The rest is plain. The first day of the new epoch was occupied in dispelling the darkness which had shrouded the earth. On the next, the water in the clouds is separated from that on the earth, and the former, with the intermediate atmosphere, forms the firmament. Then the waters are confined within their proper bounds, and the earth brings forth its teeming beauties, "grass, and herb, and the tree yielding fruit." And as necessary to the existence of these, the heavenly bodies begin to exercise their benign and legitimate influence. Long before had they been created, but only now is the earth prepared for the kind of influence they have exerted to this day. The sacred writers do not allude to them as now created, but as now appointed to their various tasks. Much confusion has arisen from the practice of terming the work of the six days the *creation*, it being manifestly inappropriate. That the Hebrew has, in various cases, been interpreted "creation," where a better word might have been used, is perhaps a cause of this.

We will now review the articles of our opponents, and "Taliesin's" first. What reason have we to believe his account of the manufacture of Genesis—that it "was compiled by Moses from other and older memorials"? There is nothing, either in scriptural or profane history, to force the conviction that writing was practised before the finger of God traced his everlasting law on the burning mount of Sinai. Some mention Egyptian hieroglyphics, but they do not evidence a greater antiquity. The sceptic pointed to the ruined cities of America—to Copan, Quirigua, and Casas de Piedras; but these are proved to have been of comparatively modern date. Besides, supposing Moses compiled his record, is it not probable that he who was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians would have palmed off upon the Israelites the extravagant theories which these held? But no; the two theories differ widely. The beautiful description in Genesis contrasts instructively with their mad conjectures, and by its very simplicity and probability forces us to receive it as the truth.

As to the definitions "Taliesin" brings forward as expressing the general idea of creation, we have no hesitation in saying that

inspired, had a more intimate knowledge of the history of the earth than theologians have supposed. See the instances already adduced. Also, Job xiv. 19; xxvi. 5, 7; xxviii. 1—7. Without doubt, Moses was the author of the book of Job.

the Mosaic record neither requires nor warrants them. Such ignorant and embodied dogmatisms, and the obstinacy of bigots in retaining them, are the chief causes of such discussions as the present, and many of the hindrances to the progress of the truth.

"Taliesin's" first six arguments we admit, ourselves disbelieving S. R. A.'s theory. His seventh was answered in our reply on the sabbath question (page 121). To his eighth, an answer was, by anticipation, afforded by the extract from Milner, in our former article on this question. In reality, it has nothing to do with the subject; nor, indeed, has his tenth. The absurdity of this last, however, is easily shown. If it were said that "the Queen gave a medal to each French soldier," would that mean every French soldier that ever lived? "Taliesin's" eleventh argument is equally nonsensical. What is there in the words he quotes to lead him to imagine that the Creator was uncertain of his success? He has little studied the genius of the Bible if he knows not that the Father, in compassion to our finite intelligence, represents himself in a human aspect. His twelfth has been already answered several times.

It is most amusing to note his procedure. The objection he starts on page 58 he himself answers on page 59; and to his seventh argument he furnishes a reply on page 60.

By what principle of logic can "Taliesin" argue as he does on page 59. Because the Creator is sometimes spoken of metaphorically, therefore all accounts of his actions are figurative! If a man uses simile once, all his utterances are to be considered symbolical! Excellent argument!—worthy of its cause! Again, he attempts to draw a parallel between the plan of the Mosaic record and the argument used by Christ respecting the Jewish exorcists. Where is the resemblance? In one place we have an historical statement, in the other a rhetorical figure used in an argument. It is a new style of rhetoric which would draw a parallel between an *epitrope* and a lie.

It is useless to attempt to compare the Bible with other books. All scripture being given by inspiration of God, the Bible must be *sui generis*, a star without parallax. It is lifted high above all the conditions of human literature. It is unaffected by a barbarous age, an ignorant people, a lack of books. Other ancient literature may have much of the fabulous, the mythical, the poetic; but the very idea of inspiration disallows the supposition that the Bible should resemble such. Aye, as to his servant Habakkuk, the Lord gave command to all the holy men, "moved by the Holy Spirit," to "write the vision and make it plain, that he may run that readeth it."

We care to remark no more on "Taliesin's" article. Professing to regard the scripture as a divine revelation, he loses no opportunity to disprove its inspiration and deny its authority. He must even wander from his subject to sneer at the sacred narrative!

How are we to regard "Grimwood"? In our former article, we endeavoured to use great plainness of speech; but it seems we must bend still lower to meet his capacity. Or must we conclude that the will is wanting, not the power—that he will not understand? Had he carefully and candidly read our statements, he would have found no difficulty in reconciling them with the verses of Genesis. We fully believe that there existed vegetation centuries before the third day of the preparation of the earth for man, and find no opposition to this belief in scripture. We may inform him, that the time when the earth was "without form, and void," was not the indefinite period to which "Threlkeld" referred, but was the closing epoch of that indefinite period. He says, that before the third and following verses of Genesis, we have no clue to pre-existing worlds. What does he make of the word "heavens" in the first verse? It is a pity the record of such obtuseness should appear in print. Soon follow three informal paragraphs—paragraphs wholly foreign to the subject. What has the introduction of death to do with the creation?

We attach little importance to his objections to what we stated concerning the deluge, since the facts are clear, that the country stretching between the Euphrates and the Tigris was well fitted to be the receptacle of such a flood; that there did not exist sufficient water for an universal one; that there was no need of more than a partial deluge; and that the universal terms used in the narrative are often, in the sacred volumes, employed in a limited sense.

" Thus far have I pursued my solemn theme,
With self-rewarding toil,"

endeavouring to show that every portion of the sacred record must be essentially true; that therefore the Mosaic account of the creation is, in the main, to be taken literally; and that, without ignoring any of the facts of science, or any of the statements of scripture, a perfect agreement may be shown to exist between the teachings of geology and the words of the Bible.

Cambridge.

THRELKELD.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

WE conclude the present debate with mingled feelings of gratification and pain: gratification at finding our position unassailable; pain at seeing such a diversity of opinion existing in reference to the interpretation of certain passages in the Bible amongst those who profess to acknowledge the divine origin of that sacred record. It was our intention, originally, to take no part in this discussion, but to await the course of events, an anxious spectator of the intellectual combat. Had "Threlkeld's" article have appeared sooner, we should have been spared the

infliction of "Von Hammer's" remark as to our "irreverence." On reading S. R. A.'s article, which is equally at variance with the teachings of geology as with those of the Bible, we were surprised to find the assertion, that his method of reconciling the two "has been adopted by all the most able recent investigators of the subject." Perceiving what a weapon he was unconsciously placing in the hands of the infidel—who could not but detect the fallaciousness of his views, and the sophistical nature of his arguments—we decided to give our opinion on the subject. We could not conscientiously support S. R. A., believing him to be in the wrong; we therefore adopted the course of opening the negative side of the question. In so doing, we distinctly stated, that geology "does not invalidate, in any one point," the Bible, "viewed in a proper light, although it" teaches "much that is directly contradictory to the Mosaic account of creation, as generally interpreted and taught"—that interpretation being, "that 'God made all things of nothing in six days,' six thousand years ago." We concluded our article by giving our method of reconciling the two records—Mosaic and geological. How have our opponents acted? They agree with us in declaring that the teachings of geology are not in accordance with the Mosaic account as generally interpreted, and then give their methods of making the two agree. In reality, the difference between us is in name only. We have all one object in view—that of maintaining the sacred and divine character of the Bible, and its general accordance with the teachings of science. Had our opening article have been written for the affirmative side of the question, the remarks of "Von Hammer" would never have appeared. Those who write professing unbounded reverence for the Bible, and who cavil for the strict literal meaning of every sentence, should at least let us see that they themselves carry out its dictates. We should expect to find humility and goodwill in every line of their writings, but are often miserably deceived, their productions being characterized by dogmatism and assumed infallibility. "Threlkeld's" views are thus spoken of by the Rev. Henry Cole,—We "defy all the combined ability of infidelity, philosophy, and geology to prove the 'beginning' to have been anterior to the 'first day' God here intends. No geologist who may read these pages will henceforth remain ignorant of his war against Omnipotence and everlasting truth. We have insubvertibly established it from the lips of Eternal Veracity, that neither the earth, nor the material of which it was formed, nor any creature that is found therein, had existence before 'the first day' of the revealed creation; that truth we have undeniably and everlastingly established, insubvertible and immovable by human ability."* Pretty fair this

* "Popular Geology subversive of Divine Revelation."

for a christian minister, we think! We could give scores of such extracts. A pamphlet has lately been published, in the above dogmatic style, attributing the various stratifications and fossil remains to the action of the deluge. Finding, then, that those holding views similar to our opponents are not very particular in distributing hard words amongst themselves, we are not surprised at coming in for our share.

It seems extraordinary that our opponents in this debate should hold such dissimilar views. S. R. A. and "Von Hammer" are as much opposed, in reality, to "Threlkeld" and A. L., as we are to either party. Every one that attempts to reconcile the scriptures with the teachings of geology considers his method as quite simple and unquestionably correct; yet, in truth, they are all so contradictory, uncertain, and incomprehensible, that, for lack of any decided views on the subject, our children are still taught in our Sunday schools that "God made all things of nothing in six days," a few thousand years ago. Does this advance the cause of religion? When the child, who has thus been taught, grows up, the infidel proves incontrovertibly that the earth has existed for millions of years. What follows? A manhood of scepticism, in many cases. It should be the endeavour of every earnest Christian to attempt to bring about some general interpretation of the Mosaic record which all could adopt. At present, the earnest seeker after truth is sneered at and reviled; the dogmatic Christian will not acknowledge, tolerate, or excuse any deviation from his opinion of the record, to the great delight of the infidel, who is overjoyed to find that the christian world has not benefited by its mistaken persecution of Galileo. The Reformation gave to every man the right of private judgment; it asserted the triumph of reason. Whilst exercising this right, we have been accused of approaching the book of Revelation "with the rude jostlings of the debating club;" but our accuser brings forward nothing to support his assertion. Ministers of religion, when arguing on certain dogmas which have no bearing on man's futurity, and only relate to a few forms and ceremonies here below, drag the Bible into the controversy with far greater warmth and fervour than we have done. No doubt "Von Hammer" found it far easier to make such assertions as these than to disprove our arguments.

We will now examine a few of the main points in our opponents' articles. It betrays a want of confidence in his position when a controversialist, keeping clear of the real points in dispute, brings forward other matters, which his opponent may or may not dispute. "Von Hammer," instead of disproving our arguments, has launched out into generalities, all of which we believe equally with himself. It seems as if he were aware of his weakness, and, with great discretion and prudence, kept from the heat of the combat, and contented himself with skirmishing

at a distance with imaginary foes. After a good deal of circumlocution,—after assuring us that he had “reluctantly struck out some pages of manuscript,” in which he “had most conclusively, to” his “own mind, proved the existence of internal heat,” for which, we are sure, the readers of the *B. C.* will be truly thankful, seeing that it had nothing more to do with the question than the proof of the existence or non-existence of icebergs in the moon,—he asserts that “geology gives the lie to that monstrous dictum, ‘that there are no traces of a beginning, no symptoms of an end.’” Who gave utterance to the “monstrous dictum”? Surely “Von Hammer” can find nothing in our article to warrant the saddling upon us the support of such absurdity. In reconciling the two records, he follows in the footsteps of his predecessor, S. R. A., and is as confident and vainglorious as though we had not overturned anything advanced by that redoubtable individual. We shall now combat his assertions, by opposing to them the words of “Threlkeld” and Hugh Miller—the latter more particularly, since “Von Hammer” quotes him as an authority. The words “without form, and void” refer to “that beginning when the mineral dynasties had not as yet begun their reigns, and when inorganic life had not evinced its birth by the play of elective affinity, or by the accretion of a crystal. Thus far, then, the two records agree.” This refers to a time *millions* of years ago. We fancy many of our readers will think this very fine writing, but quite as incomprehensible as fine. According to “Threlkeld,” the expression, “without form, and void,” refers to a period only *six thousand* years ago. Before the earth became void, “forests grew, creatures roamed the plain and peopled the waters. Through long ages successive creatures were created;” then the earth became “covered with a liquid mantle, which no eye could pierce,” and it was “without form, and void.” This is the “combined testimony” of geology and scripture, says “Threlkeld.” “Between the creation of the matter of which the earth is composed, as enunciated in the first verse, and the earth’s void and chaotic state, as described in the second, a *thousand* creations might have intervened,” declares Hugh Miller. We have, then, on the one side, “Von Hammer;” on the other, “Threlkeld” and Hugh Miller. The upshot is, that “Von Hammer” must go to the wall; his method of reconciling the two records is certainly too antiquated for the present day. Further on, he tells us the days of the sacred narrative are periods of indefinite length, and that the various animals which have occupied the surface of the ground, and whose fossils we find imbedded deep down in the bowels of the earth, were created during these periods. He believes “that this interpretation reconciles all difficulties, and if it does, every Christian is bound to accept it.” Our arguments have already been directed against such an absurd and exploded rendering. Hugh Miller, Pye

Smith, and all the celebrated geologists who have written with the purpose of reconciling the scriptures with the teachings of geology, have considered such a method untenable. Those who have adopted it, are parties whose geological truths are obtained at second hand. They read some interesting geological work, and then fancy that to reconcile the two records is quite easy: the successive creations are to them plainly the work of six periods, and these periods are the days of the Mosaic record. They sacrifice the beauty and sublimity of the sacred record to satisfy their notions on the subject. "And evening was, and morning was, day one," means a period of unlimited time. If this be not "bending" the word of God to suit our own views, we know not what is. If a portion of the narrative be figurative, why not all? "Von Hammer's" definition of life is not very satisfactory: "Man is the only earthly creature that lives;" the existence of the "mineral, the plant, and the animal, are but different manifestations of the same force." No ordinary mortal will be able to comprehend this. The life of the animal is so similar to that of man, that many theological writers—men of judgment and of scientific attainments—have thought that the animal may be destined for a future existence. That there is a greater resemblance between the existence of minerals and animals than between animals and man seems contrary to all reason. We leave "Von Hammer" in the enjoyment of his notions.

We have now to consider the method proposed by a writer for whom we entertain a sincere respect. "Threlkeld" and ourselves have already crossed swords in debate, and we here make the *amende honorable* for the mistake we then made in thinking he classed us among infidels. He takes a very sensible view of the present question; we believe, with him, that the deluge was only partial, but we still think our method of reconciling the teachings of geology and the scriptures the best. We should like to have seen "Threlkeld's" article written after the appearance of ours, as he then might have cleared away some of the difficulties we pointed out. We consider, however, that since he surrenders the literal meaning of the account of the deluge, he ought not to experience much difficulty in equally giving up the literal account of the creation.

Having been called upon unexpectedly to conclude this debate, we are prevented, through professional engagements, from extending our remarks. A. L.'s article contains only one sentence to which we need refer. "Who thinks, at this day, of any discrepancy between astronomy and revelation?" True, A. L., but who thinks at this day of settling astronomical questions theologically? As we yielded to astronomy the right of deciding all astronomical questions, so we must eventually resign to geology the settlement of all geological ones. Then, and not till th-

will the two records, Mosaic and geological, agree. We conclude in the words of Hugh Miller :—"The church of Rome strove hard, in the days of Galileo, to settle an astronomical question theologically, and did its utmost to commit the Bible to the belief that the earth occupies a central position in the system, and that the sun performs a daily revolution round it; but the astronomical question, maugre the Inquisition, refused to be settled other than astronomically. What would have been the result had Rome, backed by the Franciscan, succeeded in pledging the verity of scripture to a false astronomy? All the higher minds would have become convinced for themselves, and the great bulk of the lower, at second hand, that the scripture pledge had been given, not to scientific truth, but to scientific error; and the Bible, to the extent to which it stood committed, would be justly regarded as occupying no higher a lever than the Shaster or Koran. Infidelity never yet succeeded in placing revelation in a position so essentially false as that in which it was placed by Rome, to the extent of Rome's ability, in the case of Galileo."

TALIESIN.

ART OF BEAUTY.—The true art of assisting beauty consists in embellishing the whole person by the proper ornaments of virtuous and commendable qualities. By this help alone it is that those who are the favourite work of nature, or, as Mr. Dryden expresses it, "the porcelain of human kind," become animated, and are in a capacity for exerting their charms; and those who seem to have been neglected by her, like models wrought in haste, are capable, in a great measure, of finishing what she has left imperfect.—*Hughes*.

WOMAN.—Never shrink from a woman of strong sense. If she become attached to you, it will be from seeing and valuing similar qualities in yourself. You may trust her, for she knows the value of your confidence; you may consult her, for she is able to devise, and does so at once with the firmness of reason, and the consideration of affection. Her love will be lasting, for it will not have been lightly won; it will be strong and ardent, for weak minds are not capable of the loftier grades of passion. If you prefer attaching yourself to a woman of feeble understanding, it must be either from fearing to encounter a superior person, or from the poor vanity of preferring that admiration which springs from ignorance, to that which approaches to appreciation.

FORCE OF PREJUDICE.—As the petty fish which is fabled to possess the property of arresting the progress of the largest vessel to which it clings, even so may a single prejudice, unnoticed or despised, more than the adverse blast, or the dead calm, delay the bark of knowledge in the vast seas of time.—*Anon*.

History.

IS MACAULAY'S ESTIMATE OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE CORRECT?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IF we may judge by the pages of the *Controversialist*, the portraiture of William of Orange, in Macaulay's history, is likely to command the approving suffrages of the present generation, whatever may be its estimation in days to come. The negative side of this debate, to say the least, appears to be far from popular. Even B. J. seems to take up his controversial armour unwillingly, and to find his present task much less congenial than when he undertook to overthrow the claims of Queen Elizabeth upon our admiration. Our friend appears to have taken his motto from the cover of the "Edinburgh Review"—"*Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur*,"—and to be so nervously afraid of absolving any historical delinquent, as to have resolved upon condemning, *en masse*, all historical personages, together with all historians favourable to them. B. J., it is to be hoped, will never attempt to write history on his own principles for the juvenile portion of the community, or we fear it will prove so terrible a record of "ugly people," as to frighten young England out of its propriety. When Elizabeth and William III. find no favour, it is difficult to know who among earth's political notabilities will pass muster. "Where e'en the best are bad," what terrible impersonations of evil the generality must be! We feel tempted to suspect our friend of Red-Republicanism, for surely he would not be as unmerciful to other grades of the community as he is to crowned heads?

In our former article we endeavoured to distinguish between opinion and expression, between the matter and the manner of historical portraiture. It must be evident almost to every one that it is impossible for any one man to form an absolutely truthful conception of the character of another. We form our judgment upon actions, and reason thence by induction as to the motives which led to such actions. Unfortunately, our inductions, in effect, rest upon single instances, since we seldom find a repetition of precisely similar actions under precisely similar circumstances. Thus we can but very imperfectly apply the principle on which induction rests. Then, again, in the case of historical characters, all our observations, and all our knowledge of those actions on which we reason, are taken at second hand; thus compelling a preliminary estimate of the value and

truthfulness of the evidence, before we can reason on the facts of each case. And, to crown all, we can never know *all* the facts which should be taken into account in judging character from its exhibition in the actions of life. Let it be granted, as the consequence of this reasoning, that, at best, any estimate of character can be no more than approximately correct, and we at once see that many varying estimates may be equally correct—details may differ, without affecting the intrinsic agreement of the whole. The same conclusion may be deduced, less strictly in point of logic, but more directly, and perhaps (so to speak) more *appreciably*, from the consideration that, in estimating any given character, perhaps no two minds can, by any possibility, view that character through the same medium of pre-conceived opinion, or from the same critical stand-point. Our judgments, like our actions, and our outward selves generally, bear the impress of individuality. Now, if this be true of our conclusions, as they exist in the mind, how much more strongly must it be true of the *expression* of our thoughts! Paley must be clear, Addison elegant, Johnson pompous, and Macaulay rhetorical and florid. Must we for this reason condemn three, in order to establish the correctness and truth of the opinions of the fourth, in cases where all four lean to the same view of any given question? Surely not. We might as well fix on a particular leaf or flower, and condemn every variation in form or hue as a defect in beauty. We might as wisely pretend that only one language of the myriad tongues of men is capable of expressing truth, as attempt to mark out any particular style as the only English way of expressing truth. Surely no differences in style and language among prose writers are so distinct and marked as the difference between poetry and prose; and yet no sane man would dream of branding poetry as incapable of becoming the vehicle of truth on account of its ornate, florid, and (compared with prose) exaggerated modes of expression. We hope, therefore, that we have established with clearness the position, that the impress of mental individuality, and the style of any literary production, are separable from its correctness and truth. We may condemn the manner of a writer, and yet admit the correctness of his judgments. To use B. J.'s analogy between painting and authorship, what should we think of a critic who should object to the truth of a landscape, because it is bathed in the golden glory of sunset, instead of being wrapped in a November fog? So the artist may clothe his groves in summer verdure, or make them "thin ghosts, all leafless, grim, and bare," and yet, in either case, copy nature with all the minuteness of the pre-Raphaelite school. There is not a holiday sketcher but tries to discover the most picturesque aspect of the object he wishes to transfer to the pages of his sketch-book. There is no need to place the worst aspects in the foreground; it may be our way of

doing homage to truth, but it is by no means the only way of doing so. In respect of Macaulay, we frankly and fully stated our objections to his history in our former article; but the question of his truthfulness of judgment, in the case of William of Orange, is an entirely distinct consideration. His style is doubtless "exaggerated," and words are "heaped up" beyond the demands of simple truth; but we think that our readers will not be likely to agree with B. J., in interpreting these criticisms as a concession to our opponents, or as in any way inconsistent with the affirmative side of the present debate.

B. J., after quoting two sentences from our former article, remarks, that "it is not truth to suppress or alter any feature which mars the whole;" and that "we expect to find" all those peculiarities "which individualize the man." In these remarks we not only concur, but actually anticipated B. J. We spoke of "waiting for our antagonists to single out the defects of resemblance in Macaulay's portraiture of William." Has B. J. attempted to do this? Has he mentioned any one fact respecting William which is omitted from Macaulay's pages? The only attempt to meet our appeal is where we are told that Burnet "is used with great skill." A few instances would have been far more effective than such generalities of accusation as this. B. J. surely cannot expect either readers or writers to enter upon the collation of Burnet with Macaulay, in order to test such vague assertions. We pointedly asked, "Does Macaulay deny or ignore any material feature of William's character, or does he impute to that monarch any qualities which he did not possess?" But the question is utterly evaded, and B. J. thereby unconsciously concedes all that an opponent can desire.

We have before admitted that Macaulay groups William's qualities in an artistic manner, and we ask, How otherwise could any historian write, unless he abjures all graces of style, and is bent on making his work as unpopular and uninteresting as possible, by reducing the description of character to a mere dry catalogue of human virtues and vices? Prominent features, we maintain, should be prominently set forth. The *general* character of the man should be made to stand out in bold relief. Now, what is the testimony of our critic? We are told that he has no wish to "deny the general excellencies of William's character;" that he is "not contending against William's claims;" and that, "however great and good William may have been, we are indebted more to the overruling hand of Providence, . . . than from (?) his exemption from the foibles and frailties of human nature"!!! Truly, here is matter of justification for Macaulay, had he been ten times more rhetorical and artistic in his delineation of William! The admission of "general excellency" certainly warrants us in assigning the foreground to William's virtues, and the background to his faults, unless we

would draw character after the fashion of Mercator's projection, magnifying all objects to the same size, until the poles, instead of points, become straight lines of equal length with the equator. Then as to the declaration in which Providence is placed one step higher than William;—is there anything so exaggerated in Macaulay as such a sentence? We trow not.

Our opponent calls us to task for representing Macaulay's "startlingly vivid style" as a proof of his trustworthiness. If he will turn again to page 114, and substitute *our* words for his interpolation, "style," we think that second thoughts may perhaps lead him to agree with us. It is hard, indeed, to be life-like in delineations of character, unless those delineations are drawn from life. A poet's pen may body forth, and clothe with some semblance of reality, "the shapes of things unknown," but it is only the masters of the poetic art who can do so with success. Whence does Shakespeare derive his universal interest, but from his knowledge of human nature, his unequalled soul anatomy, his *reality* of description? Whence the interest of such works as "Uncle Tom's Cabin"? We *knew*, as we read, that its characters were taken from life. The "Key," which was subsequently published, was perhaps useful as a means of silencing sceptical argument, but the true key was to be found in the heart of every reader. The connecting links of that story were unnatural, and afforded scope for critical diatribes, which the documents in the "Key" only confirmed, by showing us, that while the incidents were real, the framework of connection was the artificial product of the authoress's imagination. We might take multitudes of other instances. Let one suffice. The secret of Sir Walter Scott's popularity arises from the fact that his best characters were all more or less sketches from life, the results of observation. His scenery even was sketched from nature. We learn that he went over the ground, and noted the very vegetation of those scenes so "vividly" portrayed in the "Lady of the Lake," just before commencing the poem. And in his novels, many of the conversations are made up of sentences which had fallen upon his ears from living lips. Who has not heard of his stopping to jot down an expression which occurred in the course of a feminine street squabble? Now, if this reasoning be applied to history, it becomes still more forcible. It appears almost impossible that a writer can be very untrue to nature, without making us sensible that his descriptions are unnatural. To avoid such result would require that the facts of history should be suppressed and garbled to an immense extent. Turn to any noted examples of partisan history and biography, and we invariably find the writer concealing some facts, inventing others, and anxiously arguing upon those unfavourable circumstances which he cannot conceal. The result is an inevitable sense of constraint, and of a want of nature. We feel that the

man is only partially brought before us—the portraiture is *not* “vividly” life-like. Without entering into the controversy between Mr. Hepworth Dixon and Macaulay as to Penn, who would call the few scanty allusions to the founder of Pennsylvania, in Macaulay’s pages, a vivid portraiture? They may prejudice us against Penn, but no thoughtful reader could help feeling that he had only *half* a man portrayed. The specific accusations may or may not be true. We can see that the historian has a low opinion of the celebrated Quaker, but we do not see enough to judge for ourselves;—the picture is not complete in these pages; it wants reality. But in the case of William, we have the opposite of all this. We know of no important act which is unrecorded. The whole man stands before us; the very minutiae of gossip finds a place in the picture; not even his failings in the anti-teetotal direction are hidden. The result is “vividly” life-like. Could this be so if the portrait were not correct, and pretty closely true to nature?

It is somewhat amusing to find that B. J., in spite of his declaration that he is “not contending against William’s claims, but against Macaulay’s florid and partial treatment of them,” is so utterly at a loss for arguments against Macaulay, that he occupies full two-thirds of his space with a tirade against William. It is still more striking, because, for anything that appears, the matter of his indictment may have been taken from Macaulay’s own pages. B. J. states not a single fact which is not duly recorded by that writer; and the unfavourable construction he puts upon these facts is not supported by a shade of argument. We imagine that neither Macaulay nor any one else will quarrel with the grave conclusion that “it was a good move from the Hague to London,” as matters turned out. At the same time, we fancy that few will share in B. J.’s “dubious” feelings, simply because the “*call*” was in an upward direction.” There may be virtue in pursuing a downward progress towards misfortune, but we think the virtue is not in pursuing such a path *because* it is downwards. The remark savours rather more of the spleen than of sound logic. There can be no doubt that, in this particular instance, William made no move until he had received a very decided “call,” in the shape of the invitation transmitted to him from this country. It would have been strange, indeed, if he had refused such a call. The interests of Europe urged him to accept it, in order to maintain the balance of power against the ambitious and aggrandizing schemes of Louis XIV. So strong was this feeling, that we find even the Pope of Rome secretly favoured the cause of William.

Still more imperatively the interests of his native country urged upon William the acceptance of this invitation. Her prosperity and influence—almost her very existence—depended upon preventing that intimate alliance, or rather subjection, of

England to France, towards which the policy of James was so evidently tending. Again, if we allow William to have had any religious convictions, they, too, must have counselled his acceptance of the English invitation. Protestantism was in jeopardy of its existence. In England its safety depended solely on the power of the people to withstand the influence of the bigoted James; and the English nation, consciously unable to carry on the contest, had raised this cry for succour, and had called on William to come over and help them. To William, as the leader of continental Protestantism—to William, as the sole representative of civil liberty—to William, as the husband of the next heir to the crown (excepting a mere babe, upon whose legitimacy there were many doubts), the people of England had a *right* to look for counsel and aid in this national crisis. The horrors of civil war, deluging the country with blood; the intolerance of the Rump Parliament; the dictatorship of the army; the short intervention of national glory and honour abroad, and of national prosperity and freedom at home, under the wise and firm rule of Cromwell, too quickly succeeded by the degradation, the tyranny, and struggles of the subsequent reign,—all this sad record was fresh in the minds of the nation. To resist James without foreign aid, was to court a recurrence of the same miseries; to submit, was to bow the neck to the double yoke of spiritual and civil slavery, and to retrograde to the struggles and persecutions of the era of Henry VIII. and Queen Mary. In the struggles of the Commonwealth, republicanism had been tried and failed; in the person of Cromwell, a change of dynasty had been attempted and failed. What, then, remained? But one path was open—to change the succession of the crown to a Protestant heir—to effect by force that which the House of Commons had attempted to accomplish by the celebrated Exclusion Bill of the previous reign. In every way William answered these conditions and requirements. Had he refused the invitation sent to him, he would, as far as human influence could effect it, have sealed the doom of England for ages, if not for ever.

Such are the various considerations, independent of ambition and of self, which “called” on William to pursue the course he adopted. Europe, Holland, England, Protestantism, Liberty! Goodly reasons, these, on the one side. What, then, is the *per contra* account which B. J. can present to us to balance the sheet? “Filial duty,”—“filial respect,”—“this is the language of a son to his father,” &c. And this, forsooth, of a father-in-law! We have read of many varieties of the *jus divinum*, but it seems to have been reserved for B. J. to discover the divine right of fathers-in-law. Truly, if the claims of nations, of country, of pure religion, of civil liberty, and of human happiness—if the duties owed to subjects, and the cry for aid of the distressed,—if

all these are to give way and be overridden by the will and pleasure of a father-in-law, whose character is (we quote B. J. himself) stamped with "folly, bigotry, and imbecility," it is to us a novel discovery. Certes, if the case of a man be so with his wife's father, it were good not to marry! If B. J. be wise, he will at least remain a Benedict for life. His doctrine assuredly is not sufficiently current in society to give effect to his reasoning.

Another fair specimen of B. J.'s impartiality is shown in his remarks on Monmouth's rebellion. B. J. "cannot say" that William had any share in the matter; "*but* Monmouth was his friend;" and "*if* the rebellion had been successful, we *might* have heard another tale"! Oh, these "buts" and "ifs"! what ragged remnants of argument they serve to tack together! Friendship is worse than marriage, according to B. J. One might chance to meet with a tolerably mild father-in-law, but it would be exceedingly dangerous to have friends, if we are to bear the penalty and odium of their misdeeds! But it were idle to comment on such arguments; to quote them is to show that the writer has need to remember the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself!" when he condemns Macaulay as "partial."

The fact of Shrewsbury's signature standing at the foot of the invitation to William may disgrace the writer, when his shuffling, treacherous machinations in after days are remembered, but how can it cast blame on the Prince of Orange? The true measure of contemptibility which marks Shrewsbury's character, in *our* eyes, was not *then* filled up; nor is it reasonable to suppose that, in the midst of his wars and state affairs, William had been able, up to that period, to study the individual character of the English peerage with any very remarkable minuteness. Time and opportunity were both wanting.

The charge against William in respect of the massacre of Glencoe is a more serious matter. Now we have Burnet's direct testimony that the king signed the order without reading it. There is neither testimony nor circumstantial evidence to the contrary. The purpose of Stair, in compassing so barbarous an act, is intelligible, evident, and in accordance with his character; the object William could have in sanctioning such an outrage is almost inconceivable, unless we impute it to a sheer love of barbarity. Such being the facts on which our decision is to rest, what say our readers to the bold assertion of B. J., that William "did not scruple" to use the revenge of Stair for "his own purpose"? Misgivings seem to have crossed B. J.'s mind, for he proceeds to comment on Macaulay's remark respecting the signature of public documents. His remarks will bring a smile to the face of any one who has ever seen the course of business, even in a large private firm, to say nothing of government offices. Why, there is not one landed proprietor in fifty who ever read through the title deeds of his own estates. Perhaps not one in

fifty could understand the meaning of his own marriage settlements, or of his will, unless he had his attorney at hand to explain them. Yet these are documents on which his fortune, position, and comfort depend, and are signed by his own hand. Does B. J. dream that the secretary of such a company as the London and North Western Railway reads through every document he signs? or that our merchant princes have any knowledge, derived from personal inspection, of every letter to which they attach their signatures? And when we come to persons holding the reins of government, the veriest tyro must see that the eyes of Argus would fail to enable a chief minister of state to read all the multifarious papers which go forth in his name. Mr. Labouchere may write a circular despatch; but it is preposterous to suppose that he can read through every one of the fifty copies for fifty separate colonies; and yet each copy will go forth in his name, and probably signed by his hand. But enough has been said to show that the account of Burnet and the comment of Macaulay are by no means improbable. In the days when our monarchs were, to some extent, their own secretaries and ministers, they must of necessity have signed *many* documents without reading; and, therefore, however much we may regret the circumstance, it was his misfortune rather than his fault if William was entrapped into an unconscious authorization of the massacre of Glencoe. We know that the parliament of Scotland absolved him; and parliaments were not obsequious in his days.

We have but one more statement to notice. B. J. asserts, that Macaulay "takes note of faults and failings only to cover and conceal, to gloss over, &c. . . . *There is nought in the foreground but graciousness and kingly majesty, and nobility of heart.*" We will pass over the first sentence with the remark, that if Macaulay really does "*take note*" of things in order to "*conceal*" them, he acts in a strangely Hibernian manner indeed! As a sample of the trustworthiness of B. J., we ask the reader to compare the second sentence (in *italics*) with the following passages from Macaulay's work:—

"His (William's) manners gave almost *universal offence*. He was, in truth, far better qualified to save a nation than to adorn a court. . . . One of the chief functions of our sovereigns had long been to preside over the society of the capital. *But of this sociableness William was entirely destitute.* He seldom came forth from his closet; and when he appeared in the public rooms, he stood among the crowd of courtiers and ladies *stern* and abstracted, *making no jest, and smiling at none.* His *freezing look*, his silence, the dry and concise answers which he uttered when he could keep silence no longer, *disgusted.* . . . The women *missed the homage due to their sex.*"—History, iii., 49—51.

Perhaps B. J. may reconcile these sentences with his own re-

mark on "graciousness and kingly majesty." We find it difficult to do so. Had we not already exceeded our limits we might produce still more striking extracts; but we chose those quoted above because they form a part of the most glowing and laudatory sketch in the whole work.

We have little doubt as to the result of discussion on this topic. When we review the whole character and conduct of William; when we recall his trials, his difficulties, his physical defects and disease (in themselves sufficient to palliate and explain many defects in temper and demeanour); when we remember the times in which he lived, the men who surrounded him, the helplessness and dependency, in minor matters, of one who was at once the bulwark of Europe against the power of the Grand Monarchy, and the ruler of two nations separated by the stormy German Ocean; when we reflect upon the fact that he was never to the last familiar with our language or our habits; can we refuse him the title of Great? When we remember that he came over untrammelled by a single stipulation, and at once, and in spite of opposition, inaugurated an era of liberty unknown before, can we deny him the epithet Good? Let the readers decide. "Aye!" will be at once a verdict for the Prince and the Historian.

B. S.

FINE SENSE.—If things were put in a true light, and we would take time to consider that man, in his very nature, is an imperfect being, our sense of the matter would be immediately altered, and the word "imperfection" would not carry an unkind idea than the word "humanity." It is a pleasant story that we, forsooth, who are the only imperfect creatures in the universe, are the only beings that will not allow of imperfection.—*Steele*.

BEQUESTS.—What you leave at your death, let it be without controversy, else the lawyers will be your heirs.—*F. Osborn to his Son*.

INFLUENCE OF PROPERTY.—Property ought to have its influence, and sweet indeed might be the uses of that influence in teaching the ignorant, in delivering the poor from the fangs of the oppressor, in binding up the broken-hearted, in visiting the widow and the fatherless. These are the influences which, in some measure, might atone to mankind for the evils which property, as now recognized, inflicts upon them. But if property will pervert its influence to effect the moral degradation and political enthrallment of those to whom it owes its value—if it will accumulate only to corrupt and crush,—let it beware lest its "rights" and influence be deemed incompatible with the anterior rights of man; and, by producing general disgust at the present arrangement of society, long before its members are fitted for a better, endanger those rights which at present it is permitted to have.

Politics.

IS EDUCATION THE DUTY OF THE STATE?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

“While others fish with craft for great opinion,
I, with great *truth*, catch mere simplicity.
While some with cunning gild their copper crowns,
With truth and plainness I do wear mine bare.
Fear not my TRUTH.”—*Shakespeare.*

WE have previously shown that it is the duty of the parent to educate his child; that it is a right which he cannot alienate, a duty which he cannot omit, without violating the laws of nature and the first principles of social science. We have also given proof that it is not in the nature of Government to receive the obligation, nor in its power to discharge the duty, and that it is impossible to legislate upon the question without injustice to society in general, and to individuals in particular. These positions have remained intact, our opponents having satisfied themselves with a few sallies of wit, a little special pleading, some measure of *petitionis principii*, and much of that high-sounding oratory which, like a bubble, is light, airy, and beautiful, until touched by a rude fact, when all vanishes as the baseless fabric of a dream. Education, personal and social, has been our vocation from earliest infancy; actively and passively, education has been our enthusiasm. For more than a quarter of a century have we actively engaged in the voluntary education of the poor. In the midst of the poor have our happiest and holiest hours been spent; aye, and among the criminal poor some of the most painful too. Thousands have gathered around us, and listened to the voice of voluntary instruction. In the schoolhouse, in the open air, in the crowded city, and in the quiet village, have we laboured. It is therefore with the simplicity which attaches to the practical experiences of life that we wish to speak on this question, and not as the advocates of a theory connected far away from the actualities of fact, for party purposes, on the platform of politics, or in the forum of the legislature.

Before entering in detail upon the arguments of the advocates of State education, we would notice the general feature of all their arguments. They admit that primarily education is the duty of the parent, but that so great is the number of criminal and vicious parents, who are either grossly negligent of this duty, or perform it to the manifest injury of the child and of society, that it is necessary *all parents* should be compelled to place *all*

children under the care of the Government for the purposes of education. Now we are particularly partial to facts, especially when stamped with the patent of competent authority. They are so stubborn, so unyielding, they care nothing for finely attenuated theories and delicately drawn hypotheses. Not they; they are firmly leagued with truth, and their course is a direct line, fair sailing to the port of their faithful ally, regardless of the show and braggart boastings of buccaneers. The fact that great numbers of vicious and criminal parents do exist in all parts of our fatherland is deeply to be regretted by all rightly constituted minds; but, as a fact which can and does assume a numerical magnitude, it is of importance to our present argument.

From police and judicial sources it has been determined that, in the city of London, some little time since, there existed not less than 60,000 persons, whose maintenance was derived from vice and crime. On the authority of parliamentary reports, we find that the children throughout England, between the ages of four and thirteen years, bear a proportion of one in four of the whole population. Judging of the criminal and vicious population by the same proportion, we find that 15,000 would be the number of children of criminal parents in the city of London between the ages of four and thirteen years. At the same time we learn from the census reports, that the population of London is 2,500,000; that is, 15,000 children of criminal parents of a school age exist in a population of 2,500,000. Now, supposing all these children to be totally unprovided with scholastic education, the number gives us 1 criminal child in 166, or 6 in 1,000, uncared for intellectually and morally, through the criminality and vice of their parents. Then, as the children of honourable parents bear a like proportion to the whole population, we have this result, that the children of criminal parents sustain a numerical relation to the children of honourable parents of the school age (four to thirteen years) of one to forty-two nearly. From this fact, will our friends, the State-educationists, now argue the question in their own peculiar manner? Will they now reason that it is right and proper for the parents of forty-two children to be deprived of their right to educate their own children, because one child is neglected by his criminal parents? If not, of what value is an argument which disappears before a single fact, and that fact the very one with which they think to support and illustrate their theory? We have taken facts and figures from the point most adverse to our own case. Crime and vice is, from the nature of things, most prevalent and prolific in crowded cities; and in proportion to the density of the population, so is the intensity of crime and vice.

It must not be objected that the children of the industrious poor do not receive scholastic education, because such an asser-

tion is contrary to fact. Every day experience has convinced us personally that the industrious poor do appreciate the value of education to their children ; and if this appreciation were measured by the sacrifices they make to procure its advantages, we are assured the industrial poor would almost universally be found to occupy an enviable position in this respect. The great body of industrious working men and women have a thorough dislike to charity schools. They think it more manly, more English, to pay to the utmost of their means, and even beyond, in many instances depriving themselves of comforts to do so. It is therefore the simplest folly to argue in general terms, when all the individual facts and our daily experiences directly oppose the generalities in which our friends have indulged. This subject is so peculiarly a matter dependent upon inductive reasoning, that extreme care is necessary in the commencement of our argument. The point from which we set out must be individual fact ; and in proportion as the individual fact is repeated, in a great number of instances, so does the argument acquire importance and potential authority in determining the general principle. The process is synthetic, a building up of many facts into a few general principles.

"Taliesin" has given us his views under three propositions, page 23. With the first, all voluntaries fully agree ; but we beg to enter a *demurrer* to the second and third propositions. "Taliesin" evidently has misunderstood the terms he has used in his second proposition, for he says, "that 'voluntaryism' (*or private charity*) is insufficient to spread education amongst the bulk of the poor." We must be permitted to say that voluntaryism is not *private charity*, and our surprise is not a little that "Taliesin" should have aimed at so covert a misrepresentation of the principle in question : it is more honourable to take the definition of a term as it is held by the advocates of the principle defined. If "Taliesin" persists in his definition of the term, we feel assured he will find that he must stand alone in his argument, for he will find neither compeers nor opponents in his crusade ; the field will be wide, but the victory valueless.

A more correct definition of the term *voluntaryism* would be, *The freewill efforts of the people of all classes, independent of State or municipal aid.* This includes, in voluntary education, such as may be paid for by parents or guardians, by personal endowments, by charitable endowments from public subscriptions, by individual acts of charity, and the unpaid labour of voluntary teachers in sabbath schools and in week evening schools ; in fact, every effort is included which is not entirely supported by payments from general or local taxes.

Taking this to be voluntaryism, we contend that it is sufficient "to spread education amongst the bulk of the poor," and that it is more effective in such necessity than State machinery can be

by any possibility, because this is mechanical, emotionless; that is vital, energetic, full of emotion.

The insufficiency of voluntaryism is a phraseology which, if seriously used, must be received by us as a taunt or a sneer, not as an argument, because facts contradict it. Let us look for a short space at the history of education. Education, previous to the invention of printing, was confined to a few of the clergy and nobility. The great mass of the people lived in barbaric ignorance; and although since that period knowledge has run on, in an ever increasing stream, at the close of the eighteenth century the middle and lower classes were most miserably supplied with the means of education. The low and grovelling pursuits, pleasures, and pastimes of the people are unfailing indications of the state of morals and intellect at this time. During the eighteenth century, we are told, the parish parson sat in the kitchen of the village inn, or played the fiddle on the village green; gambling was practised in every place of trade, and even in the public streets thimble-riggers practised their trade without fear of molestation. Strong drink was hawked about the streets; every sixth house in London was a gin-shop. British spirits were then consumed at the rate of four gallons to one of the present consumption; and malt liquors bore nearly the same proportion. Pickpockets, footpads, and highwaymen frequented every public place; a design was even formed by one gang to rob the Queen in St. Paul's Churchyard, in 1782; the roads leading to places of public resort were continually patrolled by stout fellows employed to protect passengers from violence and robbery. Hounslow Heath, Bagshot, and Popham Lane, were traversed by mounted highwaymen; and Henry Fielding, the London magistrate, compares these gangs to the Italian banditti. Base and brutal enjoyment was found by all classes in prize-fights, cock-fights, dog-fights, bear, bull, and badger-baiting. At this period, the activity of voluntaryism attacked the great evil of popular ignorance and immorality. Robert Raikes gathered together the juvenile gamblers of Gloucester, for the purpose of instruction. Here is the first germ of the sabbath school system. The education of the masses was, by politicians and churchmen, considered at this time dangerous, and opposed accordingly. The State condemned it; the church opposed and prevented it, but voluntaryism and dissent encouraged it; and from this, the first effort of voluntaryism, we see, in 1851, the amazing result of two and a half millions of children in England and Wales indicated as Sunday scholars by the Registrar General, in his report on education.

Day schools under voluntary care have progressed with equal rapidity, and with equally beneficial results to the nation. The Lancasterian school system was founded in 1808, and continued under the names of the "British and Foreign School Society"

and the "National School Society"—entirely a voluntary system of education—until it had numbered 900,000 scholars. The Infant school system, the Ragged school system, and the whole body of Mechanics' Institutions, Athenæums, Christian Instruction Societies, Young Men's Christian Associations—and the names and numbers of such societies and their regular attendants are legion,—all these are the produce of voluntarism; and comparing their effects, intellectually and morally, with those institutions of an educational character entirely supported by the State, we can fearlessly claim for them superiority of merit, both as regards efficiency and economy; for in all cases it is capable of proof, that voluntary effort produces most and best with the least cost, when compared with the State, in all matters of intellectual and moral teaching.

It is a most fortunate circumstance that the Registrar General has furnished to our hand statistics bearing upon this point in our present debate. In page 150 of his summary we find a comparative view of the state of education in the years 1818, 1833, and 1851. We give an abstract as follows, showing the relative position and progress of education at each date:—

DAY SCHOOLS.			SUNDAY SCHOOLS.		
Number of Scholars.			Number of Scholars.		
1818	1833	1851	1818	1833	1851
674,883	1,276,947	2,144,378	477,225	1,548,890	2,407,642

PROPORTION OF SCHOLARS TO POPULATION.					
Day Scholars.			Sunday Scholars.		
1818	1833	1851	1818	1833	1851
1 in 17·25	1 in 11·27	1 in 8·36	1 in 24·40	1 in 9·28	1 in 7·45

These figures indicate to us the manifold increase of the means of education beyond the increase of the population within these periods, thus taking the extremes. The population has increased about one half, while day scholars have increased more than three times, and Sunday scholars have increased nearly six times—plainly obtruding upon our notice the efficiency of voluntarism to meet the exigencies of the times. It has increased sixfold in its capability in thirty-three years, manifesting an elasticity and vitality equal to any demands which society may make upon it in the future. The education of the masses must be first a felt necessity, with which they must be perfectly indoctrinated, before any educational machinery can be effectual to the amelioration of their moral and intellectual condition. There is a very homely proverb, current in this locality, that "a horse may be led to the trough, but he cannot be made to drink." Just so with the people of England; they must be first made to feel the necessity of an increased amount of education before they will avail themselves of any supply offered them by extraneous means. Voluntarism alone can give the people to feel

this necessity; State mechanism is not only powerless to this end, but it is actually antagonistic, and would ultimately become annihilative of the feeling altogether.

We submit that "Taliesin" has thus failed to prove his second proposition, and, by consequence, his third proposition is also unproved. The foregoing remarks will be found equally applicable to the arguments of T. U., whose observations are remarkable for care and precision, but seem to ignore the difficulties and evils of State mechanism, and magnifying those of voluntaryism. One point he appears to have overlooked entirely—that even in Scotland twice the number of scholars are taught by voluntary means than by general or local taxation, the proportion being about 8 to 17.

"Philaethes," in common with most State-educationists, admits it is the duty of the parent to educate his child; but he follows this admission with an hypothesis which, we think, he does not fully understand, and which must necessarily be destructive of the argument he raises upon his hypothesis. Because, says he, the parent is ignorant, illiterate, irreligious, immoral, and criminal, he must forfeit the right to educate his child; and because society suffers from the crime of the uneducated masses, therefore the child of the uneducated parent must be educated by the State. We really cannot see the connection which these two events have with each other. It is usual for laws so to be made in general, that when a duty imposed by the law is neglected by the individual, that punishment shall be inflicted upon the person neglecting the duty, to compel due performance of the duty in future, and to deter others from like neglect, from the certainty of like punishment; but never do we find that a duty neglected transfers that duty to others, and relieves the person originally under obligation to perform the duty entirely free from responsibility to perform the duty again; nor do we find that a duty neglected by one person should cause all other persons to be relieved from the obligation to perform the duty. We contend that the principle of his hypothesis is false in theory and pernicious in practice; and, if applied as a principle of legislation, must produce anarchy and confusion throughout the body politic. Our object is to arrive at truth, to acquire and to diffuse sound principles upon this subject, to see truth and justice embodied in a systematic organization of the body politic, for the purpose of improving and perfecting the education of all classes of the community; but let it be done substantially, not empirically—not for the mere sake of catching popularity. We would have truth, right, and justice united to efficiency, that lasting good may be realized—that healthful, moral, and intellectual benefit may be secured to the children of England. We wish that a vital energy may be diffused throughout every ramification of social life; to this end let legislation do its legitimate work, and law impose its due penalties in a prop-

manner, upon the right subjects, who are worthy of its deserts. Let the parent who neglects his duty in withholding education from his child be punished for such neglect, and compelled to perform the duty; but take not the duty from him, nor from his neighbour, who faithfully discharges the duty towards his own child. Farther comment on the argument of "Philaethes" is needless. It is self-condemnatory, when duly understood; and, we doubt not, will be fairly valued as such by all readers of the *B. C.* We must, in charity to our friend "Philaethes," give him credit for good intentions; for we are fully convinced that he could not see, when writing, the entire consequences of his hypothesis.

From the course this debate has taken, it will be readily perceived that the education of the children of the nation by the State is both unjust and impracticable—unjust, because it deprives the parent of the right to educate his child. Again, all education must of necessity be of a moral character as well as of an intellectual character. The education of the moral feelings is of greater importance than the development of the intellectual powers; therefore *religion must be THE PRIMARY ELEMENT in all education.* But society is so constructed that we have not an uniformity of religious sentiment in the community; and whatever may be the means adopted to supply the religious portion of State education, it must of necessity be uniform in its nature. The imposition of an uniformity of religious teaching upon the community by law, under the control of the State, necessarily implies the payment for such teaching out of general or local taxes; hence, whatever may be the nature of the religious teaching adopted, it must be contrary to the religious sentiments of the majority of the people; and, by consequence, the majority of the people would be compelled to pay for the teaching of that which, in their estimation, is error, and would be under penalty to have that taught to their children which their own conscience condemns. State education is not practicable unless uniform in its teachings; and, if uniform, it is unjust.

We are anxious not to be misunderstood. It is not contrary to voluntarism that the children of the poor and the children of the criminal should be educated, and educated by others than the parent; far otherwise. We believe that voluntarism is competent to do this; and we could cite numberless evidences in proof of this from the past history of education did space permit; but on this account we forbear. It is, without doubt, the duty of the State to educate all pauper children by means provided through local taxation; and it is also its duty to educate all juvenile criminals under punishment for crime; and under nearly every circumstance of conviction, we believe it to be the duty of the State to detain juvenile criminals beyond the term of punishment, for the purposes of education and the formation of superior moral habits.

L'OUVRIER.

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE reply, Yes. The terms of the inquiry preclude the idea of any material difference in the starting point of either. An inequality might be put extremely, and show the hoarder of a hundred pounds to be more mischievous than the man who merely overspent ten shillings.

We will suppose two men to start in life under very similar circumstances. Each shall own some hundreds of broad acres, and command five thousand pounds a-year. The miser begins by casting off all "incumbrances," and vegetates on sixteen pence per diem. He gets his notable wardrobe from his chief tenant, and sews himself the patches on his suit, which ultimately vies with Joseph's coat in rainbow hues. At the end of his days he finds himself a millionaire. This is, indeed, "a very pretty sum to begin the next world with." He makes his will, and divides his stores among "those who will pity the poor," or, it may be, "the gentlemen of the long robe." But, while his successors will thank him for their share of his wealth, his character is execrated and his example is shunned. He has warmed no widow's heart and dried no orphan's tear. He is the object of supreme scorn and contempt—the scoff of men and the pity of angels. His penurious character has made him the centre of a heap of gold sweepings—a mere muck-gatherer. Despising the claims of nature in himself, he will acknowledge none in others; and would convert a life-teeming world into a dwindling handful of haggard, useless men. He shuts out from his ideas of happiness all the ennobling desires of the race he sprang from; and the stint he imposes on himself, and his love of accumulation, narrow his mental, moral, and spiritual nature, so that instead of being a stalwart specimen of the lords of earth, he becomes nought more than a caricature of carefulness; and all that is great and good in man in him is lost, or dies in ignominy and shame.

What has this fool been doing? He has lived without faith in God or man; has had no just ideas of pleasure: never has he brought out the merry, ringing laugh, the hilarious spirit, the flow of health, and the busy dance of life; but instead, has laid his palsied, bony fingers on the exuberance of nature, and, to some extent, has turned earth and man backward. He looks on men upon the earth as excrescences, and, if he could avoid it,

would give neither his shilling nor his blessing to any child of Adam. From him emanates no expansive scheme for increasing or enhancing bliss. He harbours not the swell of soul, the bursting thought, or a joyous, smiling hope. The reward of heaven, or an after-death mingling with misers disembodied, moves him not. He is a dwarfish, cramped, gnarled specimen of humanity, and as unreasonable and unreasoning as the chest which holds the god he bows down to.

A world of misers is inconceivable. In an increasing world men are fed; they are active, living, and aspiring; they entertain "thoughts which glow and words which burn;" they are glad—they are alive; the pulse beats with vigour, and miserhood is far from being a tempting state of feeling or being to them. The miser is in the very jaws of a deeply-indented vice, screwed by himself till the life-blood is dried up within him. His soul, his spirit, is in a very dungeon. The sun shines in vain for him. Paradise might stand before him, but he has thrown away the key of its gates, and the visions of the blest bless not him. But then, miserliness is so abhorrent, so utterly detestable, so consummately vile, it has no reproductive power, and soon dies out. The miser is rather a malefactor hung in his own chains. His banefulness is limited; it has no charms for man; and hence its lack of power for great evil. But for its thorough unattractiveness, the miser's character might vie with the prodigal's in mischief, and they might challenge all to determine which would soonest bring the world to a stand still. Had the miser many admirers and imitators, our race would converge and die out; but the extreme self-denial of the poor wretch is so intolerable, that all men discern that his gain is a cursed exchange of good for evil. The miser generates disgust in the spectator, and the mischief of his life is mainly of a negative kind—the lack of good to himself or others.

But what says the prodigal? "I am come of age; the restraint thrown on me I will throw off; the world is a pleasant world, and I will prove it. Ha! my friend, come with me; to-morrow I am twenty-one;" and in his thirst for delight, he thinks the rivers shall ever flow for him. *He* will not gather gold! As well might it remain in the "bowels of the harmless earth." "May I not do what I will with my own?" and soon the garnered stores of his predecessors fly like chaff in the wind. Overspend he must; and care and wealth fly together. He is not intentionally dishonest—not a rogue in grain; but his five thousand pounds cannot supply his wishes; his short and merry life asks ten thousand—nay, more than that; and those petty impediments to happiness, calculation and £ s. d., are left to the steward. He will not be balked; and his cry is, "Give—give a pleasure." He has entered on his estate a lusty, vigorous; rightly directed, his mind might have compassed high

purposes, and his tenants, his country, and the world have hailed him as a friend of man. But, no; he is a "spendthrift." He may have taste, but every faculty is subordinate to sense. Instead of testing his manhood by seeking the mountain paths of mind and spirit, he grasps instinctively only present good, and sinks instead of soars; the animal is developed, and the inner, higher, and more glorious light of the soul dwindles fast away.

Let us look on the two pictures. The miser is a living skeleton, and a mighty contrast to our Nimrod of delight. About the one there is the icy chill of a starveling, self-made pauper. But to the bulk of lookers-on our jolly bacchanalian is an attractive figure; strong, ruddy, and with no lack of outer polish, he is surrounded by a host of flatterers, who pick up the crumbs of pleasure which fall from him. They care but little what becomes of the dreamy, unforecasting centre of mirth; and the pursuit quickens by rivalry. The tabret, wine, and the dance allure an ever-widening circle of admirers; and, thus encompassed, the poor victim of pleasure-in-hand gives the reins of government up to fancy. Reason is slapped in the face, and the very domestics of the hero applaud the deed. In this busy round of rapture 'twere treason to speak of death. "Hush! we live. Pass round the cup of enjoyment, and let it last for ever!"

The known tendency of man to seize present good—present pleasure—inspires all persons with a honied affection for one who, in dashing carelessness, regales with the liberality of a prince, and who would, if he could, place pain and thought beyond the pale of society. Thus our man of pleasure—our squanderer—cannot calculate. All figures, save figures of speech, are discarded: all the admeasurement of means and objects are abandoned; until the Encumbered Estates Court is called upon peremptorily to decide who is true owner of all the acres which have been mortgaged for revelry.

This child of folly has not stood alone, but has furnished another illustration of the old saw, "One fool makes many." Look at him when he is no longer "Squire Spendall." The fascination is over, the fine scenes are all gone; the flattery ceases; pallor creeps over the once vigorous but now used-up man; he has drunk not merely the mixed wine-cup, but the dregs too; health, energy, morals, purse, peace, hope, flee. He stands, the wreck not only of gentility, but of humanity as well. The miser did not bless, but this man in blessing did but curse at last; the miser "paid his way," but our brilliant could not. And in the vortex of pleasure see also the gulf of ruin; the miser would exhaust man, the spendthrift the earth and man too; the miser would labour, but would the spendthrift toil for bread? Were all misers, man would die out; but were all spendthrifts, the earth would be raked, but not tilled; the grapes would be gathered, but the vine untrained; the fatted calf eaten, but

herdsman's "occupation gone." Miser and spendthrift would drag all to ruin and despair, but who would reach the infamous goal quickest, or by the shortest road? Would not he who lures nine-tenths of his fellows under the intoxication wrought by pleasures, enticing, but oh! how transient?

Herein lies the preponderance of evil and of mischief in the "Spendall" family. The miser is a beacon—none shelter beneath him. The miser is the exponent of prudence turned mad; but he is quite safe; the disease is anything but catching; his retainers are rags, enwrapping the rattling knees of a dolt, who ekes out life in very death. Fearing ill, he has run to meet it, and his parchment skin is less shrivelled than his shrunk and stunted soul. Oh! the miser is a useful man. With gaunt arms extended, while enforcing economy, he more repels than invites; his daily suicide is too terrible to find one imitator in ten thousand. The two characters we describe stand on the outer edges of the pale of being. One has frozen, and become spectral; the other has lived in dreams, to awake to the terrors of poverty, fighting "like an armed man." The miser stands comparatively alone; but when the wit, the life, the tumultuous joy of the gay dreamer is passed, what a lull! and how many stand aghast at the change! how many have caught the plague from him, and feel its woe!

The spendthrift and the miser, while in life, may plead much in extenuation of their conduct. The miser may urge the little harm he has done. He has put his money in the bank, and at his death gives back to society the precious metals, or deeds and securities, he secretively treasured; he merely deemed society and society's god a hard master; he took care of himself, and violated no earthly law. He cries, May I not do what I will with mine own? The spendthrift says, I am no hoarder of gold; I bless while I scatter, and get blessings given back. Wherever I go, all is activity. I call into requisition the talents of all, from the husbandman to the skilful caterer for all the artificial wants of men which demand attention. I call, and the sweetest earthly pleasures await my voice, and mirth and gladness run their invigorating round. We listen to this special pleading; but what say the jury empanelled to pronounce on the case of the indicted? If we hear aright, the verdict is soon delivered—"Guilty." The judge, in giving sentence, says that while he cannot help feeling deeply for the arraigned, truth and justice compel him to employ the severities of language to condemn his conduct. We, indeed, feel disposed to speak much more severely of the vices than of the men; not that we would screen them from a large proportion of censure. But, in his round of folly, the spendthrift has beguiled too many to pass unscathed by vengeance. The miser's example is as uninviting as prison bars, and all men mark and avoid him. But not so the owner of

five thousand pounds a year. There is no organized band in society to scrutinize the disbursements of the rich. Here and there one or two plodding, far-seeing men foretell the end, and fall not into the vortex, the whirlpool of Squire Spendall. Up to a certain hour, every man has been paid in full. The squire is rich, highly respectable; he is in the confidence of all, and he spends freely. The savings of many ask him for custody; he plays, he races, he gambles, he speculates, he plays higher, launches out, leaps, falls short, and dies.

"Too late," his pleasures turn to unfeigned remorse, and fain would he retrace life, and re-commence from simple boyhood a quiet, humble career. But, no! 'tis done. The sentence of justice on miscalculation is recorded—"What I have written, I have written." The tremendous character of the spendthrift's vice, and all the evils concomitant, is told by the blank dismay of all. The accountant is called, and society pays the spendthrift's bill. But who's to blame? The spendthrift? Oh, yes! But he alone? No. The whirlwind and the storm are scarcely more destructive than Squire Spendall. But has not society long since despised plodding honesty? Has it not long worshipped the golden image which itself set up? Has not refinement and elegance, taste and splendour, out-blazoned the virtues which alone can bind men in safety?

To a large extent, the spendthrift may reproach many of his victims with their lack of prudence; but we are treating, not so much of the man, as his deeds; and we close by saying, experience tells more fearful tales of misery, ruin, and death, brought on by one spendthrift, than by all the misers in a nation. N.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

"Beware of covetousness: for a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth."—*Luke xii. 15.*

"That man lives happily, and in full control over himself, who from day to day can say, *I have lived.*"—*Latin Phrase.*

THE great business of life is not mere eating and drinking, lying down and rising up; the purposes of life are not accomplished by rounds of dissipation and pleasure-taking, nor by uninterrupted labour and seclusion from society. He knows extremely little of his obligations to God and to society, who does not concern himself to become intimately acquainted with the world's wants, and his own individual responsibilities. Perhaps few men, comparatively, care to approach the subject; the nearer they come, the more vivid is the sense of their own omissions and shortcomings, and the more pungent, of course, are the apprehensions of a guilty conscience. Life's mission is very imperfectly understood, and less heeded; the mass say, in effect, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Sentimentalists are ever and anon sighing because of the preser-

of evil, but effecting nothing to mitigate it, whilst a few—what a few!—are found indefatigably toiling to benefit their race.

Neither of the characters at the head of this paper can ever rightly accomplish the mission of life. Selfishness is their rule of conduct, the mainspring which regulates their appetites and pursuits, the principle upon which all their calculations are based. In a word, selfishness is their life. What does it concern the miser that widows and orphans are famishing around him? Circumscribed within the narrow limits of his little self, his avaricious disposition knows no pity, no sympathy. Talk to him of the ties of consanguinity, of a brother's love; such sentiments, if they ever had an existence in his bosom, have long since taken their flight thence. The polar regions of our globe are not more closely bound by ice, than is the seat of his affections. Frigid and lifeless is that heart that pulsates only for itself. Chains forged of sterner materials than brass or iron hold him to his hoard—chains that shall bind irrevocably when the object of his passion shall have passed away.

On the same principle acts the spendthrift: present gratification and sensual indulgences are his world, the stamina of his existence. We say not that his conduct is more praiseworthy than the miser's; for although money, in his estimation, is only valuable so far as it is the procuring cause of his sensual indulgences, it nevertheless no more in his hands accomplishes the purposes of its original design and legitimate use, than in those of the miser. Nay, it frequently works more mischief, and entails more misery, because of its circulation among characters generally the most disreputable and abandoned, and had better, for the well-being of society, been thrown into the sea. Traces of the spendthrift's imprudence and folly are everywhere discernible.

In order to ascertain the true character of either the miser or the spendthrift, and the amount of injury which each inflicts upon society, we think it necessary to define, though briefly, the value, uses, and abuses of money.

There are at least three ways by which the value of money may be ascertained—intrinsically, relatively, commercially. It is a well established fact, that gold is the most pure, as well as the most ponderous, metal in nature; and by the common consent of mankind in all nations of the world, has been deemed the most valuable. Its properties are so various and so well known, that any mention of them here would be superfluous. It is not surprising, therefore, that persons should be found to hoard up gold, with the view to making provision against want, seeing that the greatest amount of enjoyment, &c., in a temporal sense, is thereby obtained; but that persons should be found coveting, hoarding, and idolizing it, simply for what it is,—gold,—and

grudge parting with any portion of it, albeit the necessities of nature require it, is at once foolish, impolitic, sinful.

Money is obviously the medium of reciprocal thought-exchange in every branch of science, art, literature, and mercantile business. It is a nation's credit; a banker's diploma; the main-spring of business; the passport of the gay; the *summum bonum* of lawyers. It commands talent; urges to effort; secures pleasures, enjoyments, ease, comforts. It is the lever applied to missionary and other philanthropic projects. By its agency bibles are printed and circulated; the benighted places of the earth enlightened; and labourers employed in the vast moral vineyard. Its true value, then, must be estimated by the amount of good it is capable of accomplishing in any given undertaking.

The right use of money is a question of grave import. It concerns all alike—the millionaire as well as the pauper; the saint as well as the sinner; the manufacturer as well as the workman. Strictly speaking, money is not the property of any one exclusively. It was neither coined nor issued for any particular individual's sole advantage; it is common property, circulated for the general good of society; for the use of all, for the abuse of none. It is a "talent"—would that every one knew it!—entrusted to our care: it is very unequally distributed, we admit, but not more so than the generality of other gifts. In the present state of society, this disproportion of favour is necessary to the prosperity of the whole. Not that we advocate "grinding the poor." Would to God that more of this commodity found its way to their homes. It is, however, a stimulus to exertion, and serves to cement reciprocally the bonds of society. Owners of large property—whether obtained as hereditary patrimony, or as the result of their industry and frugality, matters little—they have no right to abuse it in any sense, either by hoarding it up, or prodigally wasting it. Moreover, stewards of considerable property, their responsibilities are tremendous.

According to the foregoing principles, money, as well as every other article of general interest, has its proper and improper uses. It is either a blessing or a curse to each possessor. It is capable of accomplishing a great amount of good, if judiciously managed; and, on the other hand, of producing much woe, if improperly appropriated. Its abuse consists *mainly* in the inordinate desire which people evince for its possession, and which is termed in scripture phraseology, "covetousness!" To lay bare this principle, by showing its effects in its various ramifications throughout society, is now our task.

Much of the evil which now afflicts society is the result of the working out of this pernicious principle. The avaricious man is the prey of an insatiable desire for wealth: resolutely and unweariedly he pursues the object of his lust; his restless soul is ever the seat of conflicting emotions; he is pierced through with

many sorrows; he is like "a cage full of unclean birds;" his mind, instead of being trained to high intellectual acquirements, is miserably employed grovelling amongst the gross things of earth. "Such a man is not only miserable himself, but becomes a moral nuisance to the neighbourhood around him: stinting his own family of its necessary comforts, oppressing the widow and the fatherless, grasping with insatiable fangs every house, tenement, and patch of land within his reach; setting adrift the poor and needy from their long-accustomed dwellings, and presenting to the young and thoughtless a picture which is too frequently copied, of an immortal mind immersed in the mire of the most degrading passions, and worshipping and serving the creature more than the Creator.

"In relation to large communities and nations, this grovelling passion has produced, on an extensive scale, the most mischievous and destructive effects. It has plundered palaces, churches, seats of learning, and repositories of art; it has polluted the courts of judicature and the tribunals of justice; it has corrupted magistrates, judges, and legislators, and has transformed many even of the ministers of religion into courtly sycophants, and hunters after places and pensions; it has ground whole nations to poverty, under the load of taxation, spread misery over whole empires, drenched the earth with human gore. . . . It was the cursed love of gold that excited the Spaniards to ravage the territories of Mexico and Peru—to violate every principle of justice and humanity. . . . The same principle commenced and still carries on that abominable traffic, *the slave trade*—a traffic which has entailed misery on millions of the sons of Africa, which has for ever separated from each other brothers and sisters, parents and children."*

In conclusion, we beg to observe, that although little has been advanced condemnatory of the spendthrift's conduct, it is not to be inferred that he is a better subject, or does more for the general good of the community; he, together with the miser, retards the progress of civilization, is a "drag" upon the wheel of advancement, and infects society by the moral miasma which is constantly emitted from his distempered soul.

We have not attempted to prove the miser a worse character than the spendthrift; we do not think that he is. The question is *not* which of these two characters inflicts upon society the greatest amount of injury, but, "Is the spendthrift more injurious to society than the miser?" We have taken the negative, not because we think the conduct of the spendthrift is less culpable. In our introductory remarks, we have shown each to be actuated by a like motive—namely, selfishness; the conduct of each, therefore, are but ramifications of the same principle; the difference in their effects being the result of circumstances.

Southampton.

J. E. P.

* Dick's "Philosophy of Religion."

Self-Educator.

LESSONS IN MATHEMATICS.

WE now proceed to make some observations on the nature and processes of the simple rules of arithmetic and algebra.

In reference to arithmetical processes, we presume that the reader can add, subtract, multiply, and divide in the common way, as boys do at school; and we propose to lay before him the reasons and principles on which these methods rest.

It has been already shown (pages 90 and 138) that in NOTATION our figures have a twofold value,—one, their *simple* value, distinguished by their *form*; the other, their *local* value, distinguished by their *position*,—and that the local value increases tenfold for every remove one column to the left: 1 stands for one, 10 for ten, 100 for one hundred, &c. To this way of expressing numerical value we are so exclusively accustomed, that we do not easily see that any other number would do as well as ten, and some others even better.

Our common numeral scale is called the DECIMAL scale, because for every remove to the left the local value increases *tenfold*. For the same reason ten is called the BASE of the scale. But we might have a BINARY, TERNARY, QUATERNARY, QUINARY, or SENARY scale. So 37219 in the decimal scale is the same as 444151 in the *senary* (where each remove of a digit towards the left increases its value sixfold, or where 10 represents 6), or 110543 in the *octenary* (where 10 represents 8). For $37219 = 3 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10 + 7 \times 10 \times 10 \times 10 + 2 \times 10 \times 10 + 1 \times 10 + 9$; or, $3 \times 10^4 + 7 \times 10^3 + 2 \times 10^2 + 1 \times 10 + 9$ (see page 139. 2); and 444151 in the *senary* scale is $4 \times 6^5 + 4 \times 6^4 + 4 \times 6^3 + 1 \times 6^2 + 5 \times 6 + 1$; and 110543 in the *octenary* is $1 \times 8^5 + 1 \times 8^4 + 0 \times 8^3 + 5 \times 8^2 + 4 \times 8 + 3$; and the reader will find, if these are calculated, that the results are alike.

Let it be required to express in the *quinary* scale (that is, the scale whose base is 5, or where 10 represents 5) the number which we commonly write 1728.

$1728 \div 5$ gives 345 and remainder 3.

$345 \div 5$ gives 69 and remainder 0.

$69 \div 5$ gives 13 and remainder 4.

$13 \div 5$ gives 2 and remainder 3.

The last quotient, followed by the remainders written in inverted order, gives the equivalent expression 23403, which means, that $10^3 + 7 \times 10^2 + 2 \times 10 + 8 = 2 \times 5^4 + 3 \times 5^3 + 4 \times 5^2 + 0 \times 5 + 3$.

In this way any numbers may be written in any scale; only when the base is greater than 10 it will be necessary to take some arbitrary symbol to stand for the numbers that are greater than 9 and less than the base itself. Thus if the base were 12, we must invent symbols for 10 and 11.

We might reduce to the decimal scale numbers that are expressed in any other scale in precisely the same manner; that is to say, by successive division by 10; but this is a more difficult way than reducing them, as in the case of money, weight, &c. Thus,—What is that number which, in the *nonary* scale,

is expressed by 7835604? Answer, 4216297. The process is as follows:—
 $7 \times 9 + 8 = 71$; $71 \times 9 + 3 = 642$; $642 \times 9 + 5 = 5783$; $5783 \times 9 + 6 = 52053$; $52053 \times 9 + 0 = 468477$; $468477 \times 9 + 4 = 4216297$.

Of course different numeral scales have different conveniences and advantages. A work on arithmetic was published in 1712 by Jos. Pelican, of Prague, in which the *binary* system (where 2 is the base, or 10 represents 2) is employed; and he calls it "*Arithmeticus Perfectus*." The reader may judge of its cumbersome mode of expression from the following, which he is recommended to verify:—The difference between 76 and 29 is 47; but in the other scale 76 is represented by 1001100, and 29 by 11101, and the difference by 101111.

EXAMPLES.—1. Reduce to the *ternary*, *quinary*, and *septenary* scales each of the four following numbers:—4701038, 1729807, 3854601, and 2179316.

2. What is the value, in the ordinary scale, of the above four numbers, supposing they are written in the *duodecimal* scale (where 10 stands for 12)?

3. 3054 and 5163 are in the *octenary* scale: find their sum, difference, and product.

In algebra nothing of this kind can be found, as there we have no numeral scale.

ADDITION.—The view which it will be most convenient to take of addition is, "*Finding an expression to represent the sum of two or more quantities.*" And the word *sum* must be used for the result of putting together several quantities, either of the same kind or of opposite kinds—an extension which will presently be explained.

SUBTRACTION.—Perhaps the best definition of this process is, "*Finding an expression to represent the difference between two quantities,*" either of the same or opposite kinds. In the former, we find the arithmetical meaning; while algebra embraces both.

The restrictions which were mentioned in reference to addition apply equally to arithmetical subtraction.

[It is supposed to be unnecessary to describe the process for performing what are called the simple rules of arithmetic (but this supposition will extend no farther than division of whole numbers), and, therefore, only such observations will be presented as are not likely to be found in ordinary books. Of algebra we suppose nothing to be known, and, consequently, rules will be given for the simplest operations.]

The method of performing algebraical addition is—1st. When the quantities are alike, take the algebraical sum of their co-efficients.

2nd. When the quantities are unlike, they cannot be collected into one term, but the sum consists of the different quantities written down in a line (or lines, if necessary) each preceded by its own sign.

DEFINITION.—*Like* quantities are those that contain the same powers of the same letter or letters: so $a - a$, $3a$, $5a$ are like quantities, and their sum is $8a$; $2ax$, $7ax - 4ax$, $15ax$ are like quantities, whose sum is $20ax$. But a^2 and a^3 are *unlike* quantities, and their sum is $a^2 + a^3$; $3ax$ and $-5ay$ are unlike quantities, and their sum is $3ax - 5ay$.


EXERCISES.—What is the sum of $2x + 3a - 4b$; $3x - 2a + 5b$; $4x + 8a - 7b$; $4a - 9x + 6b$; and $5x + 7a - 9b$? What is the sum of $7a^3 - 3a^2b + 2ab^2 - 3b^3$; $4a^3 + a^2b - ab^2 + b^3$; $a^3 - 2a^2b - 3ab^2 + 5b^3$; and $5a^2b + 4ab^2 - 2b^3 - 5a^3$?

In arithmetical addition the numbers to be added may be either abstract or concrete. In the former case there is no restriction, but any two or more

numbers may be added together; thus, $5 + 3 = 8$. But in the case of concrete numbers they must be of the same kind and of the same denomination: of the same kind, since we cannot add 2 men and 3 elephants together, so as to make 5 men or 5 elephants; and of the same denomination, since we cannot add 3 shillings and 7 pence together, so as to make 10 shillings or 10 pence. And, therefore, as will be noticed more particularly hereafter, $\frac{2}{3}$ cannot be added to $\frac{1}{4}$, so as to make 6 of either, for they are of different denominations.


It ought also to be noticed, that reduction, instead of being postponed, as it always is supposed to be, to some future period in the study of arithmetic, is actually employed here. If the sum of a column of figures is 57, we set down 7 under the column, and carry 5 to the next; and the process, the mere separation of the digits 5 and 7, is so simple, that we do not usually see that the principle employed is the same that, in the case of 57 pence, leads us to set down 9, and carry 4. We reduce 57 units to 5 tens and 7 units just as we reduce 57 pence to 4 shillings and 9 pence; but in the former case we divide by 10 in separating the digits, and in the latter we more formally divide by 12.

In algebraical addition the process and the results will be better understood if we define addition as "Doing with one quantity what was done with 0 to form the other." Thus, let the sum of a and b be required, and let them be represented by the distances from zero here shown:—



To form a we begin at 0, and move to the right over as many units as are contained in a . Then, to form $a + b$, we must begin at b , and move to the right over as many units as are contained in a ; and thus we reach a point as far to the right of b as a is to the right of 0. The same point is reached if we begin at a , and move to the right over as many units as are contained in b .

Now take the sum of a and $-b$:—



$-b$ is, according to the remark above, b units measured from 0 in the opposite direction to b ; or, beginning at 0, we move over b units to the left. Do this with a ; that is, begin at a , and move to the left over b units; and we reach the point marked $a - b$. The same if we begin with $-b$.

Here we have the two quantities of opposite kinds; and the sum in such cases answers to the difference of the arithmetical values. So the sum of 6 and -4 is 2; the sum of $8a$ and $-5a$ is $3a$; the sum of $9ax^2$ and $-2ax^2$ is $7ax^2$, &c.

The difference between two numbers cannot be expressed arithmetically unless they are of the same kind and of the same denomination.

The language commonly employed in subtraction conceals the true nature of the process. When the digit to be subtracted cannot be taken from the corresponding digit, we are said to *borrow* ten from the next column in the upper line, and to repay it, not where we borrowed it, but by *carrying* one to the next left hand digit in the lower. So that our language teaches us to borrow from one, and to repay it to the other. On the continent, the borrowing is actual, and repeated, if necessary, till a digit is found in the left hand part of the upper line, capable of being diminished, first by the unit borrowed, and then by the digit of the same denomination in the number to be subtracted.

But neglecting the impropriety of the language, the principle employed in

our method of subtraction is, that *any number added to each of two given numbers does not affect their difference*. So the difference between 5 and 2 is 3: add any number we please to each, and the difference remains the same. Add 4; then $9 - 6$ is 3: or add 7; $12 - 9 = 3$: or 50; $55 - 52$ is still 3: and so of any other number.

It scarcely need be said, that adding 10 to any digit is the same as adding 1 to the next digit on the left.

Algebraical Subtraction is "*Doing with the minuend* what was done with 0 to form the subtrahend,† but in the opposite direction.*"

Thus, let it be required—1st. To subtract b from a (see diagram, page 235). To form b , we begin at 0, and move to the *right* over as many units as are contained in b . Then, to subtract b from a , we begin at a , and move to the *left* over as many units as are contained in b , and reach the point marked $a - b$.

2nd. Let it be required to subtract $-b$ from a . To form $-b$, we begin at 0, and move to the *left* over as many units as are contained in b . In subtracting $-b$ from a , we must begin at a , and move to the *right* over as many units as are contained in b , thus reaching the point marked $a + b$.

Here we find that adding b to a gives the same result as subtracting $-b$ from a ; and adding $-b$ to a gives the same result as subtracting b . Hence the truth and propriety of the common rule in regard to any quantity or quantities to be subtracted—"Change the signs of the quantities to be subtracted, and proceed as in addition."

The thoughtful reader will have observed that we have given two meanings to the signs $+$ and $-$, one as characterizing quantity, and the other as indicating an operation. That which connects these two meanings, and gives propriety to the double significance, consists in this, that the positive sign preserves, and the negative sign changes, in both cases, the direction of numerical increase.

So in the second example of addition, the sum of a and $-b$ given above, the negative sign changed the direction in which we measured b , while, in the first example in subtraction, the direction to subtract has the same effect.

It will be worth while to write down all the signs of the character of the quantities, as well as those of operation, in the four examples given above, and the results:—

1. $+a + (+b) = a + b$.
2. $+a + (-b) = a - b$.
3. $+a - (+b) = a - b$.
4. $+a - (-b) = a + b$.

Where we observe that, in reference to b , $++$ as well as $--$ give $+$ and $-+$, and $+ -$ give $-$; or, like signs give $+$, and unlike $-$: a rule with which the student will become more familiar in multiplication.

EXERCISES.—Find the difference between—

- (1) $3a$ and $-3a$.
- (2) $4ax^2 + 7a^2c$ and $3ax^2 - 2a^2c$.
- (3) $7x^2 - 2x + 5$ and $4x^2 - 5x + 7$.
- (4) $12a^3 - 7a^2x + 3ax^2 - x^3$ and $11a^3 + 5a^2x - 7ax^2 - 6x^3$.

* The quantity to be diminished, usually placed in the upper line.

† The quantity to be subtracted, usually placed in the lower line.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

92. Could any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* favour me with the names of the publishers, and the prices of the following works, Agassiz's "Poissons Fossiles," Brougniart's "Histoire des Végétaux Fossiles," "Pictet's "Traité Élémentaire de Paléontologie," Buckland's "Bridgewater Treatise," "Pictorial Atlas of Organic Remains"? Whose is the best and cheapest geological map?—A YOUNG GEOLOGIST.

93. Would you inform me in your next number if there is a cheap work on Cotton, its native state, and the process of manufacture? Also, what wages are generally given to workmen, clerks, &c., in the cotton mills of England?—ROLANDUS.

94. What works would you recommend me to study, in order to obtain a full and accurate knowledge of the history of philosophy? I have had the works of Cousin and Maurice recommended. Are they suitable?—MAT.

95. Could any of the readers of the *British Controversialist* inform me if there is any difference between Prussian blue and Chinese blue, and what they are prepared from?—P. M.

96. I should feel obliged if any of your correspondents would inform me whether there is a short work published on lithography? Are Addison's works published in a separate form; also the price and publisher of each?—C. E. T.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

"Excelsior" asks, What are the prospects of a young man who is an expert arithmetician and mathematician, and a good general English scholar? We should say very good, and only needs a little boldness to make his way in any branch he prefers.—ED. B. C.

11. J. L. J. will find excellent accounts of the proceedings of the learned societies in the *Athenæum* newspaper.—THRELKELD.

28. "The Imperial Dictionary," published by Blackie, is unequalled.—THRELKELD.

73. T. S. will meet with no single work more thoroughly adapted to his requirement than the "Lessons in English," by Dr. Beard. It is a careful reprint from "Cassell's Popular Educator."—W. ORMOND.

82. (I.) Any later edition of Zumpt's "Latin Grammar."—T. T. B.

The Scansion of Latin Verse.—"Virgil" will find "An Elementary Treatise on Latin Prosody," by Wm. Ramsay, Professor of Humanity in the University of Glasgow (Longman and Co., London), decidedly the best and most suitable work for his purpose. The laws of scansion are therein "illustrated by copious examples and critical remarks." There are good books on this subject by Carey and by Bryce.—S. K.

"Virgil" is informed that the "Latin Prosody, compiled for the use of Twyford School," by Rev. J. G. Bedford, published by Law, Fleet Street, explains scanning "fully, clearly, and simply." Several editions of this work have been published.—THRELKELD.

86. In answer to J. R.'s question, How to ascertain the circumference of a circle, a segment being given? I beg to submit the following solution.

If the arc be a semicircle, bisect its chord to find the centre; but if not, 1st. In the arc of the segment take any three points, and from each of these as a centre, with a radius greater than half the distance between each of them, describe circles; 2nd. Join the points in which they cut one another

and produce the lines so formed until they intersect one another, which point will be the centre of the required circle.—R. A. M'L.

90. Hallam's "History of Europe during the Middle Ages," Alison's "History of Europe," and Hallam's "Constitutional History of England," will furnish the required information. The best method of proceeding is, careful reading, making notes of the most important matters as you go along.—T. T. B.

If "Septimus" can read Italian, he should study the "Scienza Nuova" of Vico; if not, and he can read French, he will find in Michelet's "Discours sur le Système et le Vie de Vies," a good abstract of his doctrines. If he is only an English scholar, he will find an abstract in the "Philological Museum," vol. ii., pp. 626—644. Montesquieu's "Spirit of Laws," and Hegel's "Philosophy of History," vol. ix.; Michelet's edition of Hegel's works; Herder's "Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Man;" Schlegel's "Philosophy of History;" Miller's "Philosophy of History;" Concini's "Modern

Philosophy," Lectures v.—xi.; Guizot's "History of Civilization;" and Sir G. C. Lewis's "Method of Observation and Reasoning in Politics," are good for general views and the acquirement of principles of judgment. Russel's "Modern Europe" will supply a general outline of the progress of events. Hallam's "Middle Ages" will give breadth of foundation for a course of reading special histories, of which those published in "Lardner's Cyclopaedia" are the best at moderate prices. As to mode, see the excellent directions contained in the article, "Art of Reading," *British Controversialist*, 1855, pp. 83, 84, which is far superior in its manner of expression to anything that I can hope to give. If I were to try, I would say—

1st. Gain general principles.

2nd. Read some good abstract—White, Keightley, Tytler, Russel, or Lord—of modern European history.

3rd. Read the best special histories in the order of the importance of the several states.

I hope these hints may prove serviceable.—M. S.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

The Cambridge Youths' Mutual Improvement Society.—The first annual soirée of the above society took place on Tuesday, the 17th of June, at the rooms of the Young Men's Christian Association, Cambridge, kindly lent for the occasion. The proceedings were commenced by W. Buchanan, the treasurer, who read the report for the past year, which was very satisfactory, there being a balance in hand. Addresses were afterwards delivered by the Rev. Tritton, Messrs. Robson, Johnson, Wetherhall, J. Banham, (the secretary), Barker (the president), and the Rev. Johnstone. During the evening refreshments were served, and at intervals various pianoforte pieces were

performed. The doxology was then sung, and the company separated.

George Street Chapel (Hull) Young Men's Mutual Improvement Association. The fifth annual tea meeting of the above association was held on Thursday, August 28, when between sixty and seventy sat down to tea, the Rev. R. Hall, minister of the chapel, in the chair. Mr. S. D. Franklin, the secretary, read the report, showing the association to be in a flourishing condition. A. W. Bartho, the librarian, read the library report, stating that there were upwards of ninety volumes in the library. A MS. Magazine, the *British Controversialist*, "Eclectic Review," "Chambers's Journal," and the

"Excelsior" were circulated monthly amongst the members. Interesting addresses were delivered by the Rev. D. M. N. Thompson, Messrs. Shaw, Eastwood, Beaumont, Hill, Millhouse, Carlile, Garbuth, and Wordon. A vote of thanks to the chairman, and devotional exercises, concluded the meeting.

The Law Students' Mutual Corresponding Society.—Third Annual Report of the Committee, presented to the Members, 9th April, 1856. The committee have great pleasure in presenting to the members their third annual report of the proceedings and progress of the society, which, during the past year, have been attended with the most complete success, and prove in a very satisfactory manner its beneficial influence upon the junior members of the profession who have availed themselves of the advantages it offers. The number of members has exhibited a steady increase, and the committee are satisfied that the existence of the society only requires to be better known to make its advantageous means of self-improvement universally adopted by the law students of the kingdom; and with this view, they would suggest that active measures be taken to place the society more prominently before the profession. Steps have been recently taken to organize, in connection with this society, regular meetings of the members, when in town, for the purpose of *viva voce* debates upon legal points. The society now consists of nearly seventy members, a most convincing proof of the confidence it is obtaining amongst the law students, and that it is really deserving of their attention and support. The financial position of the society is very satisfactory, and an ample balance remains after defraying the working expenses of the past year.—CHARLES R. GILMAN, *Hon. Secretary*.

The Glasgow Association of Natural Science—noticed in a former num-

ber of the *British Controversialist*, under the title of "Glasgow Natural History Society;" but the name has been changed, owing to the existence of a society bearing the same appellation. Its object is mutual improvement in *natural science*, by essays, lectures, excursions, &c. The association was formed on the 28th of April last. It has met during the summer months fortnightly. Papers have been read on "Animalcules;" "Man, his Physiology and Ethnology;" "The Changes of Ocean Level;" "Chemistry, Ancient and Modern;" "The Importance of Science;" "Crystallization and Crystallography." Members' fee 2s. 6d. per annum. Those who wish to join are requested to communicate with the secretary, at the Religious Institution Rooms, and attend one of the meetings to enrol their names. The next meeting will be on Thursday, November 6.—HUNTER FINLAY, jun., *Secretary*.

Whitby Church of England Young Men's Association.—The first anniversary of this association was celebrated on Monday, September 22nd, in the lecture hall, when tea was provided for members and friends. The Rev. William Keane, M.A., F.R.A.S. (the president), in the chair. The report was read by Mr. J. Gaskill (the secretary), from which it appears that twenty-one lectures have been delivered during the year, by the Rev. W. Keane; H. G. Dunlop, Esq.; the late Rev. J. Laycock; Mr. F. K. Robinson; Rev. J. Hughes; Mr. J. Gaskill; Rev. W. H. Trendell; B. Woodward, Esq.; Dr. Dowson; Rev. J. Dingle; Mr. J. Bate; W. Smales, Esq.; J. Blanchard, Esq. The meetings are held every alternate week in the National School-room, and are opened with prayer and closed with the doxology. The association numbers nearly a hundred members, its affairs being managed by a committee of eight. Annual subscription, two shillings.—J. R. P.

LITERARY NOTICES.

"Genesis," a new poem, by an M.D., appears in our list of new books. It is introduced by our old and pompous acquaintance, George Gilfillan. Of the two, the poem or the prologue, we are bound to say we think the prologue is the heaviest. The poem is simply a watery edition of Milton: curious coincidences of matter, if not of manner, are by no means rare, and we fancy the public will take George Gilfillan's anticipatory defence for just what it is worth.

The trustees of Stepney College have secured Holford House, Regent's Park, for a new Baptist College, admitting lay members, and giving facilities to students for attending the London University.

Mrs. A'Becket is to receive a pension of £100 per annum.

We are happy to record the installation of Dr. Chenevix Trench as Dean of Westminster. He is a sound, talented, and amiable divine, one well worthy of his promotion. We have not heard whether this appointment will necessitate the giving up his professorship at King's College; we trust not.

Dr. Lee's "Alliance Prize Essay" is very voluminous and very cheap—some four hundred closely-printed pages for 1s. 6d.. It seems to be the whole case stated, with facts and figures to prove every statement—upon (at least) the temperance side of the question;—we say *seems*, for, in spite of a polite request of the Alliance Committee, we have not been able to spare time to do more than scan it. We never could get through a big book in our lives.

McLeod's "Class Atlas of Physical Geography," containing twenty maps, with notes, ten sections, and diagrams, is cheap, useful, and correct.

NEW BOOKS.

Beranger's Songs of the Empire, 5s.; Brewer's Scripture Hist., Part 1, 3s. 6d.; Choristens Handbook, 2nd series, 8s.; Lardner's Astronomy, Vol. 2, 5s.; Wordsworth, a Biography, by Hood,

8s. 6d.; Readings in English History, Bethel, 1s.; Boy's Voyage Round the World, 2s. 6d.; Glenny's Gardener's every day Book, 5s.; Gethsemane, and other Poems, 2s. 6d.; Steps to the Altar, 2s. 6d.; Poets of Nineteenth Century, 21s.; Symonds's Geology and Plurality of Worlds, 2s.; Wells's Science Popularly Explained, 3s. 6d.; Brown's Philosophy of Intimidation, 2s. 6d.; Harrow School Atlas of Modern Geography, 7s. 6d. and 12s. 6d.; McCrie's Works, Reformation in Italy, Sixteenth Century, 6s.; Genesis, a Poem, by E. Howard, with Introduction by George Gilfillan, 6s.; A Shilling's Worth of Practical Receipts; Page's Text-Book of Geology, 5s.; Bailey's Records of Longevity, 5s.; Belton's Fireside Preaching, 7s. 6d.; Carpenter's Physiology, 12s. 6d.; Magnetism and Somnambulism, by Didier, 5s.; Flint's Manual of Health, 6d.; Homer's Iliad, Books 1 to 4, Arnold, 7s. 6d.; Poets and Statesmen, their Homes and Haunts, 12s.; Boyhood of Great Men, 3s. 6d. Parlour Library:—Hunchback of Notre Dame, Father Darcy, and Margaret Graham. Rail. Library:—Marryat's Jacob Faithful, Miss Warner's Hills of the Shatemuc. Bohn's Classical Library:—Pliny's Natural History, Vol. V., 5s. Bray's Novels:—Fitz of Fitz Ford. New Editions of Hajji Baba, 2s.; Sasegne's French Prose, 3s. 6d.; Sinclair's Charles Seymour, 1s. 6d.; Fisk's Paley's Evidences of Christianity, 4s. 6d.; Monuments, Tombs, and Cenotaphs, by Trendall, 21s.; Webster's Dictionary Abridged, by Goodrich, 6s.; A'Becket's Comic Blackstone, 2s.; Adams' Geographical Word Expositor, 2s. 6d.; Foster's Essays, Vol. I. (Bohn's Lib.), 3s. 6d.; Far Off, Part 2, 4s.; Fowne's Chemistry, 12s. 6d.; Candle Lectures, 1s.; Mr. Angus B. Reach's Men of the Hour, Mrs. Gore's Sketches of English Character, and Mr. Horace Mayhew's Wonderful People; Apperley's Nimrod's Hunting Tour in North of England, 3s. 6d.

European Philosophy.

BY SAMUEL NEIL,

Author of "The Art of Reasoning," "Elements of Rhetoric," &c.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL—IDEALISM—EMPEDOCLES.

"Swift-fated and conscious, how brief is life's pleasureless portion!
Like the wind-driven smoke, men are carried backwards and forwards
Each trusting to nought save what his *experience* vouches;
On all sides distracted, yet wishing to find out the whole truth
In vain; perceptible *to man* neither by eye nor by ear,
Nor to be grasped by his mind. And thou, when thus thou hast wandered,
Wilt find that the knowledge of man no farther forth-reaches."

SUCH is the complaint which, in the ancient days of philosophic thought, the wise and noble Empedocles made regarding "the insufficiency of human reason," for the discovery or comprehension of absolute truth. It is a curious fact, indeed, that the spirit of speculation—the perpetually unsatisfied, unresting, ever-ambitious curiosity of the intellect—will not restrain itself within the circle of the sense-seen; but, as oft as it looks upon the mysteries of being, yearns, with uncontrollable intensity of purpose, to bring *them* within the boundary of the definitely comprehensible, and desires, not implicit faith in, but explicit knowledge regarding, those incessantly recurrent *problemata* of thought. Surely it is not without a good presiding purpose that this irresistible instinct operates? No! *this* is "the clue of Reason, whose beginning is *in the dark*, but by the benefit of whose conduct we are led, as it were by the hand, into the clearest light."*

Tendency indicates purpose, and purpose aims continually at accomplishment. Why, then, this premature despair of the capacities of the soul to work out, to perfect, and consummate all the mighty purposes of life? Why this ready adoption of the thought,—

"That all the world's a cheat,
Where truths and falsehoods lie so intermixt,
And are so like each other, that 'tis hard
To find the difference"?

Such scepticism is the weak impatience of a rash intellect. The vigorous mind hopes and labours; the feeble one despairs and droops into inertitude. Faith is stronger and more helpful than

* "Hobbes' Works," vol. ii., p. 6.

doubt. The former inspires to new efforts, and promises legitimate success; the latter deadens the activities, and falsely prophesies that all man's—

“Gorgeous dreams
And beauteous fancies, hopes and aspirations,
Were born only to wither in this life.”

To the brave heart, “though grief cometh in the evening, yet joy riseth in the morning.” Empedocles was a grief-worn, sorrowing man; but not a sceptic. We have listened to his complaint, let us now learn how he struggled for truth, and what he gained in the struggle.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH.—Empedocles was born at Agrigentum (anciently Acrāgas, now Girgenti), a magnificent and gigantic city, containing a population of 800,000, situated on the southern coast of Sicily. His family was of high repute for talent and wealth. His grandfather, after whom he was named, was not only distinguished as a poet, but also as a victor in the chariot contests in the plains of Olympia. Meton, his father, who kept a fine stud of horses, had also won the palm, and was at this time the leader of the democratic party. As Empedocles flourished about the 84th Olympiad (444 B.C.), was the teacher of Gorgias, the Sophist, who flourished about Olympiad 86 (436 B.C.), and is said in a fragment from Glaucus, quoted by Diogenes Laertius, to have died at the age of sixty,—we may assume that he was born early in the 5th century B.C., and probably in the reign of that Theron to whom Pindar, in 476 B.C., addressed two of his odes, and who, till his death in 472, was tyrant of Agrigentum. So born, and trained as he undoubtedly was, the destiny before Empedocles seemed brilliant enough. But he aspired to higher honours than mere statesmanship can yield. He indeed mixed in politics, and, at the head of the liberal party, co-operated in the revolution, in which Thrasideus, Theron's son, was expelled from the dominion of the city; but when the people, in generous estimation of his merits, offered him the supreme power, he remonstrated, and refused to accept the tyranny from which he had ousted another. By his advice a democratic government was adopted, in which the magistracy held office only by a triennial tenure. He was no flatterer of the people's vices; for when he saw that wealth and luxury were spreading their enervating influences, he rebuked his fellow citizens, by saying “they enjoyed themselves as if they were to die to-morrow, and built their palaces as superbly as if they were destined to live for ever.” Neither was he an encourager of an undue deference to station or authority. One day, being at a feast where the company had taken their several places at table, yet no viands were brought, he demanded of the host why the feast was not served? The host replied, he waited for the

chief of the senate. A little afterwards this magistrate entered, and was set at the head of the table. In his capacity as king of the feast, this person exhibited an arbitrary and imperious humour, commanding each to drink his wine undiluted, and ordaining that the contents of the vessel should be dashed in the face of whosoever refused to quaff the beverage so. Next day Empedocles impeached him before the people, and host and feast-king were condemned to death for their violation of the social rights of man.

Much of his great hereditary wealth he spent in giving dowries to girls of the lower classes, that they might be mated with young men of rank or consequence. At one time, too, when some one strove to wrest the sovereignty from the people, he not only opposed the attempt, but divided his own fortune among the poor, that they might have no cause to desire political change—the usual, but seldom successful, panacea for social evils.

Like Orpheus, he had the gifts of prophecy and poesy; like Hippocrates, he was acquainted with medicine; like Anaximander, he was a physicist; like Solon, a lawgiver; like Xenophanes, an interpreter of “man and life.” He has won the admiration of Plato and Aristotle; Lucretius has sung his praises; and succeeding ages have classed him with the greatest men. Nor, when we regard the tales, however they may be distorted by fable, which are told of him, can we wonder at this. Of these, the most singular are as follow:—

A woman for many days was sunk in a deep lethargy, over which all remedies, known to the physicians of the time, were powerless. Empedocles revived her; and hence arose the saying that he could raise the dead.

Certain periodical winds bore on their wings all sorts of maladies into Agrigentum. Empedocles sheltered the town from their fatal influences, by closing an aperture between two mountains; and the multitudes said that even the winds obeyed him.

A pestilence ravaged Selinus. Empedocles turned two streams into the river on whose banks that town stood; this quickened its sluggish current, and swept away the miasms which rose from it: the plague ceased, and the populace looked on him as a divine saviour.

Such stories as these could not but originate strange thoughts in ignorant minds; and these, combined with the singular doctrines he taught, most probably gave rise to the misinterpretation that he represented himself as a god. On such impressions spreading, he quitted Sicily; travelled, it is said, in Syria, Arabia, and the Peloponnesus; expounded his system at Athens; read his poem on “Lustrations” at the Olympic games, amid the applause of all Greece; and then returned to his native city,

but was denied admission by the party in power. Various tales are told of the mode of his death. Some assert that he was taken to heaven and placed among the gods; others, that he suffered shipwreck;—some, that he strangled himself; others, that he fell by accident from his chariot. But the commonly received account is, that anxious to discover the cause of volcanoes, he approached too near the crater of Etna, and was precipitated into its burning abyss. Amidst such a diversity of witnesses, all that we are safe in predicating is, that he passed the last years of his life in obscurity. He was tall, well-formed, and fair; wore his hair long; went dressed in a purple robe, with a golden circlet on his wrist, a Delphian garland on his temples, and slippers with brazen soles on his feet. His countenance was solemn, and his deportment grave, like a monarch-thoughtsman as he was.

Empedocles exercised his genius on many themes. Among the works attributed to him are several tragedies, some epigrams, a "Hymn to Apollo," an epic "On the Expedition of Xerxes," didactic poems on "Medicine," "Politics," "Purifications," and "Nature." It is with the latter that we are here particularly concerned. Of all these numerous writings, we possess now only fragments; but even in these fragments we find evidence sufficient to convince us that his is—

"One of the few, the immortal names,
That were not born to die."

EXPOSITION.—Our readers are aware that the ancient thinkers inherited from their poetic predecessors the mode in which they regarded the universe and its problems. The grand totality of nature had hitherto been looked upon as operated on, and governed by, a widely diversified multitude of super-human or divine agencies; but now that philosophy, *i. e.*, reflective thought, strove to acquire a solution apart from and transcending those agencies, there was presented to the view two widely differing ideas, *totality* and *change*. How were these two to be reconciled? Was change an integrally new creation, or a modification of the *one* and *all*? If a modification merely, what principle governed its multitudinous activities? what initial cause gave origin to these differing forms? Was change a seeming or a reality? Could the noumenal and the phenomenal be regarded as both existent in the One?

Parmenides recognized in the Senses the sources of man's ideas of the *Many*, and in the Reason the evidence of the *All*, and laid before humanity the new problem on which the knowledge of the *True* and *Real* seemed to him to depend, *viz.*, how to know? Empedocles was not a logical thinker; he was one of those who utter the flashing inspirations of deep thought in glowing and burning phrases; and, as Lucretius says,—

"The numbers rolling from his breast divine,
 'Reveal such bright and bold discoveries,
 That scarce he seems a soul of human birth.'"*

We must therefore unveil the hidden logic of his speculations, that it may be seen how far he carried out the science of his age. Experience and observation, in the slenderest fragments, are the elements of human knowledge—neither eye, nor ear, nor reason, can behold the All. The senses and the reason are both conditioned. The supreme canon of sense-perception is—*γινώσκεισθαι ὁμοίῳ ὁμοιον*—"the like is perceived by the like."†

"For through earth we learn to know earth, and water through water,
 Divine ether by ether, and fire destructive by fire;
 Love by love, and strife by grievous and saddening strife."

As is the composition of the bodily frame therefore, so also is the perceptive power of the senses, and man's knowledge is measureable by the amount of his sense-perceptions. This theory of emanations, by which, in ancient philosophies, it was attempted to explain the action and reaction of the sense-known object and the percipient mind, is the union point in which the mechanical and dynamical schools‡ coalesce, and in which a cycle of thought prepares for completion. If for nought else than this, it deserves signalization. But it has a more important bearing on philosophy when we perceive that it is the idea which makes Eclecticism in this era possible. The several elements were now regarded as component parts of the product knowledge, as well as the originals of all being.

"Four are the roots and elements of All—
 Fire and water, and earth and air's unmeasured expansion;
 For thence is all that is, or was, or ever shall be."

If this is so, how do the phenomenal changes of nature occur, and in what do they originate? They spring from the incongruity of these elements, each to each, in their present admixture and relations, an incongruity which produces active discord (*νεῖκος*) among them, and hence separation and change; but though thus disunited, there is a unifying agency, a principle of concord (*φιλία*) at work by which the *Many* is continually approximated to the *One*. This unitive power, inasmuch as it operates in opposition to change, man cannot perceive by the senses, but must be content to acknowledge, because it satisfies the wants of the reason.

* "De Rerum Natura," i., 732.

† See Sir W. Hamilton's "Discussions on Philosophy," p. 60, for a criticism of this principle.

‡ See "European Philosophy," B. C., 1855, pp. 2—4.

" Love, which in the body of man is deemed connate,
The source of their thoughts, their deeds, and kindly affections,
On whom they call by the names of Joy and Aphrodite.
No eye hath seen it within the circle of things—
No mortal eye."

This invisible unifying power, this All, is God, and is representable by no anthropomorphic semblance.

" For neither with head fitted to members like man,
Nor yet with two arm-limbs from shoulders forth-reaching,
Nor with feet, nor swift-motioned legs, nor hair-clad extremae.
He is wholly and perfectly *Mind* ineffable, holy,
With rapid and swift-glancing thought pervading the world."

The most perfect ideal of the *One* is the circle, and hence—

" In the secret bosom of harmony, firm fixed,
Is the well-circled sphere, in glad rest calmly rejoicing."

This God-form, though the children of earth know not, yet the perfected man in the after life will know; and though here in incessant conflict—

" All the members of God strive together, one with another,"
in that life where earth-bonds are sundered,—

" They know no god of war, nor the spirit of battles,
Nor sovereign Jove, nor Chronos, nor Hermes,
But the queen of Love and Beauty."

It is not in the separate existence of discord and concord that creation originates, but in the comminglement of their individual powers, the result of the admixture of those particles of matter in which affinity does not reside; so that,—

" When deep into the profound abyss strife has descended,
And love rules within, amidst the eddying vortex,
Then All comes together, and Unity exists alone,
Scattered no more, but closely either to either adbering:
From their commingling spring millions of perishing beings,
While much, shapeless and void, in a changeable state remains
Unmixed, as yet, by strife, yet held apart."

This affinity and repulsion, naturally resident in the principal elements—a doctrine which, in a modified form, modern chemistry homologates—is the cause of phenomenal change. In their original and perfect state the elements dwell together in love; and in so much only as strife operates on or amongst them, do phenomenal changes become developed.

" A twofold truth I speak—How one from many arises,
And how, again dissolved, the one into many returneth."

* * * " No natural birth
Is there of mortal things; nor is destructive death the end;

There is nothing but a mixing and a disengaging of the mixed.
These are called birth and death by unwitting mortals."

It is thus that the mighty mysteries of Being are solved. This life is non-natural. We belong to an hierarchy of existence of nobler status than aught that earth can encompass. But we have entered the region of strife, and are exiled from love, because—

"This is the law of Fate, the ancient law of the gods:
If with guilt or murder his members a *daimon* polluteth—
Of those who have had an existence lasting through ages—
Thrice ten thousand years must he wander apart from the happy;
Hence I stray, doomed, a fugitive, outcast from the gods,
To the mad rage of Strife submissive."

It was in this sense, and not in that of vain self-glorification, that he exclaimed, "I am a god, and am not a mortal." He believed in that sublime fancy of which our own poet Wordsworth hath spoken; viz.,—

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us—our life's star—
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar."

In this belief, and in the hope which, like a dove with folded wings, nestled in its bosom, he rested; and proclaimed aloud to each man these words as a message of truth,—

"When, leaving the body, out to the free ether thou reachest,
A god undying thou shalt be,—no longer a mortal."

That this must be true, is established by the principle that "like is knowable only by the like;" for man recognizes the Divine, and worships. He can only do so by partaking in himself of the divine nature; and whatever he knows, *exists*, because knowing is being known. It does not follow from this that the god in which he believed bore any semblance to man. As we have already showed, he thought far otherwise, and held a lofty view of the nature and attributes of the Divine Intelligence, to whose supreme sway—as given in pre-determined law—the many, the phenomenal, was subject.

In his opinions on morals, he maintained that happiness is granted only to the virtuous, and that a true and honestly noble life was requisite to obtain re-admission to the realms of love.

REMARKS.—In the preceding opinions we find the earliest instance of eclecticism. The single *elements* of former thinkers are admitted *in combination* as the primary atoms of nature; the uncertainty of the revelations of sense are conceded, while the reason is recognized as the true and trustworthy ultimate reference in matters of thought. While the moving forces of phenomena are acknowledged, the Mysterious One who subor-

dinates all to his will is honoured; and while the decrees of Fate are held as ruling in the universe, man is regarded as capable of freeing himself from their domination, and approximating to the godlike—the Divine. All the rays of ancient thought are harmonized and unified, the truths they contain adopted, and their countervailing opposites so placed in relation to them, that they seem but the doubles of each other. We cannot say that in this attempt he was successful; all that we do say is, that he strove to fuse the doctrines of the Ionic and Italic schools with the *idealism* of the Eleatics, and that he, in so doing, pointed out to man how needful it was to discover the laws according to which man judges of truth—the conditions to which human thought was subject in the elaboration of the *ideas* excited in the reason and suggested by sense.

It is ever so at the close of any given cycle of thought—the speculators, struck by the same or similar phenomena, set off, each in his own way, to discover the cause; each looks for truth by the torch-light of his own thought, and, in the end, they are all found standing round the base of the same pyramid, whose column, though stretching away up into heaven and defying ascent, yet bears on its sculptured sides, in untranslated characters, directions for further progress and an index of the route. The task of decipherment must then begin; the pathways must again be explored, and new energies be aroused to continue the search. Who can restrain—

“A longing to inquire
Into the mystery of this heart that beats
So wild, so deep in us—to know
Whence our thoughts come, and where they go”?

Hitherto, in this universe it has been impossible. In every age the “anxious questioning” of the restless soul goes on. The reason will not admit that thought can be an “insoluble problem” to itself. It may be that “to *know* more we must *be* more,” but this only whets the zest of search; for if we desire, with fervour not to be cooled, the attainment of this greater and higher knowledge, does it not prove that if we cannot *know* more here, we shall, we must *be* more hereafter?—that desire may have fruition, and that it yet may be triumphantly proven—

“That all, as in some piece of art,
Is toil co-operant to an *end*”?

To you who read, and I who write, is there no fitting lesson in the course which, in the ancient days, we see that speculative thought has taken? Is it useful only as the curious record of “the thinkings of the dead”? or is it capable of suggesting that no endeavour is ever wholly lost—that each new step in thought we take not only exhibits new scenes in the infinite realm of speculation, but also points the way to newer triumphs in succeeding

times? Does it not rather assure us that in these longings of the soul the surest evidences of immortality are found? Indulging in such reflections, cannot each one of us say—My soul,

- “Aspiring much
To know of other worlds and other truths,
• Not to this spot vouchsafed—here frees herself
From thralldom to that fast, incessant wheel
Whereon all nature rides with downward arc
Inevitable; summons here her strength;
Here imparts her wing; proclaims herself the mere
And only guest of nature; takes her way—
Slight essence!—through its circling maze, and boasts
Immortal being,—trembling as she boasts”?

It is good to close the year with such thoughts—thoughts which, on the wings of memory and hope, bear forth the soul, with brave, excursive flight, out into futurity, and enable it

“To trace the lines of past designs,
All confluent to the finished heaven.”

TIME.—Time is the only gift or commodity of which every man who lives has just the same share. The passing day is exactly of the same dimensions to each of us, and by no contrivance can any one of us extend its duration by so much as a minute or a second. It is not like a sum of money which we can employ in trade and put out to interest, and thereby add to or multiply its amount. Its amount is unalterable. We cannot “make it breed.” We cannot even keep it by us. Whether we will or no we must spend it, and all our power, therefore, consists in the manner in which it is spent. Part with it we must, but we may give it either for something or nothing. Its mode of escaping from us, however, being very subtle and silent, we are exceedingly apt, because we do not feel it passing out of our hands like so much told coin, to forget that we are parting with it at all; and thus, from mere heedlessness, the precious possession is allowed to pass away, as if it were a thing of no value. The first and principal rule, therefore, in regard to the economy and right improvement of time, is to habituate ourselves to watch it.—*Pursuit of Knowledge. Alfred.*

SIMPLICITY OF STYLE.—Like simplicity of manner, it shows us a man’s sentiments and turn of mind, laid open without disguise. More studied and artificial manners of writing, however beautiful, have always this disadvantage, that they exhibit an author in form, like a man at court, where the splendour of dress, and ceremonial of behaviour, conceal those peculiarities which distinguish one man from another. But reading an author of simplicity is like conversing with a person of distinction at home, and with ease, where we find natural manners and a marked character.—*Blair.*

History.

IS MACAULAY'S ESTIMATE OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE CORRECT?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN reply to B. S., we must first disclaim the authorship of the article in opposition to the claims of "Queen Elizabeth to admiration," not because we do not approve of the article in question, but simply because we did not write it; and therefore the ingenious scaffolding raised upon that assumption falls to the ground. And *how far* the pages of the *British Controversialist* show "the approving suffrages of the present generation" on the subject of debate we leave its readers to guess, when the only person appearing in support of the question is B. S.; so that whatever the literary claims of our worthy opponent, the remark seems to imply that *his trumpeter is either dead or absent*.

His third assumption, "that we have chosen our motto from the 'Edinburgh Review,'" is equally gratuitous and unfounded, and is easily disproved—first, because we did not know of it; secondly, because we could not have understood it if we had, our acquaintance with the language of the classics being as yet but young. We have, however, met with a motto in the course of our *juvenile reading*, we can cordially recommend to B. S. as having been of great use to ourselves,—" *Qui facile credit facile decipitur.*"* We had it in our mind's eye at the commencement of our inquiry, and as we were not writing for the sugary bread and butter fancies of young England, but for men, we put down the *doubts* as they arose, that B. S. might answer them *if he could*: but *has he*?

Let his fourth assumption answer. He feels inclined to suspect us of Red-Republicanism. Why? Because we do not take in all his pet historian says of his pet hero. Instead of answering us, B. S. gives us a learned, but needless, disquisition upon inductive logic, and the difference between opinion and expression. Are not our readers already familiar with the "Art of Reasoning"? Is it not their text-book, of which the debates in the *British Controversialist* form the exercises, that a page and more should be used in adding *line to line, precept to precept*? But enough has been already said in reply to the introductory remarks of B. S., without following him into the comparative merits and styles of Paley, Addison, Johnson, and

* "He that easily believes is easily deceived."

Macaulay;—the fact that of the four the last named only is in court, must be our excuse for leaving the first three and their merits to other heads and other hands.

We hold with B. S. that a November fog, or leafless trees, or wintry ghosts, are not necessary adjuncts to the truth of a landscape, *unless* it happens that the landscape appears under any or all of those disadvantages; when, if the "holiday sketcher" chooses such times and circumstances for his sketching rambles, if he would be true to nature, he must just take nature as he finds her.

B. S. appears to derive considerable satisfaction from our admission of "general excellency," and seems to trace from it a warrant for the almost universal perfection, as described by the historian. From this point the reply digresses into an extremely interesting, but very unnecessary, inquiry into the reasons of the popularity of Shakespeare, Walter Scott, and *Uncle Tom!* closing up with an admission that Macaulay's portrait of Penn "is *not* vividly life-like," and that there, at any rate, "we have only half a man portrayed;" proving *one fact*, that the historian *can* degenerate into the partisan.

The next point touched upon by B. S., and the first of real reply, is the call of William, which, we stated, being in an upward direction, was one, if not a principal, reason for its acceptance. B. S. admits this might have had some weight, but thinks that the interests of Europe, the balance of power, the interests of his native country, and the safety of "jeopardized Protestantism," all conspired in the Prince's mind to make the *call* availing. Well, we will not quibble about terms, but, after all, it establishes our position, that it "*was a good move from the Hague to London;*" and fortunate the Prince that so many other reasons might be put forth to justify his longing desire for England's crown. But it seems rather out of keeping with the philanthropic, patriotic, and unselfish view taken by B. S., that with wary caution and treacherous kingcraft, he should so constantly "hold with the hare while he ran with the hounds," maintaining, as one historian remarks, an apparent indifference to the projects of his adherents in England, "though well acquainted with all their secret consultations."*

The pages of Hume, which, in our opinion, are to the full as reliable and authentic as those of Macaulay, abound with instances of the Prince's under-plotting and by-play, given as proofs of his politic and deeply-calculating genius; and though in constant communication with Sunderland, "the basest of all counsellors," he yet kept up a seeming friendliness with the King, until the time when he could safely throw aside the veil of speciousness and falsehood which he had worn so long.

* "Memoirs of James II.," vol. ii., p. 86. Baldwin and Cradock 1821.

"Affecting towards James, with an air of patient tranquillity, the deference and duty of a son, he gained over the subjects, sapped the throne, and finally made himself supreme arbiter of the fate of his father-in-law, under the pretence of a zeal for a church, and affection for a nation, to neither of which he belonged."* Seemingly also at variance with this view is the fact, that it had been arranged between the Prince and Mary his wife by Burnet, the *peace maker*, that should she succeed to the crown of England by the death (or otherwise) of her father, that the Prince should be king; because, as Burnet informed her, "a titular kingship was no acceptable thing to a man, especially if it was to depend upon another's life; and by this concession the good understanding between the Prince and his wife, which had been somewhat embroiled, was restored."†

In reference to this interference between the Prince and his wife, Burnet says, "I asked pardon for having moved her in such a tender point; but I solemnly protested that no person living had moved me in it, or so much as knew of it." A protestation of innocence before suspicion or accusation is generally considered a proof of guilt; and so Lord Dartmouth evidently thinks, for he adds, "I take it for granted, that the Prince ordered Burnet to propose it to the Princess before he would engage upon the attempt upon England; and she certainly must understand it so; for certainly such a little Scotch priest durst not have proposed altering the right of succession to the three kingdoms of his own head, though he had double the confidence he was known to have."‡ And at any rate, if it was without the Prince's knowledge, it was, nevertheless, very acceptable to him; for Macaulay, first tracing the disagreement to that cause, says, "They were fortunate in having an indiscreet friend, who blurted out the whole truth."§ "Burnet plainly told the Princess what the feeling was which preyed upon her husband's mind. But William, not content with this promise, could imagine himself king only on the supposition that James was deposed, and the throne vacant: if the throne devolved upon Mary, he had not the slightest ground for supposing that the order of succession would be departed from, and the rights of the Princess sacrificed in his favour."|| But William had proved beforehand his *unselfishness*, in a letter to Sir Leoline Jenkins;—he received with pleasure the idea of the Princess being regent during her father's life; and the mission of Dyckwell, the Prince's ambassador, as gathered from Burnet, who himself drew up his

* Mackintosh, p. 363, quarto edition. Longman.

† Burnet's "History of his Own Times," vol. iii., p. 136. Oxford edition. 1823.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Macaulay, vol. ii., p. 179.

|| Mackintosh, p. 370.

instructions, was, while ostensibly dealing with the King, to cajole both of the religious parties who were then plotting and hoping for the Prince's success,—to persuade the Church that he was *not* a Presbyterian, and the Dissenters that he was *not* arbitrary and imperious, which monstrous reports, as Burnet says, had gone abroad.* Dyckwell, therefore, was to assure the Church party of the "Prince's firm attachment to the Church of England;" to press the Dissenters to stand off from the court, and not to be drawn in by any promises of the King to assist him in the elections; that he should hold out to them a full toleration, with the hopes of a compensation in a better time, if they then stood firm. Here, then, we think the attentive reader of England's eventful history, during this important crisis, will say with us, that if B. S. is right, history is wrong; for clearly this conduct, the Prince's tampering with the subjects of England's crown, his tampering with the succession (whether by himself or proxy), his constant communications with the King's ministers, his artful and insidious attempts to make a handle of the religious partizanship then prevalent in England—savoured somewhat of both "*ambition and self*," and was entirely apart from any considerations as to the interests of "Europe, Holland, England, Protestantism, Liberty, *goodly reasons*" though they were; and we cannot help surmising, that had the *call not been in an upward direction*, matters might have been somewhat different.

B. S., in his ardent advocacy, has forgotten delicacy and gallantry and respect for that only refuge of a woman, her chastity, when he rakes up and ingeniously uses the long-since exploded aspersion on the fair fame of James's Queen—the illegitimacy of the Prince of Wales,—a question set at rest for ever, save in those minds who cannot believe anything contrary to their own wish. At the time when every one was looking forward to the succession of the Princess of Orange, and deploring the evils likely to ensue from the birth of a prince born and bred in subserviency to, and in communion with, the Papacy, and of parents so bigoted in the support of those views, we cannot wonder that such an idea should get afloat; but, as Dryden sings,—

"Born in broad daylight, that the ungrateful rout
May find no room for a remaining doubt,"†

the unfortunate prince was born in the "presence of the Queen Dowager, of most of the privy council, and of several ladies of quality."‡ And previously the Queen, writing to the Princess Mary, alluded to her pregnancy in the most unaffected terms;

* Burnet, vol. iii., pp. 173, 174.

† Dryden's Ode, "*Britannia Rediviva*."

‡ Mackintosh, p. 280.

and Burnet never made a greater mistake, than when he counselled that the illegitimacy of the Prince of Wales should be put forth as a principal reason for William's aggression.* The pretence, as shameless as it was shallow, was too transparent to deceive anyone; but, for want of a better, it had to do. The Prince had long been waiting for a favourable conjuncture, and he and his partisans were but too glad to lay instant hold upon any idea likely to take with the populace, though, as is well said, "the son of James II. was perhaps the only prince in Europe of whose blood there could be no rational doubt, considering the verification of his birth, the unimpeached life of his mother, and the general morality of the court."†

We turn, in the next place, to the *per contra* account (as B. S. has it), remarking, *en passant*, how easy it is to make up a balance sheet if both sides of the ledger are in your own hands. B. S., with a considerable amount of ingenious bookkeeping (not, perhaps, quite the kind that would pass at the Bankruptcy Court), having made the credit side tolerably good, sums up the total in the usual Kossuth phrases; as, "Claims of nations, of country, of pure religion, of human happiness"!—"Duties owed to subjects, and the cry for aid of the distressed"! The only item in the *per contra* account, according to B. S., is the *jus divinum* of fathers-in-law, which B. S.—happy Benedict!—has not yet discovered. B. S. is, however, too late with his advice to ourselves to remain in his own blissful condition. We have already discovered the *jus divinum* of not only fathers, but mothers-in-law. We feel ourselves qualified to say, with B. S., it were indeed "better not to marry," if the common-sense dictates of our own conscience and of God's moral law are to be held as nought when put in the scale against our selfishness, in the game of matrimonial speculation; and if this doctrine be not current in society, it is the fault of society, and not of the doctrine.

We come, then, to the remarks upon the probability of William's share in Monmouth's rebellion. Had B. S. forgotten, when speaking of our impartiality, that there is a letter extant, sent by Lord Montague to William after he had obtained the crown, in which it seems pretty clear that William both knew and approved of the Rye House Plot? It is not such a very great stretch, either of imagination or probability, to suppose that a Prince thus implicated in all sorts of plots and counter-plots would not have been very particular in what he engaged, if likely to be successful, provided his own share in it could be concealed. "Idle," indeed, "to comment on such arguments;" and worse than idle, where there is a chance of a reply, and,

* Ellis's "Letters," vol. iii., p. 348. First series, 1824.

† Mackintosh, p. 408.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

perhaps, more coming out than is bargained for. Shrewsbury's signature is a thing of but little importance in the eyes of our opponent, because, of course, William, up to this time, had had neither time nor opportunity of knowing the character of the English peerage—at least, so says B. S.; but, according to plain facts, one thing seems pretty self-evident, that he knew them well enough to pick out tools for his own purpose. And it rather goes against this idea, that after William had full opportunity of knowing the man, yet he still held high place in court and cabinet, and the king more than once refused to accept the seals, even when Shrewsbury tendered them; and writing to him from Loo, on the 23rd of September, 1697 (shortly after the seals had again been tendered), he says, "Is it possible you should be disturbed by the absurd accusations of the greatest knaves in the world? . . . Believe me, you can have no idea of my impatience to see you, and how truly I regard you." *

The next in order, as B. S. remarks, is "a more serious matter;" namely, the massacre of Glencoe; and one not made at all less serious, even by entertaining the almost impossible supposition that William *did sign* the order *without reading*—we would have said impossible, but that the recent *exposés* of how the business of our great public companies is managed fully bears out B. S. in his remarks: need we mention the case of a Robson, or a Redpath, or a British Bank bubble, where directors, auditors, and secretaries alike seem to have acted upon the principle which Burnet, Macaulay, and B. S. contend for in the case of William III.? And though B. S. assures his readers that our remarks "will bring a smile upon the face of any one who has ever seen the course of public business," we rather fancy that the poor duped and defrauded shareholders of the Great Northern, &c., will feel much more inclined to laugh upon the wrong side of the mouth. But taking as granted the arguments of B. S., that not one landed proprietor in fifty ever read through the title-deeds of his own estate, or that not one in fifty could understand the meaning of his own marriage-settlement, does not the question still hold good, Are not the forty-nine in either case bound by the covenants of the respective deeds to the full as much as the fiftieth, who had read it before he signed? Can B. S. instance a case where title-deeds or marriage-settlements were set aside because of the culpable negligence and carelessness of the parties to the deed? Granted, that William was ignorant, is he less guilty of the fearful atrocities committed in his name, and under the sanction of his written authority? What set-off is it, to the slaughter of young and old, of men whose hoary heads and tottering feet were well nigh in the grave, and of young infants at their mothers' breasts—to the desolated hamlet—to the orphan and the widow, to know that others, too,

* "Letters of the Reign of William III.," vol. i., p. 340.

are guilty of like negligence, but still, let B. S. remember, differing in degree. His instances are but concerning property: this, concerning life. His instances, of men beneath the notice of the throne; this, of the man upon the throne, whose nod is life or death. Well may Macaulay and Macaulay's advocate notice that "*he smiled at none*," with such a load of guilty connivance, or—to accept Burnet's and B. S.'s rendering—culpable ignorance weighing down his kingly conscience; if from this one deed alone, it were difficult to smile.

B. S. has no doubts of the results of this debate. Neither have we. History says the Prince was the preserver, in God's hand, of the Protestant liberties and institutions of England. History says that seemingly—had it not been for his invasion—England's sun was set and her glory departed. History says, that if it had not been for him, the Test Act would have been repealed, and all offices thrown wide open for Jesuit intriguers and Popish emissaries. History says, that England's throne was in the possession of a traitor to his kingly oath and kingly dignity,—of a coward truckler to a foreign power. But history also says—and will be heard as much on the one side as the other—that craftiness and guile were prominent in William's character. History marks how he siezes upon all events to turn them to his purpose, scrupling not at the instrument or the means, so long as it leads to the bright goal of all his hopes and aspirations—the crown of England. History recollects, too, that his attempt was only possible because he had wedded the daughter of the man he was now moving heaven and earth to crush, if it were but possible; and at least the *jus divinum* of fathers-in-law should shield them from the crafty policy of their sons—from hired spies and traitorous counsellors—from honied words and secret venom.

When we remember that the way was paved for his success by the position of all parties in England; when we remember how James, with his Papist inclinations and predilections, played into his hands; when we remember that his wife was James's daughter, and, through her, the succession became almost his own; when we remember how all men's minds were inflamed by the impolitic imprisonment of the bishops,—will not the verdict of every good man and true be, that the Prince was more *fortunate* than either good or great; and that, instead of inaugurating a new era of liberty, unknown before, he rather reaped the fruition of the glorious days of Cromwell, whose deeds had slumbered through the wintry dearth and frosty night of the restored Stuarts, only to break forth in the force and plenitude of spring, and which would have found or made a man for the time and the place, even if the Dutch William had remained in Holland? Small thanks to him for not attempting to curb too tightly the steed who had but just hurled its lawful
 er from its back.

B. J.

Politics.

IS EDUCATION THE DUTY OF THE STATE?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"Children have as much right to some education as to have their lives preserved; and when this is not given them by their parents, the care of it devolves upon all persons: it becomes the duty of all who are capable of affording it, and whose help is wanted."—*Bishop Butler*.

WE open our article with the forcible words of the author of the "Analogy." Though written a century since, their truth is not recognized even now by a certain class of individuals. Formerly, it was the custom of such parties to deny the utility of education *in toto*. A few specimens of this almost extinct class are still to be met with; but their views have little weight; they are looked upon as relics of a departed age—as humanized fossils. Our opponents in the present debate have equally curious, though more novel, methods of denying the truth of Bishop Butler's statement. There is one peculiarity common to them all—they acknowledge the necessity of education, yet, strangely, deny the right of Government to interfere in enforcing its culture. They have kept clear of the real question under discussion, and have exhausted all their strength in proving that education is the duty of the parent, and that he has a right to delegate that duty to the teachers of the schools supported by the voluntary offerings of sectarian charity. We admit these premises, but deny the absurd deduction, that because it is the duty of the parent, the State has no right to interfere, even when he neglects that duty. Sectarianism is, in reality, at the bottom of our opponents' opposition to a State education. Truly has *Punch* said, an Englishman likes "to admit the utility of education, and yet to exclude from its benefits every one who is not of the same creed as himself."

"L'Ouvrier" having upraised the banner of the "Rights of Parents," his followers considered the opportunity a good one for the display of a little sentimental nonsense, and were thus enabled to keep clear from the points at issue. In our opening article we advanced facts and adopted a line of argument which, if not shown to be incorrect, settled the question. Not one of our opponents attempted to refute what was therein advanced. Does not this prove their inability to cope with the subject as laid down by us? "L'Ouvrier," in his reply, has certainly tried to show that my deductions are incorrect, but in order to make any onslaught at all on my position, he felt compelled to sta-

from false data, of which more hereafter. Whatever may be the individual views of our readers on the question of State education, we are certain no two opinions can exist in respect to the merits of the articles which have appeared in the *Controversialist*. Contrast the contributions of J. E. B. and E. M., jun., with those of T. U. and "Philalethes." The former are illogical, flimsy, and weak; the latter, forcible, logical, and to the point. J. E. B., E. M., and even "Ouvrier," have kept as far away from the real question as possible; T. U. has discussed the subject in all its bearings, and has, in our opinion, proved indisputably his views to be correct; whilst "Philalethes" has more particularly taken upon himself the task of showing up the fallacious reasoning and the disingenuous proceedings of "Ouvrier." Our opponents lay it down as an axiom, that the State has no right to interfere between a parent and his child in the matter of education. We will, in as few words as possible, prove that the State *has* that right.

First of all, let us see what is the Government? It is a necessary consequence of man's social state that there should be interests common to all members of the same society. There are certain duties the due discharge of which is necessary to the well-being of the community; certain men are, therefore, selected by their fellows, and have delegated to them the power of enforcing attention to these duties. These constitute what is termed the Government. So long as a man does not convert his own pleasures into sources of injury and annoyance to those who are compelled to live in society with him, he has a right to make such use of the powers and capacities with which he has been endowed as may best please himself. It is, therefore, the duty and the right of the State to see that no man, in seeking his own happiness and prosperity, interferes with the pursuits of other men in a like direction. These premises, which we consider to be undeniable, will enable us to draw a correct conclusion as to the duty of Government to provide education and enforce its culture. It follows, from what we have said, that if an individual chooses to live in society, and avails himself of its protection and the many advantages and sources of enjoyment it affords, he is undeniably bound, in all justice, to perform his duties to it in return; and society has the right, most decidedly, to compel him to do so, should he be negligent in the performance of them, or should he refuse to fulfil them. The duties which an individual owes to society are easily defined. It being necessary that he should preserve his body in health, to prevent the spread of disease around him; hence it is his duty to attend to the known laws which regulate health and disease. Should he neglect to do so, the State interferes. He is equally bound to qualify himself to act well his part in society, and, therefore, cannot remain in ignorance; for in this state he is unable to

control his passions, and, as a necessary consequence, his enjoyments are sensual and coarse; he is also unable to employ his natural powers to the best advantages, and, consequently, he throws the burden of his incapacity upon those skilled and intelligent members of society who have reaped the reward of their intelligence in wealth and the enjoyment of intellectual pleasures. "Ignorance is not a crime," says E. M. We think the man who claims the benefit of the Poor Law, through his own ignorance, recklessness, folly, and want of skill, and insists that those who have cultivated their faculties should support himself, his wife, and children, acts a criminal part towards society; and society has, therefore, a perfect *right*, in return for the assistance it renders in supporting his children, to demand and insist that he and his children be properly trained and educated; and they who talk so largely of the "duties of parents," forgetful of the "rights of the child," abet him in his unjust conduct, and are most decidedly *supporters of crime*. If the State has, then, the *right* to compel the parent to educate the child, it must necessarily provide the requisite scholastic establishments; and hence "education is the *duty* of the State."

We affirmed (and none of our opponents have denied the statement) that crime and pauperism are generally accompanied by ignorance; it is only natural, then, to look to education as a means well calculated to ameliorate the present fearful condition of a great proportion of our fellow countrymen. The future existence of society is in imminent danger; every effort should be made to prevent the torrents of vice and destitution from swelling to an unmanageable height. Education seems to be the best remedy. In fact, that it is so is almost undeniable, since, with the exception of J. E. B., our opponents admit the benefits it is calculated to produce, though they consider that voluntaryism will be sufficiently powerful to supply the requisite amount of education—in time. The responsibility resting on those who oppose State education is great in the extreme. There are two millions of children spending their days in idleness and in learning vice and immorality, whose moral and religious improvement is, humanly speaking, within the power of the State. The State is unable to make use of the influences at its command, and the opportunities which it has for sowing the seeds of religion and morality in the minds of such a large proportion of our rising generations are lost, through the obstructiveness of the voluntary champions. For the influences and opportunities thus wasted they will have to answer. They send out missionaries to all parts of the world for the conversion of the heathen, but our own countrymen, who combine the vices of civilization with the ignorance of barbarism, they allow to remain uninstructed, and, consequently, without hope for their future existence. Knowledge is essential to religion; yet our

various religious sects act as though it were not. They are willing enough to make vain efforts at proselyting, but they will not instruct their expected converts in general knowledge—because it is “godless”! We submit the following to the attention of our opponents:—

“Survey our faults, our errors, our vices—fearful and fertile field; trace them to their causes; all those causes resolve themselves into one—*ignorance*! for as from this source flow the abuses of religion, so also from this source flow the abuses of all other blessings—of talents, of riches, of power; for we abuse things, either because we know not their real use, or because, with an equal blindness, we imagine the abuse more adapted to our happiness. But as ignorance, then, is the *sole spring of evil*, so, as the antidote to ignorance is knowledge, it necessarily follows, that were we *consummate in knowledge*, we should be *perfect in good*. He, therefore, who retards the progress of intellect, countenances *crime*—nay, to a State, is the greatest of criminals.”*

Our opponents are, then, undoubtedly, great criminals; they most certainly retard “the progress of intellect.”

We will now examine the articles of our opponents in detail. E. M. says, “Legislative education is wrong in principle; is unnecessary in the present state of society; is impracticable, except at the risk of greater interests than those its object is to secure.” The first statement has been entirely refuted by anticipation in “Philalethes’” reply to “L’Ouvrier.” The arguments advanced by E. M. are exceedingly illogical and absurd. The question is, whether education should or should not be provided by Government. Individually, we consider it should be compulsory for parents to send their children to some school; but this forms no part of the question, and E. M. has acted most unfairly in assuming that the education provided by Government should be compulsory, and arguing as though the compulsion extended to *all* classes, as though every parent would be compelled to send his child to the State school! “When a parent delegates to another the duty of educating his child, he still superintends the instruction given, directs what is to be taught, and how;” “and thus the parent is nominally the educator of his child. Now, the case is completely altered when the State undertakes the education of the child; the parent has then no longer any control over the instruction given; it may be in direct opposition to the dictates of that parental instinct implanted in him, yet he cannot help it.” E. M. betrays his own ignorance, or says what he knows to be untrue. A parent does *not* “direct what is to be taught, and how,” when he commits his child to the care of a private school. No good school-

* E. L. Bulwer.

master would allow of such interference. But even granting that compulsory Governmental education existed, those who wished to send their children to private schools might still do so. They would not be affected in the least. Those who at present send their children to no school whatever would be the only parties *compelled* to send their children to the Government school. Those who do their duty to their children, by sending them to private schools, could continue to do so; the only change for them would be the certainty of having a good teacher in their neighbourhood to whom, if dissatisfied with their voluntarily supported teacher, they could entrust their children. "The infallible wisdom of Government," though sneered at by E. M., would be far more likely to elevate the child, acting through a qualified teacher, than "the parental instinct implanted in him" who sends his child to no school, but allows him to be trained in the alleys and back slums, in constant intercourse with demoralization and vice. E. M. may wish to ignore it at present, but we know, and the readers of the *Controversialist* know too, the condition of the two millions of children who are neither at school nor at work.

"If subjects have a right to demand of the legislative power food for the mind, what could reasonably restrict their demands to that only? Might they not consistently demand food for the body?" This is reasoning with a vengeance! E. M. *assumes* that Government has no right to provide food for the people—that charity is beyond its province. He must be remarkably ignorant, if he does not intentionally attempt to deceive his readers. How about the six millions spent annually under the Poor Laws? How about the millions spent in relieving the famishing Irish a few years since? The people, therefore, have consistently demanded "food for the body;" they have obtained it, and are still obtaining it. "The natural duty of parents" is the favourite hobby of our opponents. They tell us that because it is the duty of the parent to instruct his child, no one else has a right to interfere. It equally holds good, that because it is the duty of the parent to provide food for his child, no one else has a right to interfere. The benevolent Christian must look on and see the child perish for lack of food, if the father be not capable of fulfilling his duties, because, forsooth, E. M. tells us we cannot interfere in respect to the duties of a parent towards his offspring, "without material detriment to civilized society." Charity, in his eyes, instead of being of a divine character, is something akin to "injustice and oppression." "Can that system be a just one which would seek to wrest from a parent the ability to discharge those duties only capable of a right discharge by the parent? Can that principle be a right one which would thus tend to paralyze those most sacred instincts which prompt the parent to the special care of his offspring?"

A piece of very fine writing in the "virtuous indignation" line. The "sacred instinct" which prompts the parent to educate his child in vice, knavery, and deceit, should certainly be respected! It seems a pity, though, that after an admirable course of training and practice, society should find it necessary to "wrest from the parent" the control of his "hopeful," and send him on a voyage to the antipodes, thus violating the sacred ties of "family relationship—the basis on which rests the structure of society." We advise E. M. to read carefully the article by "Philaethes," and for the future to league himself on the side of virtue, and not on that of vice. "Legislative education is unnecessary"! Of course it is. We may expect, judging from the present *rapid* spread of education, that the mass of the people will be educated when—the Greek Calends come!

"Night after night are our lecture-rooms, reading-rooms, and mechanics' institutes crowded with those eager in the pursuit of knowledge." Is it so? We trow not. Those who are most in want of education do not attend these places; *they are ashamed* of doing so; they would feel out of place amongst the well-dressed middle-class individuals by whom they are principally frequented. It is well known that scientific lectures, and lectures of an improving character, are not listened to with much attention. Inquire into the state of our mechanics' institutes, and we find the same result in all cases—amusing lectures alone succeed, and the books in most demand are those on "*general literature*," the new definition for novels.

E. M. quotes a few statistics, to prove that the number of children attending school are greater now than heretofore. This we grant; but the increase is amongst the middle classes. Has E. M. ever heard of the clever arithmetician, who undertook to prove, for a wager, that if they both lived long enough, the son would become older than the father? He proved it thus: "When the son was a year old the father was thirty, or thirty times as old as his son; when the father was sixty, the son would be thirty, or half as old as his father; when the father was a hundred and twenty, the son would be ninety, or three-fourths as old as his father; and so on, till the son would become older than his father. His opponent gave into this reasoning, and paid the wager. Presently, however, he took his pipe from his mouth, and said, 'Well, but I'm not satisfied. Suppose they lived for ever, would not the father be always thirty years older than the son?' The clever statist pulled a long face, was obliged to confess that this would be the case, and he refunded the money." Just so with voluntarism. Statistics may be quoted, but the fact cannot be denied, that the two millions of uneducated children are still in advance. In our former article we stated that voluntarism had been half a century in getting one-eighth of the children in England within its influence.

Rather slow work, we think! E. M. should have told us when the remaining seven-eighths should be educated, instead of quoting statistics which prove nothing. The individuals which are most in need of being affected by educational measures are the very ones which are not affected at all. Voluntaryism has failed, is failing, and will fail to reach them. We challenge E. M., or any of our opponents, to show that it has done anything worth naming for them. In our large towns, thousands of children are growing up, under the influence of evil example, in idleness and ignorance; their childhood inevitably ends in a manhood of vice, debauchery, and crime. And this is through the obstructiveness of those who prate of "parental love." That our educational establishments at present in existence do not meet the requirements of the people is proved undeniably by our criminal statistics. They disclose the alarming fact, that those who have not received any education are much more liable to fall victims to those evil influences from which their more fortunate fellow men escape. The following speaks for itself:—Of the 1,111,360 persons committed for trial between the years 1841 and 1850, 90·99 per cent. were wofully ignorant; 8·62 per cent. could read and write well; and only ·36 per cent. had received a superior education. Comment is useless. We leave E. M. to ponder over *these* statistics, and then, perhaps, he may eventually have less faith in the seeming results of those he quoted.

We pass on to consider the views enunciated by J. E. B. Logic would be of no avail in treating with such a writer. He is afflicted with a disease of the mind which is called, in medical phraseology, a monomania. He is one of those unfortunate individuals who see a serpent in every goblet, and an imp of darkness in every bottle. According to him, the Maine law is destined to do what the Bible and all moral agencies have failed to perform; it is, in fact, to be the great regenerator of the human race. Driven irresistibly forwards by this one "dominant idea," he commits the most egregious violations of, not logic only, but common sense. What hope can we have for the sanity of any one who could, in grave earnestness, indite the following?—"The moral influences at present at work amongst the mass of the people would, to a considerable extent, be withdrawn on the interference of the State with the education of the people. Nothing can be clearer than this." What *can* J. E. B. mean? Does he consider that educated men are not so easily led to believe the truths of Protestantism as ignorant ones? that therefore the impracticability of the undertaking would cause the endeavours at present being made to evangelize the people to be withdrawn? Calvin and Luther thought differently. They considered that, as men were for the future to be led by their own convictions, and not by the light of an *assumed*

authority, it was necessary that these convictions should be wisely and properly formed. Hence the endeavours they made to enlighten their countrymen, and to cause education to extend itself far and near. Or is J. E. B. one of those ultra-admirers of sectarianism, who would be loth to see a single star blotted out from the sectarian firmament, however far it may revolve from the centre of light, and however near to the verge of utter darkness? If so, we certainly acknowledge that State education would blot out from existence "the moral (P) influences" of Mormons, Princites, &c. The people, being educated, would be too intelligent to be gulled as they now are. The spread of education might too materially lessen that rage after sectarian proselyting which is so common, to the great detriment of Christianity. This would be no loss, in our opinion: morality is not the inevitable result of an adherence to any particular sect or creed. "If we are told a man is religious, we still ask, What are his morals? But if we hear at first that he has honest morals, and is a man of natural justice and good temper, we seldom think of the other question, Whether he be religious and devout?"*

J. E. B. is particularly consistent in his views. He first of all declaims against the Government interfering with the individual, and then soon declares that until it does, in this free country, what Peter the Great, despotic and determined as he was, could not do, he sees "no hope for England." It is not the duty of the State to provide education for those who are unable to pay for it, because this is the duty of the parent; but it is the duty of the State to dictate to the poor man what he is and what he is not to drink! J. E. B. is very liberal-minded indeed!

We have proved that education is a preventative of drunkenness. Education gives a man *self-respect*, and self-respect forbids a man to make a beast of himself. A few centuries back, how deplorable was the social condition of the upper and middle classes! These classes gave up their drinking habits in proportion as education spread; and this without the aid of any Maine law. What right has J. E. B. to insinuate that the lower are not as equally capable of improving themselves? What right has he to consider that education cannot do for them what it has done for the other classes in society? Why should he suppose one class to be less susceptible of civilization than the others? Why may not the future operative differ as widely from the coarse, degraded workman of to-day, as the English gentleman does from the sensual, drunken lord of the seventeenth century? J. E. B.'s arguments are unworthy of further consideration.

The time will come, we hope, when "L'Ouvrier" will see the *speciousness* by which, in the present debate, he has attempted

* Shaftesbury.

to blind the intelligence of his readers. The rebuke administered by "Philaethes" seems to have had no effect. In his reply, he argues quite as disingenuously as he did when he tried to make us believe Blackstone was adverse to State education. The quotation from Shakespeare with which he has favoured us is certainly not very appropriately chosen, unless he meant it to be considered as a satire on his reply. It should have been slightly altered,—so :

While some with cunning gild their copper crowns,
I with base metal cover the golden crowns of others.
Fear not my INGENUITY in twisting others' words
To suit my own bad purposes.

We have soon an example of his ingenuity, for he admits that, "primarily, education is the duty of the parent, but that so great is the number of criminal and vicious parents, who are either grossly negligent of this duty, or perform it to the manifest injury of the child and society, that it is necessary *all parents* should be compelled to place *all children* under the care of the Government, for the purposes of education." Where, in the name of "truth and plainness," did he make the above wonderful discovery? We can hardly suppose he would be guilty of deliberately falsifying what we and our allies have said; but really we know of no excuse whereby to palliate his proceedings. There is nothing in any of our articles to warrant the most dull-headed, brainless individual coming to such a conclusion. We begin to have a very poor opinion of "L'Ouvrier's" argumentative powers, when we find him obliged to have recourse to such speciousness. From beginning to end, his reply is one continuous attempt to make black appear white.

He must have had little faith in the intelligence of the readers of the *Controversialist*, when he supposed he could palm off upon them such crude assertions, false deductions, and untrue statements. He cannot be so ignorant as not to know that in those countries where a State education is in existence, "all parents" are not "compelled to place all children under the care of Government." In many cases, the Government compels all parents to send their children to some school. In other cases, the Government provides the schools for those who like to avail themselves of the instruction thus placed within their reach. In America this is the case—there is no *compulsion there*.

"L'Ouvrier's" opposition to State education, being avowedly based on this assumed interference with all children, now falls to the ground. We will not allow him, though, to retire from the contest without giving further proofs of his disingenuity. "Will they now reason that it is right and proper for the parents of forty-two children to be deprived of their right to

educate their own children, because one child is neglected by his criminal parents?" We have never said that *one* parent should be deprived of that right, even if *forty-two* neglected it. We would allow every parent to educate his child, if he thinks proper, but would make it compulsory for him to do so himself, or by deputy; but whether that deputy be a teacher appointed by the State, or one supported by voluntarism, we would leave to his own choice.

We wish more particularly to draw the attention of our readers to the astonishing facility with which "L'Ouvrier" makes use of figures to support his views. Will they bear examination? He would lead us to suppose that the children of those parents whose support is "derived from vice and crime" alone neglect their children, and then declares that there is only one such a parent in every forty-two. It is an undeniable fact that 2,000,000 children are woefully neglected by their "honourable parents," since they are neither at school nor at work; and then there are other children at work at an age when their youthful strength is unable to sustain the labours which are imposed on them. In all we find, by referring to the census statistics, one child only in seven is being properly educated; hence *one parent in every seven, instead of forty-two in forty-three*, only does his duty to his child. We are astonished that any writer could *falsify* statistics to the extent "L'Ouvrier" has done.

"The education of the *moral feelings* is of greater importance than the development of the intellectual powers; therefore religion must be the primary element in all education." The seeds of religion may be planted in the State schools; sectarian instruction alone should not be given. The fundamental principles of *Christianity* might be taught, without inculcating *doctrinal religion*. "*Sectarianism is not morality*. To be zealous for a sect, and to be conscientious in morals, are widely different. To inculcate the peculiarities of a sect, and to teach the fundamental principles of religion and morality, are widely different. Indeed, schools might be named in which there is a most rigorous inculcation of an exclusive sectarianism, where there is a deplorable absence of the fruits of both religion and morality."*

We have no space left to pursue the subject. It is amusing to see that at the close of his article "L'Ouvrier" admits *even more* than we have been contending for. "Let the parent who neglects his duty in withholding education from his child be punished for such neglect, and compelled to *perform* the duty"!

TALIESIN.

* The Rev. Egerton Ryerson, in his "Report on a System of Public Elementary Instruction for Upper Canada."

TASTE is pursued at a less expense than fashion.—*Shenstone*.

Social Economy.

IS THE SPENDTHRIFT MORE INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY THAN THE MISER?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

IN our first article it may, perhaps, be fairly considered that we adopted a stricter interpretation of the limits of the question than was necessary. The question may be discussed entirely from that point of view, referring to the two characters under notice as thereby defined. But it appears clear enough, regarding the question as one not purely speculative, but as one influencing society at large, that the broader definition of terms submitted by our coadjutor, E. S. J., ought to be adopted, not as excluding the definitions we gave, but as properly combining with them, and thus affording a comprehensive view of the matter. Our opponents may, indeed, quarrel with this. "Taliesin" does so in no measured terms; and certainly we cannot defend everything E. S. J. advances. This definition tells very much against the case of our opponents, but its adoption cannot be condemned as unfair, as the meaning of both terms in the debate is proportionally extended; and we do not see anything in the dictionary definitions excluding this view of the case. The lines of distinction between a due expenditure and prodigality on the one hand, and between a strict economy and parsimony on the other hand, are readily recognized. We see little in the animadversions of "Taliesin" on the article of E. S. J. worthy of notice. While narrowing the meaning of the term miser, he unfairly expands that of the opposite term, spendthrift, so as to include cases of mere extravagance.

J. R. warns his readers not to be prejudiced against the spendthrift and in the miser's favour owing to the former being a much more numerous class than the latter, and thus doing greater injury to society. We quite agree to this; but it may be doubted whether, admitting the correctness of the definitions given by E. S. J., society is molested by a greater number of spendthrifts than misers. But we must guard equally against indulging prejudice, so far as this debate is concerned, in respect of the repugnance we naturally feel towards the miser. In a strict sense, the result of the conduct of both on society is what we have presently to do with. This caution is the more necessary, as our opponents have in general fallen into this error. If the miser is such a character as they would have us believe,

he is less likely to influence society for evil. We cannot be fairly objected to as imputing evil motives to the spendthrift, while the number is smaller in the case of the miser, as this necessarily arises; and as it is clearly shown that the miser does less injury to society than his opposite, we ought to be even more displeased with the one than the other. J. R., and also "Cid," question our allusions to the spendthrift as upholding betting and gambling houses, &c. These are, however, surely, maintained by systematic rather than by merely casual attendance. Surely the man frequenting a gambling house, for instance, and lavishing large sums of money on play, may be considered as a spendthrift. He has not those moral habits and dispositions generally connected with ordinary expenditure and gradual gain. If not a spendthrift all at once, he is in the certain way of becoming one. The same line of remark is applicable to attendance at places, if possible, more immoral. The party who so acts is squandering money and bringing himself to ruin. Say he is even a nobleman. His large income can scarcely stand the engulphing extravagance, and, if he is not too deeply involved, he only saves himself by a course of retrenchment. What we say holds good also, if not in the same degree, of horse races. These are not upheld by the mere public who frequent them, but by sharpers and bankrupt gentlemen. As for theatres, gin palaces, &c., we said that, to a large extent, these are maintained by spendthrifts. They are regular frequenters, so long as their funds last, and without them the encouragement given to such places would be wholly inadequate. We submit, then, that with a fair construction of our article, it will be found, in this respect, substantially correct. J. R. says of the spendthrift, that he may be the associate and friend of the most abandoned; and we would inquire, If that class frequent such establishments as those we have referred to, what good can we expect of the others to whom these places can be no haunts at all?

In regard to the miser, while we have no wish and no need to palliate his errors, we cannot wholly admit the correctness of our opponents' remarks. We think the miser is, in comparison with the spendthrift, chiefly his own enemy. Posterity gets the benefit of the miser's gains; and thus, not to speak of the money he necessarily circulates, it goes for useful purposes much more obviously than that expended by the spendthrift. The picture J. R. draws of the evils arising from the miser's hoarding money is either imaginary or greatly exaggerated, and we refer in answer to the article of E. S. J.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with the currency question to decide that the gain of society, at any given time, whatever the real wealth of a country, is in proportion to the money circulated; and, at all events, it is most extraordinary to assert, which J. R. does, that the sum hoarded by the miser is usually large,

and that, therefore, he is the *ignorant* cause of the misfortunes of the industrious population. We have yet to know that by the parsimony of a few the circulation of coin is impeded—that there is any scarcity in the circulation. This would imply that large sums of money are kept locked up by a few misers from circulation. But there is no evidence of this. It does not follow, that because a man is a millionaire he is therefore a miser. It does not follow, that because a man is parsimonious he keeps money from circulation. To a certain extent, every man should, if practicable, accumulate or save; the miser, therefore, does not here stand alone; but to the extent he goes beyond this line his money is still diffused, although kept in a great measure under his control. He extends his trade, he builds, he purchases land. It is not, therefore, correct for J. R. to state that the evils arising from hoarding are unavoidable, while society could release itself from those which, he says, the spendthrift maintains, but does not create; and certainly it could not shake itself clear of those evils unless the spendthrift were reclaimed. J. R. adds, that for one individual whom the spendthrift leaves a burden on the country, the miser, by his conduct, leaves five persons; but this is a mere assertion, not confirmed by facts. The miser is compelled to support his relations, and his money being circulated, the poor are not necessarily robbed. J. R. admits that the miser's wealth is set free on his decease; but then, he says, the evil has happened. We are far from maintaining that the miser does no harm by the want of a thorough use of his money, but the evil to society, which is the point at issue, is much mitigated by the consideration that posterity gains the advantage.

We grant what J. R. says regarding the solitary habits of the miser, as he defines him, as being unfavourable to the proper development of his nature. We do not defend the miser. J. R. adds, "It may, perhaps, be said of the man so acting, that his conduct is preferable to his who, by living in the country, sets a bad example to the rest." But he states, further, as something *per contra*, that the spendthrift has, from his social habits, opportunities for amendment which the miser, in consequence of his seclusion, does not possess; but it does not occur to us that the miser has not many warnings, and many means of restoration, as well as the spendthrift; and we fear that the passion of both is so strong, that it is vain to hope, in the general case, for amendment.

We admit what he states regarding the inadequacy of dictionary definitions. We only gave them as, to a certain extent, a guide towards a clear view of the question. It is not correct, however, that we are partial in the assignation of questionable motives to each of the parties. While the miser is essentially a lover of mammon, we do not assert, however, that he has in all cases no ulterior object. We affirm, that while the miser may

come to hoard money for its own sake, the spendthrift has in general some purpose in view apart from mere squandering or waste.

"Cid" prefers the spendthrift to the miser in respect he is a frigid and unsocial person. But this proceeds on an extreme view of the term miser. We have yet to know that the latter is more permanently than the former a truant from the social mean. "Cid" alleges there is some hope that the spendthrift may change his habits. The passion for extravagance, however, increases in intensity as well as that of hoarding; but if the spendthrift does recover, he generally becomes only less noxious by becoming parsimonious, going naturally from the one extreme to the other. We here repeat, the question is not the amount of sympathy we ought to show for either character; and that, if the miser, both from his solitary habits and the feeling we have towards him, is repellant, he inflicts the less injury on society—quite opposite to the position of the spendthrift. We do not assert that in all cases the miser will not be led to commit crime in order to gain wealth. A false interpretation is given to our definitions by considering them as applicable to each miser, or each spendthrift, instead of the classes generally. We submit, that the spendthrift, being bent on gaining some pleasure, is much more likely than the miser to transgress many moral laws, and thus to be led into crime; while the industry and caution which characterize the miser will induce him to keep within the strict limits of the law, in order not to peril the wealth which he gradually acquires. He is kept, for instance, from those speculations to which E. S. J. refers, and which border on dishonesty or fraud, and inflict national disaster.

"Cid," again, finds fault with our picture of a miser. There may be other kinds of misers, but surely it is true that he feels little discomfort, and is contented with his situation. He would get more money, but this only to hoard. "Cid" accuses us of disingenuous reasoning, as he says we first assert, and afterwards deny, that the miser does injury. "Cid," however, puts too strong an interpretation on the words, "society, in the end, will be no loser." What we mean to maintain is, that the miser's influence is chiefly negative. "Cid's" concluding remarks are obscure; but, so far as we understand them, we have previously replied. We do not oppose amusement, but our remarks are substantially correct regarding the species pointed out. He asserts that avariciousness does its part in enticing persons to places of vice; but we would suggest whether this is in all cases the fact; and farther, that while it would be possible to get such desires gratified without avariciousness, this could not be done without the support of the spendthrift. As to the frequenters being led on by infirmity of will and instability of purpose, that, if correct, does not influence the question; and

the fortunes which, in a few cases, are made by pandering to vicious indulgence, are, if not a means of farther mischief, a poor gain to society.

“Threlkeld” affirms that mammon worship is the great sin of our time. We submit, however, that this is as much for the purpose of outward show and luxury,—in other words, for selfish spending,—than merely to hoard. We see far more of the former than the latter; money is loved in order that it may be spent in pleasure, if not always wasted in profligacy; and certainly the love of money is as compatible with the one passion as with the other. We may notice in this connection the article of J. E. P. What we have now stated is a sufficient answer to his remarks on covetousness; and as he enters into no comparison between the miser and the spendthrift, his article appears to have no reference whatever to the question at issue. “Threlkeld” goes on to say, that the sin and consequences of covetousness are forcibly pointed out in the Bible. This is very true; but prodigality also is strongly condemned. Look into the Book of Proverbs, for example; but, indeed, the various passions of which it is a manifestation are essentially opposed to true religion. It would, however, be trivial to enter into a calculation whether the miser or the spendthrift be most frequently and powerfully animadverted upon in the scriptures. The question is, Which is the most injurious to society? “Threlkeld” adds, that if the spendthrift did as much evil as the miser, prodigality would be denounced in the scriptures; for, says he, “it is an incontrovertible truth, that whatever is hurtful to society must be hateful to God.” It is not the fact that the spendthrift is not so condemned. We thought every one would admit that the spendthrift did inflict great injury, and that his conduct was hateful in the sight of God; but certainly as well from the nature of the sin itself, and in its effects on the party who sins, as in regard to the evil done to society. “Threlkeld” questions our statement that misers seldom form family connections. We have, of course, no means of testing this, but we submit that in the sense in which we chiefly employed the term “miser,” it is reasonable to conclude that, gold being his ruling passion, he would not adopt ties which he might not love, and which would cause him expense; and, in the more enlarged view of the term, that he is not likely to starve his children, and thus entail trouble upon him, or to refuse giving them an education, the want of which would render them a burden upon him. For the same reason, he will give paternal instruction. It is true, example is better than precept, yet how little instruction is generally received at home, from the absorption of the father with business; and at all events, what is blameworthy in the miser as regards his children, is balanced by similar results from the conduct of the spendthrift towards his family. The next

series of evils alleged as produced by the miser, with reference to his offspring, may be generally admitted ; but they refer only to extreme cases, and it is surely as likely that his children may learn provident habits, without going to the extreme of parsimony. But, in any view, the same thing may be said of the spendthrift's family ; he may teach them extravagance, or reduce them to a degree of poverty adverse to their success in life. "Threlkeld" says the poor are neglected by the miser ; but are they generally regarded, and can the spendthrift spare money for their benefit from his selfish pleasures ? We think not. It will be observed that the evils mentioned refer entirely to the influence of the miser on those immediately around him, and that they are equally applicable to the spendthrift ; but of course the influence of the latter is far more injurious than that of the former to society at large. The quotation from Dr. Dwight proceeds on the most extreme and exaggerated view of the miser that can be conceived. The law in general repudiates such transactions as Dr. Dwight points out ; but surely this description fails to tally with that of the miser, as a creature who keeps money without expending it. The miser, says our opponent, lends money at a high rate, and by such means many are reduced to poverty. But money can surely be had for all honest purposes, without falling into the miser's hands. Poverty, he avers, is the great cause of crime ; but it much more clearly follows from extravagance than from miserly habits.

There is a good deal of truth in what "Taliesin" says regarding the hypocrisy of the miser. We cannot allow, however, that while the miser keeps strictly within the limits of the law, yet that he is a hypocrite in all or even in the generality of cases. Hypocrisy is the unwilling tribute vice pays to virtue ; and we do not think the evils which the miser inflicts, if wearing the mask of religion, can bear comparison with those which the spendthrift entails. Again, he argues that the spendthrift does rather good than evil to society, or, in other words, that the evil brings its own remedy, as people, seeing the ruinous consequences of his conduct, are induced to avoid it. But the same remark applies much more forcibly to the miser. He is regarded as sordid and mean, and is an object of repulsion, while the spendthrift, before becoming a burden on society, acts as a means of seduction on the path of vice. "Taliesin" says of the spendthrift, "While his means lasted he was the support of many ; eventually society has to support him ; we have the many against the one." We dispute, however, that the spendthrift who leads others astray as he circulates his money, and which is often spent in an objectionable manner, is a real buttress to a community ; and by becoming a burden on society, he injures one, but not certainly one person only,—he injures the State, which includes the people of the country at large.

On the whole, although the question is not free from difficulty, it appears that while many of the remarks of our opponents as to the miser are as thoroughly applicable to the spendthrift,—these referring chiefly to evils inflicted within a small compass,—that the arguments advanced on this side of the question, which show that the spendthrift does much more injury to society than the miser, remain unrefuted.

T. U.

WORDS AND ACTIONS.—The soldiers say they fight for honour; when the truth is, they have their honour in their pocket. And they mean the same thing that pretend to fight for religion. Just as a parson goes to law with his parishioners, he says, for the good of his successors, that the church may not lose its rights; when the meaning is, to get the tithes into his own pocket.—*Selden*.

COMPLAINING.—We do not wisely when we vent complaint and censure. Human nature is more sensible of smart in suffering, than of pleasure in rejoicing, and the present endurances easily take up our thoughts. We cry out for a little pain, when we do but smile for a great deal of contentment.—*Feltham*.

PROMISES.—Liberal of cruelty are those who pamper with promises; promisers destroy while they deceive, and the hope they raise is dearly purchased by the dependence that is sequent to disappointment.—*Zimmerman*.

ON ENVY.—The envious man is in pain upon all occasions which ought to give him pleasure. The relish of his life is inverted; and the objects which administer the highest satisfaction to those who are exempt from this passion, give the quickest pangs to persons who are subject to it. All the perfections of their fellow creatures are odious. Youth, beauty, valour, and wisdom are provocations of their displeasure. What a wretched and apostate state is this!—to be offended with excellence, and to hate a man because we approve him; The condition of the envious man is the most emphatically miserable; he is not only incapable of rejoicing in another's merit or success, but lives in a world wherein all mankind are in a plot against his quiet, by studying their own happiness and advantage.—*Steele*.

DOUBTS.—It is related that Mede had all his scholars come to him at his chambers in the evening: and the first question he put to each was, “*Quid dubitas?*” “What doubts have you met with in your studies to-day?” for he supposed, that to doubt nothing, and to understand nothing, was just the same thing. This was right, and the only method to make young men exercise their rational powers, and not to acquiesce in what they learn mechanically and by rote, with an indolence of spirit, which prepares them to receive and swallow implicitly whatever is offered them.—*Reproof of Brutus*.

Self-Educator.

LESSONS ON FRENCH.

BY W. J. CHAMPION, A.B.

PART II.—THE INFLEXIONS.

(Continued from page 184.)

5.—THE VERB—continued.

4. INFINITIVE ending in *ître*.

This class contains two divisions, one ending in *aitre*, as *CONNAÎTRE*, to know, the other in *oitre*, as *CROÎTRE*, to grow. The latter retain *o* where the former have *a*, and where the *a* disappears, so does the *o*.

CONNAÎTRE, TO KNOW.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, CONNAIS; 2, CONNUS; 3, CONNAÎTRE; 4, CONNAISSANT; 5, CONNU.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

<i>Singular.</i>		<i>Plural.</i>	
Je connais	<i>I know</i>	Nous connaissons	<i>we know</i>
Tu connais	<i>thou knowest</i>	Vous connaissez	<i>ye know</i>
Il connaît	<i>he knows</i>	Ils connaissent	<i>they know</i>

Imperfect Tense.

Je connaissais	<i>I knew</i>	Nous connaissions	<i>we knew</i>
Tu connaissais	<i>thou knewest</i>	Vous connaissiez	<i>ye knew</i>
Il connaissait	<i>he knew</i>	Ils connaissaient	<i>they knew</i>

Preterite Tense.

Je connus	<i>I knew</i>	Nous connûmes	<i>we knew</i>
Tu connus	<i>thou knewest</i>	Vous connûtes	<i>ye knew</i>
Il connut	<i>he knew</i>	Ils connurent	<i>they knew</i>

Future Tense.

Je connaîtrai	<i>I shall know</i>	Nous connaîtrons	<i>we shall know</i>
Tu connaîtras	<i>thou wilt know</i>	Vous connaîtrez	<i>ye will know</i>
Il connaîtra	<i>he will know</i>	Ils connaîtront	<i>they will know</i>

Conditional Tense.

Je connaîtrais	<i>I should know</i>	Nous connaîtrions	<i>we should know</i>
Tu connaîtrais	<i>thou wouldst know</i>	Vous connaîtriez	<i>ye would know</i>
Il connaîtrait	<i>he would know</i>	Ils connaîtraient	<i>they would know</i>

Compound Tenses—J'ai, j'avais, &c., connu.

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

Present Tense.

Singular.

Plural.

Que je connaisse *that I may know*
 Que tu connaisses *that thou mayst know*
 Qu'il connaisse *that he may know*

Que nous connaissions *that we may know*
 Que vous connaissiez *that ye may know*
 Qu'ils connaissent *that they may know*

Preterite.

Que je connusse *that I might know*
 Que tu connusses *that thou mightst know*
 Qu'il connût *that he might know*

Que nous connussions *that we might know*
 Que vous connussiez *that ye might know*
 Qu'ils connussent *that they might know*

Compound Tenses—Que j'aie, que j'eusse, connu.

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Singular.

Plural.

Connais *know thou*

Connaissons *let us know*
 Connaissez *know ye*

INFINITIVE MOOD.

Present—Connaître *to know*
 Compound—Avoir connu *to have known*

PARTICIPLES.

Present—Connaissant *knowing* Past—Connu *known*
 Compound—Ayant connu *having known*

Connaître, *to know*; paraître, *to appear, to seem*; and croître, *to grow*, with their compounds, are the only verbs belonging to this conjugation.

EXERCISE VI.

Le secret de réussir c'est d'être adroit, non d'être utile. Epargner les plaisirs c'est les multiplier. Nous avons été obligé d'entrer dans mille détails fastidieux où peut-être le lecteur ne nous a pas toujours suivi volontiers. Les hommes vertueux sont respectés de ceux même qui n'ont aucune vertu. Je tâche de rendre heureux ma femme, mon enfant et même mon chien. L'amitié est un contrat tacite entre deux personnes sensibles et vertueuses. *Ne nous flattons pas* d'avoir beaucoup d'amis: un revers seul nous en apprendra le nombre (*ne before nous shows that nous is not the nominative case, but the objective governed by the verb: let us not flatter ourselves; en, of them; the number of them*). Le feu de l'amitié échauffe le cœur sans le consumer. Dans toutes les actions de la vie, l'honnête homme doit se conduire sans art. La méchanceté se trouve plus souvent avec la sottise qu'avec l'esprit. Ouvrir son âme à l'ambition, c'est renoncer au repos. (NOTE.—Several verbs in French, like *renoncer*, take the preposition *à* before the noun.) Quelque paysans habitent des caves où le jour n'arrive que par d'étroits soupiraux. Un nerf, des fils d'aloès ou l'écorce souple d'une plante ligneuse ont servi aux premiers hommes de corde pour réunir les deux extrémités d'une branche élastique dont ils ont

fait un arc ; ensuite ils ont aiguisé de petits cailloux pour en armer la flèche (*fait* is the past participle from *faire*, to make). Un flatteur est un esclave qui n'est bon pour aucun maître.

In the conjugation of these verbs we have uniformly given *avoir*, and its various tenses, as the auxiliary in the formation of the compound parts of the various moods; but some intransitive verbs take the corresponding tenses of the verb *être*. Among these may be mentioned, because of their frequent occurrence, *aller*, to go; *venir*, to come; *devenir*, to become; *partir*, to depart; *sortir*, to go out (of doors); *échapper*, to escape; *arriver*, to happen, to arrive; *tomber*, to fall; and *mourir*, to die. Thus we say, "J'ai dormi un moment, et je suis sorti ensuite." "I slept for a moment, and then I went out."

In regard to these intransitive verbs (which take no objective case immediately after them), when the participle is accompanied with *être*, it agrees with the nominative in number and gender: but with *avoir* it is invariable. So if a lady were to use the sentence just given, she must write, "J'ai DORMI un moment, et je suis SORTIE ensuite." The following is the compound of the present indicative of the intransitive *DEVENIR*.

Past Participle—DEVENU.

MASCULINE.

Singular.

Je suis devenu
Tu es devenu
Il est devenu

Plural.

Nous sommes devenus
Vous êtes devenu
Ils sont devenus

FEMININE.

Je suis devenue
Tu es devenue
Elle est devenue

Nous sommes devenues
Vous êtes devenues
Elles sont devenues

The reader scarcely needs reminding that we have a similar anomaly in English in reference to most of these words. So we say, "She is come;" "The ship is arrived;" "Babylon is fallen." But the awkwardness that attends the use of such phrases as "The parcels are arrived;" "The funds are fallen," indicates that the mode of expression is endured rather than adopted.

REFLECTED VERBS.

Reflected verbs are those of which the action falls back upon the agent.

Every transitive verb may be used in a reflected manner: but some verbs are not employed in any other way, and are therefore called by some of the French grammarians *essentially reflected*.

Reflected verbs are conjugated in the same manner as others of the same conjugation, except, first, that they are preceded by both the nominative and the objective forms of the pronoun, thus—

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
First person	- Je me	Nous nous
Second person	- Tu te	Vous vous
Third person	- Il or elle se	Ils or elles se.

For instance, *abstenir* would mean *to hold off, to restrain*; *s'abstenir* means *to hold one's self off, to refrain*. The present tense of the indicative mood will be a sufficient example:—

<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
Je m'abstiens	Nous nous abstenons
Tu t'abstiens	Vous vous abstenez
Il or elle s'abstient	Ils or elles s'abstiennent.

The persons of the imperative which take no nominative are accompanied by one pronoun, as *abstiens-toi*, *abstenons-nous*, *abstenez-vous*.

Secondly. In all cases reflected verbs take *être*, and not *avoir*, as the auxiliary in forming the compound tenses, as—

<i>Compound of the Present Indicative—</i>	Je me suis abstenu
...	<i>Imperfect—</i> Je m'étais abstenu
...	<i>Future—</i> Je me serai abstenu, &c. &c.

So when a verb becomes reflected for a kind of occasional use, it is then subject to these rules. "I have done him the pleasure," "*Je l'ai fait le plaisir*;" but "I have done myself the pleasure," "*Je me suis fait le plaisir*."

The reflected form is often used for the passive. Instead of saying, "*Ici des gants sont vendus*," "Gloves are sold here," the reflected form is used, "*Ici se vendent des gants*," literally, "Gloves sell themselves here."

IRREGULAR VERBS.

In this class are placed verbs which do not form all their tenses and persons according to any one of the conjugations given in the preceding pages.

The student should remember that these verbs are the great difficulty in the inflexions of every language, and that it is impossible to know them too well.

IRREGULAR VERBS OF THE FIRST CONJUGATION.

1. ALLER, TO GO.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—1, *VAS*; 2, *ALLAI*; 3, *ALLER*; 4, *ALLANT*; 5, *ALLE'*.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

<i>Present Tense</i>	Vais	vas	va	allons	allez	vont
<i>Future</i>	Irai	iras	ira	irons	irez	iront
<i>Conditional</i>	Irais	irais	irait	irions	iriez	iraient

IMPERATIVE MOOD.

Va allons allez

SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD.

<i>Present Tense</i>	Aille	ailles	aille	allions	alliez	aillent
----------------------	-------	--------	-------	---------	--------	---------

The compound tenses are formed with *être* : *Je suis allé*, &c.

All the rest is regular.

ALLER is also used in the form of *s'EN ALLER*, to go away, to be off. It is conjugated as a reflected verb, inserting the word *en* between the second pronoun and the verb: thus—"Je m'en vais," "I am going away;" "Je m'en suis allé," "I am gone away," &c. "Va-t'en," "Allez-vous-en," "Go away."

2. ENVOYER, TO SEND.

PRIMITIVE FORMS—REGULAR.

INDICATIVE MOOD.

<i>Future</i>	Enverrai	-as	-a	-ons	-ez	-ont
<i>Conditional</i>	Enverrais	-ais	-ait	-ions	-iez	-aient

All the rest is regular.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

97. Can any reader inform me of any work, with publisher's name and price, which gives an account of college life, more especially applying to Oxford, and which has particulars of the aids given to poor students, and of the helps given to diligent and successful ones? Also the title of any work, with publisher's name and price, which gives particulars of Oxford University in the same way as Potts's "*Liber Cantab.*" gives them of Cambridge?—A POOR STUDENT.

98. Could any of your readers inform me what work is published on the properties of chemicals when applied to iron or steel, and what its cost?—SUBSCRIBER.

99. Would any of your readers be so good as to inform me of a good simple set of marginal marks, to indicate the opinions of the style and matter of an author, which arise in one's mind while reading?—QUÆRO.

100. Would any of your correspondents explain, through the medium of the *British Controversialist*, how to understand the paraphrase, "for signs and for seasons," Gen. i. 14; is it an hendiadys, to designate seasons? for it seems to me that something occult is comprised in it. If this history of the creation were designed to describe the effects of the six days' work as they would have appeared to a spectator, had one been present, would a supposition render probable, from its being said, "Let the dry land appear (*Heb. be seen*), when as yet there was no eye to see it? or may it be reasonable to form an opinion that the sun was formed on the first day, or created even before our earth, and to be the cause of the vicissitudes of the three first days and nights?—GWILYM, *Taibach*.

101. Can any of your readers inform us—

1st. Is there any book containing legal forms for wills, mortgages, &c.?

. Our correspondents had better leave law alone, unless practically acquainted with it.

2nd, The best mode of publishing, and the cost?

. Depends upon the price of the book, and what class it is intended for.

3rd. The best book on lithography, and the probable cost of a lithographic press, 16 by 13 and 32 by 26 in., and where stones, &c., may be procured?—P. A. S. and S. I.

102. Can any of your readers inform me of the price and publisher of the best work on the life of Lamartine and French republicanism?—M. B. H.

103. Could you inform me what course to adopt to overcome my timidity, and to gain sufficient confidence to read clearly and intelligibly? By giving a word of advice you will greatly oblige a constant subscriber, who signs his name—RIGA.

104. Can any of your subscribers tell me of a good work on punctuation? Are any of Dr. Johnson's works published separately; if so, price and publisher?—A CONSTANT SUBSCRIBER.

105. Can any of your readers inform me what is the difference between the Vulgate edition of the Bible and Bagster's? What is the course of study at University College, London, and what examination is required for matriculation?—A. L. O.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

85. If "*Nil Desperandum*" can speak French, German, and Italian, and could take a clerk's situation in a

mercantile house, he may in a few years get a salary of £150.—T. T. B.

87. The qualifications are, a knowledge of Greek and Latin (together with the ability of translating English into Latin and Greek), and mathematics. The mode of entrance at Cambridge and Oxford is by a personal examination by the college tutor, or by sending to the tutor a recommendation signed by a M.A., stating the name, age, and qualifications of the candidate. In either case a sum of money is paid as a pledge of good behaviour. This is called caution-money, and is given back to the student when he takes his name off the college boards. The expenses at Cambridge for twelve months would not be less than £60 or £70. If J. A. S. was well up, he might calculate safely upon getting a scholarship. At King's College, London, the expenses for tuition, without board, are about £30, so that it is not cheaper than Cambridge.—T. T. B.

88. A. L. is respectfully informed that the price of Mantell's "Wonders of Geology" is 18s. for the two volumes; Mantell's "Organic Remains in the British Museum" is 6s., and the "Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society," 4s. In answer to his second question, I would recommend him first to procure a work on the geology of a certain district, which, having studied, let him, with hammer in hand, go and examine for himself.—TERRA.

89. The evidences of Christianity may be classed thus: (1) External, or historical; (2) Intermediate, or moral; (3) Internal.

(1.) The external evidence is: I. Direct, as the miracles of Christ and his apostles; II. Retrospective, in the connection of Christianity with the miracles and prophecies of the Old Testament; III. Prospective, in the first triumphs of the Gospel, its historical influence on mankind, and the completion of prophecy since the days of Christ.

(2.) The intermediate consists in

I. The moral precepts of the New Testament; II. In the character and example of Christ; III. In the features of truth, love, and wisdom in the apostles and first Christians.

(3.) The internal consists of: I. Experimental, in the harmony of the gospel with man's requirements; II. Social, in the practical institutions of the christian church; III. The biblical, in the wisdom and harmony of all revealed truth; IV. The spiritual, which views the gospel as a revelation of the name, the attributes, and counsels of God.

I. The direct is divided into, 1. The possibility and probability of miracles (Paley's "Evidences," Introduction; Chalmers, at beginning of his "Treatise on Christian Evidences," Leland, Ellis, Franke, "State of the Heathen at Present Day";) 2. Testimony to the miracles of the gospel, apart from the Scriptures themselves (Paley's "Evidences," ch. 2, and Sheppard's "Evidences"); 3. Authenticity and credibility of New Testament. Paley's "Evidences," ch. 9; Lardner's "Credibility of Gospel History;" Horne's "Introduction," vol. 1; Cosin, Simon, Jones, Alex "On the Canons of the New Testament," and "Michaelis's "Introduction," contain external proofs. Paley's "Horæ Paulinæ," Blunt "On the Veracity of the Gospels," give the internal; 4. The application of these facts to prove the truth of the christian miracles: 1st, The resurrection (Sherlock's "Trial of the Witnesses," Townson's "Evangelical History," Greswell's "Forty-third Dissertation on Gospel Harmony," West "On the Resurrection," and Paley's "Evidences," part 2, ch. 8, 2nd. Christ's miracles, Campbell, Douglas, Farmer, and Sheppard; 3rd. Apostolic miracles, admissions of heathen writers, Paley's "Horæ Paulinæ"; 4th. Conversion of St. Paul, Lyttleton; 5th. Mutual harmony and dependence of the miracles; 6th. Their divine character; 7th. The transition from the truth of the mir-

to the truth of the doctrine which they attest, Farmer, Le Bas, Penrose, 1st vol. of Chalmers's "Treatise," Gregory's "Letters," Burton's "Hulsean Lectures," 1820, Chalmers, Butler's "Analogy."

II. Retrospective: 1st. Connection of Gospel with Old Testament, Stillingfleet's "Origines Sacre," Marsh "On Books of Moses," Schmidt's "Old Testament Canon," Jahn's "Introduction," Faber's "Hornæ Mosaicæ," Hengstenberg "On Pentateuch"; 2nd. Proofs of Mosaic Revelation, Leslie's "Short and Easy Method with Deists," Horne's "Introduction," ch. 1, § 1, 1—3; § 2, 1; ch. 4, § 2, 7; 3rd. The truth of the Gospel is thus confirmed by analogy, as being a continuation of the same course of Providence; 4th. It is confirmed by predictions fulfilled in gospel history, "Dialogue" of Justin Martyr, "Demonstratio Evangelica" of Eusebius, Kidder's "Demonstration," and Scott's "Answer to Croel"; 5th. Evidences of Jewish dispensation being only introductory.

III. Prospective evidence consists of: 1st. Arguments from its progress, Paley's "Evidences," part 2, ch. 9, Milner's "Reply to Gibbon," Macilvaine's "Christian Evidences," White's "Bampton Lectures"; 2nd. Fulfilment of prophecy, Keith, Newton, Greswell on Parables, "State of Jews and Judæa," Josephus; 3rd. Prophecies of the spread of the church, and her degeneracy in later times; 4th. Power of the Bible upon society.

(2.) The intermediate are touched upon in Paley's "Evidences."

(3.) The internal is best illustrated by christian evidence.

The best way of studying the evidences is to take them thus in detail.

I should, as many of the above authors as I could get, referring each to its proper place in the chain of evidence.

Butler's "Analogy," and Pearson "On Infidelity," 1s. 6d., will enable you to answer any infidel.—T. T. B.

91. T. S. is informed that he may obtain a good copy of Dante with Flaxman's illustrations. The price is about 4s.—R. A. M'L.

99. I am inclined to think that no set of signs is at once so generally requisite, so simple, or so good as those which for the last twelve years I have been in the constant habit of employing, viz.:—

A comma (,), = mediocrity, correctness, truth.

A semicolon (;), = good, excellent.

A colon (:), = better, more excellent, brilliant.

A period (.), = best, most brilliant.

An exclamation (!), = superb, grand, exquisite.

An interrogation (?), = questionable, doubt.

A dash (—), = inconclusive, fallacious.

A dagger (†), = ironic, incorrect.

A double dagger (‡), = ironic, worse.

A triple dagger (‡‡), = most ironic, worst.

A crotchet ([]), = strained to make a point.

Inverted commas (" "), plagiarism, or matter seen before.

Addition (+), = more than truth (or the premises) warrants.

Multiplication (×), = very conclusive.

Division (÷), = sophistic, not to be relied on.

Asterisk (*), = remarkable, worthy of notice.—RESPONDER.

EDUCATION.—We are taught to clothe our minds, as we do our bodies, after the fashion in vogue; and it is accounted fantastical, or something worse, not to do so.—Locke.

The Societies' Section.

LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS.

Edinburgh Young Mens' Association.—The annual soirée in connection with this association was held on the evening of the 30th September last, in the side room, Queen-street Hall, which was patronized by a very numerous company; Mr. Livingston, the president, in the chair. After a few introductory remarks by the chairman, the report of the proceedings of the association during the past year was read by the secretary, which exhibited the society to be in a flourishing condition, intellectually and numerically. In addition to miscellaneous essays and debates, the system adopted by the association for a few years past, and which has been found to be very beneficial, has been continued, viz., that of having a course of essays on particular subjects. During the past year two such courses have been concluded, one consisting of essays on "Distinguished Britons of the Present Century," embracing the biographies of Sir Robert Peel, Hugh Miller, Sir Walter Scott, Dr. Chalmers, &c.; and the other being a "Physiological Series," both of which have proved very successful. The report also gave a very gratifying account of the hearty co-operation of the members in the work of the association, and the zeal with which the various objects contemplated was prosecuted. During the evening addresses were delivered by Messrs. Usher and Hutton; and the performance of a musical party, together with recitations and songs from several of the members, caused the evening to be spent in a most delightful manner. After votes of thanks to the ladies, chairman, &c., the meeting separated, highly gratified with the proceedings, and the very promising appearance of the association.—WM. WARDEN, *Secretary*.

Literary Union of the Paisley Ar-

tisans' Institution.—The opening soirée of the ensuing session of this union was held in the lecture hall of the institution on Friday evening, the 17th October. Mr. James Martin, the president, occupied the chair. The refreshments on the occasion were most creditably served by Mr. McKinlay. Addresses on various literary subjects were delivered by the president and Messrs. R. Bruce, J. Clark, W. Peattie, J. Lindsay, A. Wilson, T. McRobert, and others, and were varied with glees, &c., which had a good effect, and made the evening pass pleasantly. Since the formation of the institution several societies of a similar nature have been started in the town, but none of them, we are sorry to say, survived above two or three sessions. This union is just entering upon its sixth session with renewed vigour, and is in a most favourable and promising condition. The following are the office-bearers for the ensuing session, viz., Mr. J. Martin, president; Mr. J. Clark, vice-president; Mr. J. Johnston, treasurer; Mr. R. Russell, secretary.

Glasgow Mechanics' Institution Mutual Improvement Association.—The second annual soirée of this association was held on Thursday evening, October 2nd, in the Franklyn Hotel, George-square. Mr. Holmes, vice-president of the institution, occupied the chair. After tea the chairman made a few remarks; the secretary, Mr. Dawson, then read the yearly report, from which it appeared that the society is in a flourishing condition. Addresses, &c., followed, and the meeting separated, well pleased with the night's proceedings. This society is open to all members of the institution, and meets every Saturday night at seven p.m., in one of the class-rooms.—WM. MCKINLAY.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Sir E. Bulwer Lytton has been elected as Lord Rector of Glasgow University. Lord Stanley was put forward by injudicious friends, whose acts, however well meant, met with a strong disclaimer in a letter to Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, and of course published in the *Times*, that great medium of intercommunion with the whole civilized world.

We are sorry to have to record the sudden death of Mr. Bogue, the publisher, successor to Mr. Tilt, a man well known and as well respected.

A Rise in Price.—It is said that the original copy of "Hamlet," recently bought by the Messrs. Boone for £70, and sold by them to Mr. Halliwell for £120, cost its original possessor 1s.; and he gave 4d. for it. Its previous history cannot be traced.

The Hume Fund has reached £1,300. What is to be done with it?

Dr. Mackay will enliven and cheer dreary winter with a new volume of poems, entitled, "Under Green Leaves."

"Pope's Poetical Works," by George Gilfillan. We can recommend the typography, the paper, the printing; in these respects, all that is done is well done. We wish we could say as much for the editor as the publisher. These volumes are published in a cheap series. We have spoken of them before. It is a most praiseworthy attempt to popularize the works of British Poets; and as to the editorship, from the nature and number of the rev. editor's productions, we are tempted to think that he is "a prophet in his own country."

NEW BOOKS.

Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*, illustrated, 7s. 6d.; Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, 7s. 6d.; *Few Hours with Scott*, 1s. 6d.; Goodrich's *Paris and Parisians*, 2s.; Grinfield's *Christian Kosmos*, 4s. 6d.; Latham's *Logic in its Application to Language*, 6s.; Marryatt's *Mission, or Scenes in Africa*, 5s.; *Naples, Political, Social, and*

Religious, 21s.; *Walter's Lectures on St. Paul*; *Wilson's Five Gateways of Knowledge*, 2s. 6d.; *Bennett's Queen Eleanor's Vengeance, and other Poems*, 3s. 6d.; *Pictures from the Pyrenees*, 3s. 6d.; *The Girlhood of Catharine De Medici*; *Robertson's Charles V., with Additions by Prescott*, 21s.; *Bonser's Visitor's Book of Texts*, 3s. 6d.; *Brown's Parting Counsels*, 8s.; *Cummings' Saving Truths*, 2s. 6d.; *Cat and Dog*, 2s. 6d.; *Edwards' Italy as I saw it*, 3s. 6d.; *Kitto's Memoirs, by Ryland*, 10s. 6d.; *Rev. J. Marshall's Memoirs, by his Son*, 5s.; *Bible Mountains, by Macfarlane*, 3s. 6d.; *Success in Business*, 1s. 6d.; *Etchings and Pearls, by Westbrook*, 2s. 6d.; *Pope's Poetical Works*, 2 vols., by Gilfillan; *Boy's own Mag.*, vol. II., 2s. 6d.; *Friends of Christ, by Adams*, 3s. 6d.; *Gore's Life's Lessons*, 31s. 6d. *Library of Christian Biography*:—*John Wesley*, 2s. 6d. *Longfellow's Evangeline, illustrated by Gilbert*, 7s. 6d.; *Page's Decorator*, 6s. *Parlour Library*:—*Rowcroft's George Mayford*, 1s. 6d. *Rail. Lib.*:—*Marryat's Dog Fiend*, 1s. 6d. *Bohn's Illustrated Library*:—*Marryat's Masterman Ready*, 5s. *Todd's Sermon on Mount*, 5s.; *Newman's Office and Work of Universities*, 6s.; *Meteyard's Golden Hours*, 6s.; *Peter Parley's Our Oriental Kingdom*, 4s. 6d.; *Cross's Landed Property*, 3s. 6d.; *Sister Kate*, 6s. 6d.; *Alford's Sermons (Quebec Chapel)*, 7s. 6d.; *Voices of Many Waters, by Aveling*, 6s.; *Aguilar's Vale of Cedars*, 6s.; *Edward's Book-Keeping by Single Entry*, 4s.; *Marvels, or Facts in Fairy Form*, 1s. 6d.

Annals for 1857.—*Punch's Pocket Book*, 2s. 6d.; *Peter Parley*, 5s.; *Christmas Tree*, 2s. 6d.; *Banking Almanack*, 5s.; *Court Album*, 21s.; *D'Albert's Album*, 21s.; *The Keepsake*, 21s.; *Medical Memorandum Book (De la Rue)*, 4s. 6d.; *Floral Souvenir*, 21s.; *Weale's Engineers' and Contractors' Pocket Book*, 6s.; *Weale's Builders' Pocket Book*, 6s.

INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY..	1, 97, 241	THE INQUIRER:—	
AIDS TO SELF-CULTURE:—		Questions.....	41, 92, 140, 187, 237, 278
Logic of Study	49, 145, 193	Answers:—	
SELF-EDUCATOR:—		Primary Incandescence of the Earth	42
Lessons in French..	36, 86, 133, 180, 274	Best Family Medicine	43
——— Mathematics	90, 138, 184, 233	Best Account of Russian War.....	43
RELIGION:—		Custom House, Studies for Examination	43, 189
Does Geology Confirm the Mosaic Account of the Creation?		Articling to a Surgeon	43
Affirmative Articles	61, 150, 199	The Sonnet	43
Negative Articles	54, 105, 203	Bailey's "Festus"	44
PHILOSOPHY:—		Photographic Apparatus	44
Is Man the Creature of Circumstances?		Commonplace Books.....	44
Affirmative Article	8	Transparency of Glass—Reason of	44, 188
HISTORY:—		Calvin's Doctrines	92
Is Macaulay's Estimate of William of Orange Correct?		Origin of Civilization.....	93
Affirmative Articles.....	112, 218	The Three Estates.....	141
Negative Articles	156, 250	Best Work on Mormonism	141
POLITICS:—		Leathers for Binding.....	141
Would Parliament be Justified in Sanctioning the Opening of the Crystal Palace on Sundays?		The Organ, &c.	141
Affirmative Reply	125	Best Commentary on the Bible	141
Negative Reply	120	Short Hand.....	142
Is Education the Duty of the State?		Religious Denominations.....	142
Affirmative Articles....	23, 66, 160, 257	Foreign Booksellers	142
Negative Articles	17, 72, 166, 218	Learned Societies	237
SOCIAL ECONOMY:—		Blackie's Imperial Dictionary.....	237
Is the Spendthrift more Injurious to Society than the Miser?		Beard's Lessons in English.....	237
Affirmative Articles	77, 225, 267	Latin Grammar	237
Negative Articles	32, 81, 130, 176, 229	Scansion of Latin Verse	237
		Latin Prosody.....	237
		How to ascertain the Circumference of a Circle.....	237
		Europe in Middle Ages.....	238
		SOCIETIES' SECTION:—	
		REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES:—	
		Belfast	45
		Swansea	45, 190
		Leicester	45
		Edinburgh	45
		Thornebank.....	45
		Burlington Club.....	94
		Newington Working Men's	—

INDEX.

	PAGE		PAGE
SOCIETIES' SECTION:—(Continued)		SOCIETIES' SECTION:—(Continued)	
St. Paul's, Preston.....	95	Whitby Church of England.....	239
Discussion Class, Nottingham	142	Edinburgh Young Men's	281
St. James's Junior, Hull	142	Paisley Artisan's	281
Northern Counties (Proposed)	143	Glasgow Mechanics'	281
Wednesbury	143		
Aberdeen Speculative	189	LITERARY NOTICES	46, 95,
Glasgow Polytechnic	190		144, 191, 240, 282
St. Bartholomew's.....	190	New Books	47, 96, 144, 192, 240, 282
Blackstone Debating.....	191		
Buckingham	191	MISCELLANEOUS:—	
Cambridge Youths'	238	New Independent Chapel, Islington	143
George-street Chapel (Hull)	238		
Law Students' Corresponding	239	LACONICS ..	16, 31, 35, 44, 53, 65, 85,
Glasgow Association of Natural			91, 104, 111, 129, 132, 149, 159, 175,
Science.....	239		186, 208, 217, 249, 263, 273, 280.

CONTRIBUTORS' SIGNATURES.

VOL. I.		VOL. II.	
Clement	7	N. (Coleford)	8, 229
V. V. (Vincat Veritas)	16	L'Ouvrier	17, 218
Threlkeld	21, 123	Taliesin	23, 54, 176, 203, 257
Vinculum.....	29	J. R.	32
La Pensee	55	Threlkeld	61, 120, 130, 199
L'Ouvrier	57	T. U.	66, 267
W.	63	J. E. B.....	72
T. W. R	70	E. S. J.....	77
N. (Coleford)	104	Cid	81
Alpha	111	Grimwood	105
B. J.	117, 145, 162	A. L.	107
Wishwell	130, 213	B. S.	112, 209
Persona	155	Wishwell	125
Taliesin	170	Von Hammer	150
E. S. J.....	199	B. J. (London).....	156, 250
Saxon	208	Philaethes	160
S. R. A.	247	E. M., jun.	167
J. E. P.....	253	J. E. P.....	232
Honestas	261		
T. U.....	266		

